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Abstract 
 
In 2017, Justin Trudeau become the first Prime Minister to be found in violation of 
Canada’s parliamentary ethics laws. This incident alone demonstrated the need for a 
comprehensive study of the Canadian parliamentary ethics regime. The Conflict of Interest 
and Ethics Commissioner (COIEC) who administers this regime is broadly recognized as 
belonging in a category of parliamentary institutions called agents of parliament. The COIEC 
is the only one of nine such agents who denies that it should be categorized as an agent. 
Instead, the COIEC argues it is an Officer of the House of Commons – a category that is 
heretofore unrecognized. Given the heightened interest in public sector ethics that has 
emerged, this dissertation analyzes what this Canadian institution is, how it works, where it 
belongs, what its limitations are and why. 
 
This is a unique institution whose design sets it apart from the recognized agents of 
parliament. The COIEC is responsible for two mandates: one (the Act) is legislative and the 
other (the Code) is a non-legislative mandate. Work under the Code is explicitly protected 
by parliamentary privilege, which shields it from judicial scrutiny. This allows the COIEC 
to exercise a level of independence from government and Parliament that is otherwise 
unprecedented among agents. I argue that the COIEC cannot be properly characterized as 
either an agent or an officer of either Parliament or the House of Commons as a result, and 
that this institutional design has allowed the COIEC to intentionally blend the administration 
of the two regimes. 
 
 iii 
This blending of regimes has contributed to a strong assertion of operational 
independence that has been exacerbated by Parliament’s reluctance to engage with the Office 
in good faith in relation to the many recommendations its commissioners have made towards 
the improvement of both the Act and Code. I explain the implications this has for the 
COIEC’s constitutional legitimacy and offer recommendations for how the mandates might 
be reformed and more thoughtfully delegated by Parliament.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv 
Acknowledgments 
 
What a journey this has been. 
 
First, I must thank my wife Aimy and our three amazing daughters, Lia, Ivy and Ainsley. 
They have graciously tolerated me over these last 4+ years, even when I have been 
intolerable. I owe them more than I can ever repay. The absolute best part of graduate school 
has been getting to spend more time at home with my girls. 
 
I also owe incredible gratitude to my wife’s parents, Hoa and Minh. Returning to graduate 
school would not have been possible without the sacrifices they have made for us. I hope 
one day that I will be able to earn the same love and respect from my children and their 
partners as my in-laws have earned from me. 
 
Ontario’s Integrity Commissioner Lynn Morrison (then my boss) introduced me to Professor 
Ian Greene back in 2013, when I first told her that I wanted to pursue a graduate degree in 
law. We met for the first time at a Second Cup near Yonge and Bloor and Professor Greene 
encouraged me to apply to both the University of Toronto (where I later obtained my LLM) 
and Osgoode Hall Law School. Although he was already officially retired when I received 
my acceptance to Osgoode (while nearing completion of my LLM), Professor Greene still 
agreed to co-supervise my PhD with Professor Liora Salter. I could not have been luckier.  
Professor Greene is the foremost scholar in political ethics and has treated me like a son. A 
better mentor does not exist. Professor Salter was also amazing because she pushed me. She 
accepted no excuses and helped me to realize very early on what I was capable of. Both 
 v 
supervisors helped me to keep everything in perspective – which I have learned is no small 
feat during graduate studies.  
 
When Professor Salter retired, I was very fortunate to have then Dean, now Justice Lorne 
Sossin step in as my supervisor (Professor Greene stayed on as a member of my committee). 
Nobody wants to let the Dean down, so I hung a picture of Justice Sossin on my wall at home 
(where I hoped my diploma might eventually go) in order to remind myself to get to work. 
It has been ever-humbling to look up at his picture on a daily basis.  Thank you, Justice 
Sossin, for the support and guidance that you have given me. 
 
Professor Trevor Farrow is the final member of my committee and has always been there for 
me when I needed to call upon him. Professor Farrow has even helped to steer me through 
some challenging situations and has done so in a way that left me more confident in my own 
thought processes and decision-making. Thank you.  
 
To Professor Naomi Couto, you have been an incredible mentor to me throughout this 
journey. I have gained so much from your friendship and support. You have continued to 
encourage me and have helped me keep my head up by reminding me of my value. I’m so 
grateful to have met you when I joined the YCPE early in my PhD and to have also had you 
there with me at the end of this amazing journey.   
 
A huge thank you must also be extended to University of Ottawa Law School Professor and 
Dean Adam Dodek for agreeing to take on the role of external examiner for my oral defense. 
 vi 
I could not have imagined a committee with more impressive credentials when it comes to 
public sector ethics and accountability. Your kindness of spirit and generosity of intellect 
are truly appreciated and I know that I will benefit a great deal from your insights as I move 
this project forward. 
 
I have also benefited a great deal from having a network of amazing people who have kept 
me going. First, Dr. Aviv Gaon. What a different and much less interesting journey this 
would have been without you. You challenged me to see past the fog and you helped me to 
stay focused on what truly mattered to me. I am thankful to have made such a great new 
friend during my time at Osgoode.  
 
Professor Giuseppina D’Agostino and Michelle Li. Working with you two (and Aviv) on the 
conferences that we organized at IP Osgoode has been a great experience for me. Thank you 
for those opportunities and for the constant and ongoing support you have both given me. A 
further thank you to Professor D’Agostino for the many opportunities you have given me 
over these past few years, including the opportunity to contribute to York University’s 
Artificial Intelligence and Society Task Force and for being the chair of my oral examination 
committee.  
 
To Dr. Ron Laxer at SickKids: I am here because of you and Lia and I will never forget that. 
No matter where life takes me, you will always be with me. 
 
 vii 
Professor Ron Pearlman, who came into my life simply because I agreed to do some 
volunteer work at the York Collegium for Practical Ethics. You have been a true mentor. 
You have allowed me to grow in ways that I never thought I would during my years at York 
University and you have opened doors for me that I never dreamed could open for me. I 
thank you from the bottom of my being for your friendship and mentorship. (Who gets to 
spend a week in a Biology lab using CRISPR on ciliates to make them antibiotic resistant 
during their PhD in Law?!). 
 
Thank you also to Professor Richard Haigh for your ongoing friendship and for allowing me 
to tag along with you and the York Centre for Public Policy and Law. You have generously  
funded/co-sponsored quite a few of my ideas over the last four years, yet you still have not 
asked me to be on your podcast, “What’s Law Got to Do with It?”. Tsk.  
 
I also owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to Professor Mike Brudno and the team at 
SickKids, including Dr. Ron Cohn, Professor Anna Goldenberg, Dr. Rulan Parekh, Dr. 
Elizabeth Stephenson and Amanda Silva. You have all given me the opportunity to put 
myself on a path towards a career that is deeply meaningful and fulfilling. Your support has 
allowed me to take risks and empowered me to engage in work that is both creative and 
forward-thinking. I look forward to what the future holds for paediatric health care and I am 
grateful to be along for the ride with such amazing and dedicated professionals. 
 
To Professor and York University AVP Research Rebecca Pillai-Riddell. You took a risk 
and brought a PhD student in law in on the ground floor of your amazing CHRP+AI research 
 viii 
journey. Your work in children’s pain is world class and so important for families like mine. 
I am excited to be able to learn from you and to grow as a researcher under your guidance. 
 
And finally, to Osgoode Hall Law School. Thank you for the financial support and the 
opportunities that you have given me to build and to grow.  I have received significant 
support from the graduate program, as well as from Anita Herrmann, Ashley Bell, Virginia 
Corner, Chantel Thompson, Nadia Azizi and Sujivany Rajaratnam . I can’t imagine a more 
supportive institution at which to purse a graduate degree and I will forever cherish my time 
here.   
 ix 
Table of Contents 
Abstract!...................................................................................................................................!ii!
Acknowledgments!................................................................................................................!iv!
Table of Contents!.................................................................................................................!ix!
List of Tables!.......................................................................................................................!xiii!
1.!Introduction!.....................................................................................................................!1!
2.!Accountability!in!Canada’s!Parliamentary!Government!....................................!14!
2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 14!
2.2 Constitutional Monarchy .............................................................................................. 14!
2.3 Responsible Government .............................................................................................. 23!
2.4 Parliamentary Oversight .............................................................................................. 26!
2.5 Agents of Parliament ..................................................................................................... 29!Who!are!the!Agents?!.........................................................................................................................................!35!(a)! Auditor!General!......................................................................................................................................!37!(b)!Chief!Electoral!Officer!..............................................................................................................................!39!(c)!Commissioner!of!Official!Languages!....................................................................................................!41!(d)!Privacy!Commissioner!.............................................................................................................................!43!(e)!Access!to!Information!Commissioner!.................................................................................................!45!(f)!Commissioner!of!Lobbying!......................................................................................................................!47!(g)!Public!Sector!Integrity!Commissioner!................................................................................................!49!(h)!Parliamentary!Budget!Officer!................................................................................................................!51!(i)!Conflict!of!Interest!and!Ethics!Commissioner!...................................................................................!53!
2.6 Linguistic and Conceptual Clarification ...................................................................... 53!
2.7 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 58!
3.!Agents!of!Parliament!(Literature!Review)!.............................................................!60!
3.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 60!
3.2 The Constitutional Foundation ..................................................................................... 60!(a)!The!Puzzle!of!Legitimacy!.........................................................................................................................!62!(b)!An!Erosion!of!Power?!................................................................................................................................!67!(c)!Agency!Drift!or!Mandate!Creep?!..........................................................................................................!70!
3.3 Creating a New Agent of Parliament ............................................................................ 72!(a)!Enabling!legislation!....................................................................................................................................!75!(b)!Recruitment,!Appointment,!Renewal!and!Term!.........................................................................!76!The!Search!...........................................................................................................................................................!79!What!is!the!Senate’s!role?!..............................................................................................................................!82!Length!of!Appointment!...................................................................................................................................!83!
3.4 Removal, Resignation and Dissolution of Office .......................................................... 86!
3.5 Budgets .......................................................................................................................... 89!
3.6 Accountability ............................................................................................................... 98!(a)!Why!is!Accountability!Important?!......................................................................................................!99!(b)!How!do!Agents!Account?......................................................................................................................!100!
3.7 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 105!
4. Independence in Action!...............................................................................................!106!
4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 106!
4.2 The Importance of Independence ............................................................................... 106!
4.3 Structural Independence ............................................................................................. 110!
 x 
(a)!Control!over!operations!and!finances!...........................................................................................!111!(b)!Control!over!staffing,!including!salaries!......................................................................................!114!(c)!Judicial!Review!and!Parliamentary!Privilege!.............................................................................!115!
4.4 Operational Responsibilities ....................................................................................... 118!(a)!Advisory!Functions..................................................................................................................................!120!(b)!Auditing!Functions!..................................................................................................................................!122!(c)!Investigatory!Functions!........................................................................................................................!123!(d)!Power!to!Compel!Testimony!..............................................................................................................!126!(e)!Enforcement!(Punishment!and!Deterrence)!..............................................................................!128!(f)!Outreach!and!Education!........................................................................................................................!130!(g)!Compellability!as!a!Witness!and!Protection!from!Libel!and!Slander!............................!131!(h)!Periodic!Mandate!Reviews!..................................................................................................................!133!
4.5 Relationships with External Stakeholders .................................................................. 135!
4.6 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 135!
5.!The!Evolution!of!Parliamentary!Ethics!in!Canada!............................................!137!
5.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 137!
5.2 History of the Office .................................................................................................... 137!(a)!Assistant!Deputy!Registrar!General!(1974)!...............................................................................!141!(b)!Office!of!the!Ethics!Counsellor!(1994)!..........................................................................................!145!(c)!Office!of!the!Ethics!Commissioner!(2004)!...................................................................................!148!(e)!Conflict!of!Interest!and!Ethics!Commissioner!(2006)!...........................................................!152!
5.3 Complementary Domestic Legal and Ethical Regimes .............................................. 162!(a)!Agents!and!Officers!of!Parliament!...................................................................................................!162!(b)!Political!Party!Codes!of!Conduct!......................................................................................................!163!(c)!Supplementary!Guidelines...................................................................................................................!165!(d)!Lawyers’!Professional!Codes!of!Conduct!.....................................................................................!166!(e)!House!and!Senate!Committees!..........................................................................................................!168!(f)!Public!Inquiries!..........................................................................................................................................!170!(g)!Criminal!Code!of!Canada!......................................................................................................................!172!(h)!Canada!Elections!Act!..............................................................................................................................!173!
5.4 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 173!
6.!The!Conflict!of!Interest!and!Ethics!Commissioner!............................................!175!
6.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 175!
6.2 Appointment and/or Renewal ..................................................................................... 175!
6.3 Removal or Resignation from Office .......................................................................... 183!
6.4 Budget, Staffing, Salaries and Financial Autonomy .................................................. 187!
6.5 What does the COIEC do?.......................................................................................... 192!(a)! Legislation!vs.!Rules!(Standing!Orders)!................................................................................!193!(b)!Advisory!Functions!.................................................................................................................................!194!(c)!Disclosure!Filings!.....................................................................................................................................!200!(d)!Investigatory!Functions!........................................................................................................................!203!(e)!Enforcement!(Punishment!and!Deterrence)!..............................................................................!207!(f)!Gifts!and!Benefits.......................................................................................................................................!212!(g)!Outreach!and!Education!.......................................................................................................................!213!(h)!Stakeholders!and!Influential!Relationships!...............................................................................!216!Non]Governmental!Organizations!............................................................................................................!218!Political!Parties!................................................................................................................................................!220!Media!and!Social!Media!................................................................................................................................!221!Academia!...........................................................................................................................................................!223!
 xi 
Other!Government!Actors!(internal)........................................................................................................!224!Other!Accountability!Actors!........................................................................................................................!225!International!Influences!...............................................................................................................................!229!
6.6 Accountability Relationships ...................................................................................... 231!(a)!The!Prime!Minister!..................................................................................................................................!232!(b)!To!the!House!of!Commons...................................................................................................................!233!Standing!Committees.....................................................................................................................................!233!(c)!To!the!Senate!..............................................................................................................................................!238!(d)!To!the!Speakers!.........................................................................................................................................!238!(e)!To!the!Federal!Court!of!Appeal!.........................................................................................................!238!(f)!To!the!Public!................................................................................................................................................!241!Table!1:!Commissioner!Renders!Account!To!........................................................................................!243!Table!2:!Holds!Commissioner!to!Account...............................................................................................!244!(g)!Other!...............................................................................................................................................................!245!
6.7 The Role of Parliamentary Privilege .......................................................................... 247!
6.8 Important Limits on Independence ............................................................................ 250!
6.9 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 253!
7.!Parliament!is!Resisting!Modernization!...............................................................!254!
7.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 254!
7.2 Commissioner’s Calls for Amendment and Related Responses ................................ 254!(a)!2013!Submission!re:!Act!.......................................................................................................................!256!(b)!2012!Submission!re:!Code!...................................................................................................................!258!(c)!2015!Submissions!re:!Code!.................................................................................................................!260!
7.3 The Public Weighs In .................................................................................................. 263!(a)!Academia!......................................................................................................................................................!264!(b)!Traditional!Media.....................................................................................................................................!266!(c)!Social!Media!.................................................................................................................................................!268!(d)!Civil!Society!and!International!Community!...............................................................................!270!
7.4 The Insulating Motivation of Self-Interest ................................................................. 272!
7.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 274!
8.!Countering!the!Resistance:!Asserting!Greater!Independence!and!ReQ
Framing!Accountability!................................................................................................!276!
8.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 276!
8.2 Frustrated by Inaction ................................................................................................ 276!
8.3 The Audacity to Innovate............................................................................................ 283!(a)!Advisory!Functions..................................................................................................................................!286!(b)!Investigatory!Functions!........................................................................................................................!288!(c)!Enforcement!(Punishment!and!Deterrence)!..............................................................................!291!(c)!Outreach!and!Education........................................................................................................................!294!(d)!Relationship!with!the!Media!..............................................................................................................!300!
8.4 Strategically Asserting Greater Independence ........................................................... 303!
8.5 Re-Framing Accountability in the Public’s Interest .................................................. 304!
8.6 Implications for Responsible Government ................................................................. 306!(a)!Watching!and!Controlling!....................................................................................................................!308!(b)!An!Erosion!of!Power?!.............................................................................................................................!310!(c)!Both!Drifting!and!Creeping!..................................................................................................................!312!
8.7 The Puzzle of Legitimacy ............................................................................................ 315!
8.8 Is Reform Necessary? .................................................................................................. 318!
8.9 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 323!
 xii 
9.!Conclusion!....................................................................................................................!325!
10.!Table!of!Authorities!................................................................................................!332!
Legislation ......................................................................................................................... 332!
Jurisprudence ................................................................................................................... 333!
Secondary Material: Monographs .................................................................................... 334!
Secondary Material: Articles (Journals and Collections) & Theses ................................ 335!
Secondary Material: News Media .................................................................................... 339!
Secondary Materials: COIEC Documents ....................................................................... 344!
Secondary Materials: Parliamentary and Government Resources (Federal) ................. 352!
Secondary Materials: Other ............................................................................................. 355!
 
  
 xiii 
List of Tables 
 
 
Table 1: Commissioner Renders Account To………………………………..………222 
 
Table 2: Holds Commissioner to Account ...………………………………..………..223 
 
 
 1 
1.#Introduction#
 
The regulation of political ethics has never been as heavily scrutinized as it is today.  
The ethical conduct of public officials has always been a matter of public interest, but we 
are now at a moment in our history where the consensus that has been reached on the 
meaning and scope of political ethics is under siege. There are many things that have 
brought about this development, including changes in what information governments share 
with the public, how they communicate, how the public consumes that information and, 
most importantly, the questionable behavior of individuals who have occupied the highest 
public offices in the United States and in Canada.  
 
On November 8, 2016, Donald J. Trump became the 45th President of the United 
States of America. Prior to occupying the political position that is widely regarded as being 
the most important one in the world, Donald J. Trump was a business person. His 98-page 
financial disclosure statements covering January 2016 through April 15, 2017, and released 
on June 16, 2017, disclosed that he was worth over $1 billion dollars.1 Prior disclosures also 
revealed that he has served as a director for over 500 limited liability corporations, although 
he resigned from many of those positions upon entering public office.2   
                                               
1 United States, Office of Government Ethics, Donald Trump annual Disclosure Form 
2017, (14 June 2017), 
online:<https://extapps2.oge.gov/201/Presiden.nsf/PAS+Index/12DAC79CC95F8490852
58142002703CA/$FILE/Trump,%20Donald%20J.%20%20final278.pdf>. 
2 Jill Disis, Drew Griffin, Curt Devine & Scott Bronstein, “Trump Organization 
documents say he has resigned from more than 400 businesses”, CNN Money Online (23 
January 2017), online: <https://money.cnn.com/2017/01/23/news/donald-trump-resigns-
business/index.html>; Donald Trump, Confirmation of Resignation from Business 
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As an individual with vast business assets, it was obvious before he won the 
Presidency that Mr. Trump would have to work hard to avoid conflicts of interest while in 
office.  The public dialogue was so attuned to this potential problem that a major source of 
controversy during the presidential campaign was the fact that Mr. Trump had not voluntarily 
released his tax returns to the public (a customary practice for Presidential candidates) so 
that the public and the press could get a good sense of the candidate’s potential conflicts of 
interest. The concern seemed to be that Mr. Trump’s business empire was so vast that it 
would in fact prohibit him from being able to serve purely in the public interest if he were to 
be elected President. If that were in fact the case, then an argument could be made that the 
public should have the right to know more about Mr. Trump’s assets before they decide 
whether to vote for him as a Presidential candidate. 
 
Even if they refuse to disclose their tax returns during their campaign for office, every 
sitting President is expected to place their conflict-generating assets in a blind trust upon 
taking office.3 This trust must be managed by an arm’s length, third party individual, with 
the public office holder being given no information and having no control over the trust 
assets while in office. Presumably on the advice of his lawyers, Donald J. Trump decided 
that he would instead put his assets into a revocable trust to be administered in part by his 
                                               
Entities (19 January 2017), online: 
<https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3404759/DJT-Resignation-Signature-Page-
With-Exhibit-a.pdf>. 
3 Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 5 USC app §102(f) (which states that assets can be 
placed in a blind trust to avoid conflicts and that one of the requirements of a blind trust 
is that there can be no conditions placed on the independent judgment of the trustee to 
dispose of any assets in the corpus of the trust). 
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eldest son, Donald Trump Junior.4 Many observers felt that this decision left something to 
be desired, but what made and makes President Trump’s business holdings so unique is that 
a number of them are real property assets that are branded with his last name. If you place a 
large office building into a blind trust and have no control or access to the asset, then 
presumably that asset could be sold without you ever knowing. This is not the case with an 
asset like an office building that has your last name on it however. It is much easier to keep 
track of that asset without having to do much digging.  
 
Since taking office, President Trump has openly used government transportation, as 
he must, to regularly visit and hold official meetings at properties held in his revocable trust. 
Each visit brings the media with it and often includes meetings with foreign dignitaries and 
their entourages. In fact, many lobbyists and foreign government officials have come to 
recognize that one way to curry favour with America’s 45th President is to frequent his real 
estate properties.5  It has also been uncovered that US Air Force air crews stopping at 
Prestwick Airport in Scotland for refuelling also stayed at President Trump’s expensive 
Turnberry Resort on several occasions while he has been in office.6  
 
                                               
4 Donald Trump, “Trump International Hotel Liquor License Filings With Trust Info” (27 
January 2017), online: <https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3442581-Trump-
International-Hotel-Liquor-License-Filings>. 
5 Jonathan O’Connell, David A Fahrenthold & Mike DeBonis, “T-Mobile executives 
seeking merger approval booked more than 52 nights at Trump’s D.C. hotel – more than 
previously known”, The Washington Post (6 February 2019), online: 
<https://wapo.st/2MRcyrp?tid=ss_tw&utm_term=.48ae2e3df92e>. 
6 Ryan Browne, “US AirForce review finds crews stayed at Trump hotel 6% of the time”, 
CNN.com (12 September 2019), online: 
<https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/12/politics/trump-organiation-hotel-air-
force/index.html>. 
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Seeing the President spend so much time at his self-branded properties while he also 
occupies the most important political position in the world makes it seem like there are few 
to no meaningful conflict of interest or anti-corruption laws that apply to prevent him from 
using his public office to further his own private interests. That this is possible in the United 
States of America, an arguably advanced democracy that is not ignorant to the problems that 
conflict of interest and public sector corruption can give rise to,7 means that perhaps the rest 
of the world ought to start paying attention to these issues within their own borders as well.  
 
In fact, Canada’s 23rd Prime Minister Justin Trudeau found himself in hot water on 
multiple occasions during his first term in office - although not because of his business 
holdings. Prime Minister Trudeau made mistakes with respect to how he handled a family 
vacation, 8  neglected to report sunglasses that he received as a gift 9  and attempted to 
influence his Attorney-General to interfere in a criminal case for political reasons.10 There 
                                               
7 See e.g. the infamous Watergate affair. 
8 Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, The Trudeau 
Report made under the Conflict of Interest Act and the Conflict of Interest Code for 
Members of the House of Commons (20 December 2017), online: <https://ciec-
ccie.parl.gc.ca/en/publications/Documents/InvestigationReports/The%20Trudeau%20Rep
ort.pdf> (Commissioner: Mary Dawson) [Trudeau Report]. 
9 Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, Public Notice of 
Administrative Monetary Penalty Issued Under the Authority of the Conflict of Interest 
Act, Re: The Right Honourable Justin Trudeau (June 2018), online: <http://prciec-
rpccie.parl.gc.ca/EN/PublicRegistries/Pages/Declaration.aspx?DeclarationID=728a6ef2-
3573-e811-99fe-000e1e07bde8>. 
10 Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, Trudeau II Report 
made under the Conflict of Interest Act (14 August 2019), online: <https://ciec-
ccie.parl.gc.ca/en/publications/Documents/InvestigationReports/Trudeau%20II%20Repor
t.pdf> (Commissioner: Mario Dion) [Trudeau II Report]. 
 
 5 
is no evidence to date that suggests Prime Minister Trudeau is outright corrupt.11 If anything, 
the evidence simply suggests that he can be careless about parliamentary ethics rules. 
Regardless, the best time to improve public sector ethics and anti-corruption laws is clearly 
when the people in power are honourable, so that a country can protect itself from the 
prospect of a dishonourable person intentionally taking advantage of their position as a 
public official by advancing their own personal interests. Wholesale improvements to 
Canada’s rules have rarely taken place however, unless a promise to do so was part of a 
candidate’s election campaign platform.12  
 
Given that Prime Minister Trudeau was the first Canadian Prime Minister to be found 
in violation of parliamentary ethics laws, this dissertation reflects the need and anticipates 
the appetite for a comprehensive study of Canada’s parliamentary conflict of interest and 
ethics regime. The official who administers this regime is broadly recognized in the literature 
as belonging in a category of parliamentary institutions called ‘agents of parliament’. Despite 
many of them having rather high public profiles, there have been no comprehensive studies 
of any of these agents to date. Interestingly, the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner 
(COIEC) is the only one in a group of nine such agents who vehemently denies that the 
commissioner’s office should be categorized as an agent of parliament. Instead, the two 
individuals who have served in the position have argued that the COIEC is an officer of the 
                                               
11 By corrupt here, I mean intentionally acting dishonestly by using his public office for 
personal gain. 
12 See e.g. “Accountability Act signed into law” CBC News (12 December 2016), online: 
< https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/accountability-act-signed-into-law-1.596815> (where 
it is noted that the Conservative government's recently passed Federal Accountability Act 
was a key campaign plank during Prime Minister Stephen Harper's election campaign). 
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House of Commons – a categorization which is heretofore unrecognized in the literature and 
has certainly not been studied. Given the heightened interest in public sector ethics that has 
emerged in recent years, it is worth exploring what this Canadian institution is, how it works, 
where it belongs, what its limitations are and why. 
!
In this dissertation I explain the political, structural and legal history of the 
governance of parliamentary ethics in Canada. I draw attention to the developments and 
tensions that have led us to the unique parliamentary ethics regime we now have in Canada 
and argue that the COIEC cannot be properly characterized as either an agent or an officer 
of either Parliament or the House of Commons. The COIEC is responsible for two mandates: 
one (the Conflict of Interest Act13) is legislative and the other (the Conflict of Interest Code 
for Members of the House of Commons14) is a mandate that exists by virtue of authority 
vested in the COIEC under the Standing Orders of the House of Commons. The COIEC 
itself is created under the Parliament of Canada Act,15 which specifically sets out that only 
the commissioner’s work under the Code is protected by parliamentary privilege, whereas 
certain aspects of the administration of the Act can, in contrast, be subject to judicial review. 
 
The COIEC is the only institution that has been generally categorized as an agent of 
parliament while also being given the explicit protection of parliamentary privilege that is 
typically reserved for officers of parliament. It is accordingly an example of a unique 
                                               
13 Conflict of Interest Act, SC 2006, c 9, s 2 [Act]. 
14 Canada, House of Commons, Standing Orders of the House of Commons, Appendix 1: 
Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of Commons (consolidated version at 
29 November 2018) [Code]. 
15 Parliament of Canada Act, RSC 1985, c P-1 [PC Act]. 
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institution whose design sets it apart from others and allows its commissioner16 to exercise 
a level of independence from government and Parliament that is otherwise unprecedented 
for agents. I argue not only that this institutional design is uncharacterizable under the current 
nomenclature that is available in the literature, but that this confusion has allowed the office’s 
commissioners significant flexibility with respect to  how they choose to operationalize the 
office’s mandates.  Specifically, the office’s commissioners have leveraged its unique 
institutional design by intentionally blending the administration of the two regimes it is 
responsible for (thus serving to shield some of its work under the Act from judicial scrutiny) 
and have begun to interpret their role through a philosophical lens that reflects a commitment 
to being directly accountable to the public as well as to Parliament. This evolving approach 
is noteworthy because the Act and Code have been specifically drafted to ensure that the 
commissioner acts as an advisor to and delegate of the PM and the House of Commons. 
While there is some expectation of transparency in its operations,17 relatively little emphasis 
is placed on public engagement or accountability to the public. This new approach to 
accountability has important implications for the COIEC’s effectiveness as a parliamentary 
body, particularly because it represents an attempt to inform and influence the office’s 
stakeholders through communication channels that were given very little emphasis in its 
formal mandates. 
 
                                               
16 Two individuals have served as the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner to 
date. I will occasionally refer to them as “the office’s commissioners” throughout this 
study. 
17 For example, the Commissioner is expected to make certain documents available to the 
public, including annual reports and investigation reports. This will be discussed further 
in chapter 6.   
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This strong assertion of its independence has been exacerbated, and perhaps inspired 
in part, by Parliament’s reluctance to fully engage with the office in good faith in relation to 
the many recommendations its two commissioners have made towards the improvement of 
both the Act and Code.  Understanding the history of the Act and Code will help us to gain 
insight into the reasons for this reluctance. Whereas the commissioners have made 
recommendations that have been primarily focused on their desire to drive strong ethical 
governance in the public sector, the political, structural and legal histories of parliamentary 
ethics in Canada seem to have had a chilling effect on Parliament’s willingness to take 
progressive action with respect to the Act and Code. 
 
As noted above, the office’s two commissioners have adopted philosophical 
approaches to their work that support their efforts to strongly assert the office’s 
independence. These decisions have important implications for the office’s constitutional 
legitimacy that have yet to be identified in the literature. I identify these implications and 
explain again how they are informed by the political, structural and legal histories of 
parliamentary ethics in Canada. My goal is to provide a thoughtful critique of the current 
regimes that contributes to the literature by drawing attention to ways in which the 
effectiveness of the office is being undercut and why.  I offer recommendations for how the 
COIEC’s mandates might  be reformed to reflect the fact that the public has come to expect 
that thoughtful and meaningful accountability from public institutions will involve placing 
greater emphasis on transparency in their operations. 
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In order to defend this argument, I begin in chapter 2 by briefly explaining Canada’s 
history as a parliamentary democracy that exists under the model of the United Kingdom’s 
Constitutional Monarchy. Necessary as a foundational starting point, this background helps 
us understand where the privileges and rights of Parliament originate from. The principle of 
responsible government is explained, and context is provided to make clear the difference 
between Parliament and government, the relationship between the two and, most 
importantly, the role that Parliament plays in overseeing government and holding it to 
account. As government has grown in its breadth and complexity, Parliament has creatively 
developed institutions to help it fulfil some of its oversight responsibilities. The emergence 
of these institutions is both historically and politically significant. The goal of this chapter is 
to explain the roles that those agents have come to occupy and situate them as being ad hoc 
oversight mechanisms that have been created to improve and strengthen Parliament’s ability 
to uphold the broad principle of responsible government. They have generally emerged in 
response to political pressure on governing parties to improve public sector governance. I 
also make an important distinction between agents of parliament and officers of parliament 
that serves to clarify the language I use throughout this study. 
 
Chapter three addresses the criticism made by some commentators that agents of 
parliament have no legitimate constitutional basis for their existence and quite simply 
represent an erosion of parliamentary power. This is an important discussion that I will return 
to later in order to better understand the implications of delegating a mandate to the COIEC 
that is properly one of the privileges and rights of Parliament, and also to understand the 
implications of how the COIEC’s accountability relationships are evolving. Despite the 
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questions surrounding their legitimacy however, agents of parliament have also been touted 
as important to parliamentary democracy because they are independent oversight bodies that 
play a role in enhancing public trust in government. The rest of this chapter therefore offers 
context from the literature about what is fundamentally necessary for the process of 
establishing an independent agent of parliament. I describe how mandates are set, the rules 
surrounding appointment and removal from office of an appointee, how budgets are 
determined and modified and how agents are held accountable. This provides a general 
comparative background within which we will be able to contextualize the emergence and 
evolution of Canada’s modern parliamentary ethics regime. 
 
Chapter four builds from the literature review and explains how agents of parliament 
generally operationalize their independence through their work. The purpose of this largely 
descriptive work is to again provide the comparative context that I appeal to in my chapter 
six analysis of the COIEC’s formal structure and operations. Having this background allows 
me to identify the ways in which the institutional design of the COIEC closely mirrors that 
of the other agents of parliament. Chapter six will build from these similarities in order to 
clearly demonstrate the structural and legal characteristics of the COIEC that make it unique.  
 
With the understanding that neither of the office’s two commissioners have 
characterized their role as being that of an agent of parliament, this dissertation next moves 
into a more detailed study of the office itself. Chapter five provides an historical overview 
of the law, politics and structure of parliamentary ethics rules in Canada that will help us 
understand why and how these regimes have evolved. The COIEC is Canada’s fourth 
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iteration of its parliamentary ethics oversight office, with the design of each successive 
iteration placing greater emphasis on structural and operational independence. I explain the 
political and legal tensions that have served to inspire the emergence of the COIEC in its 
current form and draw attention to the landscape of complementary ethical and legal regimes 
in which it is situated. Despite the primacy of the COIEC, it is only one of many regimes 
that have clear influence over public sector ethics. This is important because it helps us 
understand why parliamentarians may lack the political will to make progressive changes to 
the Act and Code. 
 
Chapter six offers a comprehensive analysis of the COIEC’s structure and ongoing 
operations. As the only parliamentary body in the class of agents that has been explicitly 
given the powerful protection of parliamentary privilege over some of its operations, it is 
crucial to understand how this rare delegation of independence is being operationalized. I 
look at what the office’s responsibilities are and how they are managed, who its stakeholders 
are, who its influential relationships are with and how the COIEC is held accountable. Most 
importantly however, this chapter explains that the COIEC is not in fact akin to an agent of 
parliament and that the parliamentary privilege bestowed upon it under the Parliament of 
Canada Act in relation to one part of its mandate (i.e. the Code) can be used by a 
commissioner (whether intentionally or not) to shield the office from scrutiny in relation to 
its work under the other half of its mandate (i.e. the Act).  
 
Chapter seven explains that despite being delegated one of its mandates by the House 
of Commons and the other by Parliament more broadly, the office’s two commissioners have 
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been unable to convince parliamentarians to work towards adequately modernizing those 
mandates. Having been asked to make recommendations on several occasions for how the 
regimes could be improved, the office’s commissioners have been left noticeably 
disappointed by the response to their recommendations. This disappointment has also been 
mirrored in the academic literature, in traditional and social media and by civil society 
organizations. Parliamentarians have yet to demonstrate a real commitment to improving the 
mandates that they have delegated to the COIEC. This reluctance could simply be due to 
their busy schedules, but I argue that the slow evolution of these two regimes is a function 
of the Prime Minister’s reluctance to lose control over the Act by opening it up to input from 
the Senate in order to pass amendments, and an interest in self-preservation for members of 
House of Commons that disincentivizes amending the Code absent political pressure to do 
so. 
 
In chapter eight I demonstrate that the obvious frustration experienced by the office’s 
two commissioners has compelled them to make decisions that demonstrate a resistance to 
Parliament’s indifference. Ethics commissioners are expected to be interested in strong 
ethical governance,  but the historical, political and structural limitations weighing on the 
Act and the Code serve to incentivize complacency from members of parliament.  Instead of 
simply being content with an out-dated status quo,  the office’s two commissioners have 
chosen to leverage the office’s unique status as the only ‘agent’ to be protected by 
parliamentary privilege in order to assert a level of operational independence that may help 
to drive progress for these regimes. This strong operational approach to emphasizing the 
COIEC’s independence has been complemented by (current) Commissioner Dion expressly 
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re-framing both the public and the media as among the office’s key stakeholders, while 
investing more resources into public outreach and education. This re-framing appears to be 
an attempt not only to get Parliament’s attention, but also to interpret the COIEC’s mandates  
as authorizing the commissioner to prioritize the public interest much more broadly than 
appears to have been intended by Parliament. Because the COIEC is similar to courts in 
terms of its expected independence, it is possible that the mandate drift is a natural response 
to the challenges that have arisen in its relationship with Parliament. Regardless, it is very 
much an intentional rather than an unconscious shift. I explain the implications of these 
changes for the legitimacy of the COIEC’s role within Canada’s parliamentary democracy 
and offer possibilities for reform. 
 
Chapter nine draws the dissertation together through a comprehensive summary of 
the important arguments I have made throughout.  
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2.#Accountability#in#Canada’s#Parliamentary#Government#
  
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I explore Canada’s history as a parliamentary democracy that exists 
under England’s Constitutional Monarchy. Having this early background allows us to 
understand where the privileges and rights of Parliament originate from and why the 
principle of responsible government is so important. I explain and contextualize the 
difference between Parliament and government, the relationship between the two and, most 
importantly, the role that Parliament plays in overseeing government and holding it to 
account. As government has grown in its breadth and complexity, Parliament has creatively 
developed institutions to help it fulfil some of its oversight responsibilities. An important 
goal of this chapter is to situate those agents of parliament as being ad hoc oversight 
mechanisms that have been created to improve and strengthen Parliament’s ability to uphold 
the broad principle of responsible government. Finally, I make an important distinction 
between ‘agents of parliament’ and ‘officers of parliament’ to clarify the language used 
throughout this dissertation. 
 
 
2.2 Constitutional Monarchy  
To begin to understand Canada’s parliamentary ethics laws it is important to first 
gain some familiarity with Canada’s constitutional structure. This will allow us to trace the 
emergence of these laws and to situate them within the proper historical, structural and legal 
contexts.  
 15 
The Parliament of the United Kingdom created and patriated Canada when it enacted 
the British North America Act in 1867.  The British North America Act became known as 
the Constitution Act, 1867. 18  The Constitution is “a comprehensive set of rules and 
principles” that provides “an exhaustive legal framework for our system of government.”19 
The written Constitution is based on the British constitutional model and outlines many of 
the rules and principles that dictate how Canada’s system of government operates, although 
some important usages, practices, customs and conventions remain unwritten.20 As a result 
of its historical and ongoing connection to the United Kingdom, Canada is considered to be 
a constitutional monarchy. The Queen or King of the U.K., as applicable, remain as Canada’s 
head of state, but the Constitution itself sets out that Canada’s system of political governance 
is democratic in nature and consists of more than simply a Monarch who governs.  There are 
three branches of government between which certain powers of governance are divided: the 
legislative, the executive and the judiciary.21 I will briefly describe these branches to provide 
background for the analysis that will follow. 
 
The first branch of the Canadian system of parliamentary democratic government is 
the legislative branch. This branch consists of the Queen (as represented by the Governor 
General), the Senate and the House of Commons, who all work together to make laws for 
                                               
18 Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, Appendix II, 
No 5 [Constitution Act 1867]. 
19 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217 at para 32 [Secession]. 
20 Peter Russell has argued, among others, that Canada should write down these customs, 
uses and conventions, as the UK and New Zealand have in their cabinet manuals. See 
Peter H Russell, “The Need for Agreement on Fundamental Conventions of 
Parliamentary Democracy” (2010) 27:1 NJCL 205 at 205. 
21 See Constitution Act 1867, supra note 18. 
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the country.  The House of Commons, also called the ‘lower house’, is composed of 
individuals who are voted for during elections by the Canadian citizenry and who therefore 
become responsible for representing particular, geographically defined, electoral districts.  
Members of Canada’s House of Commons are also called Members of Parliament (MPs) and 
there were 338 seats for these members in 2018.22 Seats in the House of Commons are 
expected to be distributed between the provinces and territories in roughly the same 
proportion as the population is distributed.  
 
The elections process has evolved over time so that there are now groups of 
candidates who have formed political parties, thus allowing them to espouse similar ideas 
and to act in concert with one another.  People who seek to become members of parliament 
typically associate themselves with political parties, of which Canada has five that are well-
recognized.23 The political parties each choose a person who will be their leader.  After an 
election has taken place, it is convention that the Governor General (who is the Queen’s 
delegate in Canada and who therefore acts on behalf of the Monarch) determines which party 
leader he or she believes is likely to receive the support and confidence of a majority of the 
                                               
22 The number of MPs corresponds to the number of electoral districts that exist within 
the country. Some electoral districts may be without representation at times, which 
accordingly means that some seats may be vacant on occasion. The number of seats has 
also changed over time.  
23 These are the Liberal Party, the Conservative or Progressive Conservative party, the 
New Democratic Party, the Bloc Québécois and the Green Party. Other parties also exist, 
but their members have never held seats in the House of Commons. That being said, 
some MPs have been kicked out of parties while still holding their seat in the House of 
Commons. In such cases, those members sit as independents. A person may be voted in 
as an independent as well, although that is quite rare in modern times. Being affiliated 
with a party is generally understood to be necessary in order to maximize influence in the 
legislative decision-making process. Political parties do not have formal status under the 
Constitution.!
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members of the House of Commons. That party leader is then given an opportunity to earn 
that support, typically by tabling and passing their first budget of the session. If they are 
successful at earning the confidence of the House, the Governor General will then appoint 
that party as the governing party.24  The title of Prime Minister does not appear in the 
Constitution Act, 1867, but is based on the conventions historically adopted by the 
Parliament of the United Kingdom. Usually the results of an election make it clear who the 
Prime Minister should be, but it is also possible that the parties whose members did not win 
the most seats can form a coalition, nominate a leader, pass a confidence vote and then ask 
the Governor General to appoint their chosen leader as the Prime Minister. The political 
party that the Prime Minister belongs to then forms government. 
 
The first job for the Prime Minister is to nominate a circle of close advisors to become 
ministers of the Crown. The members of this ‘Cabinet’ are all officially sworn in and 
appointed to their positions by the Governor General on the advice of the Prime Minister. 
Members of that same political party who are not sworn into Cabinet are called 
‘backbenchers’.25 The Constitution Act, 1867, ascribes executive power to the Queen, or, as 
the case is in Canada, her representative the Governor General. Although the Governor 
General is therefore technically responsible for governing Canada on behalf of the Monarch, 
the Constitution Act, 1867, further stipulates that the Governor General has access to a Privy 
Council, who can “aid and advise in the Government of Canada.”26 The Privy Council is 
                                               
24 Andrew Heard, Canadian Constitutional Conventions: The Marriage of Law and 
Politics (Toronto: Oxford University Press Canada, 1991) at 20 [Heard]. 
25 All members have seats in Parliament. Ministers sit near the front, and non-ministers 
sit behind them, nearer to the back. Hence the term ‘backbenchers’. 
26 Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 18. 
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actually a group of more than a hundred persons, including all current and former Cabinet 
ministers and certain other notable Canadians who are “…charged with the responsibility 
for advising the governor general as to the exercise of the powers of the Crown.”27 The Privy 
Council does not meet in actual practice however, and has no active role or function in 
governing Canada. Instead, the Cabinet that was appointed by the Governor General upon 
recommendation from the Prime Minister, is technically a committee of the Privy Council 
and exercises the powers of the Privy Council on a day to day basis.28  
 
Given the above, the Prime Minister and cabinet work together to effectively instruct 
the Governor General about matters of governance. For example, the summoning and 
dissolution of the Legislature and the drafting of a writ to start an election campaign.29 
Legally speaking, the Governor General has no obligation to accept the advice of the Prime 
Minister and cabinet. It is incredibly rare, however, to see a Governor General reject such 
advice, as constitutional convention has evolved to guard against this. 30  The Governor 
General can nonetheless respond to advice by offering advice, encouragement and/or 
warning in return. According to Andrew Heard, “[e]ither the Prime Minister personally, or 
                                               
27 Patrick J Monahan, Constitution Law, 3rd ed (Toronto, ON: Irwin Law Inc, 2006) at 62 
[Monahan]. 
28 Ibid at 64.  
29 There are many other interesting things I could note about the role of the Governor 
General, but they simply lie outside the focus of this dissertation.  See Heard, supra note 
24 at 16-47 (for a good discussion of the Governor General’s powers).  
30 The Governor General does have some reserve powers that permit him or her to 
exercise a measure of personal discretion over some matters, rather than having to strictly 
follow the advice of the Prime Minister. These powers can only be exercised in very 
exceptional circumstances (see e.g. Monahan, supra note 27 at 73 (for a discussion of the 
King-Byng Incident and the Governor General’s refusal to dissolve Parliament and call 
an election at Prime Minister Mackenzie King’s request)).  
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the Cabinet collectively, makes the decisions relevant to the exercise of almost all [sic] of 
the governors’ legal powers.”31 
 
The second branch of government is the executive branch. The executive is 
comprised of the Monarch, the Privy Council (which consists of the Prime Minister and the 
members of his or her Cabinet) and the departments of government.32 The executive branch 
of government works to create policies and procedures to put new laws into action. Those 
policies and procedures are administered by the departments that the members of the privy 
council manage in their roles as ministers of the Crown. Although members of the privy 
council are nearly always members of parliament, the roles and duties of the executive 
branch of government are separate from those of Parliament. The executive branch is 
responsible for governing according to the laws of the country, whereas the rest of Parliament 
is there to scrutinize those governance decisions and to hold the executive accountable for 
its actions.  
 
Returning to the legislative branch, the party or parties whose leader(s) are not chosen 
to govern take on the role of being the opposition. If we understand that the executive 
branch’s responsibility is to implement the laws of the country, then the opposition’s 
responsibility is to hold it to account33 for the way that it chooses to implement those laws. 
                                               
31 Heard, supra note 24 at 18. 
32 Canada, Library of Parliament, “Guide to the Canadian House of Commons (Ottawa: 
2016), online: <https://lop.parl.ca/About/Parliament/GuideToHoC/index-e.htm>. 
33 “Holding to account” is primarily done by opposition members asking questions of the 
government during question period so that its decisions must be explained in a public 
forum. The opposition must be well-informed in order to be able to ask important 
questions. As will be made clear throughout this dissertation, Agents of Parliament play 
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They do this by participating in question period, but also by playing an important role in the 
multi-partisan parliamentary committees that help to hold the executive to account. As 
Andrew Potter has explained, “[t]he essence of parliamentary democracy is the 
accountability of the government to an elected legislature.”34 The opposition fulfills this role 
primarily by asking questions of the Prime Minister and Cabinet during question period to 
seek justification for policy decisions. The opposition also debates and votes on bills35 when 
they are tabled in Parliament.  Technically, it is every MP’s job, including the government 
backbenchers, to represent the will of their constituents and to hold the government to 
account. In John Stuart Mill’s words, “…the proper office of a representative assembly is to 
watch and control government.”36 Practically speaking however, it is the opposition parties 
that do all the heavy lifting in the House of Commons. These relationships of accountability 
between the executive and legislative branches, as well as with the voting public, are 
foundational within Canada’s system of constitutional democratic government.     
                                               
an important role in ensuring that opposition members have sufficient information and 
analysis about government policies. A further discussion about accountability is taken up 
below in chapter 3.6. 
34 Andrew Potter, “Political Ethics and Responsible Government” in Denis Saint-Martin 
& Fred Thompson, eds, Research in Public Policy Analysis and Management, Volume 
14: Public Ethics and Governance: Standards and Practices in Comparative Perspective 
(UK: Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2006) 71 at 77 [Potter]. 
35 A ‘bill’ is the name given to a proposed law. How and by whom bills can be and are 
tabled is not important for the purposes of this dissertation. 
36 Paul G Thomas, “The Emerging World of Accountability an Ethics: Parliamentary 
Scrutiny and Redress of Grievances” (Luncheon Address to the Canadian Study of 
Parliament Conference delivered at Winnipeg, Manitoba, 9 December 2006) citing John 
Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (1861), online: <http://cspg-
gcep.ca/pdf/2006_Conference_Dr._Paul_Thomas_speech-e.pdf> [Luncheon speech]. 
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Once the lower house votes to pass a bill, the bill then proceeds to the Senate.37 The 
Senate is also called the ‘upper house’ of Parliament and there are 105 Senators. These 
individuals are not elected by the public but are instead appointed by the Governor General 
upon recommendations received from the Prime Minister. As explained in the Reference Re 
Senate Reform: 
The contrast between election for members of the House of Commons and 
executive appointment for Senators is not an accident of history. The framers of 
the Constitution Act, 1867 deliberately chose executive appointment of Senators 
in order to allow the Senate to play the specific role of a complementary 
legislative body of “sober second thought.”38 
 
The Senate’s primary responsibility is to study and debate bills that pass through the House 
and either send them back to the lower chamber with feedback for its consideration, or 
pass/approve them. If a bill passes through both chambers, it will then be given royal assent 
by the Governor General as a matter of convention.39 It is important to note here that until 
very recently every individual appointed to the Senate was affiliated with a political party. 
This does not mean that those individuals did not merit their appointment, but it does mean 
that the appointment process was not officially or explicitly driven by merit-based decision-
making. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau decided during his first term in office that he would 
                                               
37 The Senate can also initiate new bills. Also, majority governments will sometimes 
introduce a bill in the Senate first before it goes to the lower House for debate.  
38 Reference re Senate Reform, 2014 SCC 32 at para 56.  
39 See Canada, Library of Parliament, “Constitutional Conventions”, by Élise Hurtubise-
Loranger (11 July 2006), online: 
<https://lop.parl.ca/content/lop/TeachersInstitute/ConstitutionalConventions.pdf> (in 
which Hurtubise-Loranger explains that the Governor General cannot refuse to give 
Royal Assent to a bill that has passed through both houses, except if the Prime Minister 
advises that Assent should be withheld).  
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make Senate appointments explicitly merit-based instead and in 2019 the Independent 
Senators Group has more members than the Liberal or Conservative caucuses.40  
 
As noted above, holding the government to account is most commonly an 
undertaking that takes place in Parliament during question period. As will be addressed 
throughout this dissertation however, there are many other important and impactful ways 
that the executive branch is held to account. One of the most important ways is by the third 
branch of government: the judiciary. The Constitution Act provides for the establishment of 
a judiciary41 and convention dictates that it shall be professional and independent as it 
presides over the courts of law and the administration of justice. 42  The judiciary is 
independent of the executive and legislative branches of government and is responsible for, 
among other things, interpreting the laws that are passed by Parliament to determine whether 
actors (both public and/or private) are complying with those laws.  
 
Finally, Canada’s federalist system of government means that the power to govern 
in relation to particular subject matters is divided between the federal and 
provincial/territorial levels of government. Although the provinces and territories do not 
have upper houses of Parliament (i.e. a Senate), they do have agents and officers of 
parliament that are created under and otherwise subject to the same accountability structures 
as are agents and officers at the federal level. This is important to draw attention to because 
                                               
40 See Canada, Parliament of Canada, “Senate – Standings in the Senate” (accessed 16 
September 2019, online: <https://sencanada.ca/en/senators/#senate-standings-table>. 
41 Constitution Act 1867, supra note 18 at VII. 
42 Stephen Brooks, Canadian Democracy: An Introduction, 4th ed (Toronto: Oxford 
University Press, 2004) at 135. 
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it allows us to understand that the basic accountability structures that emerge from the 
Constitution Act in relation to Canada’s democratic system of parliamentary government 
exist at more than one level of government. The experiences of the provinces and territories 
will help to inform our analysis in later chapters. I will also return below to a discussion of 
the role of each of the branches of government in the context of the federal parliamentary 
ethics regime.   
 
2.3 Responsible Government 
 
Although the executive branch acts independently from the legislative and judicial 
branches, there must be a way to hold it continuously accountable for its actions. This 
fundamental requirement exists within our system of parliamentary democracy and is 
expressed as the principle of responsible government.  There are two requirements of 
responsible government: 1) that ministers be “…collectively responsible for the policies and 
conduct of the government and individually responsible for the policies and administration 
of their departments,”43 and 2) that Cabinet as a whole bear a collective responsibility for the 
actions of government.44 These requirements can be otherwise understood as the principles 
of individual (ministerial) and collective responsibility. Because formal constitutional theory 
makes Parliament the primary agency of accountability within the Canadian political 
                                               
43 Paul G Thomas, “The Lambert Report: Parliament and accountability” (1979) 22:4 Can 
Pub Admin 557 at 559 [Lambert]. 
44 Heard, supra note 24 at 50-51. 
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system,45 it is of course through Parliament that government must be held accountable and 
responsible to the public.46  
 
The principle of ministerial responsibility is operationalized through a recognition 
that: “first, questions concerning a department may be directed in the legislature to the 
minister; second, the minister carries a culpability for wrongful actions and will have to 
correct the wrong and/or depending on the circumstances, suffer the penalty of loss of 
office.”47 With respect to issues that may arise relating to the non-partisan public service, 
convention dictates that it is the minister who is to be held responsible. This guarantees the 
anonymity of civil servants in parliamentary debates. This emphasis on anonymity ensures 
that civil servants “have the freedom to offer advice to the minister without fear of public 
recrimination.”48  
 
The principle of collective responsibility, on the other hand, dictates that Cabinet is 
responsible to the monarch, to itself, and to elected parliamentarians. Crucial to this 
responsibility is that Cabinet must have both solidarity and confidentiality. Cabinet solidarity 
means that the members of Cabinet must be seen to publicly and unanimously support the 
policies that they, as Cabinet, have decided upon. They must present a united front to the 
electorate. Ministers who break this commitment to solidarity risk being removed from their 
                                               
45 Paul G Thomas, “The Past Present and Future of Officers of Parliament” (2003) 46:3 
Can Pub Admin 287 at 289 [PP&F]. 
46 Megan Michelle Furi, Officers of Parliament: A study in Government Adaptation (MA 
Thesis, University of Saskatchewan 2002), online: 
<https://harvest.usask.ca/handle/10388/etd-11062008-130840> at 3 [Furi MA]. 
47 Heard, supra note 24 at 52. 
48 Ibid at 59. 
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ministerial posts by the Prime Minister. Cabinet confidentiality is closely tied to solidarity 
and requires that Cabinet discussions and documents remain confidential. This protects 
Cabinet members who disagree on a position taken by Cabinet from being subject to 
criticism from the public, but also ensures that national/state secrets remain secret. 
 
These principles of responsibility are extremely important given the ways in which 
governments spend money. The Canadian system is “based on the acceptance of the 
principles of legislative supremacy and executive responsibility.” 49  All spending must 
originate with the Crown and then be voted on by Parliament.50 Government must ask for 
funds, and it must also disclose its use of resources.51 I will return below to a discussion 
about how government gets approval from Parliament to spend money, but it is important to 
note here that Parliament’s role in both spending decisions and accountability discussions 
serve as an important point of departure for any understanding of the Conflict of Interest and 
Ethics Commissioner.   
 
One of the most important ways in which accountability to Parliament is determined 
is through the confidence convention. This convention ensures that the prime minister and 
government remain in office only as long as they have the confidence of a majority of the 
                                               
49 Herbert Balls, “The watchdog of Parliament: the centenary of the legislative audit” 
(1978) 21:4 Can Pub Admin 564 at 587 [Balls]. 
50 Paul G Thomas, “Understanding and Debating the Role of Agents of Parliament” (A 
research paper prepared for the Public Policy Forum, 2017), online: 
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/328345770> at 8 [Thomas PPF].  
51 S L Sutherland, “The Office of the Auditor General of Canada: Government in Exile?” 
(2002) School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University, Working Paper 31 at 5. 
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MPs in the House of Commons.52  Confidence is determined based on the outcome of 
particular votes within Parliament, though not every government bill or motion is, or needs 
to be, considered a matter of confidence. 53  Andrew Heard writes that there are three 
categories of confidence votes: 
(1)!those that are designated as such in advance by the prime minister; 
(2)!those that would approve crucial government policy; and 
(3)!motions by the Opposition that are worded to express a clear lack of 
confidence.54 
 
If a government loses the confidence of Parliament, then it must either resign or advise the 
Governor General to call an election.55 This convention is a key accountability measure in 
Canada’s parliamentary democracy and can even be used to remove a government for 
matters related solely to its ethical conduct. The principle of responsible government 
provides a base upon which concerns about ethical conduct can find support. As Paul 
Thomas notes “[a] government that has confidence in its measures and actions should 
welcome parliamentary scrutiny, not resist it.”56  
 
2.4 Parliamentary Oversight  
 
Another way of saying that government is responsible to Parliament is to say that 
Parliament has a responsibility to watch and control the government. This was historically a 
somewhat manageable task, especially in Canada’s early years. As the federal bureaucracy 
                                               
52 Peter Aucoin, Mark D Jarvis & Lori Turnbull, Democratizing the Constitution: 
Reforming Responsible Government (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications 
Limited, 2011) at 42. 
53 Ibid at 87. 
54 Ibid at 87 (describing Heard, supra note 24 at 69-70). 
55 Heard, supra note 24 at 69. 
56 PP&F, supra note 45 at 311. 
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has grown however, and as government ministries, departments and agencies have 
multiplied, it has become increasingly difficult for Parliament to adequately carry out its 
watch and control duties. As noted above, there were merely 338 MPs in 2018. By contrast, 
there were over 200 agencies and departments57 and the federal public service employed 
273,571 individuals in 2018.58 The size of the government over which Parliament must keep 
its watchful eyes trained is quite remarkable. On top of this, it can be the case that the 
majority of MPs (as they were in 2018) are members of the governing party, which means 
that the bulk of the oversight and scrutiny of a huge government operation must come from 
fewer than half the sitting MPs.59 Interestingly, “[t]heory suggests that Parliament controls 
the executive, but in practice the reverse seems to be true.”60 In Paul Thomas’ opinion, 
because of the vast and shifting scope of modern governments, watching and controlling 
have become impossible tasks for Parliaments to perform comprehensively on their own.61 
 
Parliament has therefore been required to think creatively and to enlist the help of 
others to even begin to fulfil its duties.  This has meant leveraging the help of individuals 
and groups outside of Parliament, but also thinking creatively about how Parliament can 
                                               
57 Government of Canada, “Departments and Agencies” (2018), online: 
<https://www.canada.ca/en/government/dept.html>. 
58 Government of Canada, “Population of the federal public service” (2018), online: 
<https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/innovation/human-
resources-statistics/population-federal-public-service.html>. 
59 This is of course only the case if we do not consider government MPs as having to 
exercise oversight and scrutiny roles. 
60 PP&F, supra note 45 at 289. See also Donald V Smiley, The Federal Condition in 
Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Inc, 1987) at 87 (for a discussion of the ways 
that power is centred in the first ministers and their key advisors, both in and out of 
cabinet). 
61 Luncheon Speech, supra note 36 at 4. 
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meaningfully enhance its own oversight capabilities. Obvious examples of non-
parliamentary actors that play a role in holding government accountable are the media (both 
traditional and non-), civil society groups and members of the public who litigate or 
otherwise challenge government decision-making through courts and administrative 
tribunals. Academics, private sector organizations, and international interest groups also play 
a role in scrutinizing the operations of the Canadian government. I will provide a more robust 
analysis of the role of these different groups in chapters 5 and 7. 
 
To enhance their own capacity for oversight, parliamentarians have ensured that they 
have funding for office staff, including researchers and political advisors, and they have also 
created a variety of parliamentary standing committees. These committees are assigned 
specific mandates related to Parliament’s watching and controlling responsibilities and are 
comprised of elected members from each of the political parties. Examples of standing 
committees include: International Trade, Finance, Justice and Human Rights, Health, Public 
Accounts, and Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics. 62   To supplement these 
committees, parliamentarians have also created various standalone officers of parliament.63 
These officers have been delegated the power to perform certain aspects of Parliament’s 
oversight and regulatory functions at an arm’s length from government actors who are 
traditionally subject to parliamentary scrutiny.64 
                                               
62 Parliament of Canada, House of Commons, “List of Committees” (42nd Parl, 1st Sess), 
online: <https://www.ourcommons.ca/Committees/en/List#collapse-JUST>. 
63 The conceptual and linguistic confusion that exists in relation to officers and agents of 
parliament will be addressed below, in chapter 2.6. 
64 Jamie Baxter, “From Integrity Agency to Accountability Network: The Political 
Economy of Public Sector Oversight in Canada” (2015) 46:2 Ott Law Rev 231 at 236 
[Baxter]. 
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Megan Furi argues that officers of parliament have become a crucial aspect of 
responsible government. 65  These officers are effectively mechanisms to help make 
responsible government work when particular parliamentary oversight responsibilities have 
become unwieldy.  Interestingly, they have been created as a matter of convention within 
Canada’s model of parliamentary democracy and are not specifically mentioned in the 
written Constitution. Although they emerge in a rather ad hoc manner and as a result of 
political decision-making aimed at improving public sector governance, officers have 
unfortunately also not been the subject of sufficient academic study and scrutiny to date. It 
is worth noting that there has also been an evolution in the terminology used to describe 
officers of parliament. In fact, the word ‘officer’ is no longer used in the same way that it 
once was and there is a distinction that must be made between officers and agents of 
parliament. This linguistic and conceptual confusion will be further addressed in section 2.6, 
where I clarify that I will be using the expression “agents of parliament” throughout. 
 
2.5 Agents of Parliament 
 
According to a 2018 Public Policy Forum report, there are nine agents of parliament 
in Canada: the Auditor General, the Chief Electoral Officer, the Commissioner of Official 
Languages, the Information Commissioner, the Privacy Commissioner, the Conflict of 
Interest and Ethics Commissioner, the Commissioner of Lobbying, the Public Sector 
Integrity Commissioner, and the Parliamentary Budget Officer. Although the Parliamentary 
Budget Officer did not officially become an agent until 2017, the number of agents has 
                                               
65 Furi MA, supra note 46 at 64. 
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grabbed the attention of people like Paul Thomas. Thomas commented in 2003 that “things 
may not have gone as far in most provincial capitals, but I would recommend that you stay 
tuned because coming soon to a government near you will be an ever expanding watching 
and controlling apparatus.”66 In fact, the Public Policy Forum reports that the overall number 
of agents at the federal, provincial and territorial levels of government is 88.67 Agents have 
also been adopted by Parliaments all across the Westminster system, including UK and 
Australia. It is accordingly very clear that watching (i.e. surveillance) and controlling (i.e. 
regulation) have become significant growth industries within the public sector.68  
 
The watching and controlling responsibilities of Parliament have arguably become 
so unwieldy not only because the task is too large, but also because of there is a need “to 
respond to a public mood of cynicism, mistrust and disillusionment with the political 
process.”69 This progressive increase in the number of agents of parliament seems reasonable 
because, as Tolga Yalkin and Patrick Baud observe, “…even when parliamentarians have 
access to government information, it is often so complex and voluminous that it requires a 
specialist to interpret.”70 Furthermore, there is no guarantee that there will be MPs elected to 
Parliament who have sufficient subject matter expertise to allow them to understand and 
interpret complex information about government policies and programs. Even if they could 
                                               
66 Luncheon Speech, supra note 36 at 8. 
67 Public Policy Forum, Independent and Accountable: Modernizing the Role of Agents of 
Parliament and Legislatures (Ottawa: April 2018), online: 
<https://ppforum.ca/publications/independent-accountable/> at 3 (see chart on pages 31-
32) [PPF Report]. 
68 Luncheon Speech, supra note 36 at 8. 
69 Ibid at 1. 
70 Tolga R Yalkin & Patrick F Baud, “Ontario’s New Financial Accountability Officer: 
An Evaluation” (2014) 8 JPPL 529 at 529. 
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do so, “their analysis would be perceived as intrinsically partisan and, thus, serve less value 
in clarifying the public debate.”71 Agents help by being able to expose a lack of integrity and 
performance problems in government while also being able to offer advice about how to fix 
those problems.72 It has been argued that their ability to assist Parliament in these ways 
makes them integral parts of our accountability infrastructure.73 
 
The first agent in Canada was the Auditor General, which was established August 
1, 187874  by Alexander Mackenzie’s Liberal government in the wake of the Pacific 
Scandal.75 The offices of the Auditor and Deputy Minister of Finance had been combined 
at that time, but the auditor, John Langton, was being overburdened with work. This caused 
Mr. Langton to have to devote too much of his time to dealing with daily administrative 
problems that would arise. To provide the auditor with greater independence from the 
ministry and to free up more of his time, a new bill was introduced to separate the offices 
of Auditor and Deputy Minister of Finance by establishing the Audit Office as an agent of 
the Legislature.76  
 
                                               
71 Ibid at 530-531. 
72 Thomas PPF, supra note 50. 
73 Luncheon Speech, supra note 36 at 4. 
74 See e.g. Balls, supra note 49.  
75 Jeffrey Graham Bell, “Agents of Parliament: The Emergence of a New Branch and 
Constitutional Consequences for Canada” (2006) Institute on Governance, online: 
<https://iog.ca/docs/2005_December_alfhales.pdf> at 7 [Bell Emergence].  
76 Herbert R Balls, “John Langton and the Canadian Audit Office” (1940) 21:2 Can Hist 
Rev 150 at 174-5. 
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Offices of this nature continued to emerge progressively77 over time, until things 
changed in the wake of the 1995 Quebec sovereignty referendum. The Canadian 
government had established a fund in 1994 to help promote Canada by advertising the 
Canadian government at events anywhere in the country. 78  The management of this 
program worsened progressively between 1995-2002, with access to information requests 
revealing that money was being spent on projects for which little to no work was 
completed. The program was suspended in 2002, but it wasn’t until 2004 that Prime 
Minister Paul Martin established a commission of inquiry to investigate what had gone 
wrong. The details of the results of the investigation are not important for the purposes of 
this dissertation, but it is important to note that the Auditor General reported about the 
scandal in a 2003-2004 report. Justice Gomery then released his public inquiry report in 
2006.  
 
The sponsorship scandal cost the Liberals the election in 2006 and gave Stephen 
Harper and the Conservative party plenty of political ammunition.  One of the promises 
made by the Conservatives was that they would pass comprehensive accountability 
legislation to create three new officers of parliament and that they would make 
                                               
77 See Ann M Ann Chaplin, Officers of Parliament: Accountability, Virtue and the 
Constitution (LLM Thesis, University of Ottawa, 2009), online: 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.20381/ruor-12552> at 100 [Chaplin LLM] (The order of their first 
appointment is described by Ann Chaplin as: The Auditor General of Canada (1878), The 
Chief Electoral Officer (1920), The Commissioner of Official Languages (1970), The 
Information Commissioner (1982), The Privacy Commissioner (1982)). 
78 Ian Greene & Robert Shepherd, “Case Studies: Conflicts of Interest and Entitlement” 
in Ian Greene & David Shugarman, eds, Honest Politics Now: What Ethical Conduct 
Means in Canadian Public (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company Ltd, 2017) at 101 [HP 
Now]. 
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improvements to the officers that already existed. The theory behind the proposed Federal 
Accountability Act was that the way to “improve the capacity of Parliament to hold 
government to account was primarily to strengthen the capacities of parliamentary agents, 
the press, and the public.”79 I will return below to the specifics of the legislation that was 
later passed by the majority Conservative government. 
 
The creation of these offices in the wake of government scandals strongly suggests 
that their purpose is, at least in part, to help mitigate eroding public trust and confidence in 
government.80  The fact that the first office was a financial accountability office further 
reflects this idea that people want assurance the public’s resources have not been mis-
managed. 81  Significantly, everyone involved seems to want this assurance “from an 
individual who is not involved in the management or of those programs, but who is 
knowledgeable, independent, and objective.82  
 
Ann Chaplin argues that it is possible to discern four themes about why these offices 
are being created: probity, transparency, justice and integrity.83 She argues that the fact that 
parliamentarians have chosen to operationalize these themes in this particular way indicates 
that ordinary government institutions were insufficient to protect these values.84 A former 
                                               
79 Peter Aucoin, “Improving Government Accountability” (2006) 29:3 Can Parl Rev 20 at 
21 [Aucoin]. 
80 Thomas PPF, supra note 50 at 11. 
81 Ross A Denham, “The Canadian Auditors General – What is their role?” (1974) 17:2 
Can Pub Admin 259 at 260-261 [Denham].  
82 Ibid.  
83 Ann Chaplin, “The Constitutional Legitimacy of Officers of Parliament” (2011) 29:1 
NJCL 71 at 77 [Constitutional Legitimacy]. 
84 Ibid at 80. 
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Commissioner of Official Languages agreed with this assessment when he reflectively 
commented about his role in a speech to Statistics Canada executives that: “I think of us as 
guardians of values.”85 
 
Despite the growth, proliferation and considerable positive response to agents of 
parliament, some commentators have also expressed reservations about these offices. There 
are questions about whether the creation of these agents means that elected officials are 
effectively surrendering their responsibility to probe and dig into the workings of 
government by dumping it into the laps of agents.86 Ann Chaplin writes that the piecemeal 
nature of the development of these offices also raises some concerns:  
…officers of Parliament did not come about through an effort to identify the 
whole mandate of holding government to account and divide it up into eight 
pieces. The creation of each office responded to a perceived need, focused in a 
particular subject-area, which was assumed to require an officer with a particular 
set of functions and powers.87 
 
 They arise from increasing concerns over political legitimacy and seem to reflect the fact 
that there is a lower degree of confidence in the ability of elected legislatures to provide the 
political legitimacy and political accountability that is required for the exercise of 
governmental power.88 Although there are important differences between them in mandate, 
capacity, tools, governance, etc., some commentators have expressed doubt about the overall 
                                               
85 Graham Fraser, “Agents of Parliament and the Machinery of Government” (Notes for 
an address to Statistics Canada’s executive conference, delivered in Ottawa, 7 October  
2013), online: <https://www.clo-ocol.gc.ca/en/news/speeches/2013/2013-10-07> [Fraser 
Speech]. 
86 PPF Report, supra note 67 at 9. 
87 Constitutional Legitimacy, supra note 83 at 94. 
88 John D Whyte, “Constitutional Change and Constitutional Durability” (2011) 5 JPPL 
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potential for agents in general to make a real difference in the long run. Because there are 
many reasons for public mistrust, agencies like these can arguably only contribute a marginal 
amount to enhancing public trust.89 
 
Finally, it has also been argued that agents are given functions that can go well 
beyond simply providing support to parliamentarians.90 They have become so common that 
some believe they are beginning to play a role in government policy-making.91 This is an 
important topic to which we will return later. Now I will turn instead to taking a closer look 
at who these agents are and what roles they have come to occupy. 
 
Who are the Agents? 
Despite the historic shortage of in-depth and agent-specific studies, some academics 
have spent time trying to piece together a list of criteria that can be appealed to in order to 
determine if someone is in fact an agent of parliament.  Jeffrey Graham Bell has suggested 
the following criteria that I believe are instructive and will be reflected in the analysis I offer 
throughout this study: 
•! Is there reference in the enabling statute to a commission under the Great Seal 
affixed to the executive agent?  
•! Is it required to have the confidence of the chambers i.e. either the House or 
Senate or both to approve (or nominate and approve) the agency’s executive 
candidate?  
•! Does the executive candidate have a statutory guarantee of a term at least five 
years in length? 
                                               
89 Thomas PPF, supra note 50 at 11. 
90 Chaplin LLM, supra note 77 at 100. 
91 Gwyneth Bergman & Emmett Macfarlane, “The impact and role of officers of 
Parliament: Canada’s conflict of interest and ethics commissioner” (2018) 61:S1 Can Pub 
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•! Is Cabinet required to have a resolution of the House and/or the Senate to 
remove a sitting executive agent? 
•! Is a report submitted, at least annually, to Parliament via the Speakers of one 
or both Chambers?  
•! Are the agency’s estimates submitted to Parliament by the agency (via the 
Speaker) –or determined independently in some other fashion –rather than by 
a government department? 
•! Are staff, apart from officers named in the legislation, appointed by the 
agency’s executive agent rather than by the government? 
•! Is the executive agent’s salary fixed or pegged to a reference point in statute 
rather than being left to Cabinet discretion?92  
 
The list of officers who fit these technical indicia is continuing to grow, with the 
Parliamentary Budget Officer joining the group as recently as late 2017. This continuing 
growth has started to draw attention away from Parliament’s work in holding government to 
account on big issues, with many observers expecting that it is instead the job of officers of 
parliament to do the heavy lifting regarding the oversight related to pressing matters of public 
concern.93  As Peter Aucoin has noted, “…the capacity of Parliament to hold ministers and 
officials to account is considered almost exclusively in terms of Parliament’s agents and not 
MPs themselves.”94 Given the incredible growth of interest in these offices and the public 
trust they seem to be commanding, what follows is an overview of the offices and the nature 
of their work. This overview will allow us to draw stronger comparative insights regarding  
appointment processes, mandates and reporting requirements. As will become clear, the 
office of the COIEC is different from the other agents in several important ways, particularly 
                                               
92 Jeffrey Graham Bell, “Agents of Parliament: A New Branch of Government?” (2006) 
29:1 Can Parl Rev 13 at 15 [Bell]; See also Hubertise-Loranger, supra note 172 at 71 (for 
a similar, but shorter list). 
93 See e.g. Thomas PPF, supra note 50 at 1 (Thomas notes that “With increased 
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with respect to the unique structural setup of its two mandates and the complicated reporting 
relationships that accompany them.  
(a)!Auditor+General+
 
Creation 
 
As noted above, the Auditor General of Canada was the country’s first agent of 
parliament. The office was created in 1878 in response to a scandal that involved the Prime 
Minister and several cabinet members.95  The Office has evolved a great deal since its 
creation and is now governed by the Auditor General Act.96  
 
Appointment and Term 
 
The Auditor General is a governor-in-council appointment that is made under section 
3 of the Act. A governor-in-council appointment is one that is made by the Governor General 
after receiving the advice of his or her Privy Council. The Act stipulates that the appointment 
must be made only “after consultation with the leader of every recognized party in the Senate 
and House of Commons and approval of the appointment by resolution of the Senate and 
House of Commons.”97 The appointee may only serve one term98 of no more than ten years 
and may be removed mid-term by an order of the Governor in Council if the Senate and 
House of Commons agree to the removal.99 
                                               
95 Bell Emergence, supra note 75 at 7. 
96 Auditor General Act, RSC 1985, C A-17 [A-G Act]. 
97 Ibid, s 3(1) (“consultation” is not defined in the legislation, so it is unclear what level 
of dialogue and consensus is needed in order to meet this requirement). According to the 
Public Policy Forum, “the consultation usually consists of a phone call to the opposition 
advising them of a nominee on the eve of the appointment” (see PPF Report, supra note 
67 at 22). 
98 Ibid, s 3(3). 
99 Ibid, s 3(1.1). 
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Mandate 
 
The Auditor General’s mandate is framed very broadly under the Act. It stipulates 
simply that the “Auditor General is the auditor of the accounts of Canada, including those 
relating to the Consolidated Revenue Fund.”100 To carry out its mandate, the Office conducts 
“independent audits and studies that provide objective information, advice, and assurance to 
Parliament, territorial legislatures, boards of crown corporations, government, and 
Canadians.”101 The Auditor General also has other obligations to the  President of Treasury 
Board, the Minister of Finance and under the Financial Administration Act, but they all 
involve auditing and providing a responsive opinion.102 To properly conduct its affairs, the 
office is granted access to all relevant information 103  and is also entitled to request 
information, including reports and explanations, from members of the public service.104  
 
Reporting relationships 
 
There are two major annual reporting requirements for the Office of the Auditor 
General. First, the Auditor General must submit an annual report to the House of Commons 
by tabling it with the Speaker, who will then lay it before the House. 105 The legislation does 
not require that this annual report be tabled in the Senate. Second, the Treasury Board must 
nominate a “qualified auditor” every year who will audit the Office of the Auditor General 
                                               
100 Ibid, s 5. 
101 Canada, Office of the Auditor General of Canada, “Who We Are: Our Role” (accessed 
18 July 2019), online: <http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/au_fs_e_370.html>. 
102 Supra, note 96, s 6. 
103 There is an exception carved out for information that is expressly shielded from the 
Auditor by other Acts of Parliament. See Ibid, s 13(1).  
104 Supra, note 96, s 13(1). 
105 Ibid, ss 7(1), 7(3). 
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by examining receipts and disbursements and then reporting back to the House of 
Commons.106 The external auditor’s report is to be submitted to the President of the Treasury 
Board, who will then lay it before the House of Commons.107 
 
(b)+Chief+Electoral+Officer+
 
Creation 
 
Canada’s Chief Electoral Officer (CEO) position was created in 1920 under 
the Dominion Elections Act108 and is regarded as the first of its kind in the world.109 The 
legislation provided that the CEO would be appointed by a resolution of the House of 
Commons, rather than by the government. The push towards greater independence helped to 
insulate the CEO from undue political pressure and to eliminate partisanship in the 
administration of federal elections. Interestingly, the CEO was granted a life appointment 
under this early version of the legislation.110  
                                               
106 Ibid, s 21(1). 
107 Ibid, s 21(2). 
108 Dominion Elections Act, SC 1920, c 46. 
109 Canada, Office of the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, “A History of the Vote in 
Canada” 2nd ed (2007), online:<https://www.elections.ca/res/his/History-Eng_Text.pdf> 
at 71. 
110 Ibid. 
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Appointment and Term!
!
Not surprisingly, the lifetime term of appointment set out under the Dominion 
Elections Act has since been changed. The CEO continues to be appointed by a resolution of 
the House of Commons, but they may only hold office while demonstrating good behaviour 
and for a maximum term of 10 years, with no possibility of re-appointment.111 Furthermore, 
the CEO can be removed for cause by the Governor General at any time, provided that the 
House of Commons and Senate approve.112!
 
Mandate 
 
The office of the Chief Electoral Officer, also known as Elections Canada, was originally 
only responsible for the administration of general elections and by-elections. The office’s 
mandate has since broadened to include the administration of referenda and other important 
aspects of our democratic electoral system. Other duties include, but are not limited to: 
•! Overseeing compliance with political financing laws in the Canada Elections Act; 
•! Maintaining the national register of electors; 
•! Registering political parties and third parties engaged in electoral advertising and 
ensuring that they comply with the rules;  
•! Registering electoral district associations, leadership contestants and nomination 
contestants of registered parties;  
•! Administering the laws related to the disclosure of contributions made to candidates, 
political parties and third parties, etc.; 
                                               
111 Canada Elections Act, SC 2000, c 9, s 13(1) [Elections Act]. 
112 Ibid. 
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•! Conducting public education campaigns on all matters related to voter and candidate 
registration, as well as voting;  
•! Conducting public information campaigns about voting and voter registration; and, 
•! Supporting the independent Federal electoral boundaries commission.113   
 
Reporting relationships 
 
The Chief Electoral Officer is an independent, non-partisan agent of parliament who 
reports to the House of Commons through the Speaker. Reports must be filed following 
general elections114 as well as by-elections.115  
 
(c)+Commissioner+of+Official+Languages+
 
Creation 
 
Canada’s Constitution stipulates that the country’s records and laws must be 
produced in both English and French.116 Parliament adopted the Official Languages Act117 
in 1969, following the Royal Commission on Bilingualism,118 and created the role of the 
Commissioner of Official Languages. The first commissioner was appointed in 1970.    
 
Appointment and Term 
 
                                               
113 Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act, RSC 1985, c E-3, s 28(1). 
114 Elections Act, supra note 111, s 534. 
115 Ibid, s 536. 
116 Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, s 
18(1). 
117 Official Languages Act, RSC 1985, c 31 (4th Supp) [OLA]. 
118 Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Multiculturalism 
(Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 8 October 1967).  
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The Commissioner of Official Languages is a governor-in-council appointment that 
is made under section 49 of the Act. The Act stipulates that the appointment may only be 
made “after consultation with the leader of every recognized party in the Senate and House 
of Commons and approval of the appointment by resolution of the Senate and House of 
Commons”119 and that the two houses must pass resolutions to demonstrate their approval.  
The appointee may serve unlimited consecutive seven-year terms,120 holds office during 
good behavior and may be removed mid-term by an order of the Governor in Council if the 
Senate and House of Commons agree to the removal.121  
 
Mandate 
The commissioner is responsible for overseeing the administration and promotion of the 
Official Languages Act. The commissioner: 
•! Acts as an ombudsman for Canada’s official languages in order protect the language 
rights of Canadians and to promote bilingualism across the country;  
•! Ensures the equality of English and French in Parliament, the Government of Canada, the 
federal administration and the institutions subject to the Act; 
•! Audits institutional compliance with the Act; 
•! Creates educational tools and conducts research, studies and public awareness campaigns; 
and, 
•! Intervenes before the courts in proceedings related to the status or use of English or 
French in Canada. 
                                               
119 OLA, supra note 117, s 49(1)-(3). 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid. 
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Reporting relationships 
 
The commissioner submits annual and other special reports122 to Parliament that 
address current issues, findings and recommendations. 123  These reports are submitted 
through the Speakers of the two houses124 and are reviewed by the Senate and House of 
Commons Standing Committees on Official Languages. 125  Interestingly, there are also 
certain circumstances in which the commissioner can exercise a right to transmit a copy of 
a report and recommendations to the Governor in Council. The legislation contemplates that 
this will only take place when adequate and appropriate actions have not followed the initial 
tabling of a report that contained recommendations for action.126 
 
(d)+Privacy+Commissioner+
 
Creation 
 
The Privacy Act127 and Access to Information Act128 were both proclaimed in 1983. 
As I will explain, the two regimes complement each other very well.  
 
Appointment and Term 
 
The Privacy Commissioner is a governor-in-council appointment that is made under 
section 53 of the Act. The Act stipulates that the appointment may only be made “after 
consultation with the leader of every recognized party in the Senate and House of Commons” 
                                               
122 Ibid, s 67(1). 
123 Ibid, s 66. 
124 Ibid, s 69(1). 
125 Ibid, s 69(2). 
126 Ibid, s 65. 
127 Privacy Act, RSC 1985, c P-21 [Privacy Act]. 
128 Access to Information Act, RSC 1985, c A-1 [Access to Info]. 
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and that the Senate and House must also pass resolutions to demonstrate their approval of 
the appointment.129  The appointee may serve unlimited consecutive seven year terms during 
good behavior and may be removed by order of the Governor in Council only if the Senate 
and House of Commons agree to the removal.130  
 
Mandate 
 
The Privacy Act governs the personal information handling practices of federal 
departments and agencies. The duties of the office were also extended in 2001 to 
include private sector businesses subject to the Personal Information Protection and 
Electronic Documents Act131 (PIPEDA). PIPEDA is Canada’s federal private-sector 
privacy law. The Privacy Commissioner carries out its mandate to protect and 
promote privacy rights in various ways, including by: 
 
•! Investigating complaints against public and private sector organizations that are subject 
to the office’s legislative mandate and issuing reports with recommendations; 
•! Auditing and issuing public reports related to the personal information handling practices 
of federal institutions and private businesses; 
•! Pursuing legal remedies where necessary; 
•! Promoting public awareness of privacy issues; 
•! Providing advice and analysis, including to Parliament, public institutions and private 
sector organizations. This includes reviewing privacy impact assessments (PIAs) that are 
completed in relation to government initiatives; and, 
                                               
129 Privacy Act, supra note 127, s 53(1). 
130 Ibid, s 53(2)-(3). 
131 Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, SC 2000, c 5 [PIPEDA]. 
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•! Researching trends, practices and systemic challenges relating to privacy in both the 
public and private sectors. 
 
Reporting relationships 
 
The commissioner is required to submit an annual report and entitled to submit 
special reports to Parliament.132 These reports must be filed with the Speakers of the Senate 
and House of Commons, who will then table them in their respective houses. The 
commissioner must also file an annual report with Parliament relating to their duties under 
PIPEDA.133 
+
(e)+Access+to+Information+Commissioner+
 
Creation 
 
The Access to Information Act was passed by the House of Commons in 1982134 and 
the Office of the Information Commissioner was established very soon thereafter, in 
1983. Whereas the Privacy Commissioner oversees how information in the possession of 
particular public and private sector actors is handled, the Information Commissioner 
oversees the way that the federal government allows people to access the information in its 
possession including individuals’ personal information. The commissioner encourages and 
assists federal institutions to adopt approaches to information-sharing that meet the 
objectives of the Act, and advocates for greater access to information in Canada. 
                                               
132 Privacy Act, supra note 127, ss 38 & 39. 
133 PIPEDA, supra note 131, s 25(1). 
134 Ken Rubin, “Parliamentarians and Canada’s Access to Information Act” (1986) 9:1 
Can Parl Rev 8 at 8. 
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Appointment and Term 
 
The Information Commissioner is a governor-in-council appointment that is made 
under section 54 of the Act. The Act stipulates that the appointment may only be made “after 
consultation with the leader of every recognized party in the Senate and House of Commons” 
and that they must also pass resolutions to demonstrate their approval of the appointment.135  
The appointee may serve unlimited consecutive seven year terms136 during good behavior 
and may be removed by order of the Governor in Council only if the Senate and House of 
Commons agree.137  
 
Mandate 
 
Access to information laws ensure that the public has a right to access certain 
information that the government has in its possession, including individuals’ personal health 
information. A citizen will not be given access to personal information about other citizens 
or anything related to national security and cabinet confidences, but they are generally 
entitled to information related to government policy-making and the actual administration of 
government programs. 
 
The Information Commissioner’s role is to encourage and assist federal institutions 
with adopting policies and practices regarding the handling of information that meet the 
objectives of the Act. The commissioner also advocates for greater access to information on 
behalf of the public and, when necessary, conducts investigations into complaints that are 
                                               
135 Privacy Act, supra note 127, s 54(1). 
136 Ibid, s 54(3). 
137 Access to Info, supra note 128, s 54(2). 
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received. For example, the office may investigate how access requests are handled by 
government institutions, and then work to resolve any disputes. The dispute resolution 
process is ideally driven by mediation but may also take place through the courts. 
 
Reporting relationships 
 
The commissioner submits annual and other special reports to Parliament to provide 
it with information about the office’s yearly activities and any specific concerns that have 
arisen. 138  These reports are submitted to Parliament through the Speakers of the two 
houses139 and are reviewed by Senate and House of Commons’ Standing Committees.140  
 
(f)+Commissioner+of+Lobbying+
 
Creation 
 
The Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying was established under the Lobbying 
Act in 2008.141 
 
Appointment and Term 
 
The Commissioner of Lobbying is a governor-in-council appointment that is made 
under section 4.1 of the Act. The appointment may only be made after consultation with the 
leader of every recognized party in the Senate and House of Commons and they must pass 
resolutions to demonstrate their approval of the appointment.142  The appointee may serve 
                                               
138 Ibid, ss 38, 39(1). 
139 Ibid, s 40(1). 
140 Ibid, s 40(2). 
141 Lobbying Act, RSC 1985, c 44 (4th Supp) [Lobbying Act]. 
142 Ibid, s 4.1(1). 
 48 
unlimited consecutive seven-year terms143 during good behavior and may be removed by 
order of the Governor in Council only if the Senate and House of Commons agree to the 
removal.144  
 
Mandate 
 
Lobbyists are generally understood to be individuals who are paid to champion 
particular causes by communicating with public office holders in an attempt to influence 
them in the performance of their official duties. Lobbyist registration legislation ensures that 
these interactions are recorded on a public registry so that lobbying activities are transparent 
to the public. This registry is administered and enforced by the Commissioner of Lobbying. 
 
The goal of this regime is to leverage transparency in order to encourage public 
confidence in the integrity of government decision-making.145  The legislation even allows 
the commissioner to create a code of conduct for lobbyists to abide by when they engage in 
lobbying activities.146 Lobbyist registration laws also prohibit lobbyists from placing elected 
officials in real or potential conflicts of interest - which arises when an elected official makes 
or participates in the making of a decision in the execution of his or her official duties while 
they know, or reasonably ought to know, that there is an opportunity to improperly advance 
their own or another person’s private interest(s).147 The Commissioner of Lobbying also 
develops and implements educational programs targeted at lobbyists, public office holders 
                                               
143 Ibid, s 4.1(2). 
144 Ibid, s 4.1(3). 
145 See e.g. Ibid at Preamble. 
146 See e.g. Ibid, s 10(2).  
147 A variation of this definition can be found in the parliamentary conflict of interest 
laws for every Canadian jurisdiction. 
 49 
and members of the public, and conducts reviews and investigations to ensure that lobbyists 
are complying with the legislation 
 
Reporting relationships 
 
The commissioner submits annual and other special reports to Parliament to provide 
information about the office’s yearly activities and any specific concerns that have arisen.148 
These reports are submitted to Parliament through the Speakers of the two houses.149  
+
(g)+Public+Sector+Integrity+Commissioner+
 
Creation 
 
The Office of the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner was created in 2007, under 
the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act.150  
 
Appointment and Term 
 
The Public Sector Integrity Commissioner is a governor-in-council appointment that 
is made under section 39 of the Act. The appointment may only be made “after consultation 
with the leader of every recognized party in the Senate and House of Commons” and the 
Senate and House must also pass resolutions to demonstrate their approval.151  The appointee 
serves a seven-year term of office during good behavior and may be removed only by an 
order of the Governor in Council on the advice of the Senate and House of Commons.152 An 
                                               
148 Lobbying Act, supra note 141, s 11-11.1. 
149 Ibid, s 11.1(2). 
150 Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act, SC 2005, C 46 [PSDPA]. 
151 Ibid, s 39(1). 
152 Ibid, s 39(2). 
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individual who serves a term as commissioner may only be reappointed for one more 
identical term.153 
 
Mandate 
 
The Public Sector Integrity Commissioner is responsible for receiving disclosures of 
wrongdoing related to the federal public sector. These disclosures can be received from 
public servants and members of the public, provided they meet the criteria outlined in the 
Act. The commissioner investigates, makes recommendations and prepares reports. He or 
she is also charged with protecting whistleblowers against reprisal.  One excellent example 
of corruption being exposed by a whistleblower is the sponsorship scandal, which implicated 
several elected members of Canada’s governing party.154 
 
Reporting relationships 
 
The commissioner reports directly to Parliament on an annual basis155 and may also 
file special reports, when a matter is deemed to be urgent or important.156 As is also the case 
for the other agents, these reports must be submitted to the Speakers of both the House of 
Commons and the Senate, who will then place them before their respective houses of 
Parliament.157  
 
                                               
153 Ibid, s 39(3). 
154 See HP Now, supra note 78 at 18 (for an excellent description of the sponsorship 
scandal). 
155 PSDPA, supra note 150, s 38(1). 
156 Ibid, s 38(3). 
157 Ibid, s 38(3.3). 
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(h)+Parliamentary+Budget+Officer+
 
Creation 
 
The office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer was created in 2006 as part of the 
Federal Accountability Act. Unfortunately, the first Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO) 
“was not appointed until March 25, 2008 due to setbacks during the appointment process.”158 
The original reporting structure was such that the PBO reported to the Parliamentary 
Librarian instead of to Parliament through the Speaker.159 This reporting structure remained 
in place until September 2017 when “different understandings over the meaning of 
“independent” became apparent”160 and Parliament finally made changes to allow the PBO 
to officially became an agent of parliament under the Parliament of Canada Act.161  
 
Appointment and Term 
 The PBO’s appointment process is a little different from the other agents of 
parliament. Although it is a governor-in-council appointment made under the Great Seal with 
the approval of the Senate and House of Commons, there are further consultations that are 
required. The Governor in Council must also consult with, though not necessarily receive 
the approval of, the leader of every recognized party in the House of Commons as well as 
the members of the Senate who occupy the seats of the Leaders of the government and 
                                               
158 Ian Lee, “The Origins of the Parliamentary Budget Officer in Canada” 
(Spring/Summer 2013) 24:3 Financial Management Institute of Canada E-Journal 23 at 
24 [Lee]. 
159 Canada, Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer, 2015-16 Report on the Activities 
of the Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer (23 November 2016) at 12 (PBO: Jean-
Denis Fréchette).  
160 Lee, supra note 158 at 24. 
161 See PC Act, supra note 15, s 79.1. 
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official opposition.162 The PBO is appointed on the condition of good behavior for a term of 
seven years. They may only be removed mid-term for cause by an order of the Governor in 
Council on the address of the Senate and House of Commons.163 There is also no limit to the 
number of times that an individual can be reappointed to the positions, as long as they serve 
no more than fourteen total years in office.164 
 
Mandate 
 
The PBO provides Parliament with independent analysis of the government’s budget, 
the estimates and any other documents that relate to Canada’s finances, including the state 
of the Country’s finances as a whole. The PBO may also provide analysis at the request of 
committees or specific parliamentarians, to estimate the cost of a proposed matter that is 
within Parliament’s jurisdiction. 
The legislative mandate has also been amended so that the PBO now has an 
obligation to respond to requests received from political parties or individual members of 
the House of Commons in the months that lead up to a general election. These individuals 
may ask the PBO to estimate the cost of election campaign proposals that they are 
considering.165 
Reporting relationships 
The PBO is unique among the agents of parliament because it is required to file an 
annual work plan before the beginning of each fiscal year. This work plan is expected to 
                                               
162 Ibid, s 79.1(1)(a)-(b). 
163 Ibid, s 79.1(2). 
164 Ibid, s 79.1(3). 
165 Ibid, s 79.21. 
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outline matters that the office believes to be of significance for the year ahead, how they will 
prioritize working on those matters, and what resources will be needed.166 The PBO is also 
required to file an annual report at the end of the fiscal year and any other reports prepared 
throughout the year as they are finalized, as is typical of agents of parliament.167 The PBO 
reports directly to the Senate and the House of Commons through their respective Speakers.  
+
(i)+Conflict+of+Interest+and+Ethics+Commissioner+
 
 There is some debate as to whether the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner 
is in fact an agent of parliament.168 This debate, along with a comprehensive analysis of the 
work of the commissioner, will be taken up in chapters five through eight. 
 
 
2.6 Linguistic and Conceptual Clarification 
 
There is an unfortunate “linguistic and conceptual confusion” 169  around the 
difference between officers and agents of parliament. It is important to unpack this confusion 
because agents and officers are different and we must to be clear about what we are talking 
about. The confusion stems from the historic use of the word ‘officer’ to describe those 
individuals who have since come to be described as ‘agents’. In fact, the word ‘officer’ is 
used so widely to describe individuals and offices connected to Parliament that it is almost 
                                               
166 Ibid, s 79.13(1). 
167 See Ibid, ss 79.13(1), 79.2(2), 79.22. 
168 See e.g. Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, The 
Relationship Between Parliament and the Agents of Parliament - Seminar Offered by the 
Canadian Study of Parliament Group (Ottawa, 31 March 2017), online: < https://ciec-
ccie.parl.gc.ca/en/publications/Documents/Presentations/The%20Relationship%20Betwe
en%20Parliament%20and%20the%20Agents%20of%20Parliament%20Mar%2031%202
017%20EN.pdf> (Mary Dawson, Commissioner) [Dawson Relationship]. 
169 Bell Emergence, supra note 75 at 5. 
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impossible to argue it is a term of art with any precise meaning.  Given that both terms appear 
in the literature, it is important that I attempt to unpack the differences between them. To do 
this I must return to focusing on how Canada’s Parliament operates.  
 
Recall that the parliamentary branch of government consists in the Governor General 
as representative of the Monarch, the House of Commons and the Senate. Within Parliament, 
there are individuals who support parliamentary operations. These individuals are employees 
of Parliament, not elected officials. They include, among others, the Clerks of both houses, 
the Parliamentary Librarian, the Sergeant-at-Arms, the Law Clerks and Parliamentary 
Counsel. In an effort to use precise language, we might say that these actors operate within 
the Parliamentary bureaucracy and are subject to the authorities of the Speaker, as head of 
the bureaucracy. These individuals are non-partisan170 and “assist Parliament in procedural 
and administrative matters.”171 Historically, these officials have been referred to by the Privy 
Council Office, which is the central body of the federal government, as officers of 
parliament. 172  That being said, there is no statutory definition for what constitutes a 
parliamentary officer173 and the terms Officer of Parliament or Officer of the House appear 
                                               
170 Gary Levy, “A Parliamentary Budget Officer for Canada” (2008) 31:2 Can Parl Rev 
39 at 42. 
171 Canada, Library of Parliament, Background Paper: Appointment of Officers of 
Parliament, by Andre Barnes & Élise Hurtubise-Loranger, Publication No 2009-21-E 
(revised 10 September 2015) at 1 [Barnes & Hurtubise-Loranger]. 
172 Élise Hurtubise-Loranger “Chapter 6: Commonwealth Experience I – Federal 
Accountability and Beyond in Canada” in Oonagh Gay & Barry K Winetrobe, eds., 
Parliament’s Watchdogs: At The Crossroads (UK Study of Parliament Group, 2008) 71 
at 71 [Hurtubise-Loranger]. 
173 Supra, note 171. 
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very rarely in statute and have never been subject to judicial interpretation.”174 Interestingly, 
the Standing Orders for the House of Commons makes reference to the concept of an officer 
of parliament:175 
Officers of Parliament. Referral of the name of the proposed appointee to 
committee.  
 
(1)!Where the government intends to appoint an Officer of Parliament, the Clerk 
of the House, the Parliamentary Librarian or the Conflict of Interest and Ethics 
Commissioner, the name of the proposed appointee shall be deemed referred to 
the appropriate standing committee, which may consider the appointment during 
a period of not more than thirty days following the tabling of a document 
concerning the proposed appointment.176  
  
This reference in the Standing Orders seems to suggest that the Clerk, the Librarian and the 
Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner are not officers of parliament. This is rather 
peculiar given that the Parliament of Canada’s online Glossary of Parliamentary Procedure 
defines an officer of Parliament as “[a]n officer responsible to one or both Houses of 
Parliament for the carrying out of duties assigned by statute. Among those included in the 
designation are… the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner.”177  Paul Thomas has 
picked up on this confusion and has tried to sort through the language. He argues that we can 
better understand what an officer of parliament is if we accept that there are two types of 
officers. The first type is meant to be independent of the executive and exists to serve 
                                               
174 UK, Library of the House of Commons, Officers of Parliament – A Comparative 
Perspective, (Research paper 03/77 by Oonagh Gay, 20 October 2003) at 7 [Gay]. 
175 Ibid at 22. 
176 Canada, House of Commons, Standing Orders of the House of Commons, Committees 
(consolidated version as at 29 November 2018), s 111.1(1) [Standing Orders]. 
177 Canada, House of Commons, “Glossary of Parliamentary Procedure: Officer of 
Parliament” (accessed 18 July 2019), online:<http://www.ourcommons.ca/About/ 
Glossary/Index-e.html#officer_of_Parliament_e>. 
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Parliament. The second type is also independent of the executive and intended to serve 
Parliament, but also functions to protect and serve the public.178  
 
This way of describing the second type of officer is slowly being accepted by other 
authors to add precision to the language used and to minimize confusion. We now speak of 
these officers using the language of ‘agencies’ or ‘agents’. For the purposes of this 
dissertation, I will adopt this approach and acknowledge that there are two types of officers 
of parliament. To distinguish between them, I will describe one as being ‘officers of 
parliament’ who work for and report directly to Parliament through the Speaker as the head 
of the parliamentary bureaucracy and ‘Agents of Parliament’ who undertake work on behalf 
of Parliament, but who are independent of Parliament and who simply report back to the 
house or houses through the Speaker. Agents do not answer to Parliament in any formal 
manner, whereas officers do. The term “officer of Parliament” will be “reserved for those 
positions that are purely parliamentary in their focus – such as the clerks of the two houses 
and the librarian of parliament.”179 The new and emerging institutions that not only support 
Parliament but also serve Canadians, 180  will be described as agents or agencies of 
Parliament.181 With two exceptions, each of these agencies have reporting responsibilities 
                                               
178 PP&F, supra note 45 at 292-3. 
179 Ibid at 307. 
180 Barnes & Hurtubise-Loranger, supra note 171 at 1. 
181 PP&F, supra note 45 at 307. 
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relating to both houses of Parliament.182  A brief introduction to each of the agents of 
parliament183 was provided above. 
 
The distinction between officer and agent that I am adopting has been supported by 
others, including the former Commissioner of Official Languages, Graham Fraser, who 
noted in a 2013 speech that: “…we have used the term “agents of Parliament” to describe 
individuals who report to parliamentarians, in order to distinguish us from those who work 
directly for Parliament, like the Clerk.”184 The distinction has also been adopted in some, but 
not all, of the more modern writing on the topic. The Public Policy Forum’s 2018 research 
report “Independent and Accountable: Modernizing the Role of Agents of Parliament and 
Legislatures”185 is an excellent example of a publication that has this language. Regardless, 
the literature seems to continue to be unclear. It is for the sake of clarity in this project that I 
am drawing a semantic distinction to help distinguish between the two types of institutions.  
 
It is not the case yet, but I also hope that writers begin to use the language of “agents” 
or “agencies” on a more consistent basis. That being said, the word ‘officer’ has and will be 
                                               
182 The two exceptions are the Chief Electoral Officer, which does not report in to the 
unelected Senate, and the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, which only 
reports to the Senate with respect to its mandate under the Conflict of Interest Act and 
does not have any responsibilities towards the Senate under the Conflict of Interest Code 
for Members of the House of Commons. Notably, there is separate Senate Ethics Officer 
who reports directly to Senate (see PC Act, supra note 15, s 20.1).   
183 There are arguably nine in total, including the Conflict of Interest and Ethics 
Commissioner that is the focus of this project. Whether the Conflict of Interest and Ethics 
should properly be characterized as an agent of parliament is a matter of some debate 
however and will be addressed throughout this project.  
184 Fraser Speech, supra note 85. 
185 PPF Report, supra note 67. 
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used occasionally throughout when I am quoting or referring to the work of other scholars. 
With this distinction in mind, the next section looks at how agents of parliament came to 
exist, how they fit into our constitutional monarchy and what, in general terms, they offer 
our democratic system of parliamentary government. 
 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
 
There are either eight or nine agents, depending on how they are defined, that have 
been created to assist Parliament with its oversight and accountability functions. These 
agents are all delegated responsibilities that could in theory be taken up by Parliament itself, 
perhaps through the committee system, but that are clearly too extensive for it to give 
adequate attention to. This chapter provided a description of these agents within the context 
of our parliamentary democracy and the principle of responsible government. I offered a 
brief overview of how each of the agents are appointed, what their mandates are and how 
they are held accountable. The purpose of this overview was to situate the subject of this 
study within the class of institutions that it has been placed in and to understand their roles 
in the overall system. Although a bit of a granular analysis, it is crucial to identify the 
important tie between Canada’s parliamentary democracy and Britain’s Constitutional 
Monarchy so that we can later have this context to help us understand the role that 
parliamentary privilege plays in supporting the principle of responsible government. In the 
next chapter I will take a closer look at what the literature says about the constitutional 
legitimacy of agents of parliament. I will also describe how agents’ mandates are set, the 
rules surrounding their appointment and removal from office, how their budgets are 
determined and modified and how they are generally held accountable. This will provide us 
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with a general comparative background within which we will be able to contextualize the 
emergence and evolution of Canada’s modern parliamentary ethics regime. 
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3.#Agents#of#Parliament#(Literature#Review)#
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I explore the constitutional legitimacy of agents of parliament. I 
address the criticism that there is no constitutional basis for their existence and that they 
represent an improper erosion of Parliament’s powers. This is an important discussion that 
will help inform our understanding of the implications of delegating duties to the COIEC 
that are properly among the rights and privileges of Parliament. We will arrive at a better 
understanding of what an agent is and what important characteristics they have in common. 
Despite the questions surrounding the legitimacy of these agents, I will explain that they 
have been touted as important to parliamentary democracy because they are independent 
oversight bodies that help to enhance public trust in government. Because of Canadian 
Federalism, agents also play an important role in the governance of the provinces and 
territories. The literature related to Canada’s sub-national jurisdictions is also relied upon to 
help us understand the federal context. This chapter will accordingly explain what the 
literature tells us is needed to create an independent agent of parliament, including how 
mandates are set, what the rules are surrounding the appointment and removal from office 
of an appointee, how budgets are determined and modified and how agents are held 
accountable.  
 
 
3.2 The Constitutional Foundation 
 
According to Megan Furi, we can better understand the concept of responsible 
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government186 by looking closely at what is meant by the word responsible. She argues that 
the word has three meanings in the context we are considering. First, “ministers and cabinet 
have been granted power to advise the Crown and are responsible for the use of this 
power.”187 This means that ministers must be held accountable for the administration of their 
department(s) and every agency, board and commission under that department’s umbrella. 
Second, government is responsible for managing the nation’s affairs and ensuring that 
national interests are responded to through the development of policy.188 Third, ministers are 
not only generally responsible for the use of their powers, but they are more specifically 
responsible to the House of Commons, as a body of elected individuals who represent the 
will of the people.189  
 
Agents of parliament represent a shift in the concept of responsible government 
because they bypass the traditional reporting structure and this affords them a degree of 
protection from ministerial or central agency control that is not generally available to 
departments of government.190 This direct reporting mechanism establishes these agents as 
institutions that exist outside of the traditional configuration of government. Critical of the 
lack of clarity regarding how agents fit into Canada’s constitutional framework, some 
commentators have even labeled agents of parliament as a “watchdog bureaucracy for 
Parliament.”191 
 
                                               
186 This concept was initially described by me in chapter 2, above.  
187 Ibid at 10. 
188 Ibid. 
189 Ibid. 
190 PP&F, supra note 45 at 298. 
191 Ibid at 295. 
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According to Ann Chaplin, there are two important themes or concerns that apply to 
the exercise of power in a parliamentary democracy.  The first is that “the use of public 
power must be justified by law”192 and the second is that we must ask: to “which of the 
constitutional centres of power do they, as government actors, belong?”193 The answer to the 
first is straight-forward: agents of parliament exercise powers that are granted to them 
through legislative enactments and therefore “exercise authority on the basis of a mandate 
obtained from Parliament acting in its sovereign legislative capacity.”194 They are, in this 
sense,  creatures of parliament. The answer to the second concern is not so obvious. 
 
(a) The Puzzle of Legitimacy 
To the casual observer of politics, the fact that Canadians now have nine separate 
agents of parliament is not particularly noteworthy. After all, these agents help to hold 
government accountable and they occasionally expose public sector mismanagement that 
may not have come to light otherwise. To the political scientist or constitutional scholar 
however, these agents pose a real intellectual challenge. They seem to originate from the 
legislative branch, but their legislative mandates allow them to function in ways that 
Parliament simply does not. This has caused many scholars to question the constitutional 
legitimacy of agents of parliament. According to the Supreme Court of Canada, “[t]o be 
accorded legitimacy, democratic institutions must rest, ultimately, on a legal foundation. 
That is, they must allow for the participation of, and accountability to, the people, through 
                                               
192 Constitutional Legitimacy, supra note 83 at 86. 
193 Ibid.  
194 Ibid at 87. 
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public institutions created under the Constitution.”195 Where do agents of parliament find 
their legitimacy? A quick scan of the literature reveals the extent of the concern:  
•! “In this country, while we have not yet considered enshrining our officers in the 
Constitution, neither have we limited them to activities that Parliament itself might 
do.”196 
 
•! “The roles and powers of these legislative officers have developed with little 
constitutional definition…”197 
 
•! “…officers of Parliament have been created without clarifying how they fit into the 
constitutional framework.”198  
 
•! “…it is not clear how such entities fit within the existing constitutional framework of 
ministerial responsibility and administrative accountability.”199 
 
Agents of parliament are clearly not part of the judicial branch. Likewise, they do not 
fit comfortably into the executive branch. Even though agents are appointed by the Governor 
in Council, they do not take instructions from the executive or report back to the executive 
about their day-to-day operations. It is very clear then that agents of parliament were 
intended to form part of the legislative branch. Unfortunately, they do not fit cleanly into 
that box either because they are not elected to office nor do they exclusively support 
parliamentary operations. A vein of scholarly criticism has emerged that argues agents have 
become a sort of new branch of government that we can call the Integrity Branch.200 This 
new branch finds support and is sustained by the fact that we are turning into an audit society. 
                                               
195 Secession, supra note 19 at para 67. 
196 Chaplin LLM, supra note 77 at 141. 
197 Canadian Study of Parliament Group, Whom do you Trust? The growing relationship 
between legislative assembly officers and citizens – Conference Summary Report (9 Dec 
2006), online: <http://cspg-gcep.ca/pdf/2006_Dec_9_Conference_Report-e.pdf> at 1. 
198 Donald Savoie, “The broken chain of answerability”, The Globe and Mail (16 May 
2008), Opinion [Savoie Broken]. 
199 PP&F, supra note 45 at 288. 
200 See Bell, supra note 92 at 1 (for a good overview of this scholarly discussion). 
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This social change has reinforced the largely pragmatic emergence and evolution of this 
unique fourth branch even without any great effort being made to define a constitutional 
niche for these new institutions.201 
 
Some of these integrity branch institutions have significant powers that do not 
directly mirror the powers of Parliament. As Ann Chaplin explains: 
The officers of Parliament have other powers which Parliament has never given 
itself or assumed. These include the capacity of the COL [Commissioner of 
Lobbying], IC [Information Commissioner] and PC [Privacy Commissioner] to 
go to court to enforce the rights they establish during the investigation of a 
complaint. Various officers can make orders that would be different from any 
measures parliamentarians could take. The CEO [Chief Electoral Officer] may 
adapt provisions of the Elections Act as an election proceeds; the COIEC 
[Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner] can impose administrative 
monetary penalties on public office holders who fail to report conflicts of interest 
and can order them to take measures to correct conflicts of interest… These are 
all matters that a parliamentary committee could issues recommendations about, 
but not orders with legal effect.202 
 
It is perhaps the constant concern about independence that has opened the door for such 
novel legislative mandates. We use the language of independence to describe the ideal that 
we strive for in relation to these agents, but the truth is that actual full independence would 
not only be impossible, but it would actually be constitutionally improper.203 Agents of 
parliament are clearly not meant to be a fourth branch of government,204 so where then do 
they derive their constitutional legitimacy from?  
                                               
201 PP&F, supra note 45 at 310. 
202 Constitutional Legitimacy, supra note 83 at 94-95. 
203 Ibid at 87. 
204 Paul G Thomas, “Trust and the Role of Independent Parliamentary Agencies” (A 
paper prepared for Canada’s Public Sector Integrity Commission, 30 June 2015), online: 
<https://web.archive.org/web/20110120192925/http://www.psic-
ispc.gc.ca/quicklinks_liensrapides/pres_thomas_paper_document-eng.aspx> at 6 
[Thomas PSIC]; See also John M Ackerman, “Understanding Independent Accountability 
Agencies,” in Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter Lindseth, eds, Comparative Administrative 
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This question of how to locate the constitutional legitimacy of agents of parliament is 
not one that has been taken up by very many scholars. Some have downplayed these 
concerns, noting that agents of parliament do not undermine the constitution because 
Parliament has delegated them the authority to promote certain values and Parliament can 
take that authority back.205 Paul Thomas has argued that we should praise independent agents 
for what they contribute to democracy and citizen confidence in government by virtue of 
how they stretch the surveillance capacity of Parliament.206 Others, like Jeffrey Graham Bell, 
admit that the legitimacy of agents poses an interesting intellectual challenge, but see these 
institutions as being overall beneficial while causing no real harm:  
Yes, they change the dominant policy networks, the political discourse, and 
citizens’ impressions of government. But they leave our fundamental democratic 
mechanism intact…. we must not allow precedent and constitutional idealism to 
prevent new toolboxes from being opened.207 
 
 
 
There are others who have put forth arguments for why and how these agents have 
gained, or are gaining, constitutional legitimacy. John Whyte argues that agents represent a 
type of constitutional change through political practice.208 As these agents continue to do the 
work of specialists who review government, they will add value but also receive tremendous 
criticism. It is therefore likely that they will increasingly be seen as needing formal protection 
                                               
Law (Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010) 265 and 
265-6 (Although this is not the case in Canada, Ackerman explains that independent 
accountability agencies are categorized together as a separate branch of government in 
Ecuador and Venezuela).  
205 Bell, supra note 92 at 19. 
206 Luncheon Speech, supra note 36 at 21. 
207 Bell, supra note 92 at 20. 
208 Whyte, supra note 88 at 426. 
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through the establishment of constitutional convention.209 In other words, the unwritten 
principles of our Constitution will have to catch up to reflect the reality of our present day 
political and administrative institutions.210 Agents can be seen as a sort of pre-constitutional 
innovation. As John Whyte further argues: 
…not yet constitutional law or, even, constitutional convention. They arise from 
increasing concerns over political legitimacy and, it can be said, reflect the 
markedly lower degree of confidence in the notion that electorally mandated 
legislatures provide all the political legitimacy and political accountability that 
the exercise of governmental power requires.211 
 
The most comprehensive and deepest defence of the legitimacy of agents has been put forth 
by Ann Chaplin.212 Chaplin points out that the success of agents of parliament seems to 
reflect a sense among the populace “that probity, justice and integrity are missing from 
government and that current levels of transparency and accountability are inadequate to 
correct that situation.”213 The legitimacy of agents could therefore lie in their ability to 
embody these virtues while contributing to public sector governance “in ways that are to 
some degree alien from traditional constitutional theory.”214 
 
Chaplin draws on former Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin’s speech entitled 
Unwritten Constitutional Principles.215 In the Chief Justice’s view, the legitimacy of the state 
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“depends on its adhesion to fundamental norms that transcend the law and executive 
action.”216 She elaborates: 
Rule of law. Human rights. Good governance. Principles that all branches of 
government, including the judiciary, must seek to uphold. Principles that may be 
written down, in some measure in some countries. But principles that the 
Commonwealth countries have asserted should prevail everywhere.217 
 
These remarks give support to Chaplin’s creative argument that officers of parliament could 
possibly derive their legitimacy from being responsible for mandates that have something to 
do with restoring the virtues that are perceived as missing from government.218 Or, as former 
Chief Justice McLachlin has explained by “being the mouthpieces for the general will of the 
country, as concerns the standards of behavior expected of government actors.”219 
 
(b) An Erosion of Power? 
John D. Whyte has argued that there is a “weakening influence – and relevance – of 
legislatures.”220 David E. Smith has similarly noted that although agents were once seen as 
servants of Parliament, they are now evolving into its masters.221 M. Harold Martens, a 
former member of the Legislative Assembly in Saskatchewan, believes that legislative 
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assemblies or Parliament cannot allow their power to be eroded by giving it to other officers 
of the assembly.222 The argument that agents of parliament are legitimate because they derive 
their authority from the fact that they were created by and meant to serve Parliament does 
not get much sympathy from critics who see the direct connection that agents have with the 
public and the media as actually undermining the role of the legislature and being harmful 
to self-government.223 
 
Even though agents contribute a great deal to one of Parliament’s most important 
functions, Ann Chaplin believes that they are not in fact members of the legislative branch. 
Instead, Chaplin argues that agents exist outside of Parliament’s administrative structure and 
many of their functions and features are in fact distinct from those of parliamentary bodies.224 
The requirement that agents report to parliamentarians is not the same as requiring 
parliamentarians to undertake their own studies or investigations on an issue. Not only do 
agents of parliament bring their expertise and detached perspective to their tasks, but they 
are also subject to stringent privacy requirements that mean much of the material they gather 
during investigations must remain confidential. Accordingly, unless Parliament wants to 
hold its own hearing into a matter, it is largely dependent on the agent’s assessment of the 
facts on which the report is based.225 Furthermore, it is well known that agents discourage 
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Parliament from conducting parallel investigations. This seems to fly in the face of the 
understanding that accountability ultimately rests with Parliament. 
 
All that said, Donald Savoie has argued that opposition parties tend to treat agents of 
parliament kindly and view them as their allies.226 Agents are usually investigating the work 
of government, which means that it is possible they may uncover something that will 
embarrass the governing party. This can be useful to opposition parties and it makes them 
reluctant to challenge agents or to hold them to account.227  Despite the fact that uncovering 
problems in the public sector can help to motivate improvements in public sector 
management, some still argue that giving these powers to agents works against the ideal of 
responsible government.228 To commentators like Tolga Yalkin and Patrick Baud, agents 
represent an abdication of Parliament’s responsibility to hold the government to account. 
They instead advocate for increased resources to be provided to parliamentarians themselves 
rather than to independent officers.229 
 
On the other hand, there are also those who believe that agents of parliament 
represent an improvement to the idea of responsible government. Jack Stilborn has pointed 
out that agents do not pose a competitive threat in the way that many think they do, but that 
agents are instead undertaking work that Parliament itself could have performed, rather than 
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displacing substantive functions that Parliament currently fulfills.230 Paul Thomas agrees and 
notes that agents have stretched the surveillance capacity of Parliaments and that they make 
a positive contribution to democracy and to increasing citizens’ confidence in government.231  
 
(c) Agency Drift or Mandate Creep? 
Objections to the growth in the number of agents of parliament centre on the idea 
that they have stretched the surveillance capacity of Parliament further than it was intended 
to have been stretched and therefore represent an erosion of Parliament’s power. Some 
commentators are willing to look past this as long as the job of accountability is getting done, 
but others either do not believe that the job is getting done or remain traditionalists and object 
to the idea that Parliament should be comfortable delegating some of its responsibilities to a 
new accountability branch of government that seems to have emerged without a clear 
constitutional origin.  
 
Much of the opposition to the ongoing growth in the number of agents of parliament 
has been fueled by concerns over agency drift or mandate creep. Agency drift occurs when:  
…the policy preferences of Agents diverge from those originally envisioned by 
Principals – a phenomenon made possible by the discretion afforded to Agents 
in carrying out their activities and because monitoring these activities is itself a 
costly process.232 
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Agents are afforded so much discretion that Jack Stilborn thinks they are no longer making 
any “obvious direct contribution to Parliament and its proceedings.” 233  Three further 
examples of this idea of drift are offered by Donald Savoie, Ann Chaplin and Jamie Baxter. 
Savoie points out that some agents are beginning to circumvent Parliament entirely. They 
do this by informing the media first of their findings or, as in the case of the Privacy 
Commissioner in 2002, by launching constitutional court challenges without first 
consulting Parliament.234 Ann Chaplin adds that agency drift may be by design, whether or 
not it is intentional: “...if their investigative function was intended simply as an extension 
of that exercised by parliamentary committees, we would expect that the reports of their 
investigations would come to Parliament, but that is not always the case.”235 Some agents 
actually do not submit their investigation reports to Parliament at all.236 Finally, Jamie 
Baxter argues that underperformance can be considered a type of agency drift. The case of 
Public Sector Integrity Commissioner Christiane Ouimet provides an example of this type 
of drift. Ouimet was criticized by the media and later investigated by a parliamentary 
committee for investigating just seven of the 228 complaints received by her office during 
her tenure.237  
 
There is also concern that the emphasis on the independence of these new agents of 
parliament has allowed them to turn themselves into “turf warriors just like other 
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bureaucrats.”238 There is also apprehension about the perception that some agents tend to 
regularly push for the expansion of their mandates.239 A good example of this can be found 
in Ontario, where the Environmental Commissioner has been known to protest any move 
by the provincial government or the Legislature to restrain his actions.240 Peter Aucoin 
argues that this emerging reality is:  
…neither shocking nor, on the whole detrimental… AP mandate creep is a 
rational maximization of public expertise finally freed from the defence of the 
government of the day. The political power exercised by APs is influence. Even 
when APs use the courts to achieve their ends, Parliament retains the ultimate 
power of rewriting legislation to override undesirable interpretations.241 
 
Regardless of the lens through which one views these relatively new additions to the public 
sector accountability landscape, it is clear that their growth represents a significant shift in 
how political accountability is achieved in Canada.242  
 
3.3 Creating a New Agent of Parliament 
 
As I have noted above, the growth in the number of agents has happened over time 
in an ad hoc and improvised manner.243 They are generally established in response to social 
and political pressures 244  and there are absolutely no laws or conventions to assist 
parliamentarians with determining when it is appropriate to create a new agent of parliament. 
On the contrary, Canada’s first Auditor-General was created in response to a scandal 
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involving Prime Minister John A. MacDonald.245 Subsequent agents were direct responses 
to political unrest in Quebec,246 a Task Force report released by the Department of Justice247 
and most recently, a public inquiry headed by Justice Gomery that related to what has now 
come to be known as the Sponsorship scandal.248  
 
Being created in response to a scandal does not necessarily mean that agents are 
poorly thought through, but it does mean that Parliaments who create them must be 
especially careful. They must be careful not to act in haste by creating a new agent when one 
is not needed. Sometimes people simply fail in their duties for reasons that can be identified 
and guarded against. The appropriate solution may not always be to delegate responsibilities 
to another person or entity. One way to guard against the possibility of acting in haste has 
been to ensure that agents of parliament derive their powers and duties from legislative 
enactments.249 Except perhaps when there is a majority government, passing legislation 
ensures that there is at least some level of parliamentary debate about whether it is necessary 
to create a new agent in the wake of a scandal. At the federal level, a legislative mandate 
also ensures that there is some Senate input, which (depending on the Senate’s composition, 
whether mostly partisan or independent) may allow for some further critical analysis of the 
mandate being proposed. 
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Although agents are generally created to take on work that is otherwise in the domain 
of Parliament, no rules or conventions have been adopted to require all-party consensus or 
even all-party input into an agent’s creation. There are likewise no rules or conventions to 
require specific public consultation when the creation of new officer is being contemplated. 
Bills obviously end up at committee before they are passed, but there is no reason to believe 
that the bills creating officers of parliament are treated any differently from those that do not. 
Agents of parliament are so unique that it is difficult to know whether being created in an ad 
hoc manner is a deficiency or simply a matter of necessity. Ann Chaplin has considered this 
question and strongly urges that parliamentarians take a very deliberate and value-driven 
approach when considering whether to create new agents of parliament.  
 
Chaplin suggests that there are two types of criteria that must be considered before 
creating a new agent: substantive criteria and structural criteria. In regard to the substantive 
criteria, Chaplin asks: “...does the proposed mandate, including the ways in which it is to be 
fulfilled, advance the cause of democracy, the rule of law, or good governance?” If so, does 
it advance those concepts by “protecting virtues such as justice, probity or integrity in 
government, or the transparency required to ensure them?” and does the proposed mandate 
address a “sufficiently significant issue that it can be said that either the "general will" or the 
underlying ethical culture of the country demands that it be addressed?”250 With respect to 
the structural considerations, Chaplin also argues that it is important to consider whether the 
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agent model is the only one that can properly accomplish the mandate in question.251 
 
Given how little study there has been of the process by which new agents of 
parliament are created, it is important to take seriously concerns about whether Parliament 
is delegating away too much of its responsibility for watching and controlling government. 
A more deliberate and transparent approach to this decision-making process is perhaps 
overdue and is certainly worthy of further study. What we do know however, is that these 
agents are all created by statute through regular legislative processes and this tells us 
something about the legitimacy of their existence, if not the legitimacy of the nature of their 
work. 
 
(a) Enabling legislation 
Parliament has long recognized the value in establishing agents of parliament through 
legislation. As Paul Thomas explains, enabling legislation “identifies the primary purpose of 
an agency. It also defines its relationships with Parliament, the executive and the public,”252 
including the degree to which independence is contemplated and how it is expected to be 
operationalized and protected.  This clarity ensures that the public has information about 
what an agent is supposed to be doing, which in turn allows the public to have a better 
understanding of how government is held accountable. Furthermore, given that most of 
Canada’s agents have express legal authority to order the production of documents, summon 
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witnesses and compel oral testimony, having legislative mandates also gives them something 
they can easily point to if and when they need to assert or defend their rights. 
 
One drawback with creating agents via legislative enactment is that it can and has 
given majority governments too much unilateral power to terminate or make changes to an 
agent’s mandate. The Senate can of course act as a check on the exercise of majority power, 
but a partisan Senate can also contribute to a majority government’s ability to advance a 
particular legislative agenda.  A majority government acting without consensus in relation 
to the creation of an agent of Parliament is a rare occurrence to be sure, but it certainly 
challenges the idea that these agents can be considered creatures of parliament in any broad 
sense. They are instead more carefully characterized as being creatures of parliamentary 
enactment, subject to the usual rules of democratic governance which may not include broad 
consensus from all political parties.  It is possible to build more protection into a legislative 
mandate so that changes to an agent are consensus-driven, but that has not been an approach 
we have seen to date. 
 
(b) Recruitment, Appointment, Renewal and Term 
After an agent of parliament has been created by the passing of legislation, the next 
step is to fill that position. Given that this individual is expected to take on duties that are 
properly parliamentary in nature, it would seem reasonable that there be broad engagement 
in the recruitment and appointment process. Unfortunately, that has not historically been the 
case. The 1979 report of the Royal Commission on Financial Management and 
Accountability (“Lambert Report”) advanced an argument that having no opposition 
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involvement in the appointment process would make it less partisan and thus more desirable 
than if opposition were to play a meaningful role. The report’s authors concluded that the: 
…Commission rejects parliamentary participation in the appointment process. 
Confirmation hearings conducted by committees could become highly partisan 
and deter experienced and competent individuals from permitting their names to 
be put forward, thus reducing the already small number of outstanding 
individuals who are able and willing to serve their country in this capacity.253 
 
The position taken by the Commission seems to have valued expediency over legitimacy and 
led to the adoption of poor processes. For example, it became accepted practice that 
“…Cabinet would make a choice. They may have forwarded the name to the opposition 
parties in advance but rarely in a way that signaled meaningful consultation and would 
simply introduce the motion and make the appointment.”254  This may not seem surprising 
given the historically acceptable practice of the governing party and its executive branch 
indiscriminately appointing its supporters to senior positions within government (i.e. making 
patronage appointments).255  
 
Agents of parliament are expected to hold government to account, so it is important 
that the people appointed to those positions do not have real or perceived partisan 
connections or biases, either in their past or anytime thereafter.  It is also important for the 
appointment process to be balanced and fair and for all voices to be heard before a decision 
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is made. It is for this reason that the approach taken in the Lambert Report is no longer 
viewed as acceptable.  
 
It is now generally agreed that agents of parliament are legislative (not governmental) 
appointments and that their appointment must not be the sole prerogative of Cabinet or the 
governing political party. The entire legislature should properly be included in the process 
of appointing agents of parliament.256 The ongoing dysfunction of the appointment process 
garnered unwanted attention in 2017 when five of the nine federal agents of parliament were 
up for renewal and could not be filled in a timely manner.257 There is clearly a great deal of 
work to be done to understand and improve upon the many deficiencies of the appointment 
process. 
 
The first question that a Parliament must address is what its needs are. Once this has 
been settled, the next question is what would it take for a person to be able to meet those 
needs? When setting the necessary qualifications for being an agent, Parliament must 
consider whether there are skillsets and/or levels of professional success or career attainment 
that are required of an individual before they ought to be considered for such a position. The 
individuals chosen must not only have a certain level of technical skill, but they must also 
have soft skills such as interpersonal and management skills. They must possess attributes 
like legitimacy, credibility, impartiality, courage, fairness and trustworthiness. 258  An 
                                               
256 Smith, supra note 254 at 3. 
257 Joan Bryden, “‘Rigorous approach’ delays replacements for officers of Parliament”,  
CBC News (9 June 2017), online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/ethics-lobbying-
commissioner-delays-1.4153123>. 
258 Thomas PPF, supra note 50 at 7. 
 79 
important component of these roles is being able to earn the trust of internal and external 
stakeholders by having a strength of character and conviction that allows others, including 
the public, to see that agent as worthy of holding what effectively amounts to an important 
position that comes with a tremendous amount of job security.  
 
The high bar that candidates must meet reflects the fact that the public expects and 
depends on agents of parliament to uncover and expose public sector failures. To do this, 
agents must also, at a bare minimum, not be beholden to any master other than their 
legislative mandate(s). It is therefore important that every effort be made during the selection 
process to ensure that candidates for these offices are not actively engaged with a political 
party259 and that they demonstrate themselves to be above partisan disputes.260 This is no 
small task, which is why a great deal of thought must be put into who will conduct the initial 
search for a new agent.  
 
The+Search+
 
There are several ways that candidate search processes can be structured. One option 
is to post a traditional job opening (i.e. have an open competition261); another is to assemble 
a search committee; and another is to hire an outside recruitment firm to target candidates 
with specific qualifications and invite them to consider entering the competition. 262 
Realistically, parliamentarians themselves might sometimes lack the expertise needed to be 
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able to make hiring decisions about individuals with the degree of specialized knowledge as 
is required of an agent of parliament. 263 Parliamentarians are trusted by the public to deal 
with a broad array of complicated matters  however, so having an MP assist with hiring an 
accountant should seem no more troublesome than asking that same MP to be a critic to the 
Minister of Finance.    
 
Another possibility for a search process is to assemble a multi-party committee of 
parliamentarians. Having members of every party on the committee would serve to help 
establish distance between the government and that future agent.264 This would reinforce for 
the public that parliamentarians take seriously the idea that agents of parliament must be 
highly qualified individuals who are non-partisan and not appointed to their position as a 
result of patronage.  A parliamentary committee could engage former agents and/or other 
outside experts to assist in the decision-making.265 This would allow for some flexibility in 
the recruitment process and further serve as a reflection of how serious Parliament takes its 
responsibilities.   
 
Unfortunately, what actually happens right now at the federal level in Canada is far 
from ideal. As I have outlined above in chapter 2, agents of parliament are governor-in-
council appointments that may only be made after consultation with the leader of every 
recognized party in the Senate and House of Commons and after the Senate and House pass 
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resolutions to demonstrate their approval of the appointment.266  To check these boxes, the 
government hires its own recruitment firm and asks them to come up with a short list of 
candidates who will then be considered by Cabinet.267 The Privy Council Office generally 
plays a role in the vetting process as well.268 In conditions of a majority government, Cabinet 
then sends the name to leaders of the opposition parties and pretends to consult.  The 
requirement for the government to consult with other parties is not the same as providing the 
other parties with a formal veto.269 In fact, it is unclear from the public record how genuine 
the consultation process is in actual practice.270 This can lead to suspicion that a nominee 
will be beholden to the prime minister and their government.271 
 
Michael Smith argues that there ought to be consensus on any legislative 
appointments from all recognized political parties to ensure that those appointments are 
separated from the mere will of the government.272 This has not been the case for some time 
at the federal level however.273 Even though each agent is nominally an agent of parliament, 
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Parliament has had very little role in choosing appointees. This puts agents of parliament in 
the tricky position of being both informally beholden to the prime minister, and yet formally 
responsible to Parliament.274  
 
What+is+the+Senate’s+role?+
 
The Senate has an important role in the appointment process because it is expected 
to act as a balance to the partisan House of Commons. The Senate is supposed to be “a place 
where decisions made in the House of Commons are reviewed and evaluated, in theory, away 
from strict party discipline.”275 This has not actually been the case however. The Senate has 
historically been considered a holding tank for patronage appointments and personally 
profitable partisan paybacks. This has only begun to change very recently. As the Senate 
continues to add independent members, the Senate will continue to become more 
independent and less partisan so that it can eventually function as a proper house of sober 
second thought during the process of selection and appointment of agents of parliament. I do 
not mean to suggest here that there is evidence the Senate has allowed partisanship to inform 
its decisions about whether to agree to the appointment of a particular individual as an agent. 
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The concerns raised by the Senate in this context have mostly been in relation to the 
perception of partisanship. 
 
Length+of+Appointment+
 
Another important matter for which there is no clear consensus is what the 
appropriate length of time is for which an individual should hold office as an agent. What 
people feel is acceptable may in fact vary depending on the role in question. As explained 
above, some agents are appointed for seven years while some can only hold office for one 
term, and others can be appointed for unlimited terms. Studies suggest there is “consensus 
that mandates should be longer than the average electoral term so as to keep agents on a 
different cycle than electoral calendars.”276 There is however disagreement about whether 
reappointment is a good idea. In the Public Policy Forum’s report on agents, findings on this 
point are relayed: 
…most believed that a single mandate was sufficient, particularly if it were at 
least seven or eight years long. Multiple terms may discourage agent 
independence and objectivity. One former agent said he knew of a colleague 
who was anticipating a second term and wondered about whether to “go easy” 
on the government and ensure reappointment. “A fixed term will focus the 
mind,” said another former agent, who believed that a serving agent should not 
be re-appointed.277 
 
Ontario’s former Ombudsman André Marin is on record as supporting an extended term of 
office, but no reappointment. Marin believed that automatic reappointment tends to 
politicize the appointment process. 278  On the other hand, former Environmental 
Commissioner of Ontario Gord Miller disagrees and has taken the position that “a 
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government that knows an officer’s term is coming to an end could ignore his or her 
recommendations, putting that person in a “lame duck” situation.”279 
 
The appointment processes for agents of parliament is currently inconsistent. There 
is no consensus about what an appropriate term of office and/or condition for renewal ought 
to be. What does seem clear is that many people believe the appointment process is in need 
of reform.280 The real concern is that agents of parliament must be able to command the trust 
of their stakeholders in order to be effective, but “[t]he shambolic nature of the appointments 
process has done nothing to elevate the standing of agents in the mind of legislators, public 
servants and the public.”281  
 
It is my opinion that what is appropriate for reform depends on the nature of the work 
that an agent undertakes and the ease with which experts can be found in that particular field. 
We do not want to implement rules that place unreasonable pressure to appoint someone 
who may be under-qualified simply because there is a deadline to do so. That being said, we 
do need to have term limits and the ability to apply pressure so that a search committee 
actually does the work of filling upcoming vacancies in these positions. In that regard, I 
believe there should be term limits for agents and that the appropriate committees must be 
required not only to conduct searches, but to begin them far enough in advance that they 
have a reasonable amount of time in which to complete them before an agent’s term limit 
expires. 
                                               
279 Ibid at 14. 
280 PPF Report, supra note 67 at 21. 
281 Ibid at 22. 
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Another important reform that ought to be made to the recruitment and appointment 
process was put forth in 2001 by the Special Committee on the Modernization and 
Improvement of the Procedures of the House of Commons. The Committee’s report to the 
House of Commons recommended that the government should always consult with 
opposition parties before putting forward a name. That nominee should then be required to 
appear before the appropriate standing committee to answer questions from 
parliamentarians.282 This would allow Parliament to do what it is supposed to do by asking 
questions of the nominee that are designed to hold the government to account for its 
selection.283 These committee proceedings could be made public and, in my opinion, all 
parties should reach a unanimous and transparent consensus on every appointment.   
 
The Standing Orders should also be amended so that a formal motion to appoint could 
only be tabled if it is sponsored by all the political parties. This change would ensure that 
there is an institutional mandate regarding the consensus on which these appointments 
should be based.284  Having all party support demonstrates a level of confidence in the 
independence and impartiality of the nominee and reinforces the idea that an agent of 
Parliament must act to resist pressure from the executive because that individual knows that 
more than one party agreed to their appointment.285 This could help address the concern that 
                                               
282 PP&F, supra note 45 at 300. 
283 Smith, supra note 254 at 8 (“An officer must have, at the time of appointment, 
the trust and support of the Legislature, and given the realities of the party system, 
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284 Ibid at 14. 
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majority governments might push through appointments simply by using their majority in 
the House and ignoring the voice of the opposition.286  Allowing the executive to continue 
to have so much influence over the appointment process will doubtless leave the public with 
the impression that partisanship and political calculation are components of an agent’s 
appointment.287 This will serve to decrease public trust in those offices. 
  
3.4 Removal, Resignation and Dissolution of Office 
 
Once the office of an agent of Parliament is created, there is no obvious mechanism 
for its dissolution.288 It is accordingly just as important to ensure that the mechanisms for 
removal and resignation of an agent are free from unhelpful partisanship as it is to ensure 
that the selection and appointment process is.  There are four ways that an agent may be 
removed from or leave his or her position. First, an agent may simply resign from his or her 
position. This happens very rarely, but it has happened. Former Privacy Commissioner 
George Radwanski resigned his position amid incredible public, media and parliamentary 
criticism289 in June of 2003. Mr. Radwanski’s resignation came following a very critical 
report from the Commons’ Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates 
about his personal expenses, that was also complemented by public demonstrations made 
against him by his own staff.290 Canada’s first Ethics Commissioner, Bernard Shapiro, also 
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289 Bennett, supra note 274 at 220. 
290 Gay, supra note 174 at 25. 
 87 
resigned his office in 2006 amid intense criticism from Prime Minister Stephen Harper291 
and the first Public Sector Integrity Commissioner Christiane Ouimet resigned in 2010292 
right before an audit of her office led to a scathing report from the Auditor General.293 
 
The second way that an agent may leave or be removed is if they are not or cannot 
be renewed at the end of their term. One reason this might happen is because there are term 
limits in the legislation under which that agent was appointed. These term limits are an 
important part of the appointment and removal rules that help to secure the independence of 
that office.294  In fact, several agents have clear term limits, which ensures, at least in theory, 
that they will not take it easy on government in order to ensure their next appointment.  
 
The resignation of Canada’s first Ethics Commissioner provides an example of how 
an agent may not be able to be reappointed. Bernard Shapiro was effectively forced to resign 
his position after learning that he would not be qualified to continue in that role under 
proposed legislation that Prime Minister Stephen Harper had signaled he was putting forward 
under an upcoming accountability bill. Harper had outright refused to accept Shapiro’s 
findings in his report into former Liberal member David Emerson’s defection to the 
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Conservative party.295 This was followed by the media reporting Harper’s new Federal 
Accountability Act296  would eliminate the Ethics Commissioner and replace it with the 
COIEC. The new qualifications for being appointed to this role would necessarily exclude 
Shapiro from consideration.297  
 
Third, the legislation administered by all but one298 of the individual officers of 
parliament explicitly states that they may be removed for cause by an order of the Governor-
in-Council on address of the Senate and House of Commons.299  Parliamentarians must 
therefore decide how to evaluate the circumstances under which an agent should be removed 
for cause. The requirement for parliamentary approval before removal in fact strengthens an 
agent’s independence from the executive by ensuring that they cannot be simply unilaterally 
removed by the government of the day.300 This removal mechanism is also important to have 
                                               
295 Tim Naumetz, “PM deliberately shoving Shapiro out of job”, The Ottawa Citizen (12 
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for situations where an agent has demonstrated that they are incapable of fulfilling their 
duties.301  
 
Finally, The Judges Act302 stipulates that the Minister of Justice may request that the 
Canadian Judicial Council investigate whether a “person appointed pursuant to an enactment 
of Parliament to hold office during good behavior”303 should be removed from his or her 
position for any of the reasons set out in section 65(2)(a)-(d) of the Act:304  
!(a) age or infirmity, 
!(b) having been guilty of misconduct, 
!(c) having failed in the due execution of that office, or 
!(d) having been placed, by his or her conduct or otherwise, in a position 
incompatible with the due execution of that office.305 
! 
Although section 69(3) of the Judges Act then says that the Judicial Council cannot remove 
an Officer of Parliament on its own accord, the power to conduct an investigation allows the 
Judicial Council to report back to Parliament as to whether it thinks the person should be 
removed.306 This process could be used to obtain an independent assessment of as officer’s 
capacity to continue in their position.307 Such a report could prove useful in minimizing 
criticism in relation to whether that individual was being removed for partisan political 
reasons, especially in a majority government situation. 
 
 
3.5 Budgets 
 
                                               
301 Denham, supra note 81 at 269. 
302 Judges Act, RSC 1985, c J-1, s 69(1). 
303 Ibid. 
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The funding process for agents of parliament has been a hot topic for most of the past 
two decades. There is an (arguably) unavoidable tension when it comes to funding agents 
because parliamentarians must seek to balance the desire for those individuals to be 
independent against the foundational constitutional principle that “[i]t is the exclusive 
prerogative of the Crown to place recommendations for spending before Parliament”308 
(which effectively means that Cabinet must initiate spending309). This important principle 
leaves the process for determining funding open to the criticism that it cannot prevent against 
government interference in the operations of the many agents. Strict adherence to this 
constitutional principle might also work against the governing party on a political level, 
because if the government feels it has no choice in times of austerity but to cut an agent’s 
budget, then opposition members will likely argue that the government is using budget cuts 
to silence criticism.310 
 
According to Jack Stilborn, by the late 1990s there was a general sense among agents 
of Parliament that the processes in place to review their budgets and spending could give rise 
to interference in their operations.311 Restrictions on an agent’s budget, for example, could 
“serve to limit the scope of audit activities and the calibre of staff.”312 To better understand 
this general concern, it is important to look at how budgeting and funding decisions were 
made. The budget process has historically required agents to submit spending estimates to 
                                               
308 Jack A Stilborn, “Funding the Officers of Parliament: Canada’s Experiment” (2010) 
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the Treasury Board Secretariat (“TBS”). They would then engage directly in discussions 
with the TBS before the Treasury Board itself would approve the estimates. The President 
of the Treasury Board (who is an elected MP) would then place the spending estimates before 
Parliament for its approval. This approval was effectively a rubber-stamping exercise, which 
gave rise to some concerns. The principle concern was that agents were being asked to use 
the same process by which government departments would request their budgetary 
changes.313 There was no parliamentary involvement, broadly speaking.  
 
Much of the interest in this issue started coming to a head in 2001 when the Special 
Committee on the Modernization and Improvement of the Procedures of the House of 
Commons released a report covering officers of parliament.314 This report contained detailed 
analysis of several of the structural characteristics that the members of the committee thought 
it was important to preserve in agents of parliament to help maintain their independence. 
There was no mention of the significance of how these offices are funded.  
 
At the same time as this discussion was taking place in the House, the government 
was receiving a tremendous amount of criticism for its management of the sponsorship 
program. There was also some ongoing interest in what seemed to be money management 
problems that were surfacing at the Office of the Privacy Commissioner. The opposition 
challenged the government to do better by putting forward a motion calling for the 
                                               
313 Ibid. 
314 Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee on the Modernization and 
Improvement of the Procedures of the House of Commons (October 2001), online: 
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implementation of recommendations found in a recent report about good financial 
governance that was filed by the Standing Committee on Procedures and House Affairs.315 
This led to the creation of the Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates 
in May 2002.316 Overall, there was a tremendous thirst for debate surrounding how the public 
sector managed money and how it held individuals to account when money management 
went awry.  
 
This situation inspired Paul Thomas to write his seminal 2003 paper on the past, 
present, and future of agents of parliament, in which he explains what he sees as the most 
important indicia of independence for these offices.317 Unlike the 2001 committee report on 
officers however,318 Thomas drew close attention to the important role that decision-making 
processes for funding, as well as budget-setting and control over spending, play in 
establishing the real and perceived independence of these offices.319 This focus on agent 
finances by an academic may have been inspired in part by the very public and ongoing 
concerns that were being expressed about the Privacy Commissioner. 
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The Privacy Commissioner’s woes continued over the next couple of years, with the 
Auditor-General releasing a scathing report about the commissioner in 2003. The Standing 
Committee on Public Accounts reviewed the report, along with the annual estimates of all 
the agents of parliament. The Committee decided in the course of these meetings that it had 
lost confidence in the then-Privacy Commissioner.320 Around the same time, the Auditor-
General was investigating allegations that had been made about improper spending by the 
government in its management of the sponsorship program. The Auditor-General released 
another damaging report in 2004, which led to a commission of inquiry being called. It was 
in the course of its meetings with agents about their estimates that the Public Accounts 
Committee finally became aware of the long-standing concerns agents had about the manner 
in which they were funded.  
 
Interested in digging deeper into the concerns about funding, the Standing Committee 
on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics (ETHI) began its own hearings. A 2005 article 
by Kristen Douglas and Nancy Holmes explains that throughout ETHI’s hearings the 
Information Commissioner described his office as being in a financial crisis321 because he 
had only received emergency and partial funding despite repeated requests to the Treasury 
Board.322   The committee released a report in May 2005 entitled “A New Process for 
                                               
320 Ibid. 
321 Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy 
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Funding Officers of Parliament” 323  that considered potential models of funding and 
recommended “that a new permanent parliamentary body be created as the budget-
determination mechanism for the funding of all Officers of Parliament.”324 The report also 
echoed concerns that the process by which agents of parliament secured their funding every 
year (i.e. through submissions made to the Treasury Board) was incompatible with their 
government scrutiny mandate.325  
 
The ETHI report coincided with two others. The Senate Standing Committee on 
National Finance was responsible for reviewing annual estimates at that time and heard 
similar concerns as ETHI about funding and budgets from different agents of parliament. 
The Committee released its report on officers of parliament in May 2005, in which it put 
forth recommendations for improving the appointment process and the funding policies and 
processes related to agents.326 The Commons Standing Committee on Public Accounts also 
continued to meet to discuss issues that arose in the wake of its 2003 rebuke of the Privacy 
Commissioner. The committee released yet another report in May 2005, this one called 
“Governance in the Public Service of Canada: Ministerial and Deputy Ministerial 
Accountability.”327  
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The outcome of all these reports on financial management and accountability was the 
creation of a pilot project called the House of Commons Advisory Panel on Funding and 
Oversight of Officers. The advisory panel was composed of thirteen Members of the House 
of Commons, including the Speaker as chairperson and representatives from all political 
parties in proportion to their numbers in the House.328  It was an informal panel329 that 
allowed a group of members of parliament to review budget requests from agents and to 
make recommendations to the Treasury Board. This was a slight change to the old process 
because it allowed parliamentarians to have input rather than simply being tasked with the 
duty of rubber-stamping the Treasury Board’s recommendation. The theory was that an 
officer would not be hindered by cabinet’s refusal to provide money if their budget was 
instead set by a committee.330 The Panel’s first meeting was on November 3, 2005,331 only 
two days after the release of the first volume of Justice Gomery’s report into the Sponsorship 
Scandal.332 The minority Liberal government lost the confidence of Parliament on November 
28, 2005, in the wake of the Gomery report, and an election was triggered for January 23, 
2006. 
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Stephen Harper was the leader of the Conservative opposition when the Liberal 
government fell and seized upon the opportunity to make government accountability a 
cornerstone of his campaign. If he were to become the Prime Minister, Stephen Harper 
promised to push forward a public sector accountability reform bill called the Federal 
Accountability Act that would renew and standardize many matters relating to agents of 
parliament, including how they were appointed and how they were funded. When he did 
become the Prime Minister of a minority government in early 2006, Parliament passed the 
Federal Accountability Act and left the Advisory Panel on Funding and Oversight of Officers 
untouched.  
 
Despite the progress that was clearly being made in regard to how to handle funding 
decisions, commentators like Jack Stilborn still expressed concern about the limited 
occasions when the Treasury Board had set aside the recommendation of the parliamentary 
advisory panel, such as in relation the Access to Information Commissioner’s request in 
2009.  On that occasion, the Treasury Board cited concerns about the commissioner’s 
“proactive” activities, even though no such concerns were raised by the panel.333  Perhaps 
emboldened by the constitutional principle that Cabinet must initiate spending, Canadian 
governments have traditionally been extremely reluctant to allow Parliamentary committees 
to negotiate budgets with agents of parliament.334 The Treasury Board therefore still retained 
the final decision in budget approvals despite all the concerns that had been expressed by 
parliamentary committees and the agents themselves. The Treasury Board is a central agency 
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of government that approves spending within the Government of Canada;335 it is not a 
parliamentary body. This was accordingly something that Parliament needed to be vigilant 
about monitoring. 
 
Everything changed again in 2011 after the Conservative Party won a majority of 
seats in the general election:   
…the Harper government stopped seeking the panel's advice in 2011 after 
forming a majority government and asserting greater control over the work of 
parliamentary committees. As one former agent who went through the panel 
experience noted, it was successful when the Harper government was in minority 
position but once the Conservatives won a majority, the idea that a parliamentary 
committee could act independently from the party in power "went out the door" 
and the panel died.336 
 
The rules related to the funding of agents of parliament reverted to being what they were 
before the informal 2005 Advisory Panel experiment. According to a former agent of 
parliament, “…the problem with the panel was a lack of capacity and the fact there was 
“nothing in it” politically for the MPs who participated in it, so interest waned.”337 
 
With the process for determining how agents are funded being sent right back to 
where it started before the three 2005 reports and the Privacy Commissioner and sponsorship 
program scandals, government again has a great deal of power over appointments, re-
appointments and the budgets of agents of parliament. With the exception of the COIEC, 
annual budget estimates are submitted directly to the Treasury Board for review, which then 
places those estimates before Parliament for its approval.  There is accordingly renewed 
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reason to be concerned that an agent might soften their criticism of the executive in an effort 
to minimize the risk of being retaliated against by way of a decision about their office 
budget.338 Based on the structural requirements of institutional independence outlined above, 
the decision to require agents to submit funding requests to Treasury Board affords a 
government official a lever of control over funding that stands in stark contrast to the sense 
of independence agents are expected to have to do their jobs well and to inspire public 
confidence in their work.  
 
Agents’ budgets must be determined through a process that minimizes the risk for 
political interference. A process like that which was implemented as part of the Advisory 
Panel on Funding and Oversight of Officers would better protect an agent’s independence 
while also ensuring that they are held accountable for their spending decisions. That being 
said, accountability for their budgeting decisions is only one of the many ways in which 
agents of parliament must be held accountable. 
 
3.6 Accountability  
 
Conversations about accountability are fundamentally conversations about 
relationships. Agents of parliament have a large number of relationships with a wide variety 
of stakeholders. Some of those relationships give rise to expectations and some of those 
expectations amount to a duty to account. Peter Aucoin describes accountability as being a 
two-sided process that includes both “holding to account” and “rendering an account.”339 
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Both sides of the process are important because simply rendering an account is less 
meaningful if there is nobody to hold you to account for the account you rendered. If officials 
merely render an account, the accountability process is invariably reduced to a public 
relations exercise in self-congratulation via self-reported results.340 In the unique world of 
agents of parliament however, the objective must of course be to find a balance between the 
need for agents to ensure accountability and the importance of protecting their 
independence.341 What follows is an overview of the different accountability structures that 
have been applied to the work agents of parliament. This overview lays the groundwork for 
my chapter six analysis of the COIEC’s accountability relationships. 
 
(a) Why is Accountability Important? 
Fundamental to the role of Parliament is that it is expected to “compel the executive 
to boast and confess about its activities in public.”342 The activities of an agent of parliament 
are not akin to those of government actors or government appointees however. Even though 
Cabinet is closely involved in the appointment process, being appointed an agent of 
parliament “solidifies independence and signifies that loyalty must lie with the legislature 
and not with the governing party.”343 The balance between independence and accountability 
for agents has traditionally been heavily skewed in favour of independence,344 but the fact 
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that agents serve Parliament as accountability enforcers is no reason why they themselves 
should be held less accountable.345  
 
Except for those occasions where they are being asked to account, agents of 
parliament operate largely unchallenged. What they write is “often taken as gospel”346 and 
no matter how objective and balanced they strive to make their findings, public reports about 
issues they have investigated tend to wind up being amplified, distorted and sensationalized 
in Parliaments and in the media.347 Even though the opposition is supposed to help keep the 
government honest,348 opposition members generally “have little interest in reading reports 
which cannot be wielded as a weapon against ministers.”349 As a result, agents of parliament 
are subject to too little scrutiny. Of course, they gain some of their legitimacy from the fact 
that they are independent from government, but they also gain some legitimacy from the 
public knowing that they “are not all-powerful creatures”350 of parliament who can easily go 
rogue. 
 
(b) How do Agents Account? 
Trying to figure out accountability relationships in the public sector can be very 
complicated, and this is no different when it comes to agents of parliament. Agents are often 
ignored by the parliamentarians whose job it is to hold them to account. As David Pond 
explains: 
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Westminster style legislatures are poorly equipped to supervise their own 
bureaucracies. Members have a vested interest in playing the roles assigned to 
them under the conventions of responsible government which ensures that the 
political executive is held accountable. But they lack similar incentives in their 
working relationships with parliamentary officers.351  
 
Despite the lack of a regular and consistent accountability relationship, what is clear to any 
observer is that agents of parliament do not have unbridled power. Agents have authority 
and influence, but they must also be transparent and meaningfully accountable to Parliament 
in a manner that is appropriate to functions they have.352  
 
Megan Furi has argued that agents account to Parliament in several ways. First, they 
account through the reports that they file with the Speaker(s), who then table them with 
Parliament. Second, some agents have been given jurisdiction that places limits on the 
actions and imposes some responsibility to account to their fellow agents. Third, agents may 
occasionally be required to appear before Parliament or a parliamentary committee.353 This 
includes an annual appearance before a funding board or committee that has the ability to 
question the agent’s expenses and consider their funding requests.354  
 
First, every agent except the Chief Electoral Officer is responsible for filing an annual 
report with Parliament that details the office’s work and accomplishments.355 Often these 
reports will include summaries of investigations that have been conducted and advice or 
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recommendations that have been provided to stakeholders. These reports also generally 
detail outreach activities, if any, and office expenses.  Further to their annual reports, most 
agents are also responsible for producing special reports, such as investigation or audit 
reports. The modern practice is for these reports to be made available to the public on the 
agent’s website after they have been tabled with the Speaker.356 Importantly, if Parliament 
is not in session, agents cannot report to it. This was the case with Auditor-General Sheila 
Fraser’s report into the Sponsorship Scandal, which although completed in 2003 could not 
be tabled and made public until 2004.357  
 
Second, some officers have duties that limit the jurisdiction of other officers.  For 
example, the Commissioner of Lobbying may be responsible for investigating specific 
conflicts of interest that also involve public officials who would otherwise be under the 
jurisdiction of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner. Situations like this could 
require the agents to account to one another and work together on an investigation. Most 
agents are also subject to periodic financial and performance audits initiated by the Auditor 
General358 These interactions between agents can be characterized as examples of oversight 
or accountability, but history suggests that agents do not generally like to cross paths in these 
ways. Agents tend to want to support one another rather than account to one another and 
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prefer to accomplish their oversight goals with as little controversy as possible.  
 
Third, agents are required to appear before parliamentary committees and other select 
bodies.  This is perhaps the most robust accountability mechanism that is in place for agents. 
There are four agents of parliament in Canada who administer legislation that specifically 
designates a committee of the House of Commons or Senate (or both) to review their reports 
and work: the Commissioner of Official Languages, 359  the Access to Information 
Commissioner, 360  the Privacy Commissioner 361  and the Public Sector Integrity 
Commissioner. 362  The other agents administer mandates that have no home committee 
dedicated to their work,363 although most have committees designated to them under the 
Standing Orders of the House of Commons.364 Accordingly, there is never any guarantee 
that an agent’s reports will be the subject of parliamentary review or hearings.  
 
Although the relationship between agents and committees could benefit from being 
strengthened through legislation, parliamentarians do generally trust that agents will bring 
forward matters that require a committee’s attention. 365  David Pond has studied this 
imperfect accountability relationship and noted that: 
In order to hold a parliamentary officer to account Members on both sides of the 
House would have to tone down the partisanship and devote considerable time 
and effort to mastering problems of administration and management. This would 
                                               
359 See OLA, supra note 117, s 88.  
360 Access to Info Act, supra note 128, s 75(1). 
361 Privacy Act, supra note 127, s 75(1). 
362 PSDPA, supra note 150, s 38(4).  
363 PPF Report, supra note 67 at 11. 
364 Standing Orders, supra note 176, s 108(3). 
365 Thomas PSIC, supra note 204 at 15. 
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require developing some level of expertise in the policy field relating to the 
mandate of the parliamentary officer under scrutiny.366 
 
This is of course unlikely given the amount of extra work parliamentarians would be required 
to undertake to gain such skills and probably explains why matters move so slowly when 
agents are seeking improvements to their legislative mandates.367 Perhaps the most that 
agents can do is hope that Parliament will take their observations and recommendations 
seriously, especially when it comes to putting pressure on ministers and the bureaucracy to 
undertake reforms that are needed to help deal with obvious problems.368  
 
Not only do agents account to parliamentary committees with respect to their work, 
but they can also be held personally accountable by those same committees. As I have 
explained above, it is occasionally the case that a committee chooses to investigate an agent. 
Despite the fact that there are many ways to discipline parliamentarians when they 
misbehave, short of removing an agent for incompetence or misbehavior it can be very 
difficult to deal with serious complaints about their conduct.369  
 
Further to their formal reporting relationships to Parliament, agents must also be 
accountable to some degree to the public and to their many public sector stakeholders. Even 
though most of the agents do not have a formal obligation to report their findings to all 
individuals who may be adversely affected by them,370 every agent must take seriously their 
                                               
366 Pond, supra note 221 at 55-56. 
367 PP&F, supra note 45 at 298. 
368 Thomas PSIC, supra note 204 at 15. 
369 PPF Report, supra note 67 at 17. 
370 Constitutional Legitimacy, supra note 83 at page 83. 
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moral obligation to everyone who is impacted by their work. As we will see, this is an 
important theme that also emerges in relation to the work of the COIEC. 
 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I analyzed literature that looks at the constitutional foundation agents 
of parliament are built on and asks whether they represent a legitimate innovation or an 
unacceptable erosion of parliamentary power. Independent oversight bodies in general play 
a key role in enhancing public trust in government, which supports Parliament in its 
accountability work. Despite some confusion about their constitutional legitimacy, agents of 
parliament are no different. Although there are very few comprehensive studies about 
individual agents, the literature does tell us what these agents tend to have in common and 
how those commonalities reflect a shared philosophical commitment to independence and 
accountability. I will return to this important discussion below, in chapter eight in order to 
better understand the implications of delegating a mandate to the COIEC that is properly one 
of the privileges and rights of Parliament, but also to better contextualize the ways in which 
the COIEC’s accountability relationships are evolving. 
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4. Independence in Action 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Agents of parliament have been delegated a notable share of the oversight and 
accountability tasks that have traditionally been the responsibility of Parliament. Some of 
these have been actively performed by Parliament in the past, but most have been given 
attention only if and when necessary.  If delegation to agents is going to be meaningful, then 
they must each be trusted and empowered to assert some degree of independence from 
government. This chapter offers a further overview of the literature on agents of parliament 
in order to explain how these institutions generally operationalize their independence 
through their work. I will begin by discussing the importance of independence and will then 
look at how this philosophical commitment by Parliament has been integrated into the 
structural foundation of these offices. Finally, I will look at what duties agents generally 
undertake and how those duties allow them some further room to assert independence. This 
review will be drawn upon in chapter six to help situate the COIEC’s capacities and decisions 
in relation to how it operationalizes its own independence. 
 
4.2 The Importance of Independence 
 
An agent would not be able to earn the public’s trust if their operations were controlled 
by government or by Parliament, or if they were even perceived to be partisan371 or unduly 
                                               
371 Conservative MP Mark Adler sponsored Bill C-520 in 2014 in an attempt to tackle 
concerns about partisanship in the offices of agents of parliament. Among other things, 
the bill required applicants for agent positions to declare whether they had occupied a 
politically partisan position within the ten years prior. The bill made it to the Senate 
despite a fair bit of objection, but was never passed into law. See Canada, Bill C-520, An 
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influenced. It is accordingly necessary to make the operations of agencies free from both 
executive and parliamentary interference.372 This independence is different in character from 
constitutional independence however, which applies to the judiciary, for example. The 
independence of agents of parliament (as well as other administrative adjudicative and 
regulatory tribunals) is derived from Parliament’s intent, as it is reflected in the individual 
legislative enactments that establish each agent.373   
 
The only way to ensure that an agent has operational independence however, is to 
ensure that they first have structural independence.374 This chapter will take a closer look at 
the relationship between government, Parliament and agents of parliament, to understand the 
degree to which agents have been given structural independence, what that means for their 
operational independence, and what the implications of this independence are in terms of 
their constitutional legitimacy. 
 
To begin, it is important to note that Parliament in Canada had already considered 
what was required for independence long before it ever created the first agent of parliament 
in 1878. An excellent example of the concepts and elements of structural independence 
existed with respect to the judiciary.375 The challenge faced in the context of agents of 
                                               
Act supporting non-partisan offices of agents of Parliament, 2nd Sess, 41st Parl, 2015, cl 
6(1) (second reading in Senate 11 December 2014) [Bill C-520]. 
372 PP&F, supra note 45 at 298. 
373 See e.g. Ocean Port Hotel Ltd v British Columbia (General Manager, Liquor Control 
and Licensing Branch), [2001] 2 SCR 781, 2001 SCC 52 at 782 (where it is established 
that “…absent constitutional constraints, the degree of independence required of a 
particular government decision maker or tribunal is determined by its enabling statute”).  
374 Pond, supra note 221 at 3. 
375 Supra, note 197 at 11. 
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parliament has been to figure out how they differ from the judiciary and what the limits on 
their independence ought therefore to be. Paul Thomas suggests that we begin by asking the 
following questions “...independence for what purpose? from whom? and in relation to 
which activities?”376 We must also keep in mind that our answers will have an impact on 
how we arrive at the right balance between independence and accountability.377 
 
Crucial to sorting these questions out is to always remember that the judiciary’s 
independence is constitutionally mandated, whereas the independence we desire for agents 
is simply an optional component of a purely parliamentary innovation. If we want them to 
be useful however, then what we really want for agents is that they do not feel compelled to 
take direction from the executive in terms of their policy mandates and that they do not allow 
pressure from Parliament to influence their handling of individual cases.378  Jeffrey Graham 
Bell expands on this and argues that agents must:  
…retain their independence from their partisan ‘clients’ in order to furnish 
effective, politically-sensitive yet expert knowledge about the bureaucracy and 
its leadership – or in the case of ‘democracy branch’ institutions, about 
Parliamentarians themselves – to Parliament.379  
 
Independence helps to “ensure more neutral, handling of citizen complaints away from the 
glare of partisan controversy and media publicity,”380  so that agents can perform their 
oversight functions of audit and investigation as they see fit.381  
 
                                               
376 PP&F, supra note 45 at 297. 
377 Luncheon Speech, supra note 36 at 22. 
378 PP&F, supra note 45 at 307. 
379 Bell, supra note 92 at 20. 
380 PP&F, supra note 45 at 293. 
381 Aucoin, supra note 79 at 21. 
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This desire for real and perceived independence stands in stark contrast to the 
historically accepted practice of the governing party and its executive branch appointing its 
supporters to positions within government (i.e. making patronage appointments).382  To 
simply say that an agent is or must be independent, however, is not enough to make sense of 
what that ‘independence’ means. Ross Denham took up this challenge and put together a list 
in 1974 of what he thought was necessary to protect the auditor general’s capacity for 
objectivity and independence: 
1! the auditor’s reporting responsibility must be established and the general 
kind of information to be reported must be understood by all parties; 
2! the auditor general must be guaranteed access to all pertinent information; 
3! realistic procedures must be established for funding the Office of the 
Auditor General; 
4! special arrangements must be established for the appointment, dismissal, 
term of service, and salary level of the auditor general; 
5! the level of technical qualification of the auditor general and his staff 
should be clearly stated in order to suggest the level of expertise and 
judgment expected from the office; and 
6! a separate Auditor General Act should be enacted.383 
 
Denham’s list was only focused on the Auditor-General, but Paul Thomas has built from it 
and created a newer list of indicia that applies more broadly to all agents of parliament. 
Thomas lists five structural features that we must consider when assessing the level of 
independence of parliamentary agencies:  
•! the nature of the mandate of the agency, including how it is defined initially 
and how it is updated periodically; 
•! the provisions respecting the appointment, tenure and removal of the 
leadership of the agency;  
•! the processes for deciding budgets and staffing for the agency; 
•! whether the agency is free to identify issues for study and whether it can 
compel the production of information; and 
                                               
382 Smith, supra note 254 at 4 (the interview with Deborah Deller on 8 February 2011 
provides an example of this type of appointment process where government pushes its 
own recommendation). 
383 Denham, supra note 81 at 266. 
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•! the reporting requirements for the agency and whether its performance is 
monitored.384  
 
These indicia are instructive and will help to clarify during our analysis below that the 
COIEC suffers from an institutional structure that limits its independence in several 
important ways. It is also important to remember however, that Parliament itself must retain 
some meaningful degree of control over agents. It is only through the parliamentary process 
that accountability and performance improvement can be achieved.385  This complicated 
interplay between independence and accountability should always remain front of mind in 
the design of these agencies. That being said, it will become clear in chapter six that the 
COIEC benefits from neither robust independence nor a meaningful accountability 
relationship with Parliament.  
 
 
4.3 Structural Independence 
 
If Parliament would like agents to be as effective as they can be at holding 
government to account, then parliamentarians ought to be constantly concerned about both 
the structural and operational independence of those agents. Limits to structural 
independence have become clear from our analysis of the appointment and annual budget 
determination processes, but unsettled concerns about their constitutional legitimacy  may 
also play a role in why governments are hesitant to commit to greater structural 
independence. Where agents have been notably more successful at solidifying their 
independence from government has been in relation to their operations. Several of the agents 
run rather large bureaucracies with significant budgets and a great deal of responsibility. 
                                               
384 PP&F, supra note 45 at 297. 
385 Thomas PSIC, supra note 204 at 12. 
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Their ability to exercise autonomy with regard to the hiring and firing of staff, salaries, day-
to-day operations and their relationships with their stakeholders is very important.  
 
(a) Control over operations and finances  
To guard against government relinquishing too much control over how public funds 
are spent, the Treasury Board has long made it a policy to retain specific oversight powers 
in relation to some administrative matters, such as human resources, reporting and 
compensation. These Treasury Board directives pre-dated the Advisory Panel pilot study and 
applied to agents of parliament. One of the policies that the Treasury Board adopted was to 
require advance approval by the Privy Council office of communication strategies from some 
federal institutions. Another was that Treasury Board officials had the right to audit and 
examine the records of any federal institution. This effectively meant that government 
officials could potentially access investigation records held by an agent of parliament.386 
Although there is no record of any agent having been audited by the Treasury Board in this 
way, the existence of this right made them very nervous. Allowing the Treasury Board to 
retain such power could give rise to real or apparent government interference in the 
independence of agents.387  
 
Agents of parliament responded to this concern by forming a working group and 
engaging in discussions with the Treasury Board and arguing that they ought to be exempted 
from directives that could compromise their independence.388 These discussions were partly 
                                               
386 Hurtubise-Loranger, supra note 172 at 77. 
387 Fraser Speech, supra note 85. 
388 Chaplin LLM, supra note 77 at 30. 
 112 
successful, and the government House Leader declared on May 1, 2008, that the government 
“has no intention of requiring those independent agents of Parliament to vet their 
communications through the government in any way.”389 
 
In an interesting assertion of its independence after having expressed concerns about 
the Treasury Board’s oversight role, the Parliamentary Budget Officer released a study on 
October 9, 2008 that examined the fiscal impact of the Canadian mission in Afghanistan. 
The study was met with considerable resentment because a federal election was set to take 
place only five days later. Parliamentarians, especially those in government who were 
running for re-election, argued that the timing of this study’s release was “…in violation of 
the long standing practice in the federal public service that no public servant can release any 
report during the writ period on the basis that no public servant should influence the outcome 
of an election.”390  
 
Then in June 2009, perhaps as an indirect response to the Parliamentary Budget 
Officer’s decision about the Afghanistan mission report and after lengthy discussions with 
the agents, the Treasury Board Secretariat modified its directives so that agents of parliament 
would have full autonomy over matters that other deputy heads were still being held 
accountable for by their ministers and Treasury Board.391  This applied to matters such as 
                                               
389 House of Commons Debates, 39th Parl, 2nd Sess (1 May 2008) at 14:15 (Peter van 
Loen). 
390 Lee, supra note 158 at page 24 (i.e. the caretaker convention). 
391 Fraser Speech, supra note 85. 
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hospitality, engaging legal counsel, creating policies on evaluation, common-look-and-feel 
standards for the Internet, internal controls and financial management.392 
 
Not having to answer to the Treasury Board provides agents of parliament with the 
autonomy they need to be able to manage their offices on a day-to-day basis without being 
worried about whether they are going to be undermined. This allows them to make decisions 
that may seem controversial or undesirable to government officials. For example, operational 
independence is important for agents who want to conduct special studies or research 
projects, such as the Afghanistan report released by the Parliamentary Budget Officer. The 
Privacy Commissioner has used the power to conduct special studies to justify producing 
research reports on such issues as drug testing, AIDS and genetic testing.393 Of course the 
executive ultimately retains significant control over office budgets and can use that power 
to influence and affect the work of the agents (e.g. smaller budgets might mean fewer special 
projects can be undertaken), but there is significant political pressure placed on governments 
to avoid this type of interference. We have also seen agents become very vocal about the fact 
that their capacity to do meaningful work is being impacted by having small budgets. The 
Commissioner of Lobbying, for example, told the House Standing Committee on Access to 
Information, Privacy and Ethics that she has “concerns about her budget envelope”394 and 
this was reported by the news media.395  
                                               
392 Ibid. 
393 Bennett, supra note 274 at 229. 
394 Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy 
and Ethics, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess (16 May 2019) at 1635 (Nancy Bélanger). 
395 Samantha Allen Wright, “Lobbying czar has ‘concerns’ for her office’s budget, warns 
court decision could widen workload” (22 May 2019) The Hill Times, online: 
 114 
 
Finally, operational separation from government allows agents to conduct 
investigations and provide advice without having to be concerned about political matters or 
about whether they will be asked to answer directly to anyone for their individual operational 
decisions. This is especially helpful in relation to the sensitive investigations that many 
agents must conduct. As Ann Chaplin notes, “…none of the officers are required to hold a 
hearing, similar to a court process. All of their investigations can proceed behind closed 
doors – indeed, in some cases the legislation requires this.”396 For agents like the Public 
Sector Integrity Commissioner or the Commissioner of Lobbying, both of whom may be 
required to conduct investigations into allegations that specific individuals have done 
something wrong, it can help to move an investigation forward if you are able to reassure 
witnesses that their testimonies will remain confidential. 
 
(b) Control over staffing, including salaries 
Agents of parliament are delegated their staffing authority from the Public Service 
Commission.397 There are accordingly certain reasonable limitations to the control that most 
agents have over their staffing decisions, including that their employees remain subject to 
federal laws and policies. An early study of the Auditor General’s office by Ross Denham 
concluded that a certain level of independence over hiring is important because it allows 
agents to proactively address concerns about stagnation and inertia while also working to 
                                               
<https://www.hilltimes.com/2019/05/22/lobbying-czar-has-concerns-for-offices-budget-
warns-court-could-widen-workload/200781>. 
396 Constitutional Legitimacy, supra note 83 at 82. 
397 Ibid at 91; See also e.g. Public Service Employment Act, SC 2003, c 22, s 15. 
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enhance the prestige of their office by recruiting a group of motivated, highly professional 
and well-trained individuals.398    
 
(c) Judicial Review and Parliamentary Privilege 
Many agents of Parliament are subject to access to information requests.399 This may 
seem odd given the emphasis placed on their independence, but it is also very informative. 
Being subject to the Access to Information Act is a clear limit on independence. The Integrity 
Commissioner of Ontario, by contrast, is expressly excluded from that province’s Access to 
Information legislation.400  If agents can be compelled to disclose information about their 
operations, then the question arises as to whether they can also be judicially reviewed. If a 
person questions a decision made by an agent of parliament, can they ask the court to 
intervene? The answer is necessarily yes.  The court determined in Page v Mulcair that:  
It is a fundamental principle of the separation of powers among Parliament, the 
Executive and the Courts, that Parliament cannot oust the superintending power 
of superior courts when it comes to ordinary citizens. Despite their wording, 
privative clauses are of limited value and go more to the standard of judicial 
review, rather than to the right of review.401 
 
Instead, the only choice agents have if they wish to avoid judicial review of their work is to 
assert that their work is protected by parliamentary privilege. There is very little case law on 
this point however, and so it is not clear when, if ever, each individual agent can claim such 
privilege in the face of judicial review.  There are examples of the Conflict of Interest and 
Ethics Commissioner asserting parliamentary privilege in the context of the work that the 
                                               
398 Denham, supra note 81 at 269-71. 
399 Access to Info, supra note 128, Schedule I (neither the Information Commissioner nor 
the COIEC are listed here). 
400 See MIA, supra note 273, s 29(2). 
401 Page v Mulcair, [2014] 4 RCF 297, 2013 FC 402 at para 32 [Page]. 
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office does for MPs, but the right to do so has been expressly provided for in the Parliament 
of Canada Act:402 
Functions: members of House of Commons 
86 (1) The Commissioner shall perform the duties and functions assigned by the 
House of Commons for governing the conduct of its members when they are 
carrying out the duties and functions of their office as members of that House. 
Privileges and immunities 
 
(2) The duties and functions of the Commissioner under subsection (1) are 
carried out within the institution of the House of Commons. The Commissioner 
enjoys the privileges and immunities of the House of Commons and its members 
when carrying out those duties and functions. 
 
Even though the Courts have demonstrated tremendous deference to Parliament as having 
conferred in the text of enabling statute all the rights it intended to,403 and even though only 
the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner has been expressly conferred parliamentary 
privilege, it is still possible that some agents will be able to assert parliamentary privilege in 
some circumstances. For example, when an agent’s work deals directly with the work of 
Parliament to hold government to account. That being said, none of this is clear. The only 
thing that is clear is that most of the agents of parliament cannot be compelled to testify in 
court relating to the substantive work that they undertake.404 As will be explained below in 
chapter 4.4(g), Parliament went out of its way to ensure these protections were part of the 
agents’ legislative mandates. Ann Chaplin has observed:  
If the officers’ functions were considered to be under the control of or 
answerable to Parliament, it would logically follow that privilege would protect 
their activities from judicial scrutiny. However, Parliament itself does not seem 
                                               
402 PC Act, supra note 15, s 86. 
403 Karine Azoulay, “Making the Case: Canada’s PBO, the Courts and the Fourth Branch 
of Government” (2014) 8 JPPL 107 at 125. 
404 See discussion below, in chapter 4.4(g). 
 117 
sufficiently confident of this point to leave the officers unprotected from suits 
and prosecution before the courts.405 
 
Given the effort that we will see has been made in relation to both compellability and libel 
and slander, it is clear that Parliament chose not to deal with parliamentary privilege. It is 
therefore quite possible that agents can be subjected to judicial review in relation to their 
work. They will have to handle each application for judicial review on a case-by-case basis. 
 
Knowing that they could be subject to judicial review could influence how an agent 
of Parliament undertakes their operational responsibilities. It could, for example, persuade 
an agent to be more conservative and less aggressive in their interpretation of their legislative 
mandate(s). As I have explained above, agents can potentially be removed from their 
positions very easily. In a majority government, for instance, there may be very little to 
protect an agent who makes a mistake from being removed from their position. If an agent 
is concerned that their office’s work product may be subject to judicial review that could 
embarrass them, they may be less likely to make decisions that threaten the status quo. I will 
explain in chapter eight how the possibility of being subjected to judicial review can be 
creatively guarded against by an agent who is protected by parliamentary privilege.  
 
In the next section, I will explain the operational responsibilities that most agents of 
parliament have in common. Each individual agent must approach their work through their 
own personal philosophical and interpretive lens. Some may take a restrictive approach and 
not allow too much flexibility in how they interpret their mandate(s), whereas others may be 
                                               
405 Constitutional Legitimacy, supra note 83 at 94. 
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more flexible and permissive. It is through their personal choices regarding how to fulfil  
their responsibilities that agents are able to operationalize their independence in different 
ways.  
 
4.4 Operational Responsibilities 
 
 Our brief look in chapter two at eight of the nine mandates drew attention to Ann 
Chaplin’s point that agents of parliament are not simply Parliament’s whole mandate of 
holding government to account divided up into eight pieces. 406 Each office is different and 
responds to a different need.  Some of these offices complement each other very well, such 
as the Information and Privacy Commissioners’ offices and the Parliamentary Budget and 
Chief Electoral Officers, but there is generally very little overlap amongst them in terms of 
their mandates. What does unite them all however, is that Parliament has created them to 
fulfil functions that it either does not believe itself capable of fulfilling, or that it believes the 
public is more comfortable with a person fulfilling who is independent of Parliament and/or 
government. This makes sense, especially given the inherent conflict of interest that exists 
in Parliament policing itself. Having these independent bodies to evaluate it allows 
government to present itself as being more dependable and trustworthy.  
 
Even though these agents may exist for the purpose of offering a type of solution to 
concerns about public trust, their constant oversight presence can also give rise to some 
tensions. As Alan Freeman explained: “…governments are loathe to create independent 
Agents – “What’s in it for you but grief?” – and only do it because they are forced to 
                                               
406 Ibid.
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politically.”407 Because parliamentarians are effectively giving up power when they create 
these agents, it is no surprise to hear a legislator like Mr. Freeman say that “…when an Office 
is created, you want to give them the least amount of power possible.” 408 
 
This puts agents of parliament in a bit of a challenging position. On the one hand, 
their mandates are all values-based and values-driven so they want to be effective at fulfilling 
those values-driven mandates, presumably even when their legislation is too inflexible to 
allow them to do so. Having some legislative flexibility, for example, would allow agents of 
parliament to be more responsive when they are criticized by others for not doing enough to 
respond to concerns about matters over which they merely appear to have jurisdiction 
because of the values at play in their mandates, but do not have any actual jurisdiction. On 
the other hand, if agents do push the limits of their mandates in their search for common 
sense, value-driven solutions to matters that are on their radar but slightly outside of their 
reach, then they risk falling into a trap where their behaviour can irreparably damage their 
own position and the reputation of the office they hold. It is accordingly very important that 
agents of parliament not only understand the limitations of their legislative mandates, but 
also that they have a strong sense of how their offices fit into the broader constitutional 
scheme that legitimizes their existence. This understanding of their limitations allows agents 
to more effectively  carry out their operational responsibilities in a way that maximizes their 
independence.   
 
                                               
407 Freeman Interviews, supra note 262 at 3. 
408 Ibid. 
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Having established the importance of independence in theory, I will now turn to an 
overview of the common operational responsibilities held by the agents of parliament in 
order to draw attention to how independence can and does manifest itself in different ways 
through the actions of the individuals who hold these offices. As will be further explored in 
the context of the COIEC in chapters seven and eight, each individual who is appointed as 
an agent is generally provided with sufficient autonomy within their legislative mandate(s) 
to be able to make choices about the manner in which they will assert their independence.  
 
(a) Advisory Functions 
The advisory function is fundamental to each of the nine agents of parliament. The 
stakeholders to whom they are permitted or required to offer advice obviously varies 
amongst them, but it is clear that advice-giving is one of their primary functions. What 
becomes an interesting point of difference between the agents is the question of when and to 
whom they can offer advice. For example, the Parliamentary Budget Officer is now required 
to cost out potential election campaign proposals for some individuals.409 The Commissioner 
of Lobbying is charged with “developing and implementing educational programs to foster 
public awareness of the requirements of the Lobbying Act, particularly on the part of 
lobbyists, their clients and public office holders.”410 This would doubtless necessitate giving 
advice to pretty much anyone who asks a question about lobbying in Canada. 
 
Advice is provided by agents in many forms. For example, every agent responds to 
                                               
409 PC Act, supra note 15, s 79.21(1). 
410 Lobbying Act, supra note 141, s 4.2(2). 
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telephone and emailed/written inquiries from their stakeholders. Some agents are even 
pushing the envelope and integrating technology into their advisory work. Their websites 
are loaded with helpful resources, including information bulletins,411 current and past annual 
reports that contain sample advisory opinions, and several of them are even active on social 
media. 412  Some agents have legislative mandates that are very restrictive about what 
information can be shared publicly,  including what can be contained in an annual report, but 
most allow flexibility as long as confidential information is not disclosed by the agent in the 
exercise of their duties. 
 
An interesting challenge to the generally broad advisory function of most agents of 
parliament arises when we consider that they are also charged with investigating alleged 
violations of the rules found in their respective legislative mandates. This can lead to some 
tensions. For example, the Privacy Commissioner may audit the personal information 
handling practices of a federal institution and then offer that institution advice on how to fix 
something. If that practice is then fixed, but still becomes the subject of a complaint by a 
member of the public, then the Privacy Commissioner has a conflict. Can the commissioner 
legitimately investigate the acceptability of an information handling practice that the 
commissioner has already approved of? Proceeding with an investigation in this 
                                               
411 See e.g. Alberta, Office of the Ethics Commissioner, “Ethics Bulletins” (accessed 19 
July 2019), online/: <http://www.ethicscommissioner.ab.ca/publications/ethics-
bulletins/>. 
412 See e.g. Ian Stedman “Harnessing the Twittersphere: How using social media can 
benefit government ethics offices” (2018) 61:S1 Can Pub Admin 79 (for a discussion of 
Offices with Twitter accounts) [Harnessing Twitter]. 
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circumstance might give rise to questions about whether the investigation is acceptably 
unbiased.  
 
This concern about agents of parliament investigating whether their own advice was 
expressed by Herbert Balls back in the 1970s:  
...it was recognized that active intervention by the Comptroller and Auditor 
General in administrative matters would prejudice the independence of his work 
as a servant of the legislature.  This was based on the belief that any interference 
by an auditor before transactions were complete lessened the responsibility of 
the administrative or accounting officer and rendered the auditor incompetent to 
express an independent opinion and to form objective judgments on acts which 
he had advised or sanctioned.413 
 
If one of the motivations behind creating agents of parliament is to improve public trust in 
government accountability and oversight, then it is important to be attentive to this 
challenging aspect of the advisory function. Advice-giving is no less valuable because of the 
possibility of this type of conflict arising, but it is certainly important for parliamentarians 
to ensure that there are other, independent ways to investigate a complaint in such 
circumstances. An example of such an alternative will be provided in the ‘Investigatory 
Functions’ section below, at chapter 4.4.(c). 
 
(b) Auditing Functions 
Only some agents of parliament examine or inspect their stakeholders' financial 
accounts or other work product. The Auditor General and Commissioner of Official 
Languages are two obvious examples of agents who undertake audits. Audits are built into 
legislative mandates as being mandatory and routine, depending on the matter being 
                                               
413 Balls, supra note 49 at 602. 
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considered or the time of year where something is designated to take place. For example, the 
Auditor General is required to “examine the several financial statements required by section 
64 of the Financial Administration Act to be included in the Public Accounts.”414  The 
Commissioner of Official Languages may initiate a review of: 
(a) any regulations or directives made under this Act, and 
(b) any other regulations or directives that affect or may affect the status or use 
of the official languages, 
and may refer to and comment on any findings on the review in a report made to 
Parliament…415 
 
Audit reports are provided to the subject(s) of the audit,416 but they are also generally tabled 
with Parliament and made available to the public on agents’ websites. These audit reports 
help government stakeholders improve their own operations and/or work product, but they 
also arguably serve as further helpful forms of public outreach and education.  
 
(c) Investigatory Functions 
The power to conduct investigations is central to how the oversight and 
accountability functions of agents of parliament have been operationalized. How 
investigations can be triggered varies widely however, and seems to depend on what values 
underpin each individual agent’s mandate(s). An investigation can be triggered by a 
complaint being received from a member of the public or a public official, or by an agent of 
                                               
414 Auditor General Act, supra note 96, s 6. 
415 OLA, supra note 117, s 57. 
416 Ibid, s 59. 
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parliament exercising their ‘own initiative’ right to investigate. Some examples of the 
investigative power are as follows: 
•! The Commissioner of Lobbying has the right to investigate whether someone is engaging 
in unregistered lobbying;417  
•! The Commissioner of Official Languages has a responsibility to investigate any 
complaint that is made about a federal institution not recognizing the status of an official 
language;418 and, 
•! The Privacy Commissioner must investigate any complaint received from an individual 
who alleges “that personal information about themselves held by a government 
institution has been used or disclosed otherwise than in accordance [with the Act].”419  
 
The power and duty to conduct investigations mirrors the power that Parliament has to 
do the same.  In fact, Parliament cannot fully delegate away its own powers of investigation 
to agents of parliament. Parliament therefore retains the right to investigate a matter even if 
an agent is also doing so. It may not always be the case that the public trusts Parliament to 
investigate matters, especially if they concern Parliament itself, but that does not prevent it 
from doing so. Most often such investigations would be conducted by committees or sub-
committees that include members from each of the parties. Obviously, this can still lead to 
controversial outcomes, especially in super-majority situations, but it is important that 
Parliament retain this right to investigate. One reason why this is particularly important is 
                                               
417 Lobbing Act, supra note 141, s 10.4(1). 
418 OLA, supra note 117, s 58(1)(a). 
419 Privacy Act, supra note 127, s 29(1)(a). 
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because an agent may do a poor job on an investigation or may become embroiled in a 
controversy relating to a file they are working on.420  
 
The investigatory function also often overlaps with an agent’s advisory functions. An 
agent’s advice may be relied upon and followed, for example, but the recipient may still find 
themselves in a compromising position. This gives rise to questions about whether an agent 
should be permitted to investigate a matter that arose after an individual followed that agent’s 
advice. Some of the agents’ legislative mandates contemplate that these types of conflicts 
may arise, but others are silent on this possibility. Should an agent be bound by their own 
advice and, if so, how should that agent be held accountable if their advice was wrong? There 
are at least two different ways to handle these situations. One approach to is to allow agents 
to engage external experts who can independently undertake an investigation on their behalf. 
The agent would not be involved in any way whatsoever and Parliament would consider that 
report. Another approach is to stipulate that an agent is bound by their own advice and then 
require a parliamentary committee to conduct the investigation instead. There are 
implications for an agent’s ability to exercise independence depending on how the mandate 
is structured. That being said, Parliament must have a right to step in and take over when 
such challenges present themselves.   
 
                                               
420 See e.g. Jane Taber & Robyn Doolittle, “PEI’s conflict-of-interest commissioner steps 
down over gaming deal”, The Globe and Mail (8 March 2015), online:  
(https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/pei-conflict-of-interest-commissioner-
steps-down/article23352036/> (where the Commissioner resigned after losing the 
confidence of the members of the Legislative Assembly). 
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How an agent reports the results of an investigation and whether they are allowed to 
make decisions or simple recommendations also tells us something about the limits of their 
independence. For example, if they are required to provide a copy to the government for 
approval instead of making it directly available to the public. Such a requirement signals that 
the office’s independence is in how they conduct an investigation, not in deciding what 
happens as a result of that investigation. Most agents have no powers to punish or compel 
remedial conduct,421 but have instead been given the power to issue reports that are made 
available to the public for its consideration. In other words, the power to influence behaviour 
generally stems from the power to embarrass a party (e.g. individuals, agencies or 
governments), rather than from any legislated power to compel conduct. 
 
(d) Power to Compel Testimony  
Although the investigations conducted by most agents result only in reports that are 
made available to the public,  some agents do have the power to compel witnesses to provide 
documents and oral testimony during those investigations. 422  They also have the 
complementary power to administer oaths.  These powers again mirror the power of 
parliament to do the same 423  and are incredibly important for ensuring that agents of 
parliament are given the tools they need to be able to do their work efficiently and effectively. 
Compelling oral testimony under oath can help legitimate an agent’s findings of fact and 
minimize criticism about those findings within the political arena. This power is also 
                                               
421 As I will explain in chapter 6, the COIEC has some limited power to issue 
administrative monetary penalties.  
422 See e.g. Access to Info, supra note 128, s 36(1)(a); Lobbying Act, supra note 141, s 
10.4(2). 
423 This power exists by virtue of Constitution Act 1867, supra note 18, Preamble & s 18. 
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important because agents can conduct several investigations per year. The cost of taking 
every witness to court in order to compel them to provide testimony could add up quickly. 
According to the Public Policy Forum of Canada, “seven of the national agencies…have 
legal authority to order the production of documents, summon witnesses and compel oral 
testimony.”424 
 
The agents have been given complementary powers as well, depending on their 
mandate. For example, the Privacy Commissioner has the power to: ]!enter any premises occupied by any government institution on satisfying any 
security requirements of the institution related to the premises; ]!converse in private with any person in any premises entered and carry out 
inquiries within the authority of the privacy commissioner; and ]!examine or obtain copies or extracts from books or other records found in any 
premises entered…containing any matter relevant to the investigation.425 
 
With these powers comes a corresponding expectation that investigations will be conducted 
fairly and with a view to preserving the rights of the parties involved. Agents are not formally 
expected to conduct themselves as though they are courts of law or administrative tribunals, 
but when their enforcement tools are more robust and/or invasive, the subjects of their 
investigations ought to be afforded greater procedural protection. What types of enforcement 
mechanisms are appropriate for each agent is not important for this discussion, but what is 
important is that agents with these powers ought to hold themselves to high ethical and legal 
standards when conducting investigations. 
 
                                               
424 Thomas PPF, supra note 50 at 6. 
425 Bennett, supra note 274 at 226. 
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(e) Enforcement (Punishment and Deterrence) 
One of the major criticisms of most agents of parliament is that they have the 
independence to critique the work of government but almost no power of enforcement if they 
uncover wrongdoing.426  This is a fair criticism. In fact, their power is often limited to 
influence 427  and the weak powers of punishment and enforcement they do have are 
unquestionably by design. As Paul Thomas explains: 
Why would ministers agree to create institutions that were bound to be critical 
of them and their departments? One explanation might be that ministers believed 
they were establishing “watchdogs” who could bark but not bite, because 
parliamentary agencies rely almost exclusively on publicity and persuasion.428 
 
It is perhaps for good reason that parliamentarians are hesitant to relinquish more power than 
is politically expedient. Agents of parliament are not elected to their roles in the way that 
legislators are, nor do they exist as a result of some clear provision in the Constitution 
requiring them to exist. As such, there is some apprehension about allowing agents powers 
of enforcement that can be exercised without also having to be specifically approved by 
Parliament.  This apprehension is accompanied by a general sense that agents’ mandates 
must not allow them to have unbridled influence over the political realm. 
 
In search of that fine balance between too little impact, too much influence and 
unchecked power, Parliament has been creative about how it has handled the penalties and 
enforcements powers it has given to agents of parliament. Because each agent is expected to 
file annual and/or special reports, the power of the pen has been foregrounded by 
                                               
426 See e.g. PPF Report, supra note 67 at 3.  
427 Hubertise-Loranger, supra note 172 at 78. 
428 PP&F, supra note 45 at 293. 
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parliamentarians. It is often argued that short of kicking someone out of public office for a 
transgression, the most powerful penalty you can impose in the political realm is to publicly 
name and shame an individual, department or organization who/that has done something 
wrong. This is especially the case for an MP or senior public servant who relies on their 
name and their reputation to help them get hired or re-elected, and for a lobbyist who relies 
on their reputation as a reliable and trustworthy source of information to help them secure 
meetings with public office holders. As a minister whose ministry is audited by the Auditor 
General, your party leader could remove you from your ministerial post if it is revealed that 
you are doing a poor job of managing public funds.  
 
There are no studies to date that tackle the question of which punishments are most 
effective and/or the best deterrents for people in public life who have committed particular 
transgressions. The risk of being named and shamed may in fact be a sufficiently strong 
deterrent, especially given the permanence that comes along with the publication of a 
person’s name and transgression(s) in our modern digital world. Annual reports, special 
reports, parliamentary debates, newspaper articles, social media and other online forums, all 
work together to ensure that a person who commits, and who cares that they have committed, 
a transgression never has a chance to outrun their shame. Ultimately however, finding an 
appropriate balance between blaming and teaching is crucial to whether agents can 
contribute to levels of trust both inside and outside of government. 
 
Some other, rarer powers of punishment include: the ability to recommend and/or 
issue fines (also called “administrative monetary penalties”); the ability to restrict an 
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individual from doing something (e.g. prohibiting an individual from registering as a lobbyist 
after they have been found in violation of the Act or restricting their employment options 
after they leave the public service); and, referring a matter to law enforcement for further 
investigation. This latter option only exists in limited circumstances when an agent’s 
legislative mandate sets out offences. The Access to Information Act, for example, sets out 
that “[n]o person shall obstruct the information Commissioner or any person acting on behalf 
or under the direction of the commissioner in the performance of the commissioner’s duties 
and functions under this Act”429 and provides possible penalties for doing so.  
 
(f) Outreach and Education 
Any agent who has a mandate that involves interacting with members of the public, 
rather than simply interacting with government or parliamentary officials,430 will feel some 
obligation to engage in public outreach initiatives. The Commissioner of Lobbying, as 
detailed above, is a good example of this. The question of whether an agent’s mandate ought 
to expressly include outreach is an important one that cannot be understated. These 
institutions are institutions of Parliament and Parliament is an institution that is expected to 
represent the voice of the voting public. It seems logical that agents would engage the public 
about issues that matter to them so that the public can learn and be informed. That being 
said, the Privacy Commissioner “has no mandate for public education and therefore no 
budget for such activities.”431 
                                               
429 Access to Info, supra note 128, s 67. 
430 An example of an agent who has no express public education mandate under a 
legislative mandate is the Integrity Commissioner of Ontario under the MIA, supra note 
273. 
431 Bennett, supra note 274 at 229. 
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Public engagement takes many forms, including public appearances (e.g. speaking at 
conferences), publishing special reports and annual reports online, appearing before 
televised parliamentary committee meetings,432 engaging with the news media, engaging 
directly with the public through social media, answering phone calls and adding other 
engaging and informative materials to an office’s website.  The public outreach aspect of the 
work of agents has not traditionally been foregrounded, but it is beginning to command a 
great deal of interest and attention. 433  This interest is likely growing because 
“[p]arliamentarians tend to be better at reading people than at reading reports”434 and this is 
frustrating for the agents who work hard to prepare those reports. It has become common 
now for an agent to rely on the response of the public to a report435 rather than to put extra 
effort into trying to get Parliament’s attention. It is likely that we will see even greater public 
outreach if the work of agents continues to fly under the radar of parliamentarians.  
 
(g) Compellability as a Witness and Protection from Libel and Slander 
As a result of the sensitive and often personal nature of the work undertaken by many 
of the agents, consideration has been given by Parliament to whether they need protection 
against being compelled to testify in court. The Privacy Commissioner, 436  Auditor-
                                               
432 Although it may seem like a stretch to call this public engagement, there are many 
agents who publicize their committee appearances on their websites and social media 
accounts. The fact is that these opportunities to testify before parliamentary committees 
do represent an opportunity to speak indirectly to the public about the work that an agent 
does. 
433 See e.g. Harnessing Twitter, supra note 412. 
434 PP&F, supra note 45 at 292. 
435 Denham, supra note 81 at 267. 
436 Privacy Act, supra note 127, s 67. 
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General437 and Public Sector Integrity Commissioner are all excellent examples of agents 
who regularly come into possession of highly sensitive information in the course of their 
work. Parliament does not want these agents to be hindered in the fulfilment of their 
mandates by concerns about whether they will be forced to testify in court and, possibly, 
disclose information that others do not want them to disclose. Many of their legislative 
mandates therefore include provisions that are similar to this one from the Public Servants 
Disclosure Protection Act: 
The Commissioner or any person acting on behalf of or under the direction of 
the Commissioner is not a competent or compellable witness in any proceedings, 
other than a prosecution for an offence under this Act, in respect of any matter 
coming to the knowledge of the Commissioner, or that person, as a result of 
performing any duties under this Act.438 
 
Similar to the concerns about privacy, parliamentarian have also considered whether the 
threat of a lawsuit might have a chilling effect on the ability of agents to effectively do their 
jobs. If it was not being done by agents, the work of public sector oversight and 
accountability would have to be done by Parliament, the members of which would benefit 
from being protected by parliamentary privilege. Whether agents of parliament enjoy 
parliamentary privilege is not always clear and this has inspired parliamentarians to sidestep 
the confusion by inserting clear protections against libel and slander in many of the agents’ 
legislative mandates.439 An example of this type of provision can be found in the Privacy 
Act:     
For the purposes of any law relating to libel or slander, 
                                               
437 A-G Act, supra note 96, s 18.1. 
438 See PSDPA, supra note 150, s 46 (see also Access to Info, supra note 128, s 65; OLA, 
supra note 117, s 75). 
439 See e.g. Access to Info, supra note 128, s 66; A-G Act, supra note 96, s 18.2; OLA, 
supra note 117, s 75, PSDPA, supra note 150, s 47. 
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(a) anything said, any information supplied or any document or thing produced 
in good faith in the course of an investigation carried out by or on behalf of the 
Privacy Commissioner under this Act is privileged; and 
(b) any report made in good faith by the Privacy Commissioner under this Act 
and any fair and accurate account of the report made in good faith in a 
newspaper or any other periodical publication or in a broadcast is privileged.440 
 
These protections are incredibly important for agents to have, even if they may end up being 
unnecessary because they are never relied upon.  
 
(h) Periodic Mandate Reviews  
Several of the agents’ legislative mandates include mandatory annual or periodic 
reviews by Parliament.441 The purpose of these reviews is of course to consider whether the 
legislation needs to be updated to ensure that the agents are doing what needs to be done and 
have the tools they need in order to do so. Interestingly, none of the agents are explicitly 
required to offer recommendations to Parliament about how their legislative mandates can 
be improved. Many of them do offer suggestions on a regular basis however. They do this 
by including subtle and not-so-subtle comments in their annual and special reports, by 
providing their opinion when they appear in front of legislative committees, and by 
occasionally engaging with the media to help them understand why they do not have 
jurisdiction over a matter. Some agents are occasionally asked to prepare reports for 
Parliament to consider in the course of its review of their legislation, but being asked to do 
so is not a given. This is unfortunate, because as Paul Thomas notes, “…informally they see 
                                               
440 Privacy Act, supra note 127, s 67(2). 
441 See e.g. Lobbying Act, supra note 141, s 14.1; PSDPA, supra note 150, s 54; OLA, 
supra note 117, s 88; Privacy Act, supra note 127, s 75; Access to Info, supra note 128, s 
75. 
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it as their mission, to promote public trust and confidence in government by providing 
oversight, strengthening accountability, improving efficiency and effectiveness and helping 
to resolve problems which citizens encounter when dealing with large, bureaucratic 
organizations.”442 Agents can draw directly from their own experience acting as the foremost 
experts on their office’s particular subject matter. It ought to be mandatory to include agents 
in every periodic legislative review. 
 
It is also important to note that mandatory periodic reviews serve as a way for 
Parliament to force itself to actually pay attention to the work of individual agents of 
parliament. It can become too easy for Parliament to simply delegate parts of its oversight 
responsibilities to an agent and then not spend any time or effort monitoring that agent’s 
work. This is especially the case when there are no obvious controversies that are drawing 
the public’s attention to an agent’s work and thus demanding that it be given parliamentary 
oversight. As government grows, the demands on parliamentarians’ time grow as well. 
Agents of parliament who perform their duties effectively and without much controversy can 
easily get lost in the shuffle. One way to ensure that this does not happen is to foreground 
their insights in the periodic review process. 
 
What we sometimes see instead of periodic reviews however, is that agents get 
creative and leverage their relationships with external stakeholders in order to advance their 
interests. In other words, they sometimes fulfil their operational responsibilities by 
leveraging unofficial or informal networks of influence. 
                                               
442 Thomas PSIC, supra note 204 at 6. 
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4.5 Relationships with External Stakeholders 
 
Agents of parliament do not exist in a vacuum. They exist as part of formal networks 
and informal communities of interest, that include parliamentarians, other officers and agents 
of parliament, public servants and even external stakeholders. 443  Most agents interact 
regularly with the public, the media, and with parliamentary committees. There is an agent 
of parliament community that meets occasionally in an effort to support each other and 
discuss common problems.444 The agents even consider ways that they might be able to 
reduce expenses by sharing services. 445   Jamie Baxter’s work helpfully explains these 
relationships as being part of what he calls ‘accountability networks’. These are groups of 
interconnected agencies that function as alternative institutional arrangements and serve to 
reinforce agency independence.446  Each agent of parliament exists as a node in a network 
of the many actors who are involved in that domain of work and their collective success is 
in part dependent on the recognition that there are many different policy instruments at work 
to help encourage greater oversight and accountability.447  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter I looked at how Parliament grants agents a measure of structural and 
operational autonomy that allows agents to act with varying degrees of independence while 
                                               
443 PP&F, supra note 45 at 305; See also Adam Dodek, “What lies ahead for public 
sector ethics?” (2018) 16:1 Can Pub Admin 102 at 108 (for a discussion of the growth of 
the parliamentary accountability industry) [Dodek]. 
444 Fraser Speech, supra note 85. 
445 Ibid. 
446 Baxter, supra note 64. 
447 Bennett, supra note 274 at 239. 
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fulfilling their individual mandates. This overview was intended to be representative, but 
certainly not exhaustive. Some agents have other functions that I have not covered, including 
things like holding inquiries, for example, but the above represent what I feel are the most 
important common denominators. The agents also have important relationships within 
broader accountability networks, as explained in chapter three, but having a grasp of the 
breadth of what is possible in relation to agents’ operational autonomy gives us important 
information about what it means to be in one of these positions. This analysis will be further 
drawn upon in chapter six to help situate the COIEC’s capacities and decisions in relation to 
how it is capable of operationalizing its own independence.  
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5.#The#Evolution#of#Parliamentary#Ethics#in#Canada#
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
An important component of the Westminster system is that there is a privilege 
possessed by the House of Commons that affords it the right to discipline its own members 
and to regulate its own internal affairs. The approach taken to the operationalization of this 
privilege has varied throughout Canada’s history. In fact, as we will see, the regulation of 
the ethical conduct of members of the House of Commons has taken on many forms over the 
years. With the understanding that neither of the office’s commissioners have characterized 
their role as being that of an agent of parliament, this chapter moves into a more detailed 
study of the office itself. I begin by providing an historical overview of the law, politics and 
structure of parliamentary ethics rules in Canada that will help us understand why and how 
these regimes have evolved. The COIEC is Canada’s fourth iteration of its parliamentary 
ethics oversight office, with the design of each successive iteration placing greater emphasis 
on structural and operational independence. I explain the political and legal tensions that 
have served to inspire the emergence of the COIEC and then draw attention to the landscape 
of complementary ethical and legal regimes in which it is situated. Despite the primacy of 
the COIEC in the modern media, it is important to be clear that it is only one of many regimes 
that have authority over the conduct of public officials.  This is important because it helps 
us understand why parliamentarians may lack the political will to make progressive changes 
to the Act and Code.  
 
5.2 History of the Office 
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There has historically been a tremendous amount of trust in and deference to 
Parliament in relation to dealing with parliamentarians who allow their private interests to 
hinder their ability to accomplish their public duties – also known as being in a conflict of 
interest. This started to change in 1964 under Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson’s government 
when he introduced the first written conflict of interest guidelines for cabinet ministers.448 
No doubt inspired by this unprecedented move by Pearson, Stanley Westall wrote in 1965 
that it did not seem necessary: 
This is more often seen at the municipal level. The infrequency of the 
occurrence at the higher level is due, not to a higher standard of morality, but 
to the fact the member’s private life and associations are more widely known, 
that he is policed by his own party and particularly by his own leadership and 
watched eagerly by the Opposition.449 
 
Pearson’s guidelines were replaced in the early 1970s after President of the Privy Council 
Allan MacEachen published a Green Paper called “Members of Parliament and Conflict of 
Interest.”450 The 1973 Green Paper drew attention to the fact that Prime Ministers were 
implementing unified guidelines for ministers, but that the rules for MPs were still set out in 
many different places, including the Criminal Code, the Canada Elections Act, the Standing 
Orders, etc. MacEachen’s paper set out an analysis of a gap that he saw between evolving 
public standards of ethical conduct and those formal rules that existed to govern MPs’ 
conduct.  The paper was not written in response to any particular event or issue, but included 
a set of proposals designed to encourage both parliamentary and public debate on conflict of 
                                               
448 Round Table, “Conflict of Interest Guidelines: Too Little or Too Much?” (1998-9) 
21:4 Can Parl Rev 16 at 17 [Round Table]. 
449 Stanley Westall, Morality in Government (Toronto: The Ontario Woodsworth 
Memorial Foundation, 1965) at 7. 
450 House of Commons Debates, 29th Parl, 2nd Sess (17 July 1973) at 5687 (Statement by 
Hon Allan J MacEachen, President of the Privy Council). 
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interest.451 Although the Green paper discussed two ways to address conflicts of interest: 1) 
the principle of avoidance (i.e. requiring public officials to completely avoid putting 
themselves in conflict of interest situations) and 2) the principle of disclosure (i.e. requiring 
public officials to disclose the existence of their conflicts to some sort of official), 
MacEachen took the position that neither approach would be ideal in every case and that any 
new codification of rules must factor in both approaches.452 
 
It was in the wake of these important discussions about finding new ways to address 
conflicts of interest that Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau issued new conflict of interest 
guidelines for cabinet ministers in July 1973.453 These guidelines defined what was meant 
by a conflict of interest, required ministers to sever all business, commercial or professional 
associations while holding office and required that shares be disposed of or put in a trust in 
certain circumstances. Prime Minister Trudeau was very clear to note that the guidelines 
would not apply to ministers’ spouses and their families, but encouraged ministers to “act 
within the spirit of the guidelines” and “have regard for the possibility of a conflict of interest 
                                               
451 Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “Personal 
Trading Policies, Proactive Public Financial Disclosure and Conflicts of Interest” (Public 
Sector Ethics Conference – Panel Discussion, Toronto, 1 June 2018), online: 
<https://ciec-ccie.parl.gc.ca/en/publications/Documents/Presentations/ 
Public%20Sector%20Ethics%20Conference%20Panel%20Discussion%20June%201%20
2018%20EN.pdf> at 4 [Dion Trading Policies]. 
452 Canada, Office of the Privy Council, Members of Parliament and Conflicts of Interest, 
by Allan J MacEachen (Ottawa: Information Canada, July 1973) at 6 [MacEachen Green 
Paper]. 
453 House of Commons Debates, 29th Parl, 2nd Sess (18 July 1973) at 5735 (Statement by 
Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau) reprinted in at Kenneth M Gibbons & Donald C 
Rowat, eds, Political Corruption in Canada: Cases, Causes and Cures (Toronto: 
McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1976) at 264. 
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arising or appearing to arise from dealings…in which his spouse or dependent children may 
be involved.”454  
 
New guidelines for various groups of public servants and governor-in-council 
appointees were also announced at that time.455 It was not until 1974 that Canada’s first 
federal conflict of interest administrator, the Assistant Deputy Registrar General (ADRG), 
was appointed. 456  The ADRG’s office was established within what was formerly the 
Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs 457  and had several responsibilities, 
including: providing advice to the Prime Minister and members of his Cabinet and 
processing compliance documents that cabinet ministers were required to file as part of their 
obligations under Trudeau’s 1973 guidelines. The ADRG appears to have been established 
not because of any deficiency of the committee system, but in direct response to 
MacEachen’s green paper. MacEachen had proposed what he called an Independence of 
Parliament Act and recommended that it be administered and enforced by the Attorney 
                                               
454 Ibid. 
455 Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “Canada’s 
Federal Conflict of Interest Regime: History, Present Course and Future Directions” (30th 
Annual Administrative Law Seminar, Ottawa, 9 May 2013), online: < https://ciec-
ccie.parl.gc.ca/en/publications/Documents/Presentations/Podium%20CALS%20speaking
%20notes%20May%209%202013.pdf> at 3 [Dawson Future Directions]. 
456 Dion Trading Policies, supra note 451 at 5. 
457 Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “The Conflict of 
Interest and Ethics Commissioner: A Hybrid” (Paper delivered at 5th Annual National 
Forum on Administrative Law and Practice, Toronto, 14-15 October 2009), online: 
<https://ciec-ccie.parl.gc.ca/en/publications/Documents/Presentations/ 
Osgoode%20Hall%20companion%20paper%20Oct%202009%20EN.pdf> at 18 (Author: 
Commissioner Mary Dawson) [Dawson Hybrid Paper]. 
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General.458 Instead of burdening an MP with this responsibility however, the Prime Minister 
decided to create a separate administrative office to oversee the new guidelines. 
 
(a) Assistant Deputy Registrar General (1974) 
The Assistant Deputy Registrar General was not independent of government and 
reported back in two different ways. The ADRG reported through the Minister of Consumer 
and Corporate Affairs for matters related to the office’s resources and through the Clerk of 
the Privy Council to the Prime Minister for matters related to the office’s operations.459  The 
rules administered by the ADRG included rules against the use of insider information for 
personal gain, restrictions on permissible outside activities and a requirement for ministers 
to either divest or publicly declare particular assets that they held. Ministers were also 
prohibited from sitting as directors on corporate boards. The first formal post-employment 
rules for ministers did not come into effect until January 1, 1978.460  
 
Joe Clark succeeded Trudeau as Prime Minister and in 1979 made the guidelines 
public for the first time, while also broadening them so that they applied to spouses and 
dependent children of cabinet ministers.461 The principle innovation under Clark’s revised 
                                               
458 MacEachen Green Paper, supra note 452 at 35. 
459 Ian Greene & David P Shugarman, Honest Politics: Seeking Integrity in Canadian   
Public Life (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company Ltd., 1997) at 156 [Honest Politics]. 
460 Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “Opening 
Statement to the Oliphant Commission on mandate of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics 
Commissioner and post-employment rules” (Ottawa, 17 June 2009), online: <https://ciec-
ccie.parl.gc.ca/en/publications/Documents/Presentations/Presentation%20Oliphant%20C
ommission%2017%20juin%202009%20EN.pdf > at 1 [Dawson Oliphant] 
(these were called the ‘Conflict of Interest and Post-Employment Code for Public Office 
Holders’). 
461 Honest Politics, supra note 459 at 50. 
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guidelines was a new requirement that even interests that did not give rise to conflicts would 
have to be publicly disclosed.462 The move to make the rules applicable to spouses was 
poorly received and would eventually be walked back by Trudeau when he was re-elected 
as Prime Minister in 1980.463 
 
It was also after Trudeau’s re-election that some of the deficiencies of the ADRG 
model started to come to light. In 1983, shortly after he left office, former cabinet Minister 
Allistair Gillespie was accused of having business dealings with his old department.464 These 
types of dealings were prohibited by the post-employment rules, but the problem with 
enforcing those rules was clearly that the ADRG was not independent of government. Sitting 
MPs came to Gillespie’s defense and insisted that he asked for no favours when he 
approached his old department with his profit-making idea. 465  The opposition parties 
persisted however, which caused Prime Minister Trudeau in 1983 to ask former cabinet 
ministers Michael Starr and Mitchell Sharp (Conservative and Liberal, respectively) to form 
a Task Force and prepare a report that would offer recommendations for a revised conflict 
of interest regime. The end result was a May 1984 report that included the most 
comprehensive attempt to date to document what it meant to be in a conflict of interest.466  
                                               
462 Andrew Stark, “Conflict of Interest in Canada” in Christine Trost & Alison L Gash, 
eds, Conflicts of Interest and Public Life: Cross-National Perspectives (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008) 125 at 126-7 [Stark COI]. 
463 Round Table, supra note 448 at 17. 
464 Honest Politics, supra note 459 at 50. 
465 Mary Janigan, “Uncommon Scent of Scandal”, Maclean’s (7 March 1983), online 
(archived): <http://archive.macleans.ca/article/1983/3/7/uncommon-scent-of-
scandal#!&pid=14> at 14-15. 
466 Michael Starr and Mitchell Sharp (co-chairs), “Ethical Conduct in the Public Sector: 
Task Force on Conflict of Interest” (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, May 1984) 
[Starr & Sharp].  
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The Starr and Sharp Report drew attention to the independence deficiency in the 
current ADRG model when it noted that “conflict-of-interest rules are intended to promote 
impartial decision-making and equality of treatment.”467 The report put forth a vision for a 
legislated code of ethical conduct that could be applicable to practically all public office 
holders, not only ministers of the Crown, and it also recommended that a new office be 
created to administer the comprehensive legislative rules. 
 
Brian Mulroney had different plans when he became Prime Minister in 1985. Instead 
of following up on Starr and Sharpe’s recommendations, Mulroney quickly introduced a new 
Conflict of Interest and Post Employment Code for Public Office Holders in January 1986.468 
Mulroney’s Code was simply a guideline and was not legislated.  The Code consolidated 
everything into one document, including rules for ministers, parliamentary secretaries, 
ministerial staff, all public servants and governor-in-council appointees.469 During that time, 
Ontario’s government had also been dealing with scandals of its own and took the important 
step of commissioning a now famous report from former Lieutenant-Governor John Black 
Aird. Aird was asked to “review the compliance of all cabinet members with the guidelines 
and to recommend improvements to the rules.”470 In his report, Aird argued that conflict of 
                                               
467 Ian Greene, David P Shugarman & Robert Shepherd, “Chapter 3: Ethical Problems in 
Public Life” in HP Now, supra note 78 at 75 (citing Starr & Sharp, supra note 466). 
468 Honest Politics, supra note 459 at 51; Dion Trading Policies, supra note 451 at 6. 
469 Dawson Future Directions, supra note 455 at 2. 
470 John B Aird, Report on Ministerial Compliance with the Conflict of Interest 
Guidelines and Recommendations with Respect to those Guidelines (Toronto: Blake, 
Cassels & Graydon, 1986) [Aird] (see Ian Stedman, Understanding the Unwritten Rules: 
Examining the Use of Ontario Parliamentary Convention to Guide the Conduct of 
Elected Officials in Ontario (LLM Thesis, University of Toronto, 2015), online: 
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interest guidelines ought to be replaced by legislation and that this would help ensure that 
they are “drawn with the precision of a statute” instead of being vague and imprecise.471 
Despite what may have looked like a progressive move by Mulroney to issue his new 
guidelines, they were not legislative and seem to have fallen into the trap of imprecision that 
Aird had warned about. The next two years proved to be rather difficult for the governing 
party. According to Ian Greene and David Shugarman, Mulroney’s government found itself 
embroiled in no less than fourteen conflict of interest scandals involving ministers and their 
staff.472 The most widely publicized of these fourteen was the Sinclair Stevens affair. 
 
Sinclair Stevens was a cabinet minister who was accused of violating the Code by 
continuing to be involved in the management of his private companies.473  There were 
numerous allegations against him and the pressure on Mulroney to deal with them led the 
Prime Minister to call for a judicial inquiry. The inquiry was conducted by Mr. Justice 
William Parker, Chief Justice of what was then the High Court of Ontario. Mulroney’s Code 
quickly became the subject of national attention. In his report that was released in December 
1987, Mr. Justice Parker recommended that ministers’ assets, interests and activities all be 
publicly disclosed. Justice Parker also favoured divestment by ministers of their private 
assets where ownership of those assets could lead to obvious conflicts of interest, and he 
                                               
<https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/handle/1807/74475> (for a comprehensive history of 
parliamentary conflict of interest rules in Ontario, including an in-depth analysis of the 
Aird Report)). 
471 Aird, supra note 470 at 2. 
472 Honest Politics, supra note 459 at 51. 
473 See Canada, Commission of Inquiry into the Facts of Allegations of Conflict of Interest 
Concerning the Honourable Sinclair M. Stevens, (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and 
Services, 1987) (Commissioner: The Honourable W D Parker) [Sinclair Stevens]. 
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favoured recusal by ministers when an actual conflict of interest arose in the course of their 
duties.474 Mere disclosure of a conflict of interest was thought to be insufficient.  
 
The Parker report was followed three months later by the introduction of the first of 
four conflict of interest bills, none of which made it through to becoming law.475 Bill C-114 
in 1988, Bill C-46 in 1991, Bill C-43 in 1991 and Bill C-116 in 1993, which was the final of 
these bills to be tabled by Mulroney. 476  Bill C-116 would have created an Ethics 
Commissioner, but that commissioner would have been responsible for administering a Code 
(again, not law). The bill died when Parliament prorogued on Nov 12, 1993.477 
 
 (b) Office of the Ethics Counsellor (1994) 
Jean Chrétien was elected Prime Minister in 1993 after running a campaign that 
focused largely on the idea of “governing with integrity.”478 Part of his platform was a 
promise to create a new code of conduct for MPs and public office holders and to appoint 
an independent ethics counsellor who would administer this Code.479 A new independent 
counsellor was not immediately created however, and in June 1994 Chrétien instead  
                                               
474 Dion Trading Policies, supra note 451  at 6. 
475 Canada, Library of Parliament, Research Branch, Conflict of Interest: Selected Issues, 
by Margaret Young November, Publication No. BP-362E (Revised October 1998), 
online: <http://publications.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/BP/bp362-e.htm> at 3 (all four 
bills died on the order paper in the course of the 33rd and 34th Parliaments). 
476 Stark COI, supra note 462 at 127. 
477 Ibid. 
478 See Honest Politics, supra note 459 at 52; Ian Greene, “The Chrétien Ethics Legacy” 
in Lois Harder & Steve Patten, eds, The Chrétien Legacy: Politics and Public Policy in 
Canada (Montreal, QC, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006) at 276 [Greene on 
Chrétien].  
479 Ibid. 
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chose to change the name of the Assistant Deputy Registrar General to that of the Ethics 
Counsellor.  
 
The Ethics Counsellor reported to and served at the pleasure of the Prime Minister 
while being under the general direction of the Clerk of the Privy Council and receiving 
administrative support from Industry Canada.480 The first Counsellor named was Howard 
Wilson and he was responsible for ensuring ministerial and bureaucratic compliance with a 
new conflict of interest code for MPs and other public office holders that he himself helped 
to develop. It was not until late in 1995 that a special joint committee of the Senate and 
House of Commons was formed to begin to consider what a new, modernized code of 
conduct should look like if it were to be legislative in nature. That joint committee reported 
in 1997 (in what was called the Milliken-Oliver Report481 ) and recommended that all 
parliamentarians, and not just ministers, confidentially disclose their financial assets, 
liabilities and sources of income and any paid or volunteer positions they hold. They also 
recommended that this information be made public.482  
 
According to Denis Saint-Martin, the public and the politicians also started to turn 
their attention seriously to the need for an independent ethics commissioner after a 1997 
                                               
480 Canada, Library of Parliament, Background Paper: Conflict of Interest at the Federal 
Level: Legislative Framework and Oversight, by Michel Bédard, Kristen Douglas & 
Hurtubise-Loranger, Publication No 2005-09-E (revised 24 Nov 2010) at 1 [Bédard 
Background]. 
481 Canada, Parliament of Canada, Special Joint Committee on a Code of Conduct of the 
Senate and the House of Commons, (2nd Report, March 1997) (co-chairs Peter Milliken 
& Donald Oliver). 
482 Dion Trading Policies, supra note 451 at 6. 
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incident where Prime Minister Chrétien made a phone call to the Federal Business 
Development Bank came to light. In this call, Chrétien encouraged the bank to provide a 
loan to a hotel that was located adjacent to a golf course that he once had an ownership 
interest in. This may not seem problematic on the surface, but the hotel was not doing well 
and the purchaser of the Prime Minister’s shares in the golf course had not yet paid him for 
those shares.  The opposition MPs argued that Chrétien was in a conflict of interest because 
he was more likely to be able to collect the money owed to him for the golf course if the 
adjacent hotel was not in financial ruin.483 The ethics counsellor at the time, whose office 
was created by the Prime Minister in 1993 484  and who reported directly to the Prime 
Minister,485 investigated the matter and found that the Prime Minister’s phone call did not 
breach the conflict of interest rules. Saint-Martin argues that this finding is what really drove 
the dialogue surrounding the need for an independent ethics commissioner.486 
 
In the decade after Prime Minister Chrétien was elected to office, Ian Greene notes 
that there were eleven prominent ethics scandals.487 It was these scandals that prompted 
academics like Denis Saint-Martin to become highly critical of the then current ethics 
infrastructure. In a 2003 paper, Saint-Martin wrote: 
                                               
483 Denis Saint-Martin, “Should the Federal Ethics Counsellor Become an Independent 
Officer of Parliament?” (2003) 29:2 Can Pub Pol’y 197 at 197 [Saint-Martin Counsellor]. 
484 Michael M Atkinson & Gerald Bierling, “Politicians, the Public and Political Ethics: 
Worlds Apart” (2005) 38:4 Can Journal of Poli Sci 1003 at 1004 [Atkinson & Bierling]. 
485 Turnbull Rules, supra note 248 at 1. 
486 It should be noted that Ian Greene had published a paper in 1991 arguing that the 
Federal ethics counsellor should be independent (see Ian Greene, “Government ethics 
commissioners: the way of the future?” (1991) 34:1 Can Pub Admin 165 [Greene 
Future]). 
487 Greene on Chrétien, supra note 478 at 278. 
 148 
The Office of the Ethics Counsellor is a case of flawed institutional design that 
needs to be reformed. Either the government has an ethics counsellor who 
advises ministers and senior officials how they can avoid conflicts of interest, or 
an ethics commissioner, who is expected to be an investigator and an enforcer 
with some independent authority. But the same person cannot at the same time 
play the role of a civil servant advising government and a legislative ethics 
watchdog.488 
 
This sentiment was also echoed in the media, with journalists calling out the Ethics 
Counsellor for lacking “the independence necessary to investigate ethical breaches.”489 
 
Although revisions had been made to Mulroney’s Conflict of Interest and Post 
Employment Code for Public Office Holders during that decade,490 it was not until May 2002 
that Chrétien would introduce a bill to establish an independent ethics commissioner and a 
new conflict of interest code for MPs.491 That bill did not make it through before Parliament 
prorogued for a Liberal leadership convention in November 2003.492 The convention saw 
the party leadership and Prime Minister change to Paul Martin, who was also committed to 
making changes to the office of the Ethics Counsellor. 
 
(c) Office of the Ethics Commissioner (2004) 
Before winning the general election in June 2004, Paul Martin used his majority 
government to pass new legislation that would eliminate the Ethics Counsellor position and 
replace it with an independent Ethics Commissioner. Part of the challenge experienced by 
                                               
488 Saint-Martin Counsellor, supra note 483 at 209. 
489 Gloria Galloway and Bill Curry, “An ethics czar who reigns with a careful grip”, The 
Globe and Mail (April 7, 2010) A4 [Galloway & Curry]. 
490 That Code would also be amended again in 2003 & 2004 (see Dawson Hybrid Paper, 
supra note 457). 
491 Greene on Chrétien, supra note 478 at 292.  
492 Ibid at 292-3. 
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Chrétien’s most recent bill was that the Senate did not want to share an ethics official with 
the House. As such, Martin’s Bill C-4 made sure to allow both chambers to choose their own 
ethics official. The bill entitled “An Act to amend the Parliament of Canada Act (Ethics 
Commissioner and Senate Ethics Officer) and other Acts in consequence”, received Royal 
Assent on March 31, 2004.493  
 
The new legislation allowed Prime Minister Martin to appoint an Ethics 
Commissioner after simply consulting with the leader of every recognized party.494 So after 
a brief and rushed consultation with opposition leader Stephen Harper,495 Martin appointed 
Bernard Shapiro on May 17, 2004 to be Canada’s first independent Ethics Commissioner. 
Commissioner Shapiro was appointed for a five-year term, the office was a separate 
parliamentary entity and no longer part of the public service and the commissioner could 
only be removed “for cause by the Governor in Council on address of the House of 
Commons.”496  
 
Commissioner Shapiro assumed responsibility for the Conflict of Interest and Post 
Employment Code for Public Office Holders dating back to 1985, but also for a newer 
Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of Commons, which had come into effect 
in October 2004 as an appendix to the Standing Orders of the House of Commons. The new 
                                               
493 See Canada, Library of Parliament, Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, by 
Kristen Douglas, Publication No. PRB05-59E (11 October 2007) at 1 [Douglas]. 
494 See HP Now, supra note 78 at page 147. 
495 Greene on Chrétien, supra note 478 at 293 (according to Ian Greene, this consultation 
left a “sour note for the new office to start on”). 
496 An Act to amend the Parliament of Canada Act (Ethics Commissioner and Senate 
Ethics Officer) and other Acts in consequence, SC 2004, c 7, s 72.02(1). 
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Members’ Code was built around the conflict of interest rules that could be found in the 
Parliament of Canada Act and the former Senate and House of Commons Act.497 Shapiro’s 
office had jurisdiction over 1250 full-time order-in-council appointees and 2200 part-time 
appointees and reported to two separate parliamentary committees under the Standing Orders 
of the House of Commons.498 Duties relating to the Members’ Code fell under the mandate 
of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, whereas duties regarding the 
Conflict of Interest and Post-Employment Code for Public Officer Holders fell under the 
jurisdiction of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Access, Information, Privacy 
and Ethics.499 
 
Despite the fact that the office had a relatively high status within the parliamentary 
system, Bernard Shapiro had difficulties with Stephen Harper right from the start as a result 
of the manner of his appointment. The media also took to criticizing Shapiro for his lack of 
experience with public sector ethics regimes500 (a criticism that Harper did not disagree 
with), and Harper followed along by expressing his displeasure with Shapiro when he spoke 
publicly about the commissioner’s work.501 As I alluded to above in chapter 3, Shapiro’s 
tenure as Ethics Commissioner was fraught with some well-earned criticism. At one point 
                                               
497 See Dawson Hybrid Paper, supra note 457 at 18 (the details of those Acts is not 
important for our analysis here); C E S Franks, “Parliamentarians and the New Code of 
Ethics” (2005) 28:1 Can Parl Rev 11 (for a detailed explanation of the new legislative 
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498 See Standing Orders, supra note 176, s 108(3)(h). 
499 Douglas, supra note 493 at 2. 
500 HP Now, supra note 78.  
501 See e.g. Norma Greenaway, “Harper tells ethics chief to butt out”, National Post (8 
March 2006) A4. 
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during an interview with a media outlet, he improperly revealed details about an 
investigation he had been undertaking.502 
 
The move to an independent commissioner initially sat well with Martin Saint-Denis 
who had been critical of the Ethics Counsellor regime. Saint-Denis noted that “[t]he move 
towards a more external form of ethics regulation is designed to enhance public trust and 
confidence in the procedures that Parliament uses to discipline its members. It is intended to 
depoliticize the process of ethics regulation.”503 But others, like former Ethics Counsellor 
Howard Wilson thought the new regime was actually weaker. He believed that the principles 
established during his tenure “set a high bar with requirements to act with honesty and uphold 
the highest ethical standards. And that the new Code focused only on the non-government 
duties of MPs.”504 
 
Regardless, and perhaps unsurprisingly, the Office of the Ethics Commissioner 
would be quickly replaced after Conservative Stephen Harper became Prime Minister in 
2006. Harper had refused to accept one of Shapiro’s reports when he was the opposition 
leader by completely ignoring that report’s findings. This generated quite a buzz in the media 
and all five major parties were eager to address ethics-related issues in their platforms for 
                                               
502 See e.g. Peter O’Neill, “Ethics chief apologizes for huge privacy breach: E-mail 
names and addresses released”, Edmonton Journal (23 March 2006) A9 [O’Neill]; 
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the 2006 elections.505 After becoming Prime Minister, Harper moved ahead with his ethics-
related promises and quickly signaled that he would be putting forward an accountability bill 
to create a new Ethics Commissioner. Interestingly, the new bill also changed the 
qualifications for being the Ethics Commissioner, and these new requirements necessarily 
excluded Shapiro from consideration.506  
 
(e) Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner (2006) 
The Federal Accountability Act507 received Royal Assent on December 12, 2006 and 
established a new Conflict of Interest Act508 to replace the then long-standing Conflict of 
Interest and Post-Employment Code for Public Office Holders. The ethics rules for public 
office holders accordingly became legislated for the first time. The Federal Accountability 
Act also amended the Parliament of Canada Act to create the new position of Conflict of 
Interest and Ethics Commissioner.509 This new commissioner would be responsible for the 
new Conflict of Interest Act, but also the Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House 
of Commons which, as noted above, had come into effect in October 2004 as an appendix to 
the Standing Orders of the House of Commons. 
 
The first person appointed commissioner was Mary Dawson, a career lawyer in the 
federal Department of Justice. Ms. Dawson had a strong background in legislative drafting 
                                               
505 Douglas, supra note 493 at 7 (for an overview of the parties’ platforms as they related 
to ethics). 
506 Shoving, supra note 295. 
507 FAA, supra note 296. 
508 Act, supra note 13 (the Act did not come came into force July 9, 2007). 
509 PC Act, supra note 15,  s 81. 
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and interpretation and was the driving force behind the removal of pronouns from the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.510 According to former Justice Minister Irwin 
Cotler, Ms. Dawson’s “legal footprints are all over the department… [s]he’s like the 
Constitution incarnate. If you look at the historical constitutional moments of the last 25 
years, she’s been a central actor in all of them.”511 
 
Despite her extensive experience, it is hard to imagine that anything could have 
prepared Ms. Dawson for the unique role she would play in Canada’s parliamentary 
democracy during the final stretch of her career. The position of the Conflict of Interest and 
Ethics Commissioner is created in a rather typical way for an office of this nature, i.e. by 
legislation, but the office’s mandate is incredibly unique. As Commissioner, Ms. Dawson 
would be responsible for administering a piece of legislation that applied to public office 
holders, including those MPs who are also members of the executive council but only in 
their roles as members of the executive council, and a code of conduct applicable only to 
MPs in their role as MPs that is simply appended to the Standing Orders of the House of 
Commons. An MP who sits in cabinet is subject to both the Act and the Code in relation to 
some aspects of their conduct.  
 
As I have explained above, the public and political pressure put on successive Prime 
Ministers to create a meaningful independent ethics oversight body caused the position to be 
ingrained in legislation to help ensure that the newly created commissioner could stand at 
                                               
510 Don Butler, “She took the ‘hes’ out of the Charter”, Times Colonist (17 July 2005) C4. 
511 Ibid. 
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arm’s length from government. By making this new official a creature of statute under the 
Parliament of Canada Act, it is more difficult for Parliament to unilaterally eliminate an 
agent or to make changes to their mandate, especially during a majority government situation 
where it might otherwise have been very easy to amend a non-legislative Code. It is generally 
more difficult to pass legislative amendments through the House and Senate, so legislating 
this role into existence makes it harder to eliminate for a governing party that finds itself in 
muddy ethical waters. 
 
By contrast, the general ethics rules for MPs over which this position has authority 
were kept in the Standing Orders so that they could be amended quickly by the House, 
without possible interference from the Senate. This seems rather convenient, but it should 
not be viewed as surprising or scandalous. Keeping the MPs’ ethical conduct rules in the 
Standing Orders means that they do not need Senate approval to be amended.  This is 
important because the Code emanates from the parliamentary privilege possessed by the 
House of Commons as a collectivity to discipline its members and to regulate its own internal 
affairs.512  Because Parliament has the exclusive power to discipline its own members, 
including by removing them from office, not legislating the code of conduct has effectively 
insulated it from oversight by the Senate.  
 
                                               
512 House of Commons, Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, Thirty-
Ninth Report, 41st Parl, 2nd Sess (11 June 2015) at 1 (citing Audrey O’Brien and Marc 
Bosc, House of Commons Procedure and Practice, 2nd ed, (Montreal: Editions Yvon 
Blais, 2009) at 119). 
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The Members’ Code exists alongside legislation that applies to designated public 
office holders, including MPs who are members of the executive council. Most provinces 
and territories in Canada include specific provisions for ministers in their general 
parliamentary ethics legislation, instead of carving out two separate instruments.  The two-
instrument approach at the federal level reflects the fact that there are two houses of 
Parliament and having a non-legislative Code is a way for the House of Commons to ensure 
that the Senate is not able to influence the way in which the House chooses to codify its rules 
of ethical conduct. It also ensures that Parliament does not have the power to remove public 
office holders, including ministers, from their positions. Members of cabinet are purely 
political appointments who sit at the pleasure of the Prime Minister.  These are not 
necessarily merit-based positions. The Act was therefore written to reflect the desire to 
ensure that the power to make decisions about cabinet members stays right where it currently 
is: with the Prime Minister. Although it could change in the future, the House’s role at 
present is in the establishment and amendment of the Act, as well as in the oversight of its 
administration and application. Senate’s only role is in relation to its legislative mandate. As 
will be further explored below, neither the House nor Senate have any role with respect to 
the enforcement of the Act.  With the exception of small administrative monetary penalties 
that the commissioner can mete out, it is for the Prime Minister alone to decide when a 
violation of the Act ought to result in some sort of discipline.  
 
Former Associate Chief Justice and Integrity Commissioner of Ontario Coulter 
Osborne commented in an appearance before the Standing Committee on Rules, Procedures 
and the Rights of Parliament in 2003 that a setup like this is very much by design because 
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“...the rules route effectively eliminates the courts from judicially reviewing the 
commissioner’s decision. If, on policy or other grounds that is thought to be desirable, then 
the way to go is not to have a statute.”513 This reason to avoid legislating the rules applicable 
to MPs was echoed by Denis Saint-Martin when he wrote that:  
Parliament…is an institution that should remain the sole manager of its 
discipline...[t]he issue of court revision is something that is of great concern. 
Judges should not be involved in the disciplining of parliamentarians. Otherwise, 
you mix up the two systems.514  
 
The caselaw to date has made it very clear that the legislature has exclusive right to set 
standards of conduct, monitor compliance with these standards, and to impose discipline on 
its members.515  Parliamentarians have adopted rules under the standing orders to govern 
their own behavior rather than passing legislation as they did for public office holders, 
because not legislating makes it even more obvious that the courts have no oversight 
jurisdiction.  
 
Returning to the role of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, we can say 
something now about how that position ought to be characterized. In a 2009 speech, 
Commissioner Dawson said of herself: “I am an Officer of Parliament…I was nominated by 
the Prime Minister but the appointment could only take effect after consultation with the 
                                               
513 Senate, Proceedings of the Standing Committee on Rules, Procedures and the Rights 
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leader of every recognized party in the House of Commons, and after approval of the 
appointment by resolution of the House.”516 But this self-categorization is not so obviously 
correct. It seems like it could be almost accurate with respect to the commissioner’s mandate 
under the Code, but Parliament includes the Senate and the Senate has absolutely no role 
when it comes to the commissioner’s responsibilities relating solely to MPs. To adopt 
Commissioner Dawson’s characterization would be to look past the fact that it does not fully 
account for the commissioner’s two distinct roles. 
 
When you consider that the commissioner has two very distinct mandates, the 
COIEC does not seem to be an officer of Parliament at all. In the case of the non-legislative 
mandate over MPs, that title seems too broad because Parliament includes the Senate. 
Recognizing this, Commissioner Dawson later re-characterized her role while speaking at 
an event in 2017: “As Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, I am actually an Officer 
of the House of Commons.”517 The second and current commissioner, Mario Dion, adopted 
this same position.518  It seems to me that both commissioners took this position because of 
the following: 
                                               
516 Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “Perspectives on 
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1)! Agents of parliament are created by the legislation they administer, whereas the Conflict 
of Interest and Ethics Commissioner is created directly by the Parliament of Canada 
Act519 which suggests that the role ought to be considered an officer; 
2)! The Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner does not report to Parliament through 
a minister; and, 
3)! According to the Parliament of Canada Act, the duties and functions of the COIEC 
related to members of the House of Commons are carried out within the institution of the 
House of Commons 520  and the Commissioner therefore enjoys the privileges and 
immunities of the House of Commons and its members when carrying out those duties 
and functions.521  
 
When we view the role established by the Parliament of Canada Act holistically, we 
see that Officer of the House of Commons is technically incorrect. Despite being an office 
that was created by a legislative enactment for which both House and Senate approval were 
required, the COIEC does not have the full legal protections of an officer. At best, the 
characterization offered by the office’s two commissioners can be understood to be a verbal 
line of best fit that emphasizes organizational independence and justifies being granted the 
privileges and immunities of a member of the House of Commons. Although the position 
taken by the commissioners is compelling, I think it is also a simplification. In reality, the 
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dual mandates confuse matters in a way that it seems is being glossed over by the 
commissioners out of either confusion or convenience. It seems confusing because the 
COIEC’s work under the Act is not protected by parliamentary privilege as an officer of 
either House would be. Under the Code however, the same individual is protected by 
parliamentary privilege. It may be convenient to characterize the COIEC as an officer 
because it an easier to explain than a nuanced characterization, but also because it gives the 
impression that the COIEC is protected by parliamentary privilege in the exercise of its 
duties. I will explain in chapter eight how the COIEC stands to benefit from this 
characterization.  
 
The Parliament of Canada Act provision that accords the office parliamentary 
privilege also makes clear that this privilege applies only with respect to the duties that relate 
to members under the Code, and not to those that apply to public office holders under the 
Act. The commissioner is required to submit annual reports on his or her activities related to 
the Conflict of Interest Act to both the House of Commons and the Senate under section 
90(b) of the Parliament of Canada Act.  Both those mandates are the responsibility of the 
same individual holding the same position, and those roles cannot be separated. The 
commissioner must report to the Senate for one mandate, but not for the other. One half of 
the office’s work is protected by parliamentary privilege and the other half is not. 
Commissioner Dawson recognized this incongruity in 2009 when she tried to explain her 
position by saying that it is “…an entity that does not fit neatly into a particular class of 
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administrative decision-makers, given the unique characteristics of my mandate and role, the 
two distinct instruments my staff and I administer, and the way my Office is constituted.”522 
 
What does this mean for the way we should categorize the role of the COIEC and 
why, if at all, should this matter? It seems impossible to say that the commissioner is either 
an Officer of Parliament or of the House of Commons because of the stark differences 
between the two mandates. An Officer of either house of Parliament is someone who is 
embedded in the administration of that house and who is afforded privileges and protections 
as a result. The distinction between officer and agent that I have adopted in chapter two 
recognizes agents of parliament as being those individuals who formally report to 
parliamentarians, which distinguishes them from those who work directly for Parliament. 
Those who work directly for Parliament have parliamentary privilege. The commissioner is 
one person who is asked to wear two different hats. Identifying this role as being an officer 
of the House of Commons fails to acknowledge the internal inconsistency of choosing this 
one identity in spite of the fact that it does not reflect the position’s dual reality. The role that 
offers the most operational independence is the one that has been chosen as a label, despite 
the fact that this label lacks the nuance needed to properly capture the complexity of the 
combined roles. The literature on agents and officers is already confusing and the way this 
office has been designed simply serves to perpetuate that confusion. 
                                               
522 Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “Presentation to 
“Ombudsmen and Accountability Officers: A Growing Class of Administrative Decision-
Makers” (A session organized as part of the 5th Annual National Forum on 
Administrative Law and Practice at Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto, 15 October 
2009), online: <https://ciec-ccie.parl.gc.ca/en/publications/Documents/Presentations/ 
Osgoode%20Hall%20speaking%20notes%20Oct%202009%20EN.pdf> at 1 
(Commissioner Mary Dawson) [Dawson Hybrid Speech]. 
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This may seem to some like it is an unnecessary analysis given Parliament’s obvious 
right to create this office however it likes due to its privileges, but it is important to be clear 
that the duties assigned to the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner place it on 
conceptually unusual footing. The remainder of this dissertation therefore explores and 
analyzes an office that is unique and impossible to place in one of the categories of officer 
or agent that are currently at our disposal. This means that the COIEC stands in stark contrast  
to the other agents outlined above in chapter two and makes it difficult to situate its work 
cleanly within the paradigms that we have come to expect from agents of parliament. This 
has implications for how the commissioner can and does carry out the office’s mandates. It 
also has implications for why it is difficult for observers to clearly understand the limits of 
the commissioner’s structural and operational independence.  
 
Despite having taken a position on how their office ought to be categorized, both of 
the office’s commissioners have also repeatedly called for the harmonization of the Act and 
Code. 523  These requests have been outwardly motivated by a need to clarify the rules 
applicable to MPs who serve as ministers, but harmonization may also make sense because 
it could help to improve ethical governance in the public sector while mitigating some of the 
conceptual confusion that I have identified above. I will look at these calls for harmonization 
in further detail in chapters seven and eight, and explain why and how political and structural 
barriers stand in the way of such harmonization. 
 
                                               
523 Specific examples will be provided below, in chapter 7 & 8. 
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5.3 Complementary Domestic Legal and Ethical Regimes 
 
Despite the primacy of the COIEC in the parliamentary ethics landscape, it is 
important to be clear that it is only one of many regimes that have jurisdiction over the 
conduct of public officials.  To better understand the role of the COIEC, it is important to 
situate it within the broader legal and ethical infrastructure that governs the conduct of public 
officials. The public sector ethics oversight industry is a veritable alphabet soup of 
accountability offices. The COIEC accordingly exists within a complex tapestry of 
overlapping and complementary legal and ethical regimes. This complexity can 
unnecessarily complicate democratic engagement by making it difficult to understand who 
plays what role and how the players all fit together and interact, if at all. This can be 
challenging for public office holders as well as outside observers (e.g. the public) who want 
to understand what rules public office holders are subject to and who is responsible for 
enforcing those rules. The following is a list of different offices and regimes that play a role 
in public sector ethics oversight in Canada, as well as brief descriptions of how they apply.  
The Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner overall occupies a very narrow and clearly 
defined space within an otherwise broad and expansive playing field.  
 
(a) Agents and Officers of Parliament 
As outlined above in chapter two, the other agents and officers of parliament play a 
key role in ethics oversight. One obvious example is the Commissioner of Lobbying, who is 
responsible for ensuring that lobbyists are open and transparent and that they do not place 
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public office holders in positions of conflict of interest.524  The Commissioner of Lobbying 
is occasionally asked to investigate the same matters as the Conflict of Interest and Ethics 
Commissioner.525 The investigation into Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s trip to the Aga 
Khan’s private island is one such example that has even given rise to some disagreement 
about whether it was unreasonable for the commissioner to have refused to investigate. The 
Federal Court decided in 2019 that the commissioner must reconsider whether to proceed 
with an investigation.526 The government responded to that ruling by filing an appeal.527  
 
Important work is also done by the Information Commissioner, the Public Sector 
Integrity Commissioner and the Auditor General. Each play a role in different aspects of 
overseeing the conduct and decision-making of public officials.  
 
(b) Political Party Codes of Conduct 
The 1991 Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing 528 
recommended that Canadian political parties develop their own internal codes of ethics. This 
                                               
524 Canada, Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying, “Lobbyists Code of Conduct”, 
online: <https://lobbycanada.gc.ca/eic/site/012.nsf/vwapj/ 
LobbyistsCodeofConduct2015_En.pdf/%24FILE/LobbyistsCodeofConduct2015_En.pdf> 
at s 6 (under the authority of Lobbying Act, supra note 141, s 10.2) [Lobby Code]. 
525 Although, the Commissioner of Lobbying does not always agree to undertake those 
investigations.  
526 Democracy Watch v Canada (A-G), 2019 FC 388. 
527 Sean Kilpatrick, “Ottawa appeals court ruling that ordered fresh look at Trudeau’s 
Aga Khan-commissioned vacation”, The Globe and Mail, online: 
<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-ottawa-appeals-court-ruling-that-
ordered-fresh-look-at-trudeaus-aga/>. 
528 Honest Politics Now, supra note 78 at 321 (citing Canada, Royal Commission on 
Electoral Reform and Party Financing, Reforming Electoral Democracy, Vol. 1 (Ottawa: 
Ministry of Supply and Services, 1991)).  
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recommendation had still not been taken up by the major parties in 2014 when Elections 
Canada commissioned a report by Paul Thomas called “A Code of Ethics or Code of Conduct 
for Political Parties as a Potential Tool to Strengthen Electoral Democracy in Canada.”529 
One of Thomas’ conclusions was that adoption of a code would cause political parties and 
their followers to be “more aware of, sensitive to and capable of reasoning about ethically 
challenging situations in ways that they otherwise might not have in the past.”530 Despite 
this obvious endorsement of party-specific codes, Ian Greene and David Shugarman note 
that no party has yet adopted what can properly be understood to be a comprehensive and 
meaningful code of ethics.531 Some sub-national political parties have released codes of 
conduct however, including the Quebec Liberal Party,532 the Green Party of Canada533 and 
the United Conservative Party of Alberta.534 Regardless, there is potential in this space for 
more regulation of the ethical conduct of federal public officials. This could be particularly 
well received in relation to creating standards of conduct surrounding campaign tactics, 
constituency work (including supporting local and charitable organizations) and voter 
mobilization. 
                                               
529 Paul G Thomas, Research Study prepared for Elections Canada, “A Code of Ethics or 
Code of Conduct for Political Parties as a Potential Tool to Strengthen Democracy in 
Canada” (December 2014), online: 
<https://www.elections.ca/res/rec/tech/cod/pdf/code_of_ethics_e.pdf>. 
530 Ibid at 17. 
531 HP Now, supra note 78 at 321. 
532 Quebec Liberal Party, Code of Ethics and Conduct (Accessed 19 July 2019), online; 
<https://plq.org/app/uploads/2016/08/03_code_of_ethics.pdf>. 
533 Green Party of Canada, “Members’ Code of Conduct” (Version 1.3 enacted January 
20, 2019), online: 
<https://www.greenparty.ca/en/members/resources/party/procedures/member-code-of-
conduct>. 
534 United Conservative Party, “Code of Conduct” (Last Updated 14 May 2018), online: 
<https://unitedconservative.ca/Content/UCP_Code_of_Conduct.pdf>. 
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(c) Supplementary Guidelines   
One way in which the potential for more regulation has actually manifested itself is 
through supplementary guidelines from party leaders. As explained above in chapter four, 
what are now the Code and Act both began simply as guidelines. As those guidelines evolved 
into laws, they also became much more difficult to revise. The same is true for the non-
legislative Code, but perhaps for different reasons.  Instead of the Prime Minister being able 
simply to amend guidelines and re-issue them to ministers, senior public servants and 
appointees, they became subject to broader consultation and approval. The Act obviously 
needs parliamentary approval to be amended, whereas the Code is part of the standing order 
of the House of Commons535 and may be changed or repealed only by a decision of the 
House.536 Such a decision can be arrived at by consensus or by a majority vote, which would 
make amendment a mere formality in a majority government, but either approach is still 
more involved than a unilateral change by the Prime Minister.  As a result of the slightly 
more involved process for making amendments, the Code and Act are sometimes regarded 
by Prime Ministers as being the minimum standard that they expect from members and 
senior public officials. To set higher standards (or at least to signal that they are trying to do 
so), some Prime Ministers have also implemented supplementary guidelines.  
 
                                               
535 Code, supra note 14, s 34. 
536 See Robert Marleau & Camille Montpetit, eds, House of Commons Procedure and 
Practice, 2000 edition, online: <https://www.ourcommons.ca/marleaumontpetit/ 
DocumentViewer.aspx?DocId=1001&Language=E&Sec=Ch05&Seq=3> at chapter 5 
“Parliamentary Procedure” (for a good discussion of the different ways that the standing 
orders can be amended). 
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Prime Minister Harper released his “Accountable Government: A Guide for 
Ministers and Ministers of State” in 2011, wherein he outlines extra ethical guidelines for 
public office holders. This includes such things as best practices for dealing with lobbyists 
and guidelines regarding political activity.537 Prime Minister Justin Trudeau also released 
a guide in 2015 that he called “Open and Accountable Government.”538 It is structured 
similarly to Harper’s, except notably adds some guidance regarding the appropriate use of 
social media by Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries.539 Critics have unsurprisingly 
argued that the rules in these documents are poorly enforced and serve as little more than 
meaningless lip-service to higher ethical standards.540  
 
(d) Lawyers’ Professional Codes of Conduct 
Many elected and unelected public office holders are also members of the legal 
profession. There is accordingly an open question as to whether the rules of professional 
conduct apply to them when they are acting in their official roles as politicians or public 
servants.541 Andrew Flavelle Martin has written several important articles on public sector 
lawyers, including about those who are elected to public office. In his 2012 article “Legal 
Ethics Versus Political Practices: The Application of the Rules of Professional Conduct to 
                                               
537 The Honourable Prime Minister Stephen Harper, Accountable Government: A Guide 
for Ministers and Ministers of State (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 2011), online: 
<http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2011/bcp-pco/CP1-3-2011-eng.pdf>. 
538 The Honourable Prime Minister Justin Trudeau “Open and Accountable Government” 
(Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 2015), online: 
<https://pm.gc.ca/sites/pm/files/docs/OAG_2015_English.pdf>. 
539 See Ibid at Annex J. 
540 HP Now, supra note 78 at 375 (see footnote 8). 
541 It is not clear whether engineers and doctors who become politicians may also be 
limited in their activities by their profession’s codes of ethical conduct.  
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Lawyer-Politicians”, Martin concludes that lawyer-politicians appear to remain free to 
violate the rules of legal ethics inside legislatures with complete impunity from any 
disciplinary consequences,542 but that this does not mean they should not strive to meet the 
highest standards: 
Regardless of enforcement and disciplinary considerations, lawyer politicians 
themselves should voluntarily accept their ethical obligations as lawyers and 
attempt to meet them. Politicians that do not want to be bound by these duties, 
or feel that they will adversely impact the ability to serve the office or 
constituents, should do the honourable thing and surrender their licenses.543  
 
The Ontario Rules of Professional Conduct were amended soon after this article (in October 
2014) to stipulate that “[a] lawyer who holds public office shall, in the discharge of official 
duties, adhere to standards of conduct as high as those that these rules require of a lawyer 
engaged in the practice of law.”544 This new rule might be too vague to be helpful, but it 
applies to these lawyers nonetheless. The commentary that follows is unfortunately also very 
vague. There is however a growing body of literature that considers the role that the rules of 
professional conduct actually play in governing the behaviours of individuals who work in 
these spaces. 
 
 
Andrew Flavelle Martin has also written about what it means for a lawyer to tell a lie 
when they are acting in their role as politician. He considers whether the rule on 
                                               
542 Andrew Flavelle Martin, “Legal Ethics Versus Political Practices: The Application of 
the Rules of Professional Conduct to Lawyer-Politicians” (2013) 91:1 Can Bar Rev 1 at 
37. 
543 Ibid (interestingly, Martin’s paper was published before the R 7.4-1 was added to 
Ontario’s rules). 
544 Law Society of Ontario, Rules of Professional Conduct (current to 26 April 2018), 
 Rule 7.4-1. 
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undertakings545 should apply to political promises made by lawyer-politicians and argues 
that in general they should not: 
… these promises should not be considered undertakings such that their breach 
would be an appropriate matter for law society discipline. However, in a narrow 
subset of situations, where lawyer-politicians cloak their political promises in a 
particular kind of form, i.e. the trappings of law, disciplinary action may be 
appropriate. It [sic] in these circumstances that the honour and integrity of the 
lawyer-politician, and arguably that of lawyers in general, is implicated in the 
same way as in the breach of a traditional undertaking.546  
 
There has not yet been a public case of a lawyer-politician being subject to disciplinary 
proceedings for such a matter. 
 
(e) House and Senate Committees 
Matters of importance relating to the conduct of public officials can also be 
considered by committees of the House of Commons and the Senate. Committees are created 
under the rules established by either the Standing Orders of the House of Commons547 or the 
Rules of the Senate.548 House standing committees can change over time but are typically in 
place for a long period without significant changes being made to their overall mandate(s). 
Senate committees are clearly named and established under the Rules549 and given very 
specific mandates. When formed, House committees are composed of members of each of 
the official parties that have seats in the House of Commons, whereas Senate committee 
                                               
545 Ibid, Rule 5.1-6. 
546 Andrew Flavelle Martin, “Consequences for Broken Political Promises: Lawyer-
Politicians and the Rules of Professional Conduct” (2016) 10:2 JPPL 337 at 348. 
547 Standing Orders, supra note 176 at Chapter XIII.  
548 Canada, Senate, Rules of the Senate (updated September 2017) at Chapter Twevle: 
Committees. 
549 Ibid at Rule 12-7. 
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members are selected using a process that includes the recommendations of a Committee of 
Selection.550   
 
These bodies are typically engaged when either house of Parliament finds itself 
contentiously debating an issue and concluding that the matter is too important not to 
investigate further. Matters will be referred to a specific committee that will then conduct 
a study or an investigation, during which they will request documents and compel people 
to appear before them to testify under oath. Ultimately, reports are completed and filed 
back with the house from which the referral came, which would then vote on how to 
proceed. This is of course all very vague, but the point is simply to draw attention to another 
forum in which public office holders can be held to account for unethical conduct.  
 
Interestingly, there have also been several high profile instances of individuals, both 
MPs and agents of parliament, being accused and/or found guilty of contempt of 
Parliament. According to the House of Commons Procedure and Practice Manual, 
contempt of Parliament is “any conduct which offends the authority or dignity of the 
House, even though no breach of any specific privilege may have been committed.”551 
Former federal privacy commissioner George Radwanski was found in contempt of 
Parliament in 2003 for providing misleading information to a Commons committee about 
                                               
550 Ibid at Rule 12-1. 
551 Canada, House of Commons, House of Commons Procedure and Practice, 3rd ed,  
(2017), online: <https://www.ourcommons.ca/About/ProcedureAndPractice3rdEdition/ 
ch_03_1-e.html> at Chapter 3.  
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his spending.552  Former Ethics Commissioner Bernard Shapiro was also found to be in 
contempt of Parliament in 2005 by a Commons committee because of comments that he 
made about a file in a media interview.553  
 
The committee model is an important part of public sector ethics oversight because 
it allows Parliament to fully investigate matters that may not have another office 
responsible for their oversight. A clear drawback of the model is that the processes can be 
rather formal and the costs of proceedings, especially hearings in personam, can be 
extraordinary.  These same concerns have been raised with respect to conducting public 
inquiries, but it has also been argued that the rigour and value of the findings of these two 
procedural approaches to investigating misconduct can in many cases lead to beneficial 
remedial outcomes that might not otherwise be achievable.554 
 
(f) Public Inquiries 
There are several kinds of public inquiries, including commissions of inquiry and 
specialized task forces. At the federal level in Canada, public inquiries are originated under 
the Inquiries Act555 and must be called/initiated by the Governor in Council. The purpose 
of a public inquiry is to be able to fully and impartially review matters that are of national 
                                               
552 House of Commons Debates, 37th Parl 2nd Sess, No. 152 (6 November 2003) at 1100 
(Acting Speaker Réginald Bélair). 
553 Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, 
Report 51: Question of privilege relating to an inquiry conducted by the Ethics 
Commissioner, 38th Parl 1st Sess (18 November 2005) (Chair: Don Boudria). 
554 See e.g. John H Gomery, “The Pros and Cons of Commissions of Inquiry” (2006) 51 
McGill LJ 783 (for a good discussion about the impact of public inquiries). 
555 Inquiries Act, RSC 1985, c I-11. 
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importance. The order-in-council would set out the purpose of the inquiry and the 
investigation would necessarily include establishing the facts and causes of an event or 
issue (i.e. whatever it is that has been deemed to be of concern) and then make 
recommendations back to the government. Inquiries often look at something that has gone 
wrong, but can also deal with structural issues, including institutional procedures, mandates 
that may have caused problems, and systemic issues, which could include concerns about 
governance, infringement of rights and other matters of injustice.  
 
A public inquiry is typically led by a judge or former judge, but it could also be led 
by an expert or an individual who is otherwise distinguished. This person is appointed as 
part of the order-in-council and is given the power under the Inquiries Act to be able to 
subpoena witnesses,556 request the production of documents557 and take evidence under 
oath. 558  The goal of an inquiry is to produce a report that includes explanations, 
recommendations and perhaps even outlines further areas of concern. Recommendations 
made are not binding but may have a significant impact on public opinion and political 
action. Because an inquiry must be called on the advice of cabinet, it is reasonable to view 
an inquiry as a strong recognition by the governing party that something has gone wrong 
and is in serious need of more attention than it has otherwise been given.   
 
Two excellent examples of public inquiries related to public officials are the 
Commission of Inquiry into the Facts of Allegations of Conflict of Interest Concerning the 
                                               
556 Ibid, s 8. 
557 Ibid, s 8(1)(c). 
558 Ibid, s 7. 
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Honourable Sinclair M. Stevens559 and the Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship 
Program and Advertising Activities.560 As noted above, Commissioner Parker’s report 
concerning the Honourable Sinclair M. Stevens led directly to the introduction of a series 
of bills intended to strengthen parliamentary ethics rules.  
 
(g) Criminal Code of Canada 
The Criminal Code of Canada includes several laws that are designed not only to 
protect, but also to help regulate the conduct of elected politicians and other public officials. 
There are laws against bribing judicial officers or other government actors,561 committing 
frauds on government,562 influencing or negotiating appointments or dealings in offices563 
and committing breaches of trust.564 Civil actions can also be brought against government 
officials for behaviour that amounts to misfeasance in public office565 or breach of their 
fiduciary duties.566 Although it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to provide further 
specifics about each of these offences, it is very important to note that the courts play a 
crucial role in parliamentary ethics oversight.   
 
                                               
559 Sinclair Stevens, supra note 473. 
560 Sponsorship Scandal, supra note 332. 
561 See Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, ss 119-20. 
562 Ibid, s 121 (this section was referenced in a letter sent by Conservative MP Peter Kent 
to the RCMP in relation to Justin Trudeau’s visit to the Aga Khan’s private island. See 
Jolson Lim, “Conservatives want RCMP to investigate Aga Khan trip for Criminal Code 
Breaches”, ipolitics (2 May 2019), online: <https://ipolitics.ca/2019/05/02/conservatives-
want-rcmp-to-investigate-aga-khan-trip-for-criminal-code-breaches/>. 
563 Ibid, s 125.  
564 Ibid, s 122. 
565 See e.g. Odhavji Estate v Woodhouse, [2003] 3 SCR 263. 
566 See e.g. The Toronto Party v Toronto (City), 2013 ONCA 327. 
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(h) Canada Elections Act 
The Canada Elections Act is perhaps one of the least obvious legal regimes that has 
some role in setting limits on the behaviour of individuals who hold public office. The Act 
disqualifies a person from becoming a candidate in a federal election or holding office if 
they are found guilty of either illegal practices567 or corrupt practices.568 In the case of an 
illegal practice, that person cannot be elected to or sit in the House of Commons or hold 
any governor-in-council appointments569 for the next five years after a conviction. In the 
case of a corrupt practice, they cannot be elected to or sit in the House of Commons or hold 
any governor-in-council appointments570 for the next seven years after being convicted. 
This clearly means that an individual holding office can be removed from their position if 
they are convicted of such an offence.  
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
Controversy about parliamentary ethics is not new. It is through these controversies 
that Canada has emerged as an international leader in its approach to public sector ethics.571 
In this chapter I have described how Canada’s public sector ethics regime has been in a state 
of constant flux. Change has always happened in the wake of controversy, political 
campaigning and/or public pressure. By understanding its history, we can clearly see how 
public sector ethics oversight stands out as an obvious candidate for delegation to an agent 
                                               
567 Elections Act, supra note 111, ss 502(1), 502(3). 
568 Ibid, ss 502(2), 502(3). 
569 Ibid, s 502(3). 
570 Ibid, s 502(3). 
571 Jean Fournier, “Emergence of a Distinctive Model of Parliamentary Ethics” (2009) 2 
JPPL 411 at 421.  
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of Parliament, particularly because of the strong need for independence in this role. The 
COIEC represents Canada’s most recent experiment with this regime, but it also represents 
the first attempt to delegate an actual parliamentary privilege to someone who is widely 
considered to be an agent of Parliament.  As we will see in chapters six and seven, the COIEC 
has some unique complexities in its institutional design. Understanding why these 
complexities exist and how they impact the COIEC’s work will help us to identify the limits 
of the office’s impact.  That being said, it is important to also remember that the COIEC is 
not alone. It is complemented by many other legal and ethical regimes that have significant 
influence over the governance of public sector ethics in Canada.  
  
 175 
6.#The#Conflict#of#Interest#and#Ethics#Commissioner#
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents a comprehensive analysis of the COIEC’s ongoing work. As 
the only actor in the class of agents that has been explicitly given the powerful protection of 
parliamentary privilege over some of its operations, it is crucial to understand how this rare 
delegation of independence is situated structurally and how it is being operationalized. I 
begin by looking at how the COIEC is appointed, removed and has its budgets determined. 
This structural analysis closely mirrors the broader analysis of agents that I undertook in 
chapter three in order to allow me to offer some comparative insights.  I then describe in 
detail what the office’s responsibilities are and how they are managed, who its stakeholders 
are, who its influential relationships are with and how the COIEC is held accountable. This 
information will inform my analysis in chapter eight in relation to the COIEC’s efforts to 
push for reform. Most importantly however, I confirm in this chapter that the COIEC is not 
in fact akin to an agent of Parliament and explain that the parliamentary privilege bestowed 
upon it under the Parliament of Canada Act in relation to one part of its mandate (i.e. the 
Code) can been used to shield some of the office’s work under the Act from judicial scrutiny. 
The implications of this privilege are drawn out and will provide support for my arguments 
in chapter eight.  
 
 
6.2 Appointment and/or Renewal 
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The Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner is appointed under section 81 of the 
Parliament of Canada Act. 572   The Act stipulates specific qualifications that the 
commissioner must have573 and also outlines how that person is appointed: 
The Governor in Council shall, by commission under the Great Seal, appoint a 
Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner after consultation with the leader 
of every recognized party in the House of Commons and approval of the 
appointment by resolution of that House.574 
 
The legislation is silent on how exactly the consultation process ought to play out between 
the Governor in Council and the party leaders. Given this gap in the legislation, it has been 
left to Parliament to figure out how to approach the task of filling this position. When the 
COIEC was first created, it was not posted publicly. Instead, then Prime Minister Stephen 
Harper chose to directly nominate a highly-regarded and long-serving government lawyer 
named Mary Dawson for the position in June 2007.575  Ms. Dawson had retired from the 
public service and was not looking for a new position at the time, but was contacted by the 
Prime Minister’s head of appointments.576 Harper also evidently consulted with the other 
party leaders before making his nomination to ensure that the nomination would succeed.577 
Ms. Dawson then appeared before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Access 
to Information, Privacy and Ethics578 for what has been described as a “brief, mostly cordial 
                                               
572 PC Act, supra note 15, s 81(1). 
573 Ibid, s 81(2). 
574 Ibid, s 81(1). 
575 See Jack Aubry, “Respected PS veteran is new ethics chief: Master of writing laws 
takes on job of enforcing them”, The Ottawa Citizen (13 June 2007) A4 [Master]; 
“Harper nominates two watchdogs” The Gazette (Montreal) (13 June 2007) A14. 
576 Master, supra note 575. 
577 Ibid. 
578 Standing Orders, supra note 176,  s.111.1(1).  
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vetting by MPs.”579  Eight out of ten of the committee members recommended Ms. Dawson’s 
appointment to the House of Commons580 and she was appointed to the position by Order in 
Council on July 9, 2007.581 As per the Parliament of Canada Act, Senate’s approval was not 
required.582  
 
Ms. Dawson was replaced as Commissioner in early 2018 when Mario Dion was 
appointed to fill the position. Similar to Ms. Dawson, Mr. Dion had already had a long and 
distinguished career with the Government of Canada. Also a lawyer, Mr. Dion began his 
career as a legal advisor within the Ministry of the Attorney General, but continuously moved 
between other senior positions, such as assistant deputy minister in multiple ministries and 
Deputy Clerk and Counsel and the Privy Council Office. Interestingly, Mr. Dion had 
previously served as the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner, which is one of the agents of 
parliament covered briefly in chapter two, above. 
 
A much different approach to recruitment was taken to find Mr. Dion than was taken 
for Ms. Dawson. Instead of hand-picking a favourite candidate,583 an executive search firm 
                                               
579 Bruce Cheadle, “New Ethics Czar passes first vetting”, The Toronto Star (15 June 
2007) A16. 
580 Ibid. 
581 Douglas, supra note 493 at 1.   
582 PC Act, supra note 15, s 81(1). 
583 As I have noted above, it is customary for the Privy Council Office and the Prime 
Minister’s Office to be involved in the initial vetting of candidates. In the case of the 
COIEC however, there is no clear evidence available to suggest that the Privy Council 
was in fact directly involved in Ms. Dawson’s recruitment and appointment. We do know 
that Ms. Dawson initially contacted directly by the Prime Minister’s Office (see Master, 
supra note 575). 
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was retained584 to run a recruitment program that included a public posting to encourage 
anyone interested to apply. As explained by Marie-Danielle Smith in the National Post:  
A 3,000-word explainer on the government’s appointments website mentions 
briefly that candidates may have “an initial discussion with a search firm that has 
been engaged to support the selection committee,” though it implies that the role 
of such firms would be minimal compared with the role of a selection committee 
made up of government officials.585 
 
The requirements that candidates must meet to be considered for the position are also rather 
exclusionary. To be appointed to the position of Conflict of Interest and Ethics 
Commissioner, an individual must be: 
(a) a former judge of a superior court in Canada or of any other court whose 
members are appointed under an Act of the legislature of a province;  
(b) a former member of a federal or provincial board, commission or tribunal 
who, in the opinion of the Governor in Council, has demonstrated expertise in 
one or more of the following:  
(i) conflicts of interest, 
(ii) financial arrangements, 
(iii) professional regulation and discipline, or  
(iv) ethics; or  
(c) a former Senate Ethics Officer or former Ethics Commissioner.586 
The person chosen must also be and be seen to be independent, which helps to increase the 
possibility that the public will have confidence in their rulings.587 In this regard, being a 
public servant could possibly work against a candidate. For example, if the candidate is a 
judge or former judge, there may be concerns about double-dipping (i.e. receiving two 
                                               
584 Supra, note 267. 
585 Ibid. 
586 PC Act, supra note 15, s. 81(2). 
587 Osborne Senate, supra note 513 at 15:13 (Ontario’s Conflict of Interest Commissioner 
Coulter Osborne highlights the importance of the perception of independence for ethics 
commissioners). 
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incomes at once - e.g. salary and/or pension).588 Also, given that one of the pre-requisites is 
that the individual must have held a previous position as a judge, member of a board, 
commission or tribunal or as an ethics officer, it is clear that they would have to have been 
appointed to that previous position. Given that appointments are generally made by the party 
in power, it is easy to see how any strong candidate being considered could face resistance 
from the party that was not responsible for their previous appointment.  
 
Although this requirement seems like it could give rise to some level of tension, both 
commissioners to date were former long-standing public servants. There may have been 
some resistance to their appointments, but voices of dissent can be easily muted under the 
process for appointment that is currently in place. Specifically, the Parliament of Canada 
Act states that “[t]he Governor in Council shall, by commission under the Great Seal, appoint 
a Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner after consultation with the leader of every 
recognized party in the House of Commons and approval of the appointment by resolution 
of that House.”589 Mere consultation is all that is required. This is not the same as needing 
the opposing parties’ approval. Furthermore, the process for the Conflict of Interest and 
Ethics Commissioner’s appointment stands in contrast to those in place for other agents of 
                                               
588 British Columbia, Legislative Assembly, Select Standing Committee on Parliamentary 
Reforms, Ethical Conduct, Standing Orders and Private Bills, Hansard, 36th Parl, 1st  
Sess, No 2 (7 August 1996) at 8:30 (The Honourable Ted Hughes QC, Acting Conflict of 
Interest Commissioner in B.C.) (Commissioner Hughes notes to the Committee that he is 
working for free as interim Commissioner so that he is not perceived to be “double-
dipping”). 
589 PC Act, supra note 15, s 81(1). 
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parliament because consultation with the leaders in the Senate is not required nor is a 
resolution of the Senate.590 
 
Once a person is appointed to the commissioner position, they hold office for seven 
years (dependent upon “good behavior”591) and can be re-appointed for an indefinite number 
of terms of up to seven years each. There is even a possibility of being appointed on an 
interim basis after the end of a term. The process for a new appointment is the same as the 
original appointment. The process for making an interim appointment is notably different 
however. As per the Parliament of Canada Act: 
In the event of the absence or incapacity of the Commissioner, or if that office is 
vacant, the Governor in Council may appoint any qualified person to hold that 
office in the interim for a term not exceeding six months, and that person shall, 
while holding office, be paid the salary or other remuneration and expenses that 
may be fixed by the Governor in Council.592 
 
The glaring difference is that the governor-in-council reappointment does not require 
advance consultation to take place with the leaders of the opposition parties nor does it 
require a resolution of the House of Commons. This difference in process has given rise to 
a great deal of criticism. Commissioner Dawson’s original term ended in 2014, after which 
she was reappointed to a two-year term. That two-year term ended in July 2016 and Ms. 
Dawson did not wish to apply for a renewed term. Instead, she agreed to be appointed on an 
interim basis while a search was undertaken to find a new commissioner. She ultimately 
agreed to three consecutive interim appointments for six months each.  
 
                                               
590 Dawson Relationship, supra note 168 at 3. 
591 PC Act, supra note 15, s 82(1). 
592 Ibid, s 82(2).  
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Controversy arose in January 2017 when Commissioner Dawson received a 
complaint about the Prime Minister and decided to investigate that compliant under both the 
Code and the Act. When her first sixth month interim appointment expired in January 2017, 
Ms. Dawson was then appointed for a further interim period of six months. These 
appointments were made solely on the recommendation of cabinet, without consultation with 
the leaders of the other parties. It was in January 2017 however, that Commissioner Dawson 
had decided to investigate the Prime Minister. Duff Conacher of Democracy Watch, a not 
for profit government watchdog organization, argued that Commissioner Dawson would be 
in a conflict of interest if she were to continue to investigate the person who was ultimately 
deciding whether she could remain employed as the Conflict of Interest and Ethics 
Commissioner.593 Conacher argued that Commissioner Dawson should recuse herself from 
the investigation and ask one of her provincial colleagues to take over. Although Dawson 
did not agree to step aside, she commented publicly shortly thereafter that “[r]epeated use of 
the interim appointments for the same position can also create perceptions of a lack of 
independence and becomes problematic.”594  
 
One way to solve this problem could be to limit reappointments to the position of 
Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner or to simply not allow reappointment at all. 
Commissioner Dawson expressed this very idea in a 2017 speech: 
I have reason to wonder whether the Commissioner’s term should be made non-
renewable…in order to forestall any doubts about the incumbent’s 
                                               
593 Democracy Watch, News Release, “Democracy Watch files complaint with Ethics 
Commissioner to stop Trudeau Cabinet from appointing their own ethics and lobbying 
watchdogs” (14 December 2016), online: <https://democracywatch.ca/democracy-watch-
files-complaint-with-ethics-commissioner-to-stop-trudeau-cabinet-from-appointing-their-
own-ethics-and-lobbying-watchdogs/>.  
594 Dawson Relationship, supra note 168 at 3. 
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independence. Without the possibility of reappointment, there would not be any 
suggestion that the Commissioner might be in a conflict of interest when making 
determinations about the government…Repeated use of the interim 
appointments for the same position can also create perceptions of a lack of 
independence and becomes problematic.595 
 
Member of Parliament and NDP ethics critic Alexandre Boulerice has also suggested that 
“[t]he establishment of an independent appointment process that would put the decision out 
of the hands of the prime minister is the “next step,” worthy of consideration.” 596 This is an 
important next step that has also been suggested by Ian Greene, who argued that Prime 
Minister Trudeau “should recuse himself from the appointment process for all agents of 
Parliament, due to investigations that currently or may involve himself, and delegate these 
responsibilities to cabinet colleagues.”597 A Public Policy Forum report goes one step further 
and suggests that “…the executive needs to be distanced from the appointments of agents 
when the agent is tasked with oversight of executive performance and behaviour, as in the 
case of ethics and integrity commissioners.”598 
 
The idea that a poorly conceived process can have a negative impact on the public’s 
perception of the integrity of the commissioner could also be viewed as quite simply unfair.  
As Scott Thurlow argues, “[i]t is a nefarious inference, which is not grounded in reality, that 
either impugns her character by suggesting that she isn’t taking the appropriate safeguards, 
or it infers that the conflict of interest and ethics commissioner’s office can’t deal with a 
                                               
595 Ibid. 
596 Marco Vigliotti, “Calls for appointment reform grow, as ethics chief investigates PM 
while he weighs her future”, The Hill Times (1 Feb 2017), online: 
<https://www.hilltimes.com/2017/02/01/ndp-mp-bemoans-awkward-situation-ethics-
commissioner-investigating-trudeau-bahamas-trip/93941>. 
597 Unethical, supra note 268.  
598 PPF Report, supra note 67 at 23. 
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conflict of interest.”599 That being said, the commissioner is responsible for administering 
conflict of interest rules and the perception of a conflict can garner just as much attention in 
today’s digital world as does an actual conflict. In my opinion, it is important to ensure that 
members and the public have no reason to distrust a commissioner before they are even 
appointed.  
 
The appointment process for the COIEC ought to be amended so that the individual’s 
paper qualifications are less important than their actual demonstrable skillsets.  They must 
also be appointed by unanimous consent of all major parties. This would help to ensure that 
there are checks in place to protect against patronage appointments to such an important 
position.  
 
6.3 Removal or Resignation from Office 
 
Once a commissioner has been appointed, there are four ways in which he or she may 
leave that position or be removed from it. First, the commissioner may simply choose not to 
seek renewal at the end of their term.  This of course is exactly what happened with the 
office’s first commissioner, Mary Dawson.  
 
Secondly, the commissioner can be removed from office in several ways. The 
Parliament of Canada Act explicitly states that the commissioner holds office “during good 
behaviour” and can only be removed from the position for cause by an order of the Governor 
                                               
599 Supra, note 596. 
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in Council “on the address of the House of Commons.”600 As noted above, the Conflict of 
Interest and Ethics Commissioner is different than the other officers of parliament because 
only the House of Commons needs to be involved in the removal process, not the Senate. 
That being said, removal by an order of the Governor in Council means that it can only be 
done on the advice of cabinet. Technically speaking then, the Governor General should need 
a request from cabinet as well as proof that there has been a request for removal by the House 
of Commons. That being said, the House does not have the same authority to remove the 
commissioner as it does to dismiss its employees and other officers because it is the Governor 
in Council who must ultimately dismiss the commissioner.  If there is a majority government 
however, then a request from the House to remove a sitting commissioner may be a mere 
formality inspired by strong party loyalty that allows a government to act unilaterally.  
 
Removal by an order of the Governor in Council may seem like a foregone 
conclusion if Cabinet and the House properly request it, but the fact that removal must be 
for cause is also important because it again speaks to the idea that the commissioner must be 
treated as being independent of the House. The House must ensure that it is transparent with 
any request for removal and that it is being requested for reasons that can withstand scrutiny. 
As Ann Chaplin explains: 
If an officer of Parliament is suspected of being untrustworthy by the 
parliamentarians to whom the officer reports, that assessment can provoke an 
address by the Senate and House of Commons and provide a “cause” for which 
the Governor in Council may remove the officer.601 
 
The challenge of needing to prove cause for dismissal can be tackled in several ways. The 
                                               
600 PC Act, supra note 15, s 82(1). 
601 Constitutional Legitimacy, supra note 83 at 101. 
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most obvious would be if there was serious impropriety for which law enforcement 
authorities had to become involved. A likely more common approach would be for the House 
to ask one of its committees to investigate any concerns that it may have. This happened to 
former Privacy Commissioner George Radwanski, who was called before a Commons 
committee amid criticism of his office’s spending.602 Radwanski apologized publicly, but 
MPs later voted to find him in contempt. Although he resigned his position in June 2003,603 
the fact that he was found in contempt could have very well been used as cause for his 
dismissal. The House could also simply pass a motion indicating that members had lost trust 
in the commissioner. 
 
 As noted above in chapter three, there is even a mechanism available under The 
Judges Act604 that can be leveraged to obtain an independent assessment of a commissioner’s 
capacity to continue in office.605 The Judicial Council can then report back to Parliament if 
it thinks the person should be removed.606   
 
Situations of resignation, such as George Radwanski’s, are another way that the 
Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner could leave office.  Although he held an earlier 
version of the position, Bernard Shapiro’s experience as the House of Commons’ first 
                                               
602 Kristian Laughlin, Holding the Prime Minister to Account: A Study Examining the 
Institutionalized Checks on Prime Ministerial Power (1 January 2009) [unpublished, 
archived on Author’s Academia.edu page, online: 
<http://www.academia.edu/943773/Holding_the_Prime_Minister_to_Account> at 15. 
603 Supra, note 552. 
604 Judges Act, RSC 1985, c J-1, s 65(1), s 65(2)(a)-(d), s 69(1). 
605 Ibid. 
606 Constitutional Legitimacy, supra note 83 at 102. 
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independent Ethics Commissioner serves as an instructive example here. Commissioner 
Shapiro’s tenure as commissioner was cut short after controversy surrounded his office and 
its work.607 Meetings with members were delayed;608 public disclosure statements were slow 
to be posted;609 investigations were untimely and incomplete;610 and his office accidentally 
disclosed information about members that should not have been made public.611  Shapiro was 
called to account for these issues by the House of Commons Standing Committee on Access 
to Information, Privacy and Ethics. The Committee’s report describes Shapiro as having 
committed contempt of Parliament in 2005 when he violated rules found in the MPs’ code 
of conduct and made inappropriate comments to the media. No sanctions were 
recommended, but the Honourable Ed Broadbent moved a motion of non-confidence which 
was based entirely on Commissioner Shapiro’s action and inaction.612  As explained in 
chapter three, Shapiro chose to resign his position in 2006613 in anticipation of the legislative 
changes that new Prime Minister Stephen Harper was planning on making.614 
 
 This is an example of a resignation, but it is possible that legislative reform could 
make an individual unqualified to hold the position. It has never been the case that the person 
                                               
607 Shoving, supra note 295. 
608 “Federal ethics Commissioner has to get lead out”, Editorial, The Vancouver Sun (18 
April 2006) A16. 
609 “Ethics guru says job is a nightmare: Bernard Shapiro tells MPs he’s way behind 
schedule”, The Gazette (16 April 2006) A16. 
610 Glen McGregor, “Radiation treatment kept ethics czar off job”, The Ottawa Citizen 
(16 March 2006) A3. 
611 O’Neill, supra note 502. 
612 Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy 
and Ethics, 38th Parl, 1st Sess, No 034 (28 June 2005) at 0900 (Ed Broadbent) 
613 “Tories name long-time civil servant to fill watchdog post”, Toronto Star (13 June 
2007) A17. 
614 Shoving, supra note 607. 
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serving has been willing yet unable to seek renewal, but this could happen if, for example, 
the Parliament of Canada Act were to be amended so that it prohibited anyone from being 
appointed if they had previously been appointed to a position by an order-in-council.   
 
One challenge that might possibly arise in the context of removing a Conflict of 
Interest and Ethics Commissioner could come from the fact that the commissioner is 
responsible for two very different mandates. In theory, the commissioner could do an 
excellent job at administering the Code, but a terrible job at administering the Act. Under the 
Act however, the commissioner reports back to the Prime Minister with respect to 
examinations and tables annual reports with both the House and Senate. All parallel reporting 
under the Code is made simply to the Speaker of the House. It is possible that the Prime 
Minister would want the commissioner removed because of disagreements about how the 
Act is being administered, but that the House is not willing to make such an address. Given 
that the Senate has no role whatsoever in either the commissioner’s appointment or removal, 
it could be the case that a Prime Minister under a minority government appoints a 
commissioner after minimal consultation with the leaders of the opposition parties and is 
then stuck with not being able to remove that person. I believe this is a good thing, but it also 
speaks to why a Prime Minister should want to properly consult with opposition parties 
before recommending an individual for a governor-in-council appointment. Inadequate 
consultation could leave the governing party in a more vulnerable position than it might 
otherwise have liked. 
 
 
6.4 Budget, Staffing, Salaries and Financial Autonomy 
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As noted above, the office’s two commissioners have both considered their status to 
be that of an officer of the House of Commons. Primary to their position, it seems, is the 
office’s relationship to the treasury board through the Financial Administration Act 615 
(FAA). The FAA, among many other things, sets out that the Conflict of Interest and Ethics 
Commissioner is considered a department for the purposes of the Act,616 but that it is not a 
division or branch of the federal public administration. Being a department means that there 
are some financial accountability rules that apply to the office under the FAA. For example, 
the commissioner is deemed to be a “deputy head”617 and is therefore “responsible for 
ensuring an internal audit capacity appropriate to the needs of the department.”618 The office 
accordingly releases audited financial statements each year.619  
 
Not being included in the Schedules to the FAA as a division or branch of the federal 
public service means that the commissioner does not report to a minister. The Act deems the 
Speaker of the House of Commons to serve in that reporting role. The Act also sets out that 
the Treasury Board has authority to make policies applicable to the ministries, divisions and 
branches, but it has no authority to make policies applicable to the House of Commons. The 
commissioner accordingly is not subject to Treasury Board policies,620 nor does the Treasury 
                                               
615 Financial Administration Act, RSC 1985, c F-11 [Financial Admin Act]. 
616 Ibid, s 2. 
617 PC Act, supra note 15, s 84(1). 
618 Financial Admin Act, supra note 615, s 16.1. 
619 See Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, 
“Publications” (accessed 29 October 2019), online: <https://ciec-
ccie.parl.gc.ca/en/publications/Pages/search-recherche.aspx> (the annual audited 
financial statements can be found by clicking on the “Financial Reports” publication 
category). 
620 Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “Opening 
Statement before the House of Commons Standing Committee on the Status of Women in 
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Board determine the amount of funding available to the office. Instead, the Parliament of 
Canada Act sets out that the office’s budgetary estimates are to be considered “by the 
Speaker of the House of Commons and then transmitted to the President of the Treasury 
Board, who shall lay it before the House of Commons with the estimates of the Government 
for the fiscal year.”621 The Speaker of the House  simply includes them without change in 
the estimates of the government for that fiscal year and the commissioner is called to defend 
them before the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics.622 This 
process sets the COIEC apart from the other eight agents of parliament. 
 
The process of defending the office’s estimates is worth looking at a bit more closely. 
There are no formal rules anywhere for what this is supposed to look like, but the 
commissioner has consistently posted transcripts online623 of the opening statements that 
have been made to the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics. 
The submission is typically broken down into rather standard topics that the commissioner 
discusses with the Committee. In May 2016 for example, the commissioner discussed the 
office’s Organization and Operations (including explaining the five employment divisions, 
                                               
the context of its study on Sexual Harassment in the Federal Workplace” (Ottawa: 7 Feb 
2013), online: <https://ciec-
ccie.parl.gc.ca/en/publications/Documents/Presentations/Opening%20statement%20Statu
s%20of%20Women%20Cttee%20Feb%207%2013.pdf> at 1 (Commissioner Mary 
Dawson) [Dawson on Harassment]. 
621 PC Act, supra note 15, s 84(7)-(8). 
622 Dawson Relationship, supra note 168 at 5. 
623 See e.g. Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, 
“Presentations to Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics” 
(accessed 19 July 2019), online: <https://ciec-ccie.parl.gc.ca/en/publications/Pages/ 
search-recherche.aspx> (the speaking notes can be found by clicking on the 
“Presentations” publication category). 
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outlined immediately below), Accountability Framework, Previous Budgetary 
Requirements, the Main Estimates for the year ahead, Management Initiatives and any other 
matters that have had or may have an impact on the office’s operations. The House will 
certainly not approve the commissioner’s budget without the committee first scrutinizing it, 
but the process of defending the estimates seems to be rather friendly and efficient. This may 
be the case because the office has rarely asked for more money and has even decreased its 
estimates on occasion.624  It is also interesting to note that the commissioner’s estimates pass 
through the Speaker’s hands, the House, a committee of the House and the hands of the 
Treasury Board President. This process seems to be loosely designed to at least informally 
ensure that multiple actors will have a role in the handling and scrutiny of these estimates so 
as to limit the risk of one voice significantly overpowering the others.  Again, this stands in 
stark contrast to the other agents who submit their estimates directly to the Treasury Board. 
 
The FAA also reinforces the commissioner’s budgetary autonomy by listing the 
commissioner alongside the House of Commons, the Senate and Senate Ethics Officer, the 
Library of Parliament and the office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer as departments that 
do not answer to a minister in relation to their budgets. The office therefore considers itself 
to be part of Parliament and its employees (who enter into their own employment contracts 
and are not unionized625) to not be part of the public service.626 The commissioner has the 
                                               
624 See e.g. Dawson Relationship, supra note 168 at 3. 
625 Dawson on Harassment, supra note 620 at 2. 
626 Dawson Carleton, supra note 516 at 4. 
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power to enter into contracts627 and to hire and pay628 any staff and/or consultants629 that are 
deemed necessary. In exercising this autonomy, the office is now organized into five 
different divisions: Advisory and Compliance, Policy, Research and Communications, 
Reports and Investigations and Legal Services and Corporate Management.630 The staff is 
even subject to its own Code of Values and Standards of Conduct that all employees must 
read and sign when they join the office and again every year.631 All of these points seem to 
be strong indicia that the commissioner is given sweeping operational autonomy when it 
comes to making decisions about staffing, salary and employment relationships.  
 
Despite the many ways in which independence seems to be protected in the staffing 
context, it is possible for Parliament to very easily hinder this autonomy. In 2014, for 
example, a Conservative MP advanced a private members bill that would require agents and 
their employees to disclose their past political activity.632 Although there was no definition 
of political activity in the bill and there were no penalties for having engaged in such activity, 
the bill demonstrates how easily an agent’s autonomy and control over operations can be 
                                               
627 PC Act, supra note 15, s. 84(2). 
628 Ibid, s. 84(5)-(6). 
629 Ibid, s. 84(3). 
630 Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “Opening 
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631 Dawson on Harassment, supra note 620 at 3. 
632 Bill C-520, supra note 371. 
 192 
hindered. Bill C-520 never passed into law and was widely criticized as seeking to enable a 
“witch hunt.”633  
 
The structural safeguards that are in place to preserve the COIEC’s autonomy and 
independence are not fail proof. Commissioners must also make philosophical commitments 
in relation to how they will approach their role. As I explained above in relation to agents of 
parliament in general, it is through their personal choices regarding how to fulfil their duties 
that commissioner are able to operationalize their independence. It is therefore important to 
better understand the COIEC’s structural basis and operational functions.   
 
6.5 What does the COIEC do? 
 
The Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner has what amounts to three separate 
but connected roles: to provide counsel or advice, to investigate allegations that someone 
under his or her jurisdiction has acted improperly and to evaluate and/or judge the behavior 
of elected officials and public office holders in regards to matters that fall under the 
Commissioner’s jurisdiction. 634  As the history of this office has demonstrated, the 
innovation of having a Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner who answers to 
Parliament and not to the Prime Minister or cabinet has been received as progressive. This 
                                               
633 Alex Boutillier, “Tory MP’s proposed bill likened to witch hunt”, The Toronto Star 
(15 January 2014), online: < 
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office is slightly different from the other agents of parliament we have looked at however, 
and that difference gives rise to some complications that it is important to unpack.  
 
(a)!Legislation vs. Rules (Standing Orders) 
As explained above, the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner is responsible 
for two major mandates: 
1)! Administering the Conflict of Interest Act,635 which applies to designated public office 
holders; and, 
2)! Administering the Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of Commons, 
which is not legislative, but is instead part of the standing orders of the House of 
Commons. 636 
Who counts as a public office holder for the purposes of the Act is set out in the definitions 
section.637 Some of the more notable positions captured are: 
•! Ministers of the Crown, such as ministers of state or parliamentary secretaries; 
•! Members of ministerial staff; 
•! The Chief Electoral Officer; 
•! Ministerial advisers; 
•! Governor-in-council appointees, other than a lieutenant governor, officers and staff of 
the Senate, House of Commons and Library of Parliament, a judge who receives a salary 
under the Judges Act638, and a few others. 
                                               
635 Act, supra note 13. 
636 Code, supra note 14. 
637 Act, supra note 13, s 2(1). 
638 Judges Act, RSC, 1985, c J-1. 
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•! The Parliamentary Budget Officer; and, 
•! Ministerial appointees whose appointments are approved by the Governor in Council. 
 
What is interesting to note again here is that the Act and the Code have some overlap. 
If you are a Minister of the Crown or a parliamentary secretary, then you are subject to both 
sets of rules. This can lead to confusion among those individuals about which rules they must 
follow and when. This confusion also leads to the unique scenario where the Conflict of 
Interest and Ethics Commissioner must file annual reports to both the Senate and the House 
of Commons with respect to the Act that governs the ethical conduct public office holders, 
but only to the House of Commons when it comes to the Code that applies to Members.639  
 
(b) Advisory Functions 
The Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner is tasked with giving advice to 
stakeholders under both the Act and the Code.  This responsibility generally requires the 
individual about whom the advice applies to contact the commissioner directly.  Under the 
Code, for example, a member may request an opinion about their own personal 
responsibilities under the Code.640 The same is true under the Act in respect of individual 
public office holders,641 but with one exception. Under the Act, the commissioner is also 
obligated to receive requests from and provide the Prime Minister with confidential advice 
about how the Act applies to any individual public office holder.642 This effectively means 
                                               
639 PC Act, supra note 15, s 90(1). 
640 Code, supra note 14, s 26(1). 
641 Act, supra note 13, s 43(b). 
642 Ibid, s 43(a). 
 195 
that the Prime Minister can request advice about a public office holder without that public 
office holder’s involvement or consent being needed by the Prime Minister before doing so.  
 
As former Commissioner Dawson explained, “…there is a provision for me to 
provide confidential policy advice and support to the Prime Minister in respect of conflict of 
interest and ethical issues in general.”643 This is a notable provision because it stands in 
contrast to the usual approach of only allowing public office holders to ask for advice about 
things that apply to them in their role as public office holders. Because this mandate is 
required to be undertaken in confidence however, it is also questionable whether the 
commissioner has the right to investigate a possible violation of the Act or Code based solely 
on information that was clearly first obtained in the fulfillment of the duty to assist the Prime 
Minister.  For these reasons, allowing the Prime Minister to receive confidential advice from 
the commissioner about a staffer is problematic. The best way to correct this would be to 
require the commissioner to communicate with the public office holder in question before 
any advice is given to the Prime Minister about that individual. Given the commissioner’s 
right to initiate an investigation autonomously, they would not have to disclose that the 
inquiry came from the Prime Minister. This approach would however ensure that the public 
office holder has an opportunity to help ensure that the commissioner has all accurate and 
relevant information necessary to be able to provide meaningful advice. The advisory 
opinions that the commissioner provides to stakeholders cover a variety of matters. The first 
and most common area of advice is with respect to questions about whether an individual 
has acted in a way that could put them in or is confronted with a concern that could place 
                                               
643 Dawson Oliphant, supra note 460. 
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them in a conflict of interest. Both the Act and the Code attempt to define conflicts of interest, 
but in different ways. The Code restricts members from exercising their parliamentary duties 
and functions in a way that “furthers his or her private interests or those of a member of the 
Member’s family, or to improperly further another person’s or entity’s private interests.”644 
The Act more directly states that “…a public office holder is in a conflict of interest when 
he or she exercises an official power, duty or function that provides an opportunity to further 
his or her private interests or those of his or her relatives or friends or to improperly further 
another person’s private interests.”645 
 
These two approaches are very different. One difference is found in the fact that the 
Code explicitly lays out the situations in which a member would be furthering a private 
interest and also carves out exceptions for when a private interest would not be engaged.646 
The Act on the other hand is much less specific and merely offers three types of situations in 
which a private interest would not be engaged.647 This means that the rules for public office 
holders lend themselves to a greater deal of discretion on the part of the commissioner than 
do the rules under the Code. This may be because it is ultimately only the Prime Minister 
who can make enforcement decisions under the Act, but given the overlap between who the 
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Code and Act apply to, this can also be challenging for the commissioner. One of the most 
obvious challenges arises because there is sufficient leeway for advisory opinions about 
similar issues to vary and evolve over time and this has left the office open to criticism from 
members. As MP Candice Bergen complained to the media in 2016:  
I remember being really frustrated and standing up in caucus to complain about 
not being able to help a good cause. It was nothing to do with me personally or 
politically. She (Dawson) is incredibly inconsistent in her interpretation of the 
(Conflict of Interest) act.648 
 
Inconsistencies can be difficult to avoid when an individual is afforded a high level of 
discretion however. Variation of opinion may also be necessary to help capture new and 
unanticipated nuances in otherwise familiar scenarios. It not surprising then that a member 
might get frustrated by their inability to predict the commissioner’s advice.  
 
Another way in which the advisory role of the commissioner is complicated with 
respect to conflicts of interest is because it also allows the commissioner to consider apparent 
conflicts of interest. The Code sets out in its principles section that “Members are 
expected…to arrange their private affairs so that foreseeable real or apparent conflicts of 
interest may be prevented from arising, but if such a conflict does arise, to resolve it in a way 
that protects the public interest.”649 The commissioner is then given the right, but not the 
duty, to have regard to the purposes and principles sections when interpreting and applying 
Members’ obligations under this Code. 650 !The Act for public office holders has no 
corresponding duty to avoid the appearance of a conflict of interest, even though it has long 
                                               
648 John Ivison, “Watchdog only barks when safe”, National Post (8 April 2016) A4 
[Ivison]. 
649 Code, supra note 14, s 2(d). 
650 Ibid, s 3.1. 
 198 
been understood that public sentiment seems to expect public officials to have a duty to avoid 
apparent conflicts.651 That being said, members who are subject to the Act in their capacity 
as public office holders are of course also subject to the Code. 
 
The City of Toronto’s former Integrity Commissioner Valerie Jepson has written in 
support of a broad-based approach to conflict of interest regulation that includes apparent 
conflicts:  
…unless there is a firm precedent by a previous commissioner, Court or an 
express exclusion, restrictions against conflicts of interest for elected officials 
ought to be interpreted in a broad and purposive manner, consistent with the 
common law, which includes the duty to avoid apparent conflicts of interest.652 
 
Jepson refrains from extending her analysis to unelected officials, but this approach has real 
implications for the work that elected members do. Members are already required to refrain 
from participating in votes related to matters in which they have a private interest. 653 
Members who are also public office holders must already refrain from any matters in which 
they “would be in a conflict of interest”654 and make a public declaration of their recusals 
that includes “sufficient detail to identify the conflict of interest that was avoided.”655  
Enforcing the idea that conflicts of interest include apparent conflicts could lead to more 
recusals, especially since members who are public office holders are already subject to strong 
recusal rules.  This could have a real impact on democratic processes when there are close 
votes in Parliament. 
                                               
651 Round Table, supra note 448 at 16. 
652 Valerie Jepson, “Apparent conflicts of interest, elected officials and codes of conduct” 
(2018) 61:S1 Can Pub Admin 36 at 50. 
653 See Code, supra note 14, s 13. 
654 Act, supra note 13, s 21. 
655 Ibid, s 25(1). 
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Additionally, the general public’s expectations of public officials does not always 
align with the rules that the commissioner is tasked with enforcing. As Professor Gerry 
Ferguson has noted, “…the concept of a “private interest” has expanded over time to 
recognize that subjective private interests informed by ideological, personal, and political 
matters may improperly influence public duties.”656 Worried perhaps about the potential that 
the public’s expectation for her to interpret the rules broadly could lead down a slippery 
slope, former Commissioner Mary Dawson concluded in her 2010 Cheques Report that 
conflict of interest rules are meant to deal with private personal interests and not partisan 
political interests.657  
 
Further muddying the commissioner’s ability to provide advice about conflicts of 
interest is the fact that the Parliament of Canada Act assigns a formal title to the 
commissioner that does not align with the mandates established under the Code and Act.  As 
former Commissioner Dawson has been quoted as saying, “[i]t is a bit confusing when my 
title is conflict of interest and ethics commissioner and yet when you look into the Code and 
Act, there’s no mention of a mandate for ethics.”658 This was echoed by Lori Turnbull who 
noted that “[a] gap exists between the standard in the code and the public’s sense of what it 
means to be ethical.”659 It clearly does not make sense to call the commissioner an ‘ethics 
                                               
656 Gerry Ferguson, E-Book, Global Corruption: Law, Theory and Practice (International 
Centre for Criminal Law Reform & Criminal Justice Policy, 1 June 2018), online: 
<https://icclr.law.ubc.ca/resources/global-corruption-law-theory-and-practice/> at 9-4. 
657 See Cheques Report, supra note 647; Les Whittington, “Ethics czar wants right to 
explain”, The Toronto Star (30 Sept 2010) A7 [Whittington]. 
658 Whittington, supra note 657. 
659 Turnbull Rules, supra note 248 at 352. 
 200 
commissioner’ if the person is responsible for commenting on conflict of interest in 
particular, but not on principles of ethics in general. Having this label only serves to 
perpetuate confusion that already exists in relation to this very unique role. 
 
Having a mandate to opine about general matters of ethics would be very useful 
for an office of this nature. Ian Greene has poignantly explained that understanding 
principles of ethics can be more useful than following specific rules of ethics. He notes 
that:  
…comprehensive rules by themselves are not a complete solution. Rules are 
more effective if it is clear that they are designed to implement some general 
principles which are understood by all who are affected by them. Moreover, the 
rules themselves may extend too far, or not far enough, if the principles which 
they are intended to promote are not well understood.660  
 
Former commissioner Dawson agrees, noting that “…the more important thing is to instill 
the values in people that they follow.”661 
 
(c) Disclosure Filings 
One of the requirements of both the Act and Code that helps to empower the Conflict 
of Interest and Ethics Commissioner to be able to inform stakeholders about the rules that 
apply to them is the private disclosure process. Among other things, individuals subject to 
the Act and Code must inform the commissioner about certain classes of assets and liabilities, 
as well as their business interests (regardless of whether they are active) and volunteer 
                                               
660 Ian Greene, “Conflict of Interest and the Canadian Constitution: An analysis of 
Conflict of Interest Rules for Canadian Cabinet Ministers” (1990) 23:2 Can J Pol Sci 233 
at 255. 
661 John Geddes, “The Watchdogs who never bite”, Maclean’s (15 November 2010), 
online: <https://www.macleans.ca/news/canada/the-watchdogs-who-never-bite/>.  
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activities. These disclosure requirements have become progressively more robust over the 
years because, as Paul Thomas notes: “[c]alls for greater transparency, in the form of 
disclosure requirements, are part of the growing public insistence that governments become 
more responsive to the public will.”662 Under the Act, ministers and parliamentary secretaries 
must also make reasonable efforts to provide information specific to their spouse, common 
law partner and/or dependent children.663  
 
The commissioner will review the filings submitted by each individual and then 
advise that person (and/or their family members) about specific rules that they should pay 
closer attention to. For example, if an MP owns shares of a company that could benefit from 
a legislative initiative currently being considered by Parliament, then the commissioner may 
remind that MP about the provision in the Code that may require them to recuse themselves 
from voting on that matter. It may also be the case that the Act or Code mandates divestment 
of an asset, recusal from voting and/or resignation from outside activities or engagements. 
Importantly, although divestment and recusal are identified as specific compliance measures, 
the Act does not limit the commissioner’s authority in this regard and other creative measures 
have also been employed, including conflict of interest screens.664 
 
                                               
662 Paul G Thomas, “The Changing Nature of Accountability” in Donald J Savoie & Guy 
B Peters, eds, Taking Stock: Assessing Public Sector Reforms (Montreal, QC: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 1998) at 355. 
663 Act, supra note 13, s 22(3). 
664 See e.g. Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, 
“Morneau Report made under the Conflict of Interest Act” (June 2018), online: < 
https://ciec-ccie.parl.gc.ca/en/publications/Documents/InvestigationReports/ 
Morneau%20Report.pdf>; Democracy Watch v Canada (A-G), 2018 FCA 195. 
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Another compliance measure that is allowed under both the Act and Code is the 
implementation of a blind trust to manage an individual’s assets.665 A blind trust ensures that 
the individual who owns the asset is not also actively managing it. This rather demanding 
requirement helps to maintain the public’s trust in that minister’s decision-making. If an 
asset is placed in a blind trust, then the owner of the asset (i.e. the MP or public office holder) 
will not be regularly informed about that asset’s management (e.g. whether it has been sold 
or otherwise disposed of) or performance. This distancing from assets ensures, in theory, 
that the individual’s private interest in the asset’s performance does not influence the actions 
they take on behalf of the public interest. Blind trusts are not perfect however. As former 
commissioner Dawson mused:  
…[i]f you’ve got a huge set of holdings in one area and you put it in a blind trust, 
what do you think is in your blind trust?” she said. “You know what the hell’s in 
there. That’s a defect on a blind trust. You’ve got to have other measures around 
the blind trust, like conflict screens.666 
 
Regular disclosure filings play an important role in providing an opportunity for the 
commissioner to educate stakeholders about their obligations. Interestingly however, the 
commissioner has never proactively audited any public office holders to make sure that they 
were recusing themselves in situations where they may have conflicts.667  
 
                                               
665 See Act, supra note 13, s 27 (reporting Public Office Holders are prohibited from 
holding controlled assets under the Act and must divest those assets or place them in blind 
trust within 120 days of their appointment to their position). 
666 Laura Stone, “Ethics Commissioner Mary Dawson says she ‘went out with a bang’”, 
The Globe and Mail (8 January 2018), online: 
<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ethics-commissioner-mary-dawson-
says-she-went-out-with-a-bang/article37517088/>. 
667 Althia Raj, “Federal Ethics Commissioner Mary Dawson Has Never Proactively 
Checked If Ministers Are Following Rules”, HuffPost Canada (Oct 27, 2017), online: < 
https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2017/10/27/federal-ethics-commissioner-mary-dawson-
has-never-proactively-checked-if-ministers-are-following-rules_a_23258196/>. 
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(d) Investigatory Functions 
To complement the commissioner’s advisory function, he or she is also responsible 
for investigating alleged breaches of the Act and Code.668 The advisory opinions that the 
commissioner provides to members under the Code are binding on the commissioner with 
respect to “any subsequent consideration of the subject-matter, as long as the commissioner 
was aware of all relevant facts known to the member when the advice was provided.”669 
Advice under the Act is afforded no similar protection, but the Act does allow the 
commissioner to easily discontinue an own initiative examination without having to give 
reasons for doing so.670  If an examination was requested by a parliamentarian however, 
then reasons for discontinuing the examination must be provided in a report that is provided 
only to the Prime Minister. 
 
Interestingly, the two regimes use different language to describe the commissioner’s 
investigatory powers. They are called “inquiries” under the Code671 and “examinations” 
under the Act.672 This distinction is helpful because they are in fact processes that have 
meaningfully different outcomes.673 Under the Act, the commissioner addresses and provides 
an examination report directly to the Prime Minister. The report is made available to the 
                                               
668 Dodek, supra note 443 at 109 (in which Adam Dodek puts forward the idea that the 
advisory and investigatory functions should be kept separate, which is in fact the case in 
some Canadian cities). 
669 Code, supra note 14, s 26(3). 
670 Act, supra note 13, s 45(2). 
671 Code, supra note 14, s 27. 
672 Act, supra note 13, s 44. 
673 Regardless of the differences between the two, I will hereafter refer to both processes 
simply as investigations that are conducted by the Commissioner. I will use more precise 
language only when necessary. 
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public, but it is not considered by either house of Parliament. Under the Code, the inquiry 
report is filed with the Speaker of the House of Commons, who then tables it in the House 
so that it can be considered/debated for no more than two hours.674   
 
Investigations can be initiated as a result of requests received from a member of the 
House or, in the case of examinations under the Act, requests can also be received from a 
member of the Senate. They can be self-initiated by the commissioner675 or commenced 
under the Code as a result of a resolution passed within the House of Commons. Neither the 
Act nor the Code obligate the commissioner to launch an investigation if a complaint is 
received from a member of the public. Having this discretion to act in response to 
information received from members of the public could be regarded as another indicia of the 
commissioner’s independence.676 This discretion is very important because it addresses a 
concern raised by Ian Greene in a 1991 paper, that the complaints process could be abused 
by people who send frequent complaints to the commissioner for investigation.677 
 
Unsurprisingly, the commissioner has considerably more robust investigatory 
powers under the Act than under the Code. In particular, the commissioner has the same 
power under the Act as a court of record has to be able to compel witnesses and the 
                                               
674 Code, supra note 14, s 28(11). 
675 I have also referred to this as an “own initiative” right to conduct an investigation. See 
above, page 4.4(c). 
676 This stands in stark contrast to Ontario’s Integrity Commissioner, who cannot accept 
complaints from a member of the public and cannot conduct investigation on their own 
initiative. 
677 Greene Future, supra note 486 at 170. 
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production of records.678 The Act and Code both also emphasize the importance of privacy 
and confidentiality, ensuring fairness of process and the broad reasons for which the 
commissioner may refuse to investigate. Section 66 of the Act, for example, says that the 
commissioner’s decisions and orders are final and “shall not be questioned or reviewed in 
any court”, except in accordance with subsections 18.1(4)(a), (b) or (e) of the Federal Courts 
Act.”679 It also important to note that both the Code and Act provide instructions for when an 
investigation must be suspended.680 For example, if the commissioner suspects that the 
subject of the investigation has committed a criminal offence.681 
 
Despite the robustness and clarity of the investigatory mandates, it has also been 
argued that an ethics commissioner should not sit in judgment of his or her own advice 
because they may not be or even appear to be impartial.682 This concern was raised in 1991 
by Ian Greene but has also more recently been echoed in 2018 by Adam Dodek. Dodek put 
forward the idea that the advisory and investigatory functions of these offices should be 
separated and one possible solution to this tension that he identified would be for an alternate 
commissioner to be engaged when conflict situations arise.683 
 
                                               
678 Act, supra note 13, s 48(2). 
679 Ibid, s 66. 
680 See e.g. Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “Carson 
Report – Discontinuance of an examination” (June 2018) (in which the Commissioner 
discontinued an examination because the same matter was also being considered by the 
Supreme Court of Canada SCC). 
681 See Act, supra note 13, s 49; Code, supra note 14, s 29. 
682 Greene Future, supra note 486 at 169-70. 
683 Ibid. 
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Another criticism of the idea that ethics commissioners should be responsible for 
conducting investigations rests on the belief that doing so could have a negative impact on 
how our parliamentary democracy functions. As Andrew Potter argues:  
…when a commissioner becomes involved in an investigation…it could have 
the effect of taking the issue out of the political realm entirely…could backfire 
by actually making it harder for the opposition to hold government’s feet to the 
fire... Canadian governments have always found royal commissions and judicial 
inquiries extremely useful instruments for burying politically inconvenient 
issues.684 
 
On the other hand, receiving complaints and questions, especially from the public, could 
allow an ethics commissioner to “become better aware of the public’s standards of ethics 
and [this] could [allow the Commissioner to] keep politicians informed of them.”685  
 
An ethics commissioner can quickly become attuned to the tremendous pressure that 
is on them to make sure they do not overstep their delegated role(s). As former commissioner 
Dawson noted in a talk she gave at Osgoode Hall Law School in 2009:  
...I would not intervene in policy disputes or other political matters unless they 
also involve a deliberate and focused attempt by a Member of the House of 
Commons to further a private interest. It is sometimes difficult to determine 
exactly where to draw the line between a private interest and a “political” or 
“partisan” interest, and it will always depend on the circumstances of the case.686 
 
It is precisely this concern that independent commissioners might intentionally or 
inadvertently insert themselves into purely political and/or policy matters that regularly 
emanates from commentators.687 One way to address and maybe even reduce this cynicism 
                                               
684 Potter, supra note 34 at 88. 
685 Turnbull Rules, supra note 248 at 365. 
686 Dawson Hybrid, supra note 457 at 6. 
687 In fact, this was a key criticism leveled at Commissioner Dion in the wake of the 
Trudeau II report, supra note 10 (See e.g. Ian Austen, “A Watchdog Found Trudeau 
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would be to make sure that commissioners can always fully explain their decisions, 
particularly when the decision is to not investigate a matter that is getting significant public 
attention. As former commissioner Dawson once explained, she has been “absolutely 
muzzled”688:   
The Code prevents me from making any public comment relating to a 
preliminary review or inquiry. The purpose of this prohibition is to prevent 
attention being drawn to allegations of wrongdoing unless and until the 
Commissioner has conducted an inquiry and issued a report on the matter. This 
reflects an important principle in procedural fairness and my Office takes care 
to ensure that investigative work is conducted in confidence. 
 
There are, however, certain occasions where I believe it would be in the interest 
of Members for me to be able to communicate the results of a preliminary 
review. In particular, I have in mind cases where the allegations in question have 
been made public, either by the Member requesting the inquiry, through media 
reports, or in some other way.689 
 
This applies equally to investigations that the commissioner has discontinued because the 
matter complained of falls outside the Office’s jurisdiction or has no basis in evidence.690 
 
(e) Enforcement (Punishment and Deterrence) 
The Act and Code take different approaches towards their role in influencing the 
behaviours of the individuals to whom they respectively apply. The Act provides the 
commissioner with a larger selection of tools that can be used to encourage compliance than 
                                               
Broke the Law, but Not Everyone Agrees”, The New York Times (16 August 2019), 
online: <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/16/world/canada/trudeau-snc-ethics.html>). 
688 Whittington, supra note 657. 
689 Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “The 2008-2009 
Annual Report made under the Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of 
Commons” (Ottawa: June 2009) at 2. 
690 Whittington, supra note 657; see also Bruce Cheadle, “Ethics watchdog seeks power 
to fine MPs for conflicts of interest”, The Globe and Mail (3 Jan 2013) A4 (Cheadle 
writes that Commissioner Dawson “…argues that she’d like to be able to address 
“misinformation put into the public domain in relation to investigative work.”). 
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does the Code. These tools tend to focus first on prevention and second on punishment. The 
Code leaves most of the decision-making in the hands of the House, with the commissioner’s 
role being primarily that of an educator and investigator. Former commissioner Dawson 
described her personal philosophy about her role as follows: “[i]t is important to understand 
that our practice is primarily collaborative, not adversarial. My staff and I work with 
individuals to avoid conflicts of interest from arising. Our aim is prevention, not 
punishment.”691 
 
Dawson’s approach is rather typical. As Paul Thomas explains, “…the majority of 
agencies operate on the basis of what is called the “ombudsman model” that involves reliance 
on persuasion, mediation, recommendations and publicity.”692 It is unclear whether this is 
the best approach for public sector ethics regulation, but after several years in office former 
commissioner Dawson did believe that the simple act of publicly disclosing violations could 
have a tremendous impact. She noted that, “[w]hile I think the enforcement tools in the Act 
and the Members’ Code could be strengthened, public disclosure following an investigation 
is, in my view, the most potent sanction for a failure to comply.”693  Dawson has also 
rhetorically chided: “[w]ould you like to have a report written about you? I don’t think so.”694 
 
Given that the Code and the Act have overlap in their application despite the fact that 
they are structured to operate very differently, individual commissioners do have to make 
                                               
691 Dawson Hybrid Paper, supra note 457 at 16. 
692 Thomas PPF, supra note 50 at 7. 
693 Dawson Future Directions, supra note 455 at 6. 
694 Tim Harper, “Time to give ethics act some teeth”, The Toronto Star (28 Mar 2012) 
A6. 
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some philosophical decisions about how they would like to approach their role. For some, 
like former commissioner Dawson, their approach to administering the Act is based primarily 
on prevention.695  Other commissioners may decide that using resources to continue to 
improve education and early prevention is a lower value approach and instead prioritize pure 
enforcement because they think it is more likely to compel greater compliance. These rules 
of conduct are not new, and it may be reasonable to take the position that public office 
holders should no longer be able to pretend that they are ignorant of the rules and their 
application. Enforcement can also serve as a strong deterrent that helps with prevention. A 
considered balancing of values and mechanisms is undoubtedly required. Under the Act, 
there are three types of enforcement measures that are each limited in their scope: 
compliance orders, examination reports containing recommendations that are consequently 
adopted and administrative monetary penalties.  
 
With respect to matters like annual disclosure filings, section 30 of the Act allows the 
Commissioner to “…order a public office holder, in respect of any matter, to take any 
compliance measure, including divestment or recusal, that the Commissioner determines is 
necessary to comply with this Act.”696 Compliance orders issued under this provision are 
made public on the COIEC’s website697 and are regularly shared by the office on Twitter. 
                                               
695 Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “Opening 
Statement before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Access to Information, 
Privacy and Ethics, (23 February 2016), online: <https://ciec-
ccie.parl.gc.ca/en/publications/Documents/Presentations/Opening%20Statement%20ETH
I%20%20Feb.%2023,%202016%20EN.pdf> at 2. 
696 Act, supra note 13, s 30. 
697 See Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “Public 
Registry Home: All results published under the Act” (accessed 29 October 2019), online: 
<http://prciec-rpccie.parl.gc.ca/EN/PublicRegistries/Pages/PublicRegistryAct.aspx> 
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Examinations under the Act always result in a report that is provided to the Prime 
Minister and that includes an explanation of the conclusion reached by the commissioner. 
The Prime Minister is not permitted to alter the conclusion reached but is also under no 
obligation to accept it. 698  When the commissioner uncovers a contravention while 
conducting an examination under the Act, their report also does not include any sort of 
recommendation. The Act does allow the imposition of administrative monetary penalties 
(AMPs) of up to $500 for failures to meet a number of reporting requirements, but those are 
dealt with separately from the types of matters that require an examination to be conducted. 
Only violations related to failing to meet reporting deadlines can trigger an AMP699 and those 
violations are dealt with in a much more administrative manner.700 
 
Inquiries under the Code are much different. The reports are tabled with the 
Speaker701 and debated in the House of Commons.702 A finding of contravention in a report 
                                               
(Compliance Orders are publicly disclosed despite the fact that there is no clear provision 
in the Act requiring same. The Commissioner chooses to exercise discretion to do so. See 
Act, supra note 13, s 51(1)(e)). 
698 Act, supra note 13, s 47. 
699 See e.g. Supra, note 9 (Prime Minister Justin Trudeau was handed a $100 
administrative monetary penalty for not disclosing sunglasses that he received as a gift).  
700 Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “Opening 
Statement before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Access to Information, 
Privacy and Ethics on 2008-2009 Annual Report in respect of the Conflict of Interest Act, 
October 20, 2009 (20 October 2009), online: <https://ciec-
ccie.parl.gc.ca/en/publications/Documents/Presentations/Opening%20Statement%20ETH
I%20October%2020%202009%20EN.pdf> at 2 (Commissioner Dawson remarks that: 
“After developing appropriate processes, including a system of reminder notices, my 
Office implemented the regime in November 2008”). 
701 Code, supra note 14, s 28. 
702 Ibid, s 28(11). 
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is also expected to be accompanied by a recommendation from the commissioner. Although 
there may be small fines for failing to meet a deadline under the Act, there are no penalties 
for substantive contraventions under either the Act or the Code. The commissioner may 
recommend actions that could be taken by the members of the House of Commons in 
response to a reported violation, but the commissioner has no right to impose a sanction of 
any kind. Former commissioner Dawson did not see a problem with this however, and 
commented before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Access to Information, 
Privacy and Ethics that: 
I recognize that there are differences of opinion on whether it is necessary or 
desirable to impose penalties in such cases. My view is that issuing a public 
report in which a contravention is found is itself a significant adverse result, and 
that the imposition of monetary penalties is not necessary.703  
 
Others, like Adam Dodek, disagree with former commissioner Dawson’s perspective. Dodek 
says “[t]here is a need to both expand the range of formal sanctions and to increase their 
strength.”704 He further argues that “…the remarkably low maximum amount of the AMP 
under the Conflict of Interest Act undermines the efficacy of an ethics regime precisely 
because it makes it look equivalent to a municipal parking system.”705 It is difficult, if not 
impossible, to measure the effectiveness of naming and shaming as a deterrent to bad ethical 
behavior but, as will be further discussed in chapter eight, it is abundantly clear that there is 
little interest in expanding the sanctions or increasing their strength.  
                                               
703 Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “Opening 
Statement before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Access to Information, 
Privacy and Ethics in the Context of the Five-Year Review of the Conflict of Interest 
Act” (11 Feb 2013), online: <https://ciec-
ccie.parl.gc.ca/en/publications/Documents/Presentations/Opening%20Satement%20Five-
Year%20Review%20Act.pdf> at 3. 
704 Dodek, supra note 443 at 106. 
705 Ibid at 105. 
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 (f) Gifts and Benefits 
The rules in place regarding the receipt of gifts and other benefits by MPs and other 
public office holders are incredibly similar throughout the different national and subnational 
jurisdictions in Canada. Furthermore, rules prohibiting certain types of gifts and benefits 
and/or requiring their disclosure rarely change to become either more or less nuanced.706 
Despite the consistency of these types of rules, it is incredibly common to read an ethics 
commissioner’s annual report in which they explain that members tend to find the rules 
confusing.707 It seems clear to me however, that members simply choose not to take these 
rules very seriously. 
 
Members of Canada’s House of Commons ought to concern themselves with the 
possibility that the public might respond negatively to them receiving too many gifts or gifts 
from the wrong people and/or for the wrong reasons. The Code explicitly allows members 
to accept what it calls ‘sponsored travel’ as long it is related to their position and a statement 
is filed with the commissioner that describes the travel and nature of the sponsorship that has 
been provided.708 The commissioner is not obligated to approve such travel, but is required 
                                               
706 One of the amendments made to the Code in 2015 was to lower the threshold for 
public declarations of gifts and benefits from $500 to $200. Other than that, there has 
been no notable change to these rules. 
707 See e.g. Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “The 
2010-2011 Annual Report made under the Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the 
House of Commons” (Ottawa: 16 June 2011) at 6 (in which the Commissioner remarks 
that: “Although the rules relating to gifts and other benefits received by Members and 
members of the families seem relatively straightforward, their application is not always 
clear-cut.”) [AR 2010-11 Code].  
708 Code, supra note 14, s 15. 
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to publicly disclose all reported travel by filing one comprehensive list with the Speaker of 
the House by no later than March 31 every year.709 The only restriction on this travel is that 
it must relate to a member’s duties as a member. This is very broad in scope and effectively 
absolves members from obvious conflicts of interest (e.g. having direct stakeholders pay for 
flights and accommodations) under the rationale that it can sometimes be too expensive for 
members to pay for these trips on their own.710  
 
(g) Outreach and Education 
Compliance with the law is of course only one of the many ways that we attempt to 
shape the behaviour of public officials. As Warren Bailie and David Johnson explain,  
…the law is limited. It is only one of the means, and certainly not the best means, 
by which public morality is forged and developed. It is to these other means that 
ethics agencies should direct more attention, and the greatest of these is that of 
broad public education.711 
  
In her 2008-2009 annual reports, Commissioner Dawson noted the importance of her public 
education mandate under section 32 of the Code712 and reported that she had formed a new 
learning and communications group within her office.713 The office would now publish 
                                               
709 Ibid, s 15(3). 
710 See Trudeau Report, supra note 8 (for an example of a member who did not disclose 
his sponsored travel, as required). 
711 Warren R Bailie & David Johnson, “Governmental ethics and ethics agencies” (1991) 
34:1 Can Pub Admin 158 at 162 [Bailie & Johnson]. 
712 Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “The 2008-2009 
Annual Report made under the Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of 
Commons” (Ottawa: June 2009) (interestingly, there is no corresponding public outreach 
mandate under the Act). 
713 Ibid at 17. 
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Advisory Opinions to explain how the Code operates714 and Information Notices715 to help 
explain how the Act operates. Transcripts from talks that the commissioner and staff had 
given were also posted on the office’s website.716   
 
Looking at the transcripts from talks given can be instructive. While the 
commissioner and staff no doubt interact with many different people and sources of 
information outside of their office, seeing who they engage with in an official capacity tells 
us a great deal about who the commissioner feels the office owes its time and energy to. The 
office makes presentations to the caucuses of parties represented in the House of 
Commons,717 but also to a variety of other groups. The publicly available transcripts disclose 
presentations that have been given to: 
•! Committees of the House and the Senate;718 
                                               
714 Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “Browse 
Advisory Opinions” (accessed 29 October 2019), online: <https://ciec-
ccie.parl.gc.ca/en/rules-reglements/Pages/AdvOpinion-AvisCons.aspx>.  
715 Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “Browse 
Information Notices” (accessed 29 October 2019), online: <https://ciec-
ccie.parl.gc.ca/en/rules-reglements/Pages/InformationNotices-AvisInformation.aspx>. 
716 Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “Publications” 
(accessed 29 October 2019), online: <https://ciec-
ccie.parl.gc.ca/en/publications/Pages/search-recherche.aspx> (the presentation notes can 
be found by clicking on the “Presentations” publication category). 
717 Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “Presentation by 
Mary Dawson before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Access to 
Information, Privacy and Ethics” (Ottawa, 29 September 2011), online: <https://ciec-
ccie.parl.gc.ca/en/publications/Documents/Presentations/ETHI%20-
%20Sept%2029%202011.pdf> at 3 [Dawson ETHI 29 Sep 2011]. 
718 See e.g. Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, 
“Publications” (accessed 29 October 2019), online: <https://ciec-
ccie.parl.gc.ca/en/publications/Pages/search-recherche.aspx> (notes from presentations to 
parliamentary committees can be found by clicking on the “Presentations” publication 
category). 
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•! Federal and Provincial commissions; 
•! Conferences at academic institutions (e.g. law, public policy and political science); 
•! Officials from other national governments (e.g. Korea,719 China720); 
•! International governance organizations (e.g. Group of States against Corruption of 
the Council of Europe – GRECO721); and, 
•! Canadian Think Tanks (e.g. the Institute of Public Administration of Canada (IPAC), 
Canadian Study of Parliament Group). 
Further to the presentations given, the commissioner’s Annual Reports also refer to outreach 
undertaken that is less demanding or atypical in nature. For example, the office usually 
responds to simple requests received from other countries,722 makes presentations to the 
                                               
719 Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “Presentation to 
Special Committee on Ethics from the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea” 
(Ottawa: 5 August 2011), online: <https://ciec-
ccie.parl.gc.ca/en/publications/Documents/Presentations/Korean%20delegation%20Aug.
%205%202011%20EN.pdf>. 
720 Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “Values and 
Ethics at a Political Level”, Presentation at a Bilateral Workshop on Perspectives on 
Innovation in the Public Service Hosted by the Public Service Commission for a 
Delegation from China (Ottawa: 18 April 2011), online: <https://ciec-
ccie.parl.gc.ca/en/publications/Documents/Presentations/PSC%20Symposium%20April%
2018%20ENGLISH.pdf>. 
721 Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “GRECO High-
Level Conference Strengthening transparency and accountability to ensure integrity: 
United against corruption “National bodies or authorities in charge of preventing and/or 
fighting corruption: the next steps of their co-operation at an international level”” 
(Ottawa: 16 October 2018), online: <https://ciec-
ccie.parl.gc.ca/en/publications/Documents/Presentations/GRECO%20High-
Level%20Conference%20-%20Oct%2016%202018.pdf> (Speaker: Lyne Robinson-
Dalpé – Director, Advisory and Compliance) [GRECO]. 
722 See e.g. Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “The 
2017-2018 Annual Report in respect of the Conflict of Interest Act” (Ottawa: 4 June 
2018) at 17 (where Commissioner Dion writes: “As part of our international outreach, we 
responded to information requests from Australia, Indonesia, Ireland, Kazakhstan, South 
Korea, the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) and ParlAmericas”) [AR 2017-
18 Act]. 
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caucuses of parties represented in the House of Commons, 723  has participated in the 
Members’ Orientation Program, the House of Commons Service Fair, a Library of 
Parliament seminar724  and information on members’ obligations under the Code has even 
been added to the ‘Source’, which is the House of Commons’ mobile-enabled portal that is 
accessible on iPads that are provided to members.725  These presentations are important 
because they allow the commissioner and staff to engage with the public in a way that helps 
them to “become greater activists in the process of tracking ethics within society…”726 As 
Penny Collenette has argued, this active engagement is very important because ethics issues 
like conflicts of interest often hide in plain sight and can be easily overlooked unless there 
is rigorous awareness and training about these issues.727 
 
(h) Stakeholders and Influential Relationships  
The public profile of the commissioner’s role seems to have steadily increased over 
the years. This is not only because Commissioner Dawson was in the role for an extended 
period of time while ethics scandals become more visible in the traditional and online media, 
                                               
723 Dawson ETHI 29 Sep 2011, supra note 717 at 3. 
724 See Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, Opening 
Statement before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Access to Information, 
Privacy and Ethics” (3 May 2016), online: <https://ciec-
ccie.parl.gc.ca/en/publications/Documents/Presentations/Opening%20Statement%20ETH
I%20%20May%203,%202016%20EN.pdf> at 4. 
725 Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “The 2015-2016 
Annual Report made under the Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of 
Commons” (Ottawa: 14 June 2016) at 2 [AR 2015-16 Code]. 
726 Bailie & Johnson, supra note 711 at 162. 
727 Penny Collenette, “Political conflicts of interest will only get trickier: Collenette”, The 
Toronto Star (Nov 18, 2017), online: <https://www.thestar.com/opinion/star-
columnists/2017/11/18/political-conflicts-of-interest-will-only-get-trickier-
collenette.html>. 
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but also because the office itself has become much more outward-looking and social in its 
work. Further to taking on a very strong stakeholder education and outreach role,728 the 
office’s commissioners have both viewed the role as being one that is responsible for 
educating the public and they have accordingly become very active with their outreach and 
participation in conferences and other community events. As a result, the commissioners 
have been able to build and nurture important relationships with other individuals and 
organizations who have shared interests.  
 
The office of the COIEC does not exist on an island. It works within an industry of 
organizations inside and outside of the public service that are interested in ethics, 
accountability and good governance. It is important for the office to have a meaningful 
relationship with these industry players so that its work can be reflective of broader 
perspectives and emerging trends. Engaging with people and organizations who see things 
through different lenses and who challenge the status quo can also help to inform best 
practices. That being said, it is important to be clear about what other influences are at play 
in the commissioner’s work so that we can pay attention to how, if at all, those influences 
manifest themselves.   
 
Although it would be impossible to substantiate an assertion that any such 
relationships have a direct impact on the commissioner’s work, it is much less controversial 
to say that these are the obvious relationships that have a greater likelihood of informing and 
                                               
728 Reference to this operational emphasis can be seen in every annual report and there is 
now also a division within the office that is dedicated to education and outreach.  
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influencing the office’s work. When the commissioner is out and engaging with these 
individuals and organizations, theirs are the voices and perspectives that are encountered. 
Some may be sympathetic to the commissioner’s work and some not. Some of the voices 
may be progressive and some may be more interested in the status quo. Regardless, it is 
important to note that the commissioner’s work informs and is informed by the conversation 
that is being had by and between all of these individuals and groups. In this section I will 
look at who these stakeholders are and how their relationships with the commissioner 
generally manifest themselves. I will draw out the implications of these relationships where 
doing so is possible. 
 
NonGGovernmental+Organizations+
Two of arguably the most important relationships that the office has are with its 
biggest critic and with its counterparts around the world. First, the Canadian non-
governmental organization Democracy Watch is perpetually challenging the commissioner’s 
decisions. Democracy Watch has been questioning and seeking judicial review of everything 
from Commissioner Dawson’s reappointments729 and Commissioner Dion’s appointment730 
to decisions about whether to investigate a complaint731 and whether the commissioner has 
                                               
729 See Ryan Maloney, “Democracy Watch files Court Case Against Ethics 
Commissioner Mary Dawson”, HuffPost (26 June 2017), online: 
<https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2017/06/26/democracy-watch-files-court-case-against-
ethics-commissioner-mar_a_23002888/> (in which it is noted that Democracy Watch 
filed an application for judicial review of Commissioner Dawson’s refusal to recuse 
herself from investigating the Prime Minister). 
730 Democracy Watch v Canada (A-G), 2018 FC 1290. 
731 Democracy Watch v Canada (A-G), 2018 FCA 195. 
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the authority to give certain advice.732 Although it has never been noted in the office’s annual 
reports, it is likely the case that challenges brought by Democracy Watch account for a large 
percentage of the office’s annual legal spending.  
 
It is a good thing that Democracy Watch exists and takes such as active role in 
holding the office to account for its decisions. The office has been delegated significant 
authority by the House of Commons to monitor the behaviour of members. As we will see 
in chapter seven, the House has mostly relieved itself of any responsibility in this area by 
disregarding the expertise of the commissioner and refusing to move the office’s mandates 
in a progressive direction. Democracy Watch plays an important role not only in holding the 
commissioner to account for any missteps, but also in continuing to call attention to the 
inherent limitations in the role that the commissioner plays within our parliamentary 
democracy. 
 
The other relationship the commissioner has that may arguably be one of its most 
important is its connection to the Council on Government Ethics Laws (COGEL) and regular 
participation in COGEL’s annual international conferences. Attendance at COGEL’s 
conferences exposes the commissioner (and those office staff who also attend) to global 
perspectives on public sector ethics governance. Among other things, they learn about new 
initiatives, new technologies, new approaches to outreach and education, new ideas to create 
operational efficiencies, and make new connections. COGEL is by far the largest 
                                               
732 Democracy Watch v Canada (A-G), 2018 FCA 194. 
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organization of its kind in the world and provides invaluable opportunities for ethics officials 
to be able to spend time thinking outside the limits of their demanding day-to-day operational 
mandates. 
 
Political+Parties+
 
Political parties are not subject to the COIEC’s jurisdiction,733 but play a fundamental 
role in shaping the types of issues that find their way to the office. Members will often ask 
ethics-related questions to their caucus or leader’s office before possibly asking that same 
question of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner. As was discussed in chapter 
five above, some political parties in Canada actually have their own codes of conduct. Most 
often however, there is no official code of conduct and it is simply regarded as politically 
expedient to seek advice about potential ethics concerns from one’s caucus or party leader. 
The party may have already encountered a similar situation and may be able to give advice 
quickly or perhaps the party knows a reason why a member should or should not file a 
complaint with the commissioner about another member. The party’s role in this initial 
advice-seeking process is mostly unofficial, yet very firmly entrenched in politics. 
 
Members also tend to seek advice from their party leaders or caucuses first because 
of the commissioner’s own-initiative investigation rights that were discussed above.  One of 
the reasons that own-initiative investigation rights have not been granted to some sub-
                                               
733 See e.g. Cheques Reports, supra note 647 (MP Martha Hall Findlay filed a complaint 
alleging partisan use of government advertising. Commissioner Dawson found no 
violation under the Code because political parties are not “persons” under the Conflict of 
Interest Act).  
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national ethics commissioners is likely because of parliamentarians’ fear that they may 
accidentally alert that commissioner to a matter worthy of investigation during what they 
might otherwise perceive to be a regular consultation. If, for example, a member seeks advice 
about a controversial matter after the fact, then they may put themselves at risk. This is 
accordingly one of the reasons that political parties seem to have so much control over how 
their members handle ethics-related matters and why it sometimes seems like the 
commissioner is the last person to be brought in to the discussion when there is an ethics-
related controversy.     
 
Media+and+Social+Media+
When it is not a member or their political party, it is typically a member of the media 
or a user of social media who brings ethics-related controversies to light. Because the media 
covers so much of what politicians do on a daily basis, they often stumble upon questionable 
conduct and then skillfully follow the lead. An excellent example of this type of discovery 
was when a member of the media uncovered that Prime Minister Trudeau and his family 
took a trip to the Aga Khan’s private island during their holidays. This came to light simply 
because a reporter saw that the Prime Minister’s Christmas vacation was listed as 
‘confidential’ on his official itinerary. The reporter casually asked a member of Trudeau’s 
staff where he went, was told he had gone to visit the Aga Khan, and then started to piece 
together that such a visit might possibly be inappropriate.734  
 
                                               
734 CTV Staff, “PMO Tried to keep Trudeau’s Vacation Details Secret”, CTV News (2 
January 2017), online: <https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/pmo-tried-to-keep-trudeau-s-
vacation-details-secret-1.3225061>. 
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It is because the news media is omni-present that they regularly report on ethics 
matters and seek information from the commissioner’s office. Whereas it was once left to 
the media to figure out these matters for themselves, matters of public sector ethics can often 
be incredibly nuanced so it behooves ethics commissioners to engage with the media when 
they can. The media sometimes needs help sorting out who the players are and what issues, 
if any, actually fall under the commissioner’s jurisdiction. Former commissioner Mary 
Dawson’s approach to dealing with the media varied throughout her time in office, but in 
2016 she acknowledged the importance of her relationship with the media when she said: “I 
am also as open with the media as I am permitted to be under the two regimes. I believe the 
media can only help to communicate the existing ethics rules, thus performing an educational 
role.”735 
 
Part of the media’s educational role is in interpreting the commissioner’s reports, 
especially annual and investigation reports, and relaying that information to the public. 
Stories about scandals generate interest and the fact that much of the news is consumed 
online now means that this interest can be tracked and monetized. Because scandals get 
attention, the media has a powerful platform from which to educate or mis-educate the 
public. This has not always been the case however. Ethics commissioners have not always 
been able to put out a press release about something interesting they have seen or done and 
have that matter garner significant public attention. Many reports have historically gone 
unnoticed by the media and have even received little to no attention from Parliament itself.  
Commissioners can no longer afford to decline to comment and say that a report “speaks for 
                                               
735 Dawson Emerging Issues, supra note 883 at 3. 
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itself.”736 They must now find ways to intentionally leverage the media in order to raise the 
public’s awareness. 
 
In fact, the online world and the ubiquity of social media have helped to dramatically 
expand the traditional media’s reach. The public now has greater access to reporting and can 
share information through online networks with greater ease and at very low cost. Social 
media users can even help to expose controversies737 or simply to bring more attention to 
them. The commissioner’s relationship with  the media and social media is more important 
now than ever. 
 
Academia+
 
Although there are only a modest number of academics in Canada whose work 
focuses on public sector ethics, there are enough that they have made a real and lasting 
impact on the field. Academics have written books and scholarly articles, they write op-eds 
for major newspapers, blog posts and commentaries on social media. These works are all 
consumed by ethics commissioners across the country who themselves understand that they 
must be among Canada’s intellectual leaders in this space.  
 
                                               
736 Monique Scott, “‘I want very badly to get it done,’ says Dawson of Trudeau report”, 
Global News (14 January 2018), online: <https://globalnews.ca/news/3958992/mary-
dawson-trudeau-ethics-report/> (this web article is accompanied by a rare televised 
interview with Commissioner Dawson). 
737 See Harnessing Twitter, supra note 412 (for a discussion of the active role that the 
general public is now taking in news reporting and news-making and how social media 
use plays an important role in enabling this engagement). 
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Aside from their written works however, academics also appear before House and 
Senate committees considering ethics matters, they interact with and are regularly relied 
upon by the media as experts and they regularly host conferences. In fact, the Conflict of 
Interest and Ethics Commissioner has attended numerous administrative law and public 
sector ethics conferences organized by Canadian academics. The commissioner must expect 
that certain academics will always read the office’s reports and that feedback may be 
received from them. These are important relationships that allow for a high level of 
theoretical and practical engagement and have the potential to help advance thinking about 
these issues.  
 
+Other+Government+Actors+(internal)+
 
The Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner is regularly called upon to give 
advice to other public sector actors who are interested in establishing or updating their ethics 
or accountability-related policies. Three examples may be instructive here. First the office 
“provided input to the Government of Canada Values and Ethics Network with regard to a 
new draft policy on conflict of interest for the public service.” 738  Second, the office 
“provided advice to a Government of Canada working group seeking to establish a guideline 
on the reimbursement of costs for the divestment of assets.”739 Finally, the office entered 
into an agreement in 2017 that would allow its employees access to a wide range of learning 
opportunities through the Canada School of Public Service.740 Engagements like these are 
                                               
738 AR 2010-11 Code, supra note 707 at 22. 
739 Ibid. 
740 Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “Opening 
Statement before House of Commons Standing Committee on Access to Information, 
Privacy and Ethics” (2 May 2017), online: <https://ciec-
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undertaken on a voluntary basis and are not reflected in the office’s formal mandates, but 
they certainly have an influence on the office and its employees. 
 
Other+Accountability+Actors+
 
Agents of parliament have been created and have evolved in an uncoordinated 
manner.  This may be less than ideal. Christopher Dunn thinks that these offices should have 
an element of collegiality in their operation. He argues that there should be something akin 
to a college of legislative officers. This level of coordination could help to raise their 
individual and collective profiles, allow them to engage in common/collective public 
consciousness-raising, engage in common media training and allow them to sponsor and/or 
undertake common studies about related or identical issues.741 Although no such college has 
been established to date, there are other ways in which legislative ethics officers have begun 
to work together. 
  
First, ethics commissioners across Canada formed a group called the Canadian 
Conflict of Interest Network (CCOIN) in 1992. As Canada’s first Senate Ethics Officer Jean 
Fournier explained: 
Since the conflict of interest rules applicable to legislators in the various 
jurisdictions generally cover the same broad subject areas, it is useful for ethics 
commissioners to maintain a level of contact with colleagues across Canada in 
                                               
ccie.parl.gc.ca/en/publications/Documents/Presentations/Opening%20Statement%20ETH
I%20%20May%202,%202017%20EN.pdf> at 3. 
741 Christopher Dunn, “The ethical structure of provincial governments” (Presentation 
delivered to the Public Interest Disclosure Conference in St. John’s, Newfoundland, 3 
October 2012). 
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order to be able to exchange information, thoughts on best practices, and ideas 
on issues of common interest.742 
 
The group receives administrative support from the Office of the Conflict of Interest and 
Ethics Commissioner and continues to meet at least once a year. Although there are no 
agendas or proceedings made public from their meetings, it is known that they regularly 
invite at least one guest speaker.743 The agenda otherwise covers matters of common interest 
to the commissioners (e.g. best practices) and provides opportunity to brainstorm new ideas 
and share recent developments. The group also maintains a master shared document that 
describes and analyzes all of their major investigation reports, including those requests that 
result simply in reports to explain why no investigation will take place. Members of CCOIN 
also have an email listserv and will email one another on rare occasion with questions about 
how others might handle a particular situation.  
 
Despite the existence of CCOIN and the usefulness of their annual meetings, 
Canada’s many ethics commissioners do not produce any joint publications that might draw 
attention to leading industry standards. Given the growth in interest in the work of these 
individuals, CCOIN could be leveraged as a way to gather and disseminate more information 
for public consumption. A simple example that might go a long way to helping to inform the 
public about the ethics rules applicable to their elected representatives might be the 
publication of a comparative analysis of all the major aspects of the different regimes.   
 
                                               
742 Jean T Fournier, “Recent Developments in Canadian Parliamentary Ethics” (2009) 
32:2 Can Parl Rev 9 at 11. 
743 York University’s University Professor Emeritus Ian Greene was invited to give a 
presentation in 2018. No transcripts of those proceedings are publicly available however.  
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As mentioned above in chapter three, a working group of federal agents of parliament 
was once formed so that they could collectively advocate to be excluded from Treasury 
Board policies that might compromise their independence.744 This group appears to still 
exist745 because working together with other agents and officers is crucial. One reason why 
this is crucial is because parts of their mandates can sometimes overlap and/or conflict. 
 
An excellent example of such a conflict can be found in the definition of private 
interest that is found in the Lobbying Act versus the one that is found in the Conflict of 
Interest Act. The meaning of a private interest has been interpreted differently by the two 
commissioners. Rule 8 under the Lobbyists Code of Conduct states that “lobbyists should 
not place public office holders in a conflict of interest by proposing or undertaking any action 
that would constitute an improper influence on a public office holder.”746 Former Lobbying 
Commissioner Karen Shepherd’s interpretation of Rule 8 was that political activities 
undertaken by lobbyists could count as actions that put a public office holder in a conflict of 
interest by advancing the public office holder’s private interest.747 This suggested a broader 
interpretation of private interest than that which had been advanced by Commissioner 
                                               
744 Chaplin LLM, supra note 77 at page 30. 
745 Bill Curry, “Watchdogs of Parliament forge closer ties”, The Globe and Mail (12 May 
2004), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/watchdogs-of-
parliament-forge-closer-ties/article4170488/> (Curry notes that: “…most of the agents 
now meet about every other month over meals, sometimes at Ottawa’s Rideau Club, to 
discuss mutual issues”). 
746 Lobby Code, supra note 524 at Rule 8. 
747 See e. g. Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Access to Information, 
Privacy and Ethics, Hansard, 40th Parl, 3rd Sess, No 26 (21 October 2010) at 1710 
(Commissioner Karen Shepherd). 
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Dawson under the Conflict of Interest Act.748 Commissioner Dawson had decided in the 
Cheques Report in 201o that private interests were limited to pecuniary interests and did not 
include advancing someone’s political interests.749 The lesson learned from this confusion 
was that there is a need to work together on some matters so that there is consistency across 
different regimes that apply to the same people.750  
 
Adam Dodek agrees that there are some important synergies between the two offices 
and has even suggested that it might be prudent to combine them.751 In fact, Ontario’s 
Integrity Commissioner is also its Lobbyists Registrar. So are Alberta’s, Manitoba’s, New 
Brunswick’s and Prince Edward Island’s.752 Combining the federal offices would require 
action by Parliament, which has not yet taken place. Instead, Commissioner Mario Dion 
worked with the Commissioner of Lobbying Nancy Bélanger to put together a Memorandum 
of Understanding in March 2018. Under this MOU they have “undertaken to jointly organize 
                                               
748 Canada, Library of Parliament, 41st Parliament Current and Emerging Issues: The 
Federal Accountability Act: Ethics and Public Office, by Élise Hurtubise-Loranger & 
Dara Lithwick (June 2011). 
749 Cheques Report, supra note 647 at 16. 
750 Interestingly, Commissioner Dion has expanded the definition of private interest to 
potentially include financial, social and/or political interests (See Trudeau II, supra note 
10 at paras 290-291). 
751 Dodek, supra note 443 at 109. 
752 Ian Stedman, “Everything Under one Roof: Canada’s Evolving Model of 
Parliamentary Ethics” (2018) 9:1 Jindal Global LR 109 [Stedman Roof]. 
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educational activities for their respective audiences.” 753  It is conceivable that further 
agreements could arise as the two offices realize their synergies and identify further 
opportunities for collaboration.The Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics 
Commissioner is also a founding member of a newly formed network of conflict of interest 
and parliamentary ethics organizations within the Francophonie. This network occupies a 
role that is similar to CCOIN’s and allows participants to share best practices with a view to 
enhancing their expertise. The first meeting took place on July 9, 2018 in Quebec City.754 
+
+International+Influences+
 
Outside of CCOIN, there are several other international bodies with which the 
COIEC has engaged, either directly or indirectly. This includes being invited to 
international conferences and being asked to give opinions about reports published by 
international agencies with an interest in public sector ethics. 
 
                                               
753 Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “Memorandum of 
Understanding between the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner and the 
Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada” (dated 22 March 2018), online: <http://ciec-
ccie.parl.gc.ca/EN/AboutUs/WhatWeDo/Pages/WorkingWithOthers.aspx> (NB: this 
document appears to have been removed from the Office’s website on 24 October 2019, 
but can still be found on the website for the Commissioner of Lobbying’s website; see 
Canada, Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying, “Memorandum of Understanding” 
(accessed 29 October 2019), online: 
<https://lobbycanada.gc.ca/eic/site/012.nsf/eng/h_01451.html>). 
754 Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “Working with 
Others” (accessed 19 July 2019), online: <https://ciec-ccie.parl.gc.ca/en/About-
APropos/Pages/WorkingOthers-TravaillerAutres.aspx> (where Commissioner Dion 
writes: “Commissioner Mario Dion participated in the network’s first meeting, which 
took place on July 9, 2018 in Quebec City, in conjunction with the 44th plenary assembly 
of the Assemblée parlementaire de la Francophonie.”). 
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Former commissioner Dawson was asked to make a presentation at the Ethics in 
Democracy II Conference in El Salvador, in November 2009. This event was organized 
by the government of Canada with a focus on Mesoamerica but was attended by 
representatives from a broader range of countries.755 Dawson was also asked to testify at 
a government commission that was looking into public sector ethics issues related to the 
Airbus Affair756 and was asked to address a report from the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) that called on independent fiscal institutions to 
“develop a mechanism for external evaluation of their work to be conducted by local or 
international experts.”757 
 
The OECD, alongside the Dutch National Integrity Office, hosted former 
commissioner Dawson at the Global Forum on Public Governance in Paris in May 2009, 
where post-employment rules were among the top issues discussed. The OECD 
acknowledged that member countries were having implementation challenges in relation 
to post-employment restrictions because contraventions become difficult to manage when 
an individual is no longer employed in a public sector position.758  
A senior member of the COIEC’s team also attended and presented at a conference held 
in October 2018 in Croatia that was hosted by the Council of Europe’s anti-corruption 
monitoring body. All Council of Europe members have taken part in GRECO since 2010 
                                               
755 Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “The 2009-2010 
Annual Report made under the Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of 
Commons” (Ottawa: 12 June 2010) at 20 [AR 2009-10 Code]. 
756 See Dawson Oliphant, supra note 460. 
757 PPF Report, supra note 67 at 17. 
758 AR 2009-10 Code, supra note 755 at 21. 
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and GRECO, as well as the separate “high-level conference”,759 is open to non-European 
states. As such, members of the COIEC’s team had an opportunity to engage with and 
learn from a very international community of state-level actors. This is not unusual of 
course, as the office regularly hosts delegations interested in learning about the Canadian 
model of parliamentary ethics, such as delegations from Mali, Kenya, Australia and even 
the United States.760 
 
It is important to understand who the commissioner’s office works with and who 
they might be influenced by, but it is also important to be clear that the commissioner 
really only occupies one of many roles that are being played in the overall public sector 
ethics landscape. 
 
6.6 Accountability Relationships 
 
In chapter three I looked at how accountability generally works for agents of 
parliament. I relied then on Peter Aucoin’s description of accountability as being a two-
part process: first of “holding to account” and second of “rendering an account.”761 I will 
now describe how the COIEC satisfies those two requirements of accountability.  
 
The Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner exists because there was a 
perceived need to have someone neutral and independent who could provide opinions and 
                                               
759 Although it is not clear what a “high level conference” is, there is a website that can be 
accessed. See Council of Europe, Group of States Against Corruption (accessed 19 July 
2019), online: <https://www.coe.int/en/web/greco/conferences>. 
760 GRECO, supra note 721 at 6. 
761 Aucoin, supra note 79 at 25-6. 
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analysis about conflicts of interest and other ethics issues. This position was created by 
statute and expected to be independent, but also required to be accountable in some way 
that makes sense given the constitutional framework from which the right to establish the 
office emerged. Given the unique nature of the office’s very different mandates, figuring 
out how to make accountability work in an intelligible way seems to have been a challenge. 
What accountability means is different under the Code than it is under the Act. It is therefore 
impossible to say that the commissioner is held accountable in some particular way, but 
rather that the accountability expectations are nuanced, unclear and require a well thought 
out chart to even begin to keep track of (see Tables 1 and 2, below).  
 
The Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner notably does not report to a 
Minister under either the Code or the Act. This means that the office is also not subject to 
Treasury Board policies. The relationships outlined below are the only formal and informal 
accountability relationships that exist.  
 
(a) The Prime Minister 
The commissioner reports to the Prime Minister762 with examination reports under 
the Act and these reports are provided to the subject of the report and made available to the 
public.763 The Prime Minister also has the power to appoint and remove the commissioner 
by virtue of the cabinet’s role in governor-in-council processes, which could give rise to 
some tension. In a majority government the executive has a disproportionate amount of 
                                               
762 Act, supra note 13, s 44(7) (the Commissioner also reports to the Prime Minister under 
section 68(a), which relates to referrals made by the Public Sector Integrity 
Commissioner – this is not important for this dissertation). 
763 Act, supra note 13, s 44(8). 
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power and does not need the approval of the other political parties to be able to remove the 
commissioner. As Paul Thomas explains, “[t]heory suggests that Parliament controls the 
executive, but in practice the reverse seems to be true.”764 The threat that is posed by this 
power to dismiss can in some Parliaments be seen as a power to hold the commissioner to 
account. 
 
(b) To the House of Commons 
Annual reports under the Code and the Act and inquiry reports765 under the Code 
are filed with the Speaker of the House of Commons. The Speaker then tables those reports 
in the House,766 but it has an obligation to debate the inquiry reports. There should be a 
reasonable expectation of being questioned by legislators after an annual report is filed with 
either house of Parliament. It is for this reason that two standing committees exist to review 
the commissioner’s work.  
 
Standing+Committees++
 
Two standing committees of the House of Commons play a role in ensuring the 
commissioner’s accountability. Chapter 13 of the Standing Orders of the House of Commons 
establishes the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics (ETHI). 
Among other things, ETHI is responsible for reviewing the government’s proposed 
appointment(s) to the position of Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner. Proposed 
                                               
764 PP&F, supra note 45 at 289. 
765 Again, this is the technical language used in the Code to denote investigations into 
alleged breaches of the Code. 
766 PC Act, supra note 15, s 90(1)(a). 
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appointments are deemed referred to the committee that then has thirty days to decide 
whether to put forward a notice of motion to the House of Commons to ratify the 
appointment. 767  Any such notice of motion is to be decided on without debate or 
amendment.768  
 
With respect to the Code, the commissioner is required to carry out “duties and 
functions under the general direction of any committee of the House of Commons that may 
be designated or established by that House for that purpose.”769 The committee that has been 
created for this purpose is the House of Commons Standing Committee on Access to 
Information, Privacy and Ethics (ETHI). The commissioner is not required to report to ETHI 
or take any regular part in its deliberations per se,770 but is required to report to whatever 
committee has been given the same authority under the Standing Orders as ETHI has been 
given. The commissioner also does not have a positive obligation to regularly report to ETHI, 
only to answer to ETHI if and when the committee calls on the commissioner. This happens 
at least once every year however, when estimates are being considered. 
 
The reasons ETHI might call on the commissioner are related to its precise mandate. 
ETHI is responsible for “the review of and report on the effectiveness, management and 
operation together with the operational and expenditure plans relating to the Conflict of 
                                               
767 Standing Orders, supra note 176, s 111.1(1). 
768 Ibid, s 111.1(2). 
769 PC Act, supra note 15, s 86 (and section 86(4) says that duties under the Act are not to 
be overseen by this committee). 
770 Dawson Carleton, supra note 516 at 4-5. 
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Interest and Ethics Commissioner”771 as well as the review of the commissioner’s reports 
made under the Code772 and the Act.773  
 
The commissioner’s work is also overseen by the Standing Committee on Procedure 
and House Affairs.774 This committee is responsible for “the review of and report on all 
matters relating to the Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of Commons”775 
including “any clarification, change or amendments to the Code or any of its related forms 
or guidelines.”776 The Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs has no mandate 
with respect to the Act.   
 
Unlike with ETHI, the commissioner has rarely been asked to appear before the 
Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs. This is notable because the Committee 
has conducted reviews of the Code to which the commissioner has contributed,777 yet has 
only sought the commissioner’s attendance at committee on five occasions. This is a very 
low number. Evert Lindquist and Irene Huse have posited that parliamentary committees 
might be struggling to meet their oversight responsibilities because they are over-burdened 
by too much reporting. In their words, “…increased reporting has not necessarily led to more 
accountability or better organizational performance; rather, it might crowd-out other forms 
of assessments such as evaluation and reduce the ability of legislatures to hold the executive 
                                               
771 Standing Orders, supra note 176, s 108(3)(h)(iii). 
772 Ibid, s 108(3)(h)(vii). 
773 Ibid, s 108(3)(h)(v). 
774 Ibid, s 108(3)(a)(vii). 
775 Ibid, s 108(3)(a)(vii)-(viii). 
776 Dawson Carleton, supra note 516 at 4-5. 
777 This will be detailed further in chapter 6, below. 
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to account.”778 This could be the same for the Standing Committee on Procedure and House 
Affairs. It may be the case that there is so much to do otherwise that oversight duties like 
this one can be given less energy unless and until something pressing arises.  
 
Gwyneth Bergman and Emmett MacFarlane conducted a detailed study of the 
commissioner’s committee appearances. In their study they noted, among other things, that 
the commissioner’s work under the Code has been relatively ignored by the Standing 
Committee on Procedure and House Affairs 779   and that this serves to limit the 
commissioner’s influence and the capacity of the office to exercise informal power.780 It 
seems to me that the Committee would call the commissioner to appear more often if it were 
actually under pressure to do so, which it arguably is not. The Code is currently structured 
so that any report after an inquiry must be debated in the House of Commons for a maximum 
of two hours after being tabled. This means that the House does get an opportunity to discuss 
important matters like inquiries when they arise. Unless they are looking to amend the Code 
then, the committee may see no reason to need to meet with the commissioner.  
 
In my opinion, the Committee on Procedure and House Affairs ought to be required 
to meet with the commissioner every year in order to discuss the office’s annual report under 
the Code. This would ensure that the committee is forced to turn its attention to issues related 
to the governance of the ethical conduct of members, but also that the commissioner has an 
                                               
778 Evert A Lindquist & Irene Huse, “Accountability and monitoring government in the 
digital era: Promise, realism and research for digital-era governance” (2017) 60:4 Can 
Pub Admin 627 at 631 [Lindquist & Huse]. 
779 Bergman & Macfarlane, supra note 91 at 20. 
780 Ibid at 22. 
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opportunity to further explain anything found within the annual report. It also importantly 
provides the commissioner with a further opportunity to put recommendations on the record.  
 
The commissioner should also be required to appear before ETHI whenever an 
examination report is released under the Act. Examination reports are provided directly to 
the Prime Minister, the subject of the complaint and posted online. Because members of 
parliament have absolutely no decision making role in relation to these reports, the Act has 
not been drafted so as to require them to be tabled in either house for debate.  Requiring the 
committee to review these reports could help to inspire amendments to the Act, even if those 
amendments have to come from private members bills. Unfortunately, the history of 
parliamentary ethics laws in Canada is that public pressure has been necessary in order to 
really get Parliament’s attention to take any progressive steps. The Code is not likely to 
change without public pressure and the Act is not likely to change unless it can be done 
without government members’ votes. Given how much power to decide on disciplinary 
action is left in the hands of the Prime Minister under the Act, it is unlikely that a governing 
party would agree to open up the Act for amendment and risk the Senate using its leverage 
to force the government pull back on some of its powers. This is precisely what happened 
with the passing of the Federal Accountability Act, which initially attempted to assign Senate 
ethics oversight responsibilities to the COIEC. The Senate refused to pass the bill unless 
oversight over Senators’ ethical conduct was removed from the COIEC’s powers and 
assigned to an independent Senate Ethics Officer who would report directly and only to the 
Senate. All of these tensions might be lessened if the standing orders were amended to 
require mandatory committee attendances by the commissioner. Given the twenty-four hour 
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news cycle and rising public engagement in relation to public sector ethics, it might be 
possible to generate increased public pressure that could lead to meaningful reform. 
 
(c) To the Senate  
Annual reports under the Act are filed with the Speaker of the Senate. The Speaker 
then tables those reports in the Senate.781 Although it could if it wanted to, the Senate is not 
obligated to respond to these reports and has not done anything in response to them to date. 
Given that the Senate has a role in the legislative process however, the Commissioner is still 
required to abide by the formality of filing annual reports with the Speaker of the upper 
house.  
 
(d) To the Speakers 
 
Further to filing annual reports and inquiry reports though the two speakers, the 
commissioner also submits the office’s spending estimates to the Speaker of the House of 
Commons, who, as outlined in chapter four, provides them to the Treasury Board. The 
Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics 782  then calls the 
commissioner to defend the estimates.   
 
(e) To the Federal Court of Appeal 
Section 28 of the Federal Courts Act makes clear that the Federal Court of Appeal 
has jurisdiction to “hear and determine applications for judicial review made in respect 
                                               
781 PC Act, supra note 15, s 90(1)(b). 
782 Dawson Carleton, supra note 516 at 4-5. 
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of…the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner appointed under section 81 of the 
Parliament of Canada Act.”783 This jurisdiction is tempered by the Parliament of Canada 
Act, which stipulates that “[t]he Commissioner shall perform the duties and functions 
assigned by the House of Commons for governing the conduct of its members when they are 
carrying out the duties and functions of their office as members of that House”784 and that 
“[t]he Commissioner enjoys the privileges and immunities of the House of Commons and 
its members when carrying out those duties and functions.”785 The commissioner’s decisions 
under the Code are therefore not subject to judicial review, but decisions under the Act are.786 
This difference exists because the Act of course applies to public office holders and not to 
members of the House of Commons. Overseeing the conduct of public office holders is not 
something that falls within the constitutional rights and privileges of Parliament, as will be 
explored further below. That being said, the commissioner is considered to be a 
“Commissioner” under Federal Courts Act787 and this means that the reasons for which a 
judicial review can be sought are very specific:  
Grounds of review  
                                               
783 Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7, s 28(1)(b.1) [FCA]. 
784 PC Act, supra note 15, s 86(1). 
785 Ibid, s 86(2). 
786 See also Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, 
“Speaking Notes during a Panel Discussion on Ethics in Government at the Annual 
General Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association at the University of 
Ottawa” (4 June 2015), online: <https://ciec-
ccie.parl.gc.ca/en/publications/Documents/Presentations/Speaking%20Notes%20Annual
%20General%20Meeting%204%20juin%202015%20EN.pdf> at 1 [Dawson Ottawa 
CPSA]. 
787 Except with respect to the Commissioner’s functions under the Code (See FCA, supra 
note 783, s 2(2)). 
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(4) The Federal Court may grant relief under subsection (3) if it is satisfied that 
the federal board, commission or other tribunal  
(a) acted without jurisdiction, acted beyond its jurisdiction or refused to 
exercise its jurisdiction;  
(b) failed to observe a principle of natural justice, procedural fairness or other 
procedure that it was required by law to observe;  
(c) erred in law in making a decision or an order, whether or not the error 
appears on the face of the record;  
(d) based its decision or order on an erroneous finding of fact that it made in a 
perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the material before it;  
(e) acted, or failed to act, by reason of fraud or perjured evidence; or  
(f) acted in any other way that was contrary to law.788  
Although one might think that it is generally members or public office holders who would 
bring an application for judicial review of a decision made by the Conflict of Interest and 
Ethics Commissioner, these applications have only been brought by the advocacy group 
Democracy Watch.789  
 
 Advocacy groups and members of the public cannot however bring civil proceedings 
against the commissioner, nor can the Crown bring criminal charges.  The Parliament of 
Canada Act states that:  
No criminal or civil proceedings lie against the Commissioner, or any person 
acting on behalf or under the direction of the Commissioner, or any person 
acting under the direction of the Commissioner, for anything done, reported or 
said in good faith in the exercise or purported exercise of any power, or the 
performance or purported performance of any duty or function, of the 
Commissioner under this Act.790 
                                               
788 FCA, supra note 783, s 18.1(4). 
789 See e.g. Democracy Watch v Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, 2009 FCA 
15; Democracy Watch v Canada (A-G), 2018 FCA 194. 
790 Ibid, s 86.1(2). 
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This applies to work that is done under either the Act or the Code and serves to insulate the 
commissioner and staff from judicial scrutiny of their personal conduct as long as they acted 
in good faith and in the purported exercise of their official duties. Presumably this was meant 
to insulate the commissioner and staff if/when they published something that, if not for the 
fact that it was published in the course of their work, might be considered defamatory.  
 
(f) To the Public 
Although the public can certainly disagree with the commissioner and can seek 
judicial review of decision made under the Act, the Commissioner is not actually held to 
account by the public through any direct formal mechanisms. It is the Federal Court of 
Appeal that must be engaged in order to hold the commissioner to account if and when 
appropriate. The office is also not subject to Access to Information laws, which means that 
the commissioner does not have to provide individuals with access to documents upon 
request. This is a defacto recognition that the office is not a government institution.791  
 
There are other specific public reporting requirements however. The Act requires that 
a public office holder report to the commissioner when they recuse themselves from a 
decision in an effort to avoid a conflict of interest. Information about this recusal is then 
declared publicly. Other declarations made by public office holders are also made public, 
such as when certain gifts are received,792 when certain outside activities are engaged in793 
                                               
791 Dawson Carleton, supra note 516 at 6. 
792 Act, supra note 13, s 25(5). 
793 Ibid, s. 25(4). 
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and when particular assets are owned.794  The commissioner is even expected to make 
examination reports under the Act available to the public.795 Similarly, the Code requires that 
inquiry reports be made public, 796  disclosure summaries be made available for public 
inspection at the office and online797 and that the commissioner “undertake educational 
activities for Members and the general public regarding this Code and the role of the 
Commissioner.”798 
 
The following two tables are a visual representation of the commissioner’s 
accountability relationships, as have been described herein. They are divided into those 
relationships where the commissioner is required to render an account (Table 1) and those 
relationships where another entity is charged with holding the commissioner to account 
(Table 2). 
 
                                               
794 Ibid, s. 25(2). 
795 Ibid, s 44(8). 
796 Code, supra note 14, s 28(2). 
797 Ibid, s 23(2). 
798 Ibid, s 32. 
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Table&1:&Commissioner&Renders&Account&To&
 
 Prime 
Minister 
House of 
Commons 
(Speaker) 
The Senate 
(Speaker) 
The Public 
Under 
the Act 
Submits 
Examination 
Reports. 
1)! Submits Annual Reports, 
2)! Submits the office’s spending 
estimates  
Submits Annual 
Reports. 
Several Public Registry items, as 
described in s. 51(1),799 including, but not 
limited to: 
public declarations, summary statement, 
gifts forfeited and any other documents 
the Commissioner considers appropriate. 
 
Examination reports must also be made 
available to the public (see s 45(3)). 
Under 
the 
Code 
 1)! Submits Inquiry Reports, 
2)! Submits Annual Reports 
 Annual reports, financial disclosures, 
sponsored travel, educational outreach.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
799 Act, supra note 13, s 51(1). 
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Table&2:&Holds&Commissioner&to&Account&
 
 The Federal 
Court of Appeal 
The House of Commons Standing 
Committee on Procedure and House 
Affairs (PROC) 
The House of Commons Standing Committee 
on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics 
(ETHI) 
 
Under 
the Act 
Reports under the 
Act are subject to 
judicial review on 
limited 
grounds.800  
 
It has no role with respect to the Act. ETHI is responsible for reviewing and reporting to 
House & Senate on matters related to the office’s 
work. The commissioner can be called to appear 
(discretionary) but does not specifically report 
directly to ETHI. 
Under 
the 
Code 
Reports under the 
Members’ Code 
are not subject to 
judicial review. 
The Standing Committee on Procedure and 
House Affairs has been delegated oversight 
responsibility for the Code. The Committee 
Reports back to the House. 
 
 
 
                                               
800 See Act, supra note 13, s 66. 
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(g) Other 
Not all relevant accountability structures are formal in nature. Greg Inwood has 
described accountability as requiring some combination of the types of relationships and 
regimes found in the following list: 
1)! Accountability to a superior 
2)! Accountability to elected officials 
3)! Accountability under the law 
4)! Accountability to professional norms and institutions 
5)! Accountability to the public801 
 
It is number four that needs to be further addressed. While I have discussed ways in which 
the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner is formally accountable to the institutions 
of Parliament, there are also other relationships and professional norms that we must take 
into consideration. The first of these is the office’s relationship to other accountability 
offices. I have earlier outlined some of the specific interactions that take place between these 
offices, but the commissioner arguably also has informal obligations to those other agents 
and officers of parliament by virtue of their shared status as accountability officers. These 
individuals have all been trusted by Parliament to receive delegated powers that are properly 
the jurisdiction of Parliament itself. If one officer or agent abuses that trust it can possibly 
have a deleterious effect on the reputations of the others. Likewise, each of these individuals 
must take seriously that they are expected to be both independent (to the extent that they can 
be) and accountable. If any one does not take these obligations seriously, then they risk 
causing damage to the trust that Parliament and the public place in all of these institutions. 
                                               
801 Gregory J Inwood, “The Accountable Public Official: Teaching Accountability and 
Ethics to Public Servants” (2008) 1 JPPL 379 at 384 (citing R L Gagne, “Accountability 
and Public Administration” (1996) 39 Can Public Admin 214). 
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The second relationship of accountability worth considering exists because more 
than one individual has held the position of Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner. 
Each successive commissioner must be accountable to the established history of the office 
itself. This is not an obligation that emerges from the legislation that creates the 
commissioner but can instead be understood as showing respect for the history of the office 
and the decisions it has made. If each successive commissioner treated the office as though 
it were newly established at the time that they received their appointment, the office’s 
stakeholders (members, public office holders, the public, etc.) might lose confidence in 
either the principles upon which the office is built or the rules that are being administered. 
This accountability relationship is similar in nature and complimentary to the idea that the 
commissioner must be accountable to other officers and agents.  
 
Finally, there is a professional relationship of accountability that exists with the 
academic community whose work relates to the COIEC and the other agents and officers of 
parliament. Academic commentators analyze and interpret the COIEC’s work and engage in 
a dialogue with the COIEC and the public though their writing and teachings. This 
relationship is very important because it offers the COIEC a shared community of interest 
with which the office and its staff can regularly interact and look to for high-level 
independent third-party analysis about their work.  
 
The challenge with these three additional accountability relationships that I am 
proposing is that it is not clear at first glance how they fit into the categories of ‘holding to 
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account’ or ‘rendering an account.’802 This is easily resolved by framing these relationships 
as being ones where the commissioner is informally rendering an account to a party that is 
different than the one that will hold the commissioner to account. The COIEC benefits from 
having this robust and heightened environment of accountability, but it is only Parliament 
that can formally (and the public more informally) hold the commissioner to account for 
neglecting these relationships.  
 
 
6.7 The Role of Parliamentary Privilege 
 
The challenge of securing a meaningful level of structural and operational 
independence is made clear from our close look at the many formal and informal 
accountability relationships to which the office must attend. Coupled with the general 
recognition that it could be political suicide for a party to ask the commissioner to stop doing 
work that the public deems important, the law of parliamentary privilege also serves as a 
mechanism by which a degree of independence for the office is secured.   
 
Parliamentary privilege refers to the collection of constitutional rights and 
immunities that are enjoyed by the House of Commons and its members. According to the 
House of Commons’ Compendium of Procedure: 
The rights and immunities related to Members individually may be grouped 
under the following headings: 
•!freedom of speech; 
•!freedom from arrest in civil actions; 
•!exemption from jury duty; and 
•!exemption from being subpoenaed to attend court. 
                                               
802 Aucoin, supra note 79 at 25-6. 
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The two most important collective privileges or powers of the House of 
Commons are its disciplinary powers and its exclusive right to regulate its own 
internal affairs.803 
 
Because these rights are constitutional in nature, they exist separate from and are not decided 
upon by parliamentarians. It is for the court to recognize when privilege applies. That being 
said, the court cannot determine the extent or breadth of a privilege, but can instead merely 
determine that one exists.804 Perhaps because of the odd nature of the commissioner’s dual 
mandates, Parliament made clear in the Parliament of Canada Act that “[t]he Commissioner 
enjoys the privileges and immunities of the House of Commons and its members when 
carrying out those duties and functions” that are related to Members of the House of 
Commons. 805  The commissioner’s work related to public office holders under the Act 
received no corresponding recognition. This makes sense because it is the collective (not 
individual) privileges that would apply by virtue of the office’s delegated authority. Unlike 
the Code that applies only to members, the Act also looks outward at public office holders 
who are not also members, rather than inward at the House’s own internal affairs.806  
 
All of this has obvious implications for whether and which stakeholders can 
challenge or appeal the commissioner’s decisions in court, such as a decision about whether 
or not to investigate a matter. As a metric of independence, the existence of parliamentary 
privilege serves to clarify that the commissioner is able to act free from a certain type of 
                                               
803 Canada, House of Commons, Compendium of Procedure – Parliamentary Privilege 
(accessed 18 July 2019), online: 
<https://www.ourcommons.ca/About/Compendium/ParliamentaryPrivilege/c_g_parliame
ntaryprivilege-e.htm>. 
804 See Canada (House of Commons) v Vaid, [2005] 1 SCR 667, 2005 SCC 30 at para 29. 
805 PC Act, supra note 15, s 86(2). 
806 Supra, note 803. 
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accountability oversight. According to section 18 of the Constitution Act, 1867, the House 
of Commons enjoys such privileges and immunities “as are from time to time defined by 
Act of the Parliament of Canada” as long as at the time the Act is past those privileges do 
not exceed the privileges, immunities, or powers of Parliament that exist in the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.807  Not only has Parliament expressly conferred 
parliamentary privilege on the COIEC in the Parliament of Canada Act, but the court in 
Duffy808 has also confirmed that parliamentary privilege extends to Parliament’s right to 
regulate its own affairs and procedures, including the right to enforce discipline on Members. 
The Supreme Court of Canada explained in New Brunswick Broadcasting Co, that: 
If a matter falls within this necessary sphere of matters without which the dignity 
and efficiency of the House cannot be upheld, courts will not inquire into 
questions concerning such privilege.  All such questions will instead fall to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the legislative body.809 
 
This means that once the court recognizes a privilege it cannot dig into or opine about what 
the breadth and scope of the privilege is. As I will demonstrate below in chapter eight, this 
is an incredibly important point that has huge implications for the COIEC.  
 
Recognizing also that some matters may be so significant that the commissioner will 
refer them to the RCMP for investigation, it was made clear in the Parliament of Canada 
Act that the commissioner, and any person acting under the their direction, “is not a 
competent or compellable witness in respect of any matter coming to his or her knowledge 
as a result of exercising any powers or performing any duties or functions of the 
                                               
807 Constitution Act 1867, supra note 18, s 18. 
808 R v Duffy, 2015 ONCJ 694, paras 89-91. 
809 New Brunswick Broadcasting Co v Nova Scotia (Speaker of the House of Assembly), 
[1993] 1 SCR 319. 
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commissioner under this Act.”810 This applies to the commissioner’s work under both the 
Act and the Code and, coupled with the commissioner’s parliamentary privileges and 
immunities, effectively restricts the Crown from being able to subpoena the commissioner’s 
documents. This is an important reason why the Act and the Code place all responsibility in 
one person and do not carve out sub-powers for other individuals, such as a deputy 
commissioner. Having broad exclusion from being subject to a subpoena makes a clear 
statement about the Office’s independence from judicial oversight. 
 
 
6.8 Important Limits on Independence 
  
Despite the important role that parliamentary privilege plays in strengthening the 
office’s independence, it is arguably more meaningful in minority government situations. In 
part, having privilege allows the commissioner to act independently and to avoid being 
subject to legal proceedings in relation to work done under the Code if a member or the 
governing party disagrees with a decision or report. In a majority government with strong 
party discipline however, the commissioner can simply be removed at the whim of the Prime 
Minister. There would be no way to sue the government or Parliament for wrongful dismissal 
since the commissioner has no legal right to demand that cabinet explain its decisions.811 
 
There are also two other important limits to the commissioner’s independence. First, 
as noted above, renewals of appointment need not be approved by all political parties. 
Instead, they are decided upon by cabinet. This could lead a commissioner seeking re-
                                               
810 PC Act, supra note 15, s 86.1(1). 
811 See e.g. Marin v Office of the Ombudsman, 2017 ONSC 1687 (in which a former 
Ombudsman of Ontario brought an unsuccessful suit for wrongful dismissal). 
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appointment to look favourably upon the current government. Former commissioner 
Dawson had already been reappointed twice during the time that she was investigating Prime 
Minister Justin Trudeau. These facts caused Democracy Watch to launch a public campaign 
calling for changes to be made to the re-appointment process812 and to advocate for the 
commissioner to delegate her investigation to a third party who could conduct the 
investigation without the obvious tension of it being related to the person who had the sole 
authority to renew the investigator’s contract.813  
 
The second limit to independence is that there is nothing that would prevent a sitting 
commissioner from being offered or given extra duties or mandates. For example, legislation 
could be passed that assigns further duties and gives a pay raise to the sitting commissioner. 
This could be especially problematic if that legislation is passed by and under a majority 
government. There are examples of sitting commissioners at the provincial levels in 
Ontario814 and Northwest Territories815 receiving contracts from governing parties that add 
                                               
812 Democracy Watch, Petition, “Stop Bad Government Appointments” (18 January 
2018), online: <https://democracywatch.ca/democracy-watch-files-lawsuits-challenging-
trudeau-cabinets-appointments-of-new-ethics-commissioner-and-lobbying-
commissioner/>. 
813 Supra, note 729. 
814 See Financial Accountability Office of Ontario, Media Release, “Integrity 
Commissioner J. David Wake Appointed Temporary Financial Accountability Officer of 
Ontario” (28 September 2017), online: <https://www.fao-
on.org/en/Blog/media/Temporary-Officer-announcement_MR> (in which Ontario’s 
Integrity Commissioner was given temporary new duties via an Order in Council 
appointment). 
815 Stedman Roof, supra note 752 at 72 (where I write that: “Interestingly, the Conflict of 
Interest Commissioner also has a separate contract with the Office of the Executive 
Council to serve as its Ethics Counsellor for senior appointees in the Government. This 
requires the Commissioner to provide advice under the Code of Conduct Respecting 
Conflict of Interest and Oath of Office and Secrecy for the Employees of the Government 
of the Northwest Territories.”). 
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temporary new duties.  These commissioners then take direction from their Parliaments but 
also become employees of the government. Coupled with the possible pressures of seeking 
reappointment, this could lead to situations where a commissioner is inclined to agree to a 
raise and/or new contracts or mandates even when doing so would be undesirable.  Ethics 
commissioners should therefore not be subject to salary adjustments that are not pre-
determined and should not receive extra contracts or temporary pay from governments816 
unless those changes also require broad parliamentary consensus and approval. 
Commissioners must not be placed in a position where they may be concerned about 
maintaining the extra pay that comes with a government contract instead of simply fulfilling 
their primary duties.  
 
The existence of the Senate at the federal level arguably serves to limit the governing 
party’s ability to create new legislative duties for a sitting commissioner. That being said, 
the Senate would play no role in non-legislative contracts or emergency delegations. This 
happened in Ontario when Integrity Commissioner David Wake was appointed Temporary 
Financial Accountability Officer (FAO) for the province when the FAO went on extended 
medical leave.817 It would be incumbent upon the sitting commissioner to decide whether or 
not it is appropriate to accept extra duties, but the pressure to do so is quite simply 
unacceptable if we want these roles to at least appear to be independent of government.  This 
                                               
816 Chris Stockwell, “The Independence of Parliament and its Officials” (1999) 22:1 Can 
Parl Rev 2. 
817 Office of the Integrity Commissioner of Ontario, News Release, “Integrity 
Commissioner J. David Wake appointed Temporary Financial Accountability Officer” 
(27 October 2016), online: <http://www.oico.on.ca/info/news---full-
article/2016/10/27/integrity-commissioner-j.-david-wake-appointed-temporary-financial-
accountability-officer>. 
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is accordingly an example of how the structure of the COIEC’s office could leave it 
vulnerable to political pressures. The best way to avoid this would to be make it clear in the 
Parliament of Canada Act not only that the commissioner is expected to carry out the duties 
as assigned,818 but also that the commissioner shall not be permitted to be assigned nor 
accept further contracts or remuneration without broad consultation and consent. In other 
words, to ensure that a governing party with a majority could  not unilaterally compromise 
the commissioner’s independence.  
 
6.9 Conclusion 
 
In some ways, the COIEC is similar to other agents of parliament. In other ways it is 
completely different. In this chapter I have explained the appointment and removal processes 
for the commissioner, as well as how budget estimates are handled and how autonomy over 
operational and human resource decisions is ensured. I have demonstrates that the COIEC is 
different than other agents in all of these areas. I have also looked at what the COIEC’s 
operational responsibilities are and how they are managed, who the office’s stakeholders are, 
who its influential relationships are with and how the COIEC is held accountable. The 
purpose of this analysis was to establish clarity with respect to the office’s operations and it 
will inform my arguments in chapter eight in relation to the COIEC’s efforts to push for 
reform. This information also situates the COIEC as an entity that has been given 
parliamentary privilege that shields work under the Code from judicial review. As I will 
argue,  the implication of this privilege under the law is that the commissioner also has the 
ability to shield some work related to the Act from judicial scrutiny.   
                                               
818 See PC Act, supra note 15, s 85. 
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7.#Parliament#is#Resisting#Modernization#
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I explain why the office’s commissioners have been unable to 
convince parliamentarians to work towards adequately modernizing the office’s mandates. 
Commissioner Dawson has made submissions to standing committees in 2012, 2013 and 
2015 regarding how to improve the Act and the Code. The response to those 
recommendations has been insufficient. Not only have the office’s commissioners carefully 
expressed their disappointment, but so too have academia, the media, the public and civil 
society groups. I argue that progress is slow because there is an inherent conflict of interest 
in the fact that parliamentarians are solely responsible for strengthening the conflict of 
interest and ethics rules that apply to them under the Code and the Prime Minister is reluctant 
to advance a reform agenda under the Act. Due also perhaps to parliamentarians’ busy 
schedules or to a lack of pressure being put on them by the electorate, the committees’ studies 
of the Act and Code have become stale-dated.  
 
 
7.2 Commissioner’s Calls for Amendment and Related Responses 
 
Included in the Code is a requirement that the Standing Committee on Procedure 
and House Affairs undertake a comprehensive review of the rules every five years and 
report back to the House. 819  The Act requires only one such review and it must be 
conducted by whichever committee or committees the House and Senate assign the task to 
and begin within five years of the Act coming in to force.820 That/those committees are then 
                                               
819 Code, supra note 14, s 33. 
820 Act, supra note 13, s 67(1). 
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expected to report back to Parliament with any recommended changes to the Act.821  There 
is no indication as to what exactly these reviews must entail or who, if anyone, must be 
consulted.  
 
These mandatory periodic reviews of parliamentary ethics laws are actually 
uncommon in Canada. That being said, they are incredibly important so that Parliament has 
an opportunity to keep its standards current and to have effective systems of administration 
in place.822 One review of the Act and two reviews of the Code have been undertaken to date. 
On December 10, 2012 the House of Commons designated the Standing Committee on 
Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics for the purposes of conducting a mandatory 
section 67 review of the Act. Although the Act had come into force back in 2007, this first 
review was allowed to slip under the radar until January 2013. By contrast, the first reviews 
of the Code (which was adopted by the House of Common in April 2004) happened much 
earlier - in 2007. This was perhaps too early to be as robust and meaningful as it might have 
been had it been undertaken at a later date, but it did allow some early wrinkles to be ironed 
out. The Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs began its second 
comprehensive review of the Code in May 2012.   
 
Former commissioner Dawson was in office for each of the reviews that have been 
conducted of both the Act and the Code. She was called to make submissions before the 
                                               
821 Ibid, s 67(2). 
822 Jean T Fournier, “Strengthening Parliamentary Ethics: A Canadian Perspective” 
(Paper delivered at the Australian Public Sector Anti-Corruption Conference in Brisbane, 
29 July 2009), online: <http://sen.parl.gc.ca/seo-cse/PDF/BrisbaneSpeech-e.pdf> at 13 
[Fournier in Brisbane]. 
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committees and the office posted those submissions online so that they could be downloaded 
by anyone interested. This process contrasts with the Senate’s Standing Committee on Ethics 
and Conflicts of Interest for Senators, which meets in camera when reviewing its Code of 
Ethics. Dawson’s submissions were reasonably consistent across the board, in that she 
focused a great deal on adding mandatory training requirements to both regimes, amending 
the Act and Code to require all public office holders and members to participate in training 
sessions within a reasonable period of time after taking office and emphasized greater 
transparency and greater harmonization of the two regimes to help reduce confusion about 
their application.823 
 
(a) 2013 Submission re: Act 
Commissioner Dawson’s 2013 submissions were very comprehensive and focused a 
great deal on the clarity of the language in the Act. Her experience administering the Act to 
that point had allowed her to make note of situations where the language used gave rise to 
unintended loopholes824 and unnecessary over-reach.825 There are many recommendations 
of this nature, but there are also some important recommendations that focus more broadly 
on the importance of educating and informing the office’s many stakeholders. For example, 
that all public office holders should be required to participate in training sessions826 and that 
                                               
823 Dawson CPSA Ottawa, supra note 786 at 2-3. 
824 Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “The Conflict of 
Interest Act: Five-Year Review – Submission to the Standing Committee on Access to 
Information, Privacy and Ethics” (30 January 2013), online: <https://ciec-
ccie.parl.gc.ca/en/publications/Documents/InternalReports/ETHI%20submission%20re%
20five-year%20review%20of%20Act%20-%20Jan2013.pdf> (see e.g. recommendation 
2-10 on page 76 and recommendation 3-4 on page 77) [2013 Act Submission]. 
825 Ibid, recommendation 2-11 on page 76. 
826 Ibid at 60. 
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the commissioner be permitted to comment publicly when it is necessary to correct 
misinformation that is in the public domain.827  
 
Commissioner Dawson had historically taken a very conservative approach to her 
interpretation of the Act. It is for this reason that she would have been requesting 
amendments to allow her to do something as simple as speaking publicly to correct 
misinformation. The Act does not however explicitly prohibit public engagement by the 
commissioner. Another person holding the same position might have instead taken the 
liberty of asserting their independence by issuing clarifications as needed. The Committee 
also heard from individuals and organizations with different perspectives. These included 
university Professors (e.g. Ian Greene, Lorne Sossin, Lori Turnbull, Adam Dodek, etc.), 
professional and civil society groups (e.g. Democracy Watch, Canadian Bar Association, 
Government Relations Institute of Canada) and other officers and agents of parliament from 
across the country.  
 
Dawson made over 70 recommendations in her submissions to the committee. 
Although many of them were mentioned in the Committee’s final report, only two were 
adopted.828 The general format of the Report’s content was that it was divided into topic 
areas. It first addressed the commissioner’s recommendations under each particular heading 
and then considered other witness’s opinions about the commissioner’s recommendations. 
                                               
827 Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy 
and Ethics, “Statutory Review of the Conflict of Interest Act”, 41st Parl, 2nd Sess 
(Ottawa: February 2014) at Appendix A [2014 Code Review]. 
828 Supra, note 695 at 2-3. 
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Dawson later noted that many of the opinions that the committee included in the Report were 
new to her and that she had not been given the opportunity to comment on them before the 
report was finalized. This may seem strange given that she was the individual who would 
ultimately be responsible for administering those new rules, but it is not technically improper 
in any legal sense because neither the Act or Code even suggest that the commissioner’s 
perspective ought to be given greater weight. 
 
The committee’s final report was not unanimous. The opinions from the NDP and 
the Liberal party that accompanied its release were both dissenting. The Liberal committee 
vice chair Scott Andrews called the report “a complete farce” and said that the 
“recommendations outlined in this report are certainly not those of the committee as a 
whole.”829 The NDP took the position that the process was carried out in bad faith and highly 
politicized. 830  Despite these dissenting positions, the Conservative government actually 
reviewed and supported the report.831 Despite their support however, the overall result was 
that absolutely no amendments were put forward. 
 
(b) 2012 Submission re: Code 
Reviews of the Code have come to much different outcomes than reviews of the Act. 
Whereas a comprehensive report outlining clear and specific recommendations to improve 
                                               
829 2014 Code Review, supra note 827 at 69.  
830 Ibid at 65. 
831 Canada, House of Commons, “Letter to Mr. Pat Martin, Chair of the Standing 
Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics” (5 June 2014), online: 
<https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/41-2/ETHI/report-1/response-8512-
412-34>. 
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the Act can easily be abandoned in the midst of political posturing and uncertainty,832 the 
Code is not legislative and is accordingly much easier to amend in the face of partisanship. 
Because the process is much less formal, the commissioner has been able to make 
recommendations much more regularly, especially during appearances before the standing 
committee. The Code was first amended in May 2012 and Commissioner Dawson has 
continued to suggest changes ever since.833  
 
In stark contrast to her submissions in respect of the Act, Commissioner Dawson 
provided nineteen new recommendations to improve the Code. She also re-submitted 
previous recommendations that she had made in 2010 that had not yet been taken up. Those 
recommendations were accompanied by draft wording of how exactly the Code could look 
if amended to conform her with suggestions, including how the related forms ought to be 
modified.834  Overall, it was generally the same themes that were woven throughout these 
submissions as were included in her submissions under the Act.  
                                               
832 See Lori Turnbull, “Ethics Rules”, Canadian Government Executive (10 April 2018), 
online: <https://canadiangovernmentexecutive.ca/ethics-rules/> (in which Turnbull 
comments that “Every five years, the Conflict of Interest Act is subject to review by 
Parliament, but partisan bickering tends to take precedence over thoughtful dialogue 
about ethical standards in public life.”). 
833 In 2007, an interpretation section was added, the reporting deadline for gifts was 
extended to 60 days, and there were several changes to the disclosure statement 
provisions.  In 2008, an exemption was introduced as a result of an inquiry report so that 
Members would not be considered to be furthering their own private interests or those of 
another person if the matter in question consisted of being a party to a legal action 
relating to actions of the Member as an MP.  In 2009, the gift rules were amended.  
834 Although a relatively uninteresting component of the Code, parliament must approve 
and re-publish any forms that are required for filings. What a form looks like is typically 
a matter of discretion for other ethics commissions across the country, but is a task 
retained by parliament at the federal level. This can in theory lead to delayed updates to 
those forms, but in reality it has not yet proven an impediment to making small changes 
when they have been requested by the Commissioner.  
 260 
 
The first theme that emerged was greater clarity and precision in the language 
used.835 Second, she believed that members ought to be meeting with the commissioner for 
frank one-on-one conversations that will help them better understand the rules.836 Third, if 
it is public knowledge that a request for an inquiry was received, then the commissioner 
wanted to be able to speak publicly about why no inquiry was undertaken.837 Finally, the Act 
and Code needed to be harmonized.838  
 
The committee never ended up releasing a report in relation to this 2012 review. 
Instead, the Committee’s review was interrupted and set aside due to what it said were 
“conflicting priorities”839 and the study was later recommenced on February 19, 2015. 
 
(c) 2015 Submissions re: Code 
 
                                               
835 Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “The Conflict of 
Interest Code for Members of the House of Commons: Five-Year Review – Submission 
to the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs” (14 May 2012), online: 
<https://ciec-
ccie.parl.gc.ca/en/publications/Documents/InternalReports/PROC%20submission%20re
%20review%20of%20Code%20-%20May2012.pdf> (the need for greater clarity is 
evident from the fact that the Commissioner provides the Committee with draft language 
in relation to her suggestions). 
836 Ibid, at 8 (the Commissioner recommends mandatory meetings with members). 
837 Ibid, at 13 (see recommendation 14). 
838 Ibid (see recommendation 18). 
839 See Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Procedure and House 
Affairs, “Thirty-Ninth Report” 41st Parl, 2nd Sess (11 June 2015), online: < 
https://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/412/PROC/Reports/RP8040054/procrp
39/procrp39-e.pdf> [Committee Code Report].  
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Commissioner Dawson re-submitted an updated list of recommendations to the 
Committee in February 2015.840 There were now twenty-three suggestions in total, though 
none of them were arguably new or surprising. The committee filed its final report on June 
11, 2015 and noted in that report that it had only completed “its assessment of ten 
recommendations brought forward by the Commissioner.”841 This time, the committee heard 
from individuals who occupied positions within parliamentary bodies across the country, but 
not from academics or from other outside organizations. The committee’s report again 
foregrounded Commissioner Dawson’s submissions and then contrasted them with the 
opinions of other witnesses.  As if to subtly say right up front that it would not consider 
harmonization of the Code and Act as the commissioner had recommended, the Report said 
very early in the body of its text that the “Code emanates from the parliamentary privilege 
possessed by the House of Commons as a collectivity to discipline its members and to 
regulate its own internal affairs” and that it is separate from the Act, which is legislative and 
does not form part of the Standing Orders.842  
 
The committee report resulted in amendments to the Code related to gift rules (i.e. 
lowering the disclosure threshold from $500 to $200), changes to the thresholds for reporting 
sponsored travel and also introduced deadlines for Members in relation to signing their 
                                               
840 Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “The 2015 
Review of the Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of Commons: 
Submission to the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs” (19 February 
2015), online: <https://ciec-
ccie.parl.gc.ca/en/publications/Documents/InternalReports/PROC%20submission%20re
%202015%20review%20of%20Code%20-%20Feb2015.pdf> (see summary list of 
recommendations on page 20) [Dawson 2015 Code]. 
841 Committee Code Report, supra note 839 at 6. 
842 Ibid at 1. 
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disclosure summaries and completing the annual review processes. Each of these changes 
reflected recommendations that Commissioner Dawson had made during the review.  
 
Despite her success at having some of her recommendations adopted, Commissioner 
Dawson later appeared before the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs and 
reminded its members that the review they had conducted was not in fact complete: “...I 
made 13 other recommendations, and I would be pleased to discuss them should the 
Committee chose to proceed with a comprehensive review of the Members’ Code as 
recommended in the June report.”843 Those other recommendations continue to be all but 
ignored despite the fact that they were submitted in response to a request from the committee 
by the sole person who had been entrusted to administer the Code up to that point in time.  
 
The  reluctance of the committees to advance recommendations made by the 
commissioner has led to a situation where observers and officials alike are acutely aware of 
Parliament’s failure to adopt the recommendations of the expert that they themselves 
appointed. Consider that Commissioner Dawson’s submissions to both committees were 
respectively inspired by having identified the main issues that created challenges for her in 
the administration of the Code844 and that would make the Act “easier to administer and 
                                               
843 Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “Opening 
Statement before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Procedure and House 
Affairs” (Ottawa, ON, 18 February 2016), online: <https://ciec-
ccie.parl.gc.ca/en/publications/Documents/Presentations/Opening%20Statement%20PRO
C%20February%2018%202016.pdf> at 2 (Commissioner Mary Dawson). 
844 Supra, note 835 at 17. 
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enforce”845 and it is difficult to believe even for a second that Parliament has taken these 
mandatory reviews seriously. 
 
7.3 The Public Weighs In 
 
In spite of the commissioner’s efforts to fully and thoughtfully contribute to the 
periodic reviews of the Code and the Act, there remains a general sense that Canada is not 
doing enough to strengthen its parliamentary ethics laws. Some observers have attributed 
this to the commissioner not taking an aggressive enough approach to enforcement, whereas 
others have noted the limitations inherent in the commissioner’s mandates and constitutional 
role.846     
 
As has been explained above, the commissioner has very little stand-alone 
enforcement power that is not simply a delegated authority to conduct investigations and 
make recommendations back to a house of Parliament or to the Prime Minister. The 
committee system is supposed to fill this gap by reviewing the commissioner’s work and 
making recommendations. Committees can only be effective however if they make a 
concerted effort to exercise influence over houses of Parliament for the purpose of 
championing and pushing through their suggestions. Parliamentarians are also incredibly 
busy though,  and getting an issue to be placed high on the agenda of things that need to be 
accomplished is not always straight-forward.  
  
                                               
845 2013 Act Submission, supra note 824 at i. 
846 Examples will be provided below. 
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This criticism of the committee system is not new. Former MP Jean-Robert Gauthier 
argued back in 1993 that “… we should review how the present parliamentary committee 
system operates or works. It is a parliamentary structure that needs to be modernized to make 
it more responsive to public expectations, and more efficient by giving members of 
parliament greater authority and powers.”847 What seems to be new is the fact that the public 
is now finding unimpeded and unfiltered ways to vocalize its dissatisfaction. Pressure to 
continue to push the envelope and criticism of slow-to-evolve parliamentary ethics laws are 
commonly heard from the academy, within the traditional and social medias, from civil 
society groups and even from international anti-corruption bodies. A brief look at some of 
these pressures and criticisms follows.  
 
(a) Academia 
Academics from all over Canada are very alive to the fact that the country’s 
parliamentary ethics laws have been slow to evolve. Professor Gerry Ferguson has written a 
free online treatise about global corruption. In this work, Ferguson offers a comparative 
analysis of anti-corruption laws in Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States. In 
the section focusing on Canada’s conflict of interest rules, Ferguson notes that the Conflict 
of Interest and Ethics Commissioner has been drawing attention to deficiencies in some of 
the definitions within the Code. Despite Commissioner Dawson’s recommendations, 
                                               
847 Canadian Study of Parliament Group, “Seminar Transcript: Accountability 
Committees and Parliament” (19 May 1993), online: <http://cspg-gcep.ca/pdf/1993_05-
b.pdf> at 2:16 (Mr. Jean-Robert Gauthier, MP Ottawa-Vanier).  
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especially in regard to the definition of “family member”, amendments have not been made 
to ensure that the Code is in line with the standards found in the Act.848 
 
Ian Greene and David Shugarman’s edited collection Honest Politics Now features a 
great many criticisms of parliamentary ethics laws in Canada. In particular, Ian Greene and 
I note that there is too little public consultation about what these laws should look like and 
that the appointment process for the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner remains 
deficient and unacceptable for a position of this stature.849 Lori Turnbull wrote in 2018 that 
partisan bickering tends to get in the way of meaningful review and discussion by 
parliamentarians about when and how to update the Act and Code.850  
 
Gwyneth Bergman and Emmett Macfarlane have looked at the many 
recommendations that the commissioner has submitted to Parliament and noted that 
“[d]espite the persistence of these and other recommendations, however, much of the 
COIEC’s significance seems to have been relegated to an educational and advisory role for 
public office holders and MPs.”851 Echoing some of those recommendations, University of 
Ottawa Law School’s Dean Adam Dodek argues that there is a need to consider expanding 
the formal sanctions that can be levied by the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissions 
and that Parliament should also consider whether the advisory and investigatory functions 
of offices like this one should properly be separated.852 I have similarly written that there is 
                                               
848 Supra, note 656 at 9-24. 
849 HP Now, supra note 78 at 151-152. 
850 Supra, note 832. 
851 Bergman & Macfarlane, supra note 91 at 21. 
852 Dodek, supra note 443 at 106 &109. 
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a trend of combining government oversight offices across the country and that we ought to 
be collecting more data so that we can truly understand if this is a meaningful direction to 
be heading in.853 
 
Professor Anita Anand and Justice Lorne Sossin (then Dean of Osgoode Hall Law 
School) have identified several ways in which public sector ethics could be improved. Two 
of their suggestions are that: first, these regimes could benefit from including provisions 
related to civil recovery following misconduct by public officials. Secondly, accountability 
offices should be encouraging more whistleblowing.854 Many other academics855 are also 
writing about these regimes and offering ideas for how we can continue to position Canada 
as a public sector ethics leader on the global stage.  
 
(b) Traditional Media 
The online and print media have been very critical of the lack of progressive policy-
making in relation to parliamentary ethics. The media plays an important role in inspiring 
and shaping civic and political engagement.856 Here are two brief excerpts: 
In what has become a long-running, if largely fruitless, campaign, Ethics 
Commissioner Mary Dawson is once again attempting to persuade MPs to 
tighten up the House conflict of interest code. Judging from the response she 
                                               
853 See generally Stedman Roof, supra note 752. 
854 Anita Anand & Lorne Sossin, “Independence and accountability in public and private 
governance” (2018) 61:S1 Can Pub Admin 15. 
855 See e.g. Professors Rob Shepherd, Susan Dimock, Luc Juillet, Val Jepson, etc.    
856 See e.g. Brenda O’Neill, “The Media’s Role in Shaping Canadian Civic and Political 
Engagement” (2009) 3:2 Can Poli Sci R 105. 
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has received, however, it appears her parliamentary charges still aren’t ready 
to heed her call.857 
 
The House of Commons has not amended the Conflict of Interest Act to close 
many key loopholes. Liberal MPs rejected an effort to do so – and to also 
condemn Morneau’s actions – when they defeated a motion Tuesday.858 
 
The media has not only been critical of Parliament, but it has also been highly critical of the 
commissioner. John Ivison wrote that “Dawson’s office is the source of frustration for many 
in Ottawa…this is an office that should have as its emblem the three mystic apes – see no 
evil, hear no evil, speak no evil.”859 Tonda MacCharles noted that “[o]thers who’ve dealt 
with Dawson say her advice has been clear but baffling nevertheless because it is seen as 
overzealous, misguided and based on a fundamental misinterpretation of the law, its intent 
and how Parliament actually works.”860 Most scathingly, Mark Bonokoski of the Toronto 
Sun wrote that:  
Mary Dawson should at least be tossed off the bus, if not under it, not just 
because Trudeau was using her as an excuse for his finance minister’s ethical 
pickle but because her ticket long ago expired… Now, there is no question that 
Mary Dawson is one smart cookie, but she appears to have lost the intensity 
her job requires…the time for her to go has come.861 
 
Articles like these serve as a constant reminder of how difficult the commissioner’s job can 
be, especially when the regimes being administered are clearly outdated and insufficient and 
                                               
857 Kady O’Malley, “Ethics watchdog tries again to get MPs to limit gift bags, junkets”, 
CBC News (21 Feb 2015), online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/ethics-watchdog-
tries-again-to-get-mps-to-limit-gift-bags-junkets-1.2964822>.  
858 Supra, note 667.   
859 Ivison, supra note 648.  
860 Supra, note 634.   
861 Mark Bonokoski, “Bonokoski: Time to toss the ethics commissioner off the bus”, 
Ottawa Sun (23 October 2017), online: <https://ottawasun.com/opinion/columnists/ 
bonokoski-time-to-toss-the-ethics-commissioner-off-the-bus>.  
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Parliament seems intent on modernizing them as little as possible. This can make it seem 
nearly impossible for a commissioner to meet the public’s expectations.  
 
(c) Social Media 
Social media websites have come to the fore as platforms for political engagement 
since the creation of Facebook and Twitter. Citizens, corporations and other actors have 
learned to leverage social media in order to engage in discussions about politics and political 
ethics. Political parties and most MPs now also have Facebook and Twitter accounts where 
they post news and even live-stream press conferences.862 This drives constituents to these 
online platforms to keep abreast of what is happening in the world of the political. The 
internet has accordingly overtaken the print media several times over as being the most 
direct, lowest cost and easiest to control way for elected officials to communicate with the 
public.863  
 
A highly engaged citizenry has emerged that consumes and circulates nearly 
anything that has the scent of a political ethics scandal. Since the Liberal party won the 
federal election in 2015 for example, government ethics has trended in Canada several times. 
Whether or not they ended up being violations of the Act, Code or other norms, some 
controversies have even received enough attention to be honoured with their own social 
media hashtags:   
                                               
862 The Canadian Press, “Political parties clamour for social media influence in the 
election”, CTV News (25 May 2018), online: <https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/political-
parties-clamour-for-social-media-influence-in-the-election-1.3945503>. 
863 See generally Harnessing Twitter, supra note 412 (for a broad discussion of the value 
of social media within this space). 
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#LavScam 
#MorneauSheppell  
#AgaKhan 
#NormanGate 
 
While there are of course also many people who are happy with the ethical conduct 
of Canada’s politicians, social media seems to find a way to amplify the voices of those who 
express their discontent. This happens because the algorithms upon which these platforms 
function tend to create echo chambers that animate greater polarization of opinion.864 This 
polarization can lead to greater discontent, but it can also lead to deeper engagement and 
debate about real issues. A newspaper may post a story about a scandal that will then take 
on a life of its own as users of social media instantaneously publish and share their mostly 
unfiltered opinions with the whole internet or simply with their own networks of friends and 
followers.865  
 
Political parties, parliamentarians, and the Conflict of Interest and Ethics 
Commissioner are all using social media. It is accordingly common to see these platforms 
rife with lively debate about parliamentary ethics issues. It is also not uncommon to see 
official accounts engage in these debates with members of the public. The Courts in the 
United States have already been asked to consider whether politicians should be allowed to 
                                               
864 See e.g. Cass R Sunstein, #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media 
(New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2017) at 60.   
865 Notably, platforms are beginning to take a more active role in filtering content. This is 
also complemented by users who report content to the platform. 
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block constituents on Twitter.866 Social media therefore provides us with another window 
into the criticisms that are being levelled against Canada’s ethics regimes. 
 
(d) Civil Society and International Community 
Civil society and international anti-corruption groups have taken on a very visible 
and influential role in relation to political ethics. When Parliament chose to delegate its right 
to govern the ethical conduct of its own members, it created a sort of intermediary between 
itself as an institution and any criticism that might be levelled at how ethical misconduct is 
treated. With a Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner in place, Parliament can take 
the position that it is that individual who is responsible for investigation and oversight when 
there is a live controversy about a member’s ethical conduct. We saw this with Prime 
Minister Trudeau, who repeated a similar mantra incessantly when questioned about the Aga 
Khan scandal and the SNC-Lavalin affair, instead of actually answering questions: “I am 
pleased to work with the conflict of interest and ethics commissioner to answer any questions 
she may have may have.”867 This is an important point because as we have seen from the 
media excerpts above, the commissioner shoulders quite a bit of the burden when there is 
                                               
866 See e.g. Tom Kludt, “Trump can’t block users on Twitter, federal court rules”, 
CNN.com (23 May 2018), online: <https://money.cnn.com/2018/05/23/media/judge-
rules-trump-cant-block-twitter-users/index.html>; Ann E Marimow, “President Trump 
cannot block his critics on Twitter, Federal appeals courts rules”, The Washington Post (9 
July 2019), online: < https://wapo.st/32jTd9F?tid=ss_tw&utm_term=.f0f7541d1a3b>. 
867 See e.g. Aaron Wherry, “Opposition asks 18 times, but Trudeau won’t answer on 
ethics commissioner meetings”, CBC News (10 May 2017), online: 
<https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/trudeau-question-period-ethics-commissioner-
1.4108903>; Daniel Leblanc, “Trudeau is ‘hiding’ behind ethics commissioner on SNC-
affair, Scheer says”, The Globe and Mail (1 March 2019), online: 
<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-pm-hiding-behind-ethics-
commissioner-on-snc-affair-opposition-says/>. 
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persistent ethical misconduct by parliamentarians. The public does not seem to have a good 
understanding of how the commissioner’s role and powers are limited. At the same time, the 
commissioner has been unable to convince parliamentarians to update the regimes so that 
there is a duty and/or a right for the Office to engage with the media and to provide public 
explanations when her role is being debated in public or when she has decided that an 
investigation will not be pursued.  
 
We are left with a gap. The commissioner’s role serves to insulate Parliament from 
criticism that it might otherwise receive about the conduct of its members, while at the same 
time being intentionally designed so as to ensure that the commissioner is unable to 
effectively respond to many of those criticisms. This allows organizations like Democracy 
Watch to step in to the public dialogue and frame the narrative around parliamentary ethics. 
A large part of how this is done by Democracy Watch is by agreeing to make continuous 
appearances in the media and by filing regular applications for judicial review. For example, 
Democracy Watch has brought an application for judicial review of the appointment of 
Mario Dion as the COIEC, alleging the consultation process was insufficient. 868  The 
organization has also sought judicial review in relation to advice given by Commissioner 
Dawson that allowed a minister to establish a conflict of interest screen as a compliance 
measure under section 29 of the Conflict of Interest Act.869 
 
                                               
868 Democracy Watch v Canada (A-G), 2018 FC 1290. 
869 Democracy Watch v Canada (A-G), 2018 FCA 194. 
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In his 2018-2019 annual report for the Members’ Code of Conduct, Commissioner 
Dion explained that he is attentive to and interested in understanding the levels of public 
trust in Canada. In particular, he regularly reviews the Latin American Public Opinion 
Project report called Americas Barometer: The Public Speaks on Democracy and 
Governance in the Americas, Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 
and the Edelman Trust Barometer.870 
 
Canada plays a role in several other international organizations that influence 
thinking about public sector anti-corruption, including: The Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), The World Bank, the World Economic Forum and the 
United Nations. Although these organizations have not been overly critical of Canada, they 
do conduct regular analysis and produce reports that draw attention to failures they observe.  
The mere existence of these international organizations puts pressure on governments to not 
be on the receiving end of one of their rebukes. Despite this pressure however, there have 
been very few improvements made to the Code and Act. 
 
7.4 The Insulating Motivation of Self-Interest 
 
Both houses of Parliament have been very clear in the past that the conflict of interest 
regime is always a “work in progress” and that adjustments, improvements, and refinements 
are required over time.871 While this is of course true, these words do not seem to be inspiring 
                                               
870 Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “The 2018-2019 
Annual Report made under the Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of 
Commons” (Ottawa: June 2019) at 19 [AR 2018-19 Code]. 
871 Canada House of Commons, Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, 
Seventh Report, 39th Parl, 1st Sess (May 2006); Canada, Senate, Standing Committee on 
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much action. There is an obvious tension that exists by virtue of the fact that both the Act 
and the Code apply to members of parliament and that neither can be amended without those 
amendments passing through the House of Commons. If parliamentarians were to strengthen 
these regimes as the commissioner has requested, they would be placing further obligations 
and restrictions on themselves. From an historical perspective, it appears that only when 
members of parliament could possibly lose or gain votes in an upcoming election on this file 
will they make and keep promises to champion improvements. 
 
Under the leadership of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, we have also seen a sitting 
PM investigated under the Conflict of Interest Act for the first (and second) time. This simple 
fact all but guaranteed that the majority Liberal government would not look to make 
amendments to the Act or the Code while the investigation was ongoing and interest in ethics 
laws was heightened. First, because of the political challenges they were facing due to the 
mere fact of the investigation, the governing Liberals would not want to intentionally invite 
further debate about matters of parliamentary ethics. The PM’s troubles are widely viewed 
as an embarrassing distraction to the Party and opening up debate on these rules would give 
the opposition even more opportunity to remind the Prime Minister about his transgressions. 
What should ideally be a non-partisan parliamentary discourse aimed at improving trust in 
the country’s public institutions and governance models, would likely turn into a collection 
of political talking points instead. Second, any weakening in the rigorousness of the rules or 
even a refusal to make suggested improvements could lead to criticism from the opposition 
                                               
Conflict of Interest for Senators, Fourth Report, 39th Parl, 2nd Session (May 2008) (the 
same sentiment has been expressed in both houses of parliament). 
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that the governing party is declining to improve them because the PM knows he will get 
away with less if he does. This is not to say that Prime Minister Trudeau is pining to break 
the ethics rules, but simply that the rhetoric would doubtless be something to that effect. In 
either scenario, the Liberal party would be doing itself a great political disservice if it were 
to allow dialogue about ethics rules and its leader’s ethical transgressions to remain a live 
political issue. 
 
On the other hand, parliamentary ethics regularly plays a role in opposition parties’ 
campaign platforms. We have seen this in the past and it has generally resulted in overhauls 
of the regimes, as it did when Prime Minister Stephen Harper campaigned on the promise of 
passing the Federal Accountability Act. Regardless of which party forms government in 
2019 however, there is very little historical precedent to suggest that these regimes will be 
modernized in a meaningful way that factors in the many ignored recommendations that 
have been made by the office’s two commissioners and puts the public interest squarely 
before the private interests of parliamentarians. The resistance to modernization is palpable. 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
 
In chapter seven I demonstrated that despite having been asked by standing 
committees to contribute to three total reviews of the Act and Code, the commissioners’ 
suggestions have been largely dismissed. This has left the office’s commissioners noticeably 
disappointed. Similar disappointment has also been reflected in the academic literature, in 
traditional and social media and by both domestic and international civil society 
organizations.  Despite the obvious disappointment that has been expressed however, 
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parliamentarians have yet to make a good faith commitment to improving these regimes. 
Part of the problem may lie in the inherent conflict of interest that exists by virtue of the fact 
that the Code and Act apply directly to and can only be amended by parliamentarians. There 
may be very little incentive for a government to open up debate about the Act and Code, 
particularly if that government has found itself in the hot seat with respect to its ethical 
conduct.   As we saw in chapter five, Parliament has historically only been keen to make 
changes when votes are at stake.   
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8.#Countering#the#Resistance:#Asserting#Greater#Independence#
and#Re>Framing#Accountability#
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I demonstrate that the two commissioners’ obvious frustration has 
compelled them to offer a counter-resistance to Parliament’s clear indifference towards the 
work of updating the parliamentary ethics rules. Not only have both commissioners 
expressed their discontent, but Commissioner Dion has begun to bring greater attention to 
the rules by taking a strict approach to how he interprets them.  The office is trying to draw 
parliament’s attention to the Act and Code by, in part, leveraging the COIEC’s unique status 
as the only ‘agent’ to have parliamentary privilege to help it assert a more aggressive 
operational independence. I explain that Commissioner Dion’s strict interpretation of his 
office’s independence has been complemented by his increased investment in public 
outreach and education. This is not only an attempt to get Parliament’s attention however, 
but also to subtly re-frame the COIEC as having authority to act outside of the confines of 
its delegated mandates by virtue of the legitimacy it receives from its broader contributions 
to governance in the public interest. Drawing from the discussion above in chapter three, I 
explain the implications this has for the legitimacy of the COIEC’s role within Canada’s 
parliamentary democracy and conclude by offering suggestions for how the regime ought to 
be reformed. 
 
 
8.2 Frustrated by Inaction 
 
In 2011, Commissioner Dawson made the bold move of writing a letter to the editor 
of the Globe and Mail to provide clarity about her work and respond to an article that had 
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been printed on July 19. The article in question appeared in the paper five days after 
Commissioner Dawson had released a report in which she determined that Conservative 
MP Helena Guergis contravened sections 8 and 9 of the Code.872 The author of the article 
criticized the commissioner for not conducting enough investigations and for the fact that 
the two reports she had recently completed did not reflect poorly on the government at all. 
The article further outlined different ways in which Democracy Watch had been critical of 
the office and its work.873 Commissioner Dawson’s brief letter to the editor laid bare her 
frustration at the fact that the Globe and Mail would print such a criticism: “…in all of my 
annual reports, under both the act and the code, I clearly identify all cases where questions 
or complaints are raised with my office and how these have been dealt with.”874 This was 
an interesting early indication that Commissioner Dawson may occasionally feel it 
necessary to defend her work in the media if she believed it to be under attack. 
 
The next year, a few months after she had made recommendations to the Standing 
Committee on Procedure and House Affairs in relation to the Code, Commissioner Dawson 
again took to the media. In what could be seen as a bold step, she sat down for an extended 
interview with Postmedia to discuss the recommendations she had made to the Committee. 
The rationale for this must have been that the interview was in relation to the Code and 
there was a clear public education mandate in the Code. Excerpts from the interview were 
                                               
872 Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, The Guergis 
Report made under the Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of Commons 
(14 July 2011) (Commissioner: Mary Dawson) at 1. 
873 Lawrence Martin, “How do lawmakers stand such harsh scrutiny?” The Globe and 
Mail (19 July 2011) A15. 
874 Mary Dawson, “Conflicts of Interest”, Letter to the Editor, The Globe and Mail (23 
July 2011) F8. 
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posted widely on different Postmedia websites and in various papers.875 Perhaps out of 
interest in following the public’s reaction to news about her work more closely, her office 
then joined Twitter in June 2013. Dawson spoke with Global News in September 2013 
about the suggestions she had made in 2012 in relation to Code, as well as her 2013 
suggestions in relation to the Act.876 With this interview, Commissioner Dawson seemed 
to be signaling to Parliament that she would not only respond to media inquiries as 
necessary, but that she would also leverage the media (both traditional and social) to help 
maximize the impact of her work. This included using the media to raise awareness about 
the Act, even though the provisions of the Act gave her no explicit mandate to undertake 
public education and outreach. This of course stands in stark contrast to the Code.   
 
Dawson continued to engage with the media in very intentional ways, but she also 
took advantage of the office’s website and started to build content that would help members 
and public office holders understand their obligations.877 This content was made available 
for download by members of the public as opposed to being password protected. It was after 
her follow-up 2015 testimony before the Standing Committee on Procedure and House 
Affairs in relation to the Code that we began to see a more deliberate and sustained effort at 
public outreach and education from the office.  In her 2015-2016 annual report under the 
Code, Dawson specifically noted that she had been invited to appear before the Standing 
                                               
875 Mike De Souza, “Ethics watchdog calls MPs honest”, Edmonton Journal (1 Sept 
2012) A15. 
876 Amy Minsky, “’No end’ to recommendations to improve conflict-of-interest system: 
commissioner”, Global News (8 September 2013), online: 
<https://globalnews.ca/news/848769/no-end-to-recommendations-to-improve-conflict-of-
interest-system-commissioner/>. 
877 AR 2015-16 Code, supra note 725 at 27. 
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Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics to discuss her work under the Act. 
She wrote in that annual report that she had reminded the Committee that a five-year review 
was conducted and that no amendments to the Act had resulted from that review. She also 
reminded the Committee that no further review is in fact required under the Act.878 In a clear 
sign of frustration, she repeated these points again at the end of the annual report and 
reassured her readers that she “…would be pleased to contribute to a potential review of the 
Members’ Code or the Act should either committee decide to undertake one.”879 
 
This understandable frustration continued to make its way in to Commissioner 
Dawson’s reports, her speeches and her submissions to the committees. When invited to 
appear before a newly formed Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs early in 
2016, she emphasized in her submission that the Committee had not been reviewing her 
Annual Reports and that they still need to complete their broader review of the Code:  
In the early years of my mandate, I was invited to discuss with the Committee 
two of my annual reports, but have not been given the opportunity to do so since 
2010.880 
… 
I note that the Members’ Code is generally working quite well. But I also note 
that I made 13 other recommendations, and I would be pleased to discuss them 
should the Committee choose to proceed with a comprehensive review of the 
Members’ Code as recommended in the June report.881   
 
She also expressed her general frustration about the fact that the Committee needed to 
approve simple form changes proposed by her office so that they could be used to help ensure 
compliance with the Act: 
                                               
878 Ibid at 24. 
879 Ibid at 33. 
880 Supra, note 843 at 4 (Commissioner Mary Dawson). 
881 Ibid at 3. 
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Generally, the approval requirement has hampered my efforts to help Members 
comply with their obligations. I cannot issue any guidelines or forms under the 
Members’ Code, notably guidelines in relation to gifts, an area that appears to 
cause a lot of confusion and prompts many questions from Members… I have 
raised this concern with the Committee in the past and asked it to consider 
whether there is really a need for the Committee to approve any guidelines and 
forms that I may develop under the Members’ Code.882 
 
Dawson later gave a public speech at a September 2016 public sector ethics conference in 
Toronto where she again made it clear that the limits on her jurisdiction had been frustrating 
her for a long time. She provided an example of her courage to push the envelope that 
reached back to 2010: 
My mandate is quite precise and touches on many ethics issues only incidentally. 
I do, however, comment on ethical matters of concern to Canadians that are not 
covered by the Act or Members’ Code where I believe it useful to do so...A case 
in point is my 2010 Cheques Report... Even though I found no breach of the Act 
or the Members’ Code, I suggested that the practice was inappropriate and 
should be stopped.883 
 
Realizing then that perhaps not having a standing committee willing to pay attention to her 
work in any meaningful way might afford her an opportunity to innovate a bit, Commissioner 
Dawson also commented at that September 2016 event that she had begun to see a real 
benefit in leveraging the media: “I am also as open with the media as I am permitted to be 
                                               
882 Ibid, at 3; See also AR 2015-16 Code, supra note 877 at 24 (where Commissioner 
Dawson says “I was left with little choice but to proceed with the consequential 
amendments so that the forms would reflect the amended provisions of the Members’ 
Code and could be used by new and returning Members in fulfilment of their obligations. 
… The Committee met to retroactively approve the changes on February 23, 2016.”).  
883 Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, Mary Dawson, 
“The State of Public Sector Ethics: Exploring Emerging Issues and Challenges in the 
Field” (Panel Presentation Public Sector Ethics Conference, Toronto, ON, 30 September 
2016), online: <https://ciec-
ccie.parl.gc.ca/en/publications/Documents/Presentations/The%20State%20of%20Public
%20Sector%20Ethics-
%20Exploring%20Emerging%20Issues%20and%20Challenge%20in%20the%20Field%2
0Sept%202016%20EN.pdf> at 2 [Dawson Emerging Issues]. 
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under the two regimes. I believe the media can only help to communicate the existing ethics 
rules, thus performing an educational role.”884   Shortly thereafter, in November 2016, 
Commissioner Dawson wrote an op-ed article for the National Post885 to publicly respond to 
a column about political fundraising that had misinterpreted sections 7 and 16 of the Act. 
The outreach work to help ensure that the public understood the rules had, for the most part, 
been historically reserved for inclusion in the commissioner’s investigation and annual 
reports. What we were beginning to see at this point was a much more aggressive and 
proactive strategy take hold. 
 
It was in March 2017, with the controversy of her first sixth month interim 
appointment having caught the media’s attention that past January, that Commissioner 
Dawson gave a speech to the Canadian Study of Parliament Group. In that speech she 
remarked that the idea of independence in the context of her role “means not only being 
independent, but also being seen to be independent.”886 To help her operationalize this 
philosophical commitment to being seen to be independent, Dawson decided to expand her 
use of Twitter in order to provide the public with more general information about the regimes 
she administered.”887 Dawson also continued to remind parliamentarians that they have been 
                                               
884 Ibid at 3. 
885 Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “The 2016-2017 
Annual Report in respect of the Conflict of Interest Act” (Ottawa: 8 June 2017) at 40 
(Commissioner Mary Dawson) [AR 2016-17 Act]. 
886 Dawson Relationship, supra note 168 at 2 (emphasis in the original). 
887 Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “The 2016-2017 
Annual Report made under the Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of 
Commons” (Ottawa: 9 June 2017) at 27 [AR 2016-17 Code]; See also AR 2016-17 Act, 
supra note 885 at 41 (Commissioner Dawson writes: “…we sent our first “storytelling” 
tweet, with text images, about sponsored travel. We are also using more infographics and 
tweeting more frequently”). 
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ignoring her for too long. In an October 2017 appearance before the House of Commons 
Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs during its study of a bill related to 
political fundraising (Bill C-50), Dawson demonstrated frustration at the fact that things only 
get done when there is obvious public outrage and scandal: 
The level of public interest in fundraisers involving federal politicians is 
particularly high at present. However, concerns about political fundraisers were 
also raised much earlier during my mandate as Commissioner...I also addressed 
the matter in my submission to the parliamentary committee that conducted the 
five-year review of the Act, which concluded in 2014…I have recommended 
strengthening the fundraising provision in the Act on several occasions, for 
example, by putting in place a more stringent rule for ministers and 
parliamentary secretaries… As amendments to the regimes that I administer are 
not the issue currently before the Committee, I mention these recommendations 
only as context and to establish my longstanding general position that 
fundraising rules should be tightened.”888  
 
Finally, in the last annual reports she would table before the end of her tenure as the 
Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, Ms. Dawson again reminded committee 
members, who likely would not read her report, that she still hopes “…Parliament will in the 
future consider the recommendations that I have made in the context of the five-year reviews 
of the Members’ Code and the Act and elsewhere.”889 She then continued her outreach 
efforts after filing her joint investigation report in relation to Prime Minister Trudeau and his 
family trip to the Aga Khan’s private island by giving an exclusive interview to the Globe 
                                               
888 Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “Opening 
statement before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Procedure and House 
Affairs during its Study of Bill C-50” (Ottawa, ON, 17 October 2017), online: 
<https://ciec-
ccie.parl.gc.ca/en/publications/Documents/Presentations/Opening%20statement%20PRO
C%20C-50%20October%2017%202017.pdf> at 2 (Commissioner Mary Dawson). 
889 See AR 2016-17 Code, supra note 887 at 35; AR 2016-17 Act, supra note 885 at 49. 
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and Mail where she discussed her major investigations and her accomplishments in office. 
She even remarked in that interview that “she went out with a bang.”890 
 
Mario Dion replaced Ms. Dawson in January 2018 and became the country’s second 
Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner. Commissioner Dion he was quick to pick up 
right where Ms. Dawson had left off. 
 
 
8.3 The Audacity to Innovate  
 
In his first appearance before the Standing Committee on Access to Information, 
Privacy and Ethics after his appointment, Commissioner Dion immediately made it clear 
that he had done his homework. Knowing that Ms. Dawson had spent a great deal of energy 
trying to convince parliamentarians to take her recommendations seriously and to make 
improvements to the Act and Code, Commissioner Dion reminded the Committee that they 
have work to do: “Like my predecessor, I do not think the Act is broken, but there is clearly 
room for improvement.”891 He then made a suggestion that he must have thought would be 
an easy win for him being that he was in a room full of people who seemed resistant to 
more onerous regulation. He recommended that the commissioner be given the power to 
prohibit complainants, witnesses and even the media from discussing or reporting about 
ongoing investigations: 
                                               
890 Supra, note 666.  
891 Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “Opening 
Statement before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Access to Information, 
Privacy and Ethics” (8 February 2018), online: <https://ciec-
ccie.parl.gc.ca/en/publications/Documents/Presentations/Opening%20Statement%20ETH
I%20%20February%208,%202018%20EN.pdf> at 1 (Commissioner Mario Dion) [Dion 
8 Feb 2018 ETHI]. 
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… I suggest that the Commissioner be given the power to issue confidentiality 
orders to witnesses and that the Act be amended to require complainants to 
maintain confidentiality until the Commissioner has reported.892  
 
These recommendations did not sit well with the media however. In an editorial written by 
the Toronto Star editorial board, the commissioner was rebuked for expressing a desire to 
gag journalists: 
 …he suggested he should have the power to issue confidentiality order to 
prevent MPs from informing the public about a complaint and stop the media 
from reporting on an investigation, no matter who their source was for the 
information in the first place. 
 
Those are very dangerous ideas, indeed, and Dion should immediately drop them 
from his otherwise sensible proposed reforms on ethics issues.893 
 
For a former Public Sector Integrity Commissioner, it seems implausible that Dion would 
think that the media needed to be muzzled. It is much more likely that this suggestion was 
a way to get both the members’ and the media’s attention to help bring awareness to the 
regimes and to his other recommendations. The more palatable recommendations that he 
made included that the commissioner be empowered to make recommendations in 
examination reports that were undertaken under the Act; that there should be more 
sanctions available under the Act; that training sessions be made mandatory for public 
office holders and that rules on fundraising be strengthened.894 Nothing else was nearly as 
controversial as his suggestion that he be permitted to issue confidentiality orders. 
 
                                               
892 Ibid at 4. 
893 “Memo to ethics czar: Don’t gag MPs or media”, Star Editorial Board, The Toronto 
Star (11 Feb 2018), online: 
<https://www.thestar.com/opinion/editorials/2018/02/11/memo-to-ethics-czar-dont-gag-
mps-or-media.html>. 
894 Supra, note 891 at 3-4. 
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Commissioner Dion filed his first annual reports only six months after he took 
office. This was a short enough time period that he was obviously still getting up to speed 
on some things, but long enough for him to have developed a real philosophy about how 
he would administer the Act and the Code.  Early in the reports, Dion offered up the office’s 
new mission statement and emphasized its independence: “Our office is an independent 
institution that serves an important purpose: to enhance Canadians’ trust and confidence in 
the Members of Parliament they elected and in the public office holders appointed by the 
government.”895 This language is a bit of an extrapolation. It would be more accurate to 
say that one of the general purposes of the Code created by members of the House of 
Commons is to “maintain and enhance public confidence and trust in the integrity of 
Members as well as the respect and confidence that society places in the House of 
Commons as an institution.”896 The Act has no corresponding statement in it about public 
trust or confidence and the Parliament of Canada Act states simply that the commissioner’s 
mandate is to “(a) carry out the functions of the Commissioner referred to in sections 86 
and 87; and (b) provide confidential policy advice and support to the Prime Minister in 
respect of conflict of interest and ethical issues in general.”897 Nowhere in sections 86 and 
87 is there mention of it being the commissioner’s responsibility to ensure public 
confidence. If the Act and Code are properly administered and they still do not inspire 
                                               
895 See Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “The 2017-
2018 Annual Report made under the Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House 
of Commons” (Ottawa: 11 June 2018) at 4 [AR 2017-18 Code]; Canada, Office of the 
Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “The 2017-2018 Annual Report in respect 
of the Conflict of Interest Act” (Ottawa: 4 June 2018) at 4.  
896 Code, supra note 14, s 1. 
897 PC Act, supra note 15, s 85. 
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public trust and confidence, then it is technically incumbent on parliamentarians to fix that, 
not the commissioner. 
 
The office’s new mission statement therefore emphasizes a philosophical 
commitment to going above and beyond the commissioner’s formal mandates by acting in 
the spirit, but not exactly the letter of the Act and Code. This seems to reflect an idea about 
how Commissioner Dion thinks independence ought to be operationalized within his role. 
As I will explain, Commissioner Dion’s approach to his advisory functions, investigations, 
enforcement and education/outreach all boldly reflect a sense of independence and purpose 
that challenge the traditional accountability structures that we know underpin the design of 
this unique parliamentary role.  
 
(a) Advisory Functions 
Commissioner Dion has called for some amendments to his regimes and issued 
several advisory opinions since taking office that have signaled his reluctance to settle for 
the status quo. For example, Dion appeared before the Standing Committee on Information, 
Privacy and Ethics early in his tenure and suggested removing a clause in the Act that allows 
public office holders to accept gifts from friends.898 He then started to interpret the rules 
around gifts and benefits much more strictly than they had been interpreted in the past. In 
May 2018 Dion decided, against a precedent established under former Commissioner 
Dawson, that the Code prohibits members from accepting barbecue services that have 
historically been provided free of charge by organizations in order to allow members to hold 
                                               
898 Supra, note 891 at 2. 
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community events in their ridings. These community events are incredibly common in the 
summer months. Then in October 2018, he told members that they can no longer accept 
intern services that are provided to them free-of-charge by third parties.899 Evidently this 
was very common as well, especially in the context of constituency offices. 
 
In his next controversial move, Commissioner Dion issued an advisory opinion in 
late 2018 where he expanded the post-employment and cooling-off prohibitions that apply 
to public office holders. In what some have described as a “stunning” ruling, 900  Dion 
clarified the rule that a reporting public office holder cannot accept an offer of employment 
with an entity that he or she had direct and significant official dealings with for one year 
after leaving their position. Whereas an ‘entity’ has historically been interpreted to be an 
actor outside government, Dion’s new interpretation holds that the restriction also applies to 
federal public sector entities.901 This interpretation of course means that political staff and 
governor-in-council appointees will have a difficult time competing for and accepting 
positions within the federal public service.902 
                                               
899 Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “Advisory 
Opinion: Gifts or other benefits to Members – Services of interns provided free of 
charge” (October 2018), online: < https://ciec-ccie.parl.gc.ca/en/rules-
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902 Etienne Rainville & Tom Jarmyn, “Expanding the cooling-off period for public office 
holders”, Policy Options (29 March 2019), online: 
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Despite his clear willingness to push forward with new ideas and stricter 
interpretations of the Act and Code, Commissioner Dion has also ensured that his office 
invests in an updated case management system that will bring older advice forward into a 
more user-friendly platform. The upgraded Integrated Case Management System was 
deployed in November 2018903 and was invested in to help ensure the consistency and 
timeliness of the advice being offered by the office. Dion even made the bold prediction in 
a public speech given at York University that he thinks the future of prevention and 
avoidance of ethical transgressions may lie in applications of artificial intelligence. This 
stands out as being one of the very few times that either of the office’s commissioners have 
spoken freely (i.e. outside of a committee hearing or official report) about what they think 
the future of their work might look like. Previous presentations of this sort have tended to 
merely repeat the commissioner’s recent recommendations in regard to improving the Act 
and Code.  
 
(b) Investigatory Functions 
The commissioner’s call for the power to issue gag orders was not well received.904 
This recommendation appears to have been inspired by a general sentiment about the 
                                               
<https://policyoptions.irpp.org/fr/magazines/march-2019/why-expand-the-cooling-off-
period-for-public-office-holders/>. 
903 See Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “The 2018-
2019 Annual Report in respect of the Conflict of Interest Act” (Ottawa: June 2019) at 21 
(Commissioner Mario Dion) [AR 2018-19 Act]; AR 2018-19 Code supra note 870 at 18 
(Commissioner Mario Dion). 
904 Supra, note 893.  
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danger of unfounded accusations that has been echoed for quite some time, including in 
1998 by Glenn Hagel when he was the Speaker of Saskatchewan’s Legislative Assembly: 
As we know in this modern day and age, where public officials are accused of 
being in conflict of interest, the public judge us to be guilty until proven 
innocent. Often it is just the passage of time by which it becomes clear later on 
that a member was not in a conflict of interest, but the accusations itself was 
enough to kill their political reputation.905 
 
Dion appears to have taken the feedback about his bold suggestion and reconsidered what 
the actual result was that he was trying to achieve. Now, instead of continuing his call for 
muzzling, he has undertaken to conduct investigations with what he is calling “due dispatch” 
to minimize the sometimes-irreversible damage that allegations can do to individual 
members and public office holders’ reputations. It is difficult to argue with the results of this 
re-framed “due-dispatch” initiative given the statistics that Commissioner Dion has since 
disclosed: 
The average length of time it took to complete the five examinations that I 
reported on in 2018-2019, including two that were launched by my predecessor, 
was 212 days, compared to an average of 336 days during our Office’s first 10 
years of operation.906 
 
This is an important step in the right direction. As I have noted in an earlier publication, “the 
public no longer waits for a commissioner’s investigation report to be released before 
coming to its own conclusions about the appropriateness of an official’s actions…”907 This 
progress in time to publication also stands to benefit from a decision Commissioner Dawson 
made that I believe could prove to be one of the most important decisions a commissioner 
has ever made, which is to issue combined examination and inquiry reports where possible.  
 
                                               
905 Round Table, supra note 448 at 22. 
906 AR 2018-19 Act, supra note 903 at 14. 
907 Harnessing Twitter, supra note 412 at 81. 
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In her 2009-2010 annual reports, Commissioner Dawson noted that she recently 
had to release parallel reports under the Code and the Act for the first time in relation to 
two separate matters because the procedures for releasing reports under the two regimes is 
different.908 Commissioner Dawson also noted very clearly that she “must produce two 
separate reports in these circumstances.” 909  In the wake of this obvious frustration, 
Commissioner Dawson decided in September 2010 to release the Dykstra Report as her 
first unified investigation report under both the Code and the Act.910 Her next annual reports 
in June 2011 again asked that the Act and Code be “streamlined.”911  
 
Although Commissioner Dion has not yet had occasion to do so, combined reports 
have been issued three times in the office’s history. In 2010 in relation to Rick Dykstra, in 
2013 regarding Christian Paradis and in 2017 in relation to Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. 
All three of these reports have been about individuals in both their capacities as members 
of parliament and as public office holders. The stakes were accordingly higher and the 
public interest greater. Interestingly however, it is not so obvious that this approach is 
appropriate. Given the caselaw related to parliamentary privilege that has been explored 
above in chapter six, it is clear that the commissioner’s investigatory work under the Act 
                                               
908 Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “The 2009-2010 
Annual Report in respect of the Conflict of Interest Act” (Ottawa: 16 June 2010) at 20 
(Commissioner Mary Dawson). 
909 Ibid. 
910 Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, The Dykstra 
Report made under the Conflict of Interest Act and the Conflict of Interest Code for 
Members of the House of Commons (7 September 2010) (Commissioner: Mary Dawson). 
911 See Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “The 2010-
2011 Annual Report in respect of the Conflict of Interest Act” (Ottawa: 16 June 2011) at 
25; AR 2010-11 Code, supra note 707 at 26. 
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in relation to these three files would now be protected from judicial review.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(c) Enforcement (Punishment and Deterrence) 
In his opening statement before the Standing Committee on Access to Information, 
Privacy and Ethics in May 2018, Commissioner Dion firmly resolved to take a strict 
approach to enforcement of the Code and the Act.912 The examples offered above certainly 
demonstrate that this has been the case, but there may be more to this philosophical approach 
than meets the eye. It is clear at this point that both commissioners have believed the Code 
and the Act need to be updated. Parliamentarians have not historically found time to take 
these requests seriously unless there is a risk to their reputations or chances of re-election. 
By strongly asserting that he will take a strict approach to enforcement, Commissioner Dion 
appears to be attempting to put the committee on notice.  
 
In my opinion, it is much more likely that Parliament will be willing to amend the 
Code than the Act. I believe this is the case because the Standing Orders can be amended 
quickly on consensus. Furthermore, a majority government can move quickly to amend the 
                                               
912 Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “Opening 
Statement before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Access to Information, 
Privacy and Ethics” (1 May 2018), online: <https://ciec-
ccie.parl.gc.ca/en/publications/Documents/Presentations/Opening%20Statement%20ETH
I%20May%201,%202018%20EN.pdf> at 3. 
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Standing Orders all by itself with little risk of political resistance. Even if an opposition 
member or party disagreed with the government’s proposed changes, their vote against those 
changes would have very little impact. In fact, we have seen more changes made to the Code 
post-Federal Accountability Act than we have seen made to the Act. The Act is much less 
likely to be amended because even a majority government would not be able to move 
amendments through quickly and efficiently. Despite the fact that the Act applies only to 
public office holders and not to backbench MPs or Senators, legislative amendments require 
debate and compromise in order to pass. A government looking to make amendments to the 
Act would likely be reluctant to give up control over disciplinary decision-making. A bill 
may of course still be able to move through the House of Commons quickly, but the Senate 
will study that bill and almost certainly look to make changes as they did with the passing 
of the Federal Accountability Act.  A majority of Senators are also independent now, which 
means that they ought to be more interested in supporting public sector ethics reforms that 
emphasize strong principles of ethical governance than they are to be concerned with 
political expediency and toeing the party line. It is for these reasons that, short of wholesale 
reform that takes place as a result of a campaign promise and/or tremendous public pressure, 
I believe we are more likely to see progress made under the Code than under the Act.  
 
Despite the above, it is still realistic to expect that changes might be made to the Act. 
The 2019 general election gave rise to a minority parliament, which clearly gives opposition 
parties an opportunity to work together to introduce a bill without needing government 
members’ votes to pass it through the House. A bill can of course also be introduced in the 
Senate. Given the interest that Canadians and parliamentarians are now taking in 
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parliamentary ethics and the number of Senators who now identify as independents, we 
could in fact see a bill advanced that seeks to modernize the Act.  
 
Hoping to inspire a push to modernize the Act, Commissioner Dion has called 
repeatedly for the power to make recommendations in examination reports,913 such as that 
an improper gift be repaid,914 and for the power to either recommend or apply sanctions for 
substantive contraventions of the Act. 915  He asks that these new powers of course be 
accompanied by criteria that can be used to guide the commissioner when making a 
recommendation or  imposing a sanction.916 Sanctions are important to him as commissioner 
because they can have a dissuasive effect and they also “provide Canadians with the 
assurance that there are consequences for breaching the Act that are more serious than what 
has been called naming and shaming.”917 Given the way that information travels in our 
digital age, stricter enforcement may also help to generate greater public interest and this 
would in turn serve an educational role by promoting greater awareness and understanding 
of the rules.918  
 
                                               
913 Dion 8 Feb 2018 ETHI, supra note 891. 
914 Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “Letter to Chair 
Bob Zimmer in relation to Commissioner Dion’s 8 Feb 2018 appearance before the 
House of Commons Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics” 
(7 March 2018), online: <https://ciec-
ccie.parl.gc.ca/en/publications/Documents/Presentations/Letter%20to%20ETHI.pdf> 
[Dion Letter]. 
915 Supra, note 893. 
916 Dion Letter, supra note 914 at 5. 
917 Dion 8 Feb 2018 ETHI, supra note 891 at 3. 
918 AR 2018-19 Code supra note 870 at 9. 
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By asking for more power to recommend and punish, the commissioner has again 
signaled to Parliament that he believes he does not have the proper tools at his disposal. 
Because he believes that the regimes need desperately to be strengthened, Commissioner 
Dion has made it clear that he intends to continue to be aggressive with using the limited 
tools that he does have. In my opinion, greater tools of enforcement would also require more 
dense legal protections and possibly cause bureaucratic and other delays that could in fact 
serve to lessen the office’s effectiveness and ability to respond quickly to complaints. 
 
(c) Outreach and Education 
The Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner has no express mandate to 
proactively audit compliance with the Act or the Code.919 As such, one of the office’s big 
challenges is that it relies on stakeholders to reach out for advice when needed. This puts the 
burden on individual public office holders to recognize when a problematic situation has 
arisen. A big part of the commissioner’s mandate is accordingly to make sure that 
stakeholders trust the office and know when and how to reach out and ask questions. One of 
the ways that the office has been tackling this challenge is by the creation and continued 
improvement of its outreach and education work.  
 
Commissioner Dion noted in a speech at York University’s McLaughlin College that 
three-quarters of Commissioner Dawson’s investigation reports started from information 
                                               
919 Interestingly, some of the most famous ethics violations in Canadian history have been 
in relation to incomplete or false declarations. Democracy Watch has called for the 
Commissioner to have the power to audit declarations and private disclosures.  
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that came to her attention from a member of the public.920  He has accordingly identified 
education and outreach as one of his three key priority areas.921 In his opinion, more outreach 
and education would help to refine public engagement.  
 
It is also uncontroversial that communication, education and outreach can help 
prevent conflicts of interest from arising in the first place. With this in mind, Commissioner 
Dion has decided to take the bold step of publicly declaring that he will conduct education 
and outreach in relation to both the Act and the Code.  
…section 32 of the Code requires the Commissioner to undertake educational 
activities for Members and the general public regarding the Code and the role of 
the Commissioner. There is no similar requirement in the Act, but my Office 
conducts education and outreach on both regimes.922 
 
This is an incredibly powerful and bold statement by the commissioner. He is explicitly 
acknowledging that his jurisdiction is limited, but that he is going to proceed with public 
education work in relation to the Act regardless. He has also chosen to proceed by leveraging 
technology, including social media platforms that are open to the public and, despite his 
assertion that Twitter allows him to communicate directly with Members and public office 
holders,923 are very clearly not directed exclusively at Members and public office holders. 
                                               
920 Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “The Federal 
Approach to Ethics from an Evolutive Perspective: Key Milestones, Past and Future” 
(Annual Public Policy Lecture, McLaughlin College, York University, Toronto, ON, 29 
November 2018), check page #), online: <https://ciec-
ccie.parl.gc.ca/en/publications/Documents/Presentations/York%20University%20Nov%2
02018%20EN.pdf> (Commissioner Mario Dion) (remarks were made during lecture, but 
are not from script) [Dion at McLaughlin]. 
921 Supra, note 912 at 2. 
922 Dion at McLaughlin, supra note 920 at 9. 
923 Canada, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “Opening 
Statement before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Access to Information, 
Privacy and Ethics” (Ottawa: 16 May 2019), online: <https://ciec-
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In his 2018-2019 annual report under the Act, Dion explains rather tongue-in-cheek that his 
office has “…used Twitter to communicate directly with Members. For example, we tweeted 
reminders about deadlines for disclosing to our office any outstanding sponsored trips in 
preparation for the annual publication of the list of sponsored travel.”924 In fact, Tweeting is 
not a form of direct communication with a Member or public office holder. Absent tagging 
a person, mentioning them in a tweet or sending a direct message to their inbox, tweeting is 
merely a modern form of broad communication that is akin to using a public billboard 
because you expect a particular individual will drive by that billboard on a regular basis.   
 
The commissioner explains his decision to use these newer technologies by pointing 
to a brief survey that Commissioner Dawson sent to members of the House of Commons in 
October 2017 in order to gauge their satisfaction with the outreach and education tools 
produced by the office and to identify possible areas for improvement.925 This survey applied 
only to matters under the Code and not to the Act, which is why it was only referenced in the 
2017-2018 annual report filed under the Code. 926  Based on the survey findings, the 
commissioner notes that the office “will develop webinars, online videos and other products 
using new media in order to inform and educate Members about their obligations under the 
                                               
ccie.parl.gc.ca/en/publications/Documents/Presentations/Opening%20Statement%20ETH
I%20May%2016,%202019%20EN.pdf> at 2 (similar language is also in AR 2018-19 
Code supra note 870 at 10). 
924 See also AR 2017-18 Code, supra note 895 at 8; AR 2017-18 Act, supra note 722 at 11  
(the Commissioner writes in both reports: “We will leverage modern technology to 
implement education and outreach initiatives. With a greater presence on Twitter, we 
have already begun making more use of the possibilities this information-sharing 
platform has to offer.”). 
925 AR 2017-18 Code, supra note 895 at 20; AR 2017-18 Act, supra note 722 at 24. 
926 AR 2017-18 Code, supra note 895 at 20. 
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Code.” 927  This exact same language to announce the decision to develop new 
communication tools is found in the annual report under the Act, with no corresponding 
reference to survey results upon which that decision was based. This missing reference is of 
course because the survey was only about the Code and likely provides no clear justification 
for conducting public outreach under the Act. 
 
What we are therefore seeing under the leadership of Commissioner Dion is that he 
is moving to harmonize the administration of the Code and the Act in rather subtle ways. He 
is not holding his breath and waiting for amendments, but is instead quietly administering 
the Act in a way that helps to modernize it. These decisions also have a clear impact on how 
much information is made available directly to the public and this should in theory contribute 
to the public education goal that Commissioner Dion set for himself when taking office. For 
example, the office uses Twitter to post information that might otherwise have only been 
made available to a particular individual and then buried deep on the office’s website. The 
COIEC issues media advisories, news releases about the office’s work, including 
notifications about the release of public reports, and even tweets about administrative 
monetary penalties and compliance orders.928  The office retweets items that are of interest 
to itself and to the broader ethics community, including reports from other ethics 
commissioners and international organizations.929 This is more than mere outreach to the 
“general public regarding this Code and the role of the Commissioner,” as is required by 
section 32 of the Code. 
                                               
927 Ibid. 
928 Ibid at 13-14. 
929 Ibid at 16. 
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Most interesting however, is that Commissioner Dion is still very much aware of the 
fact that he has no express mandate under the Act to engage in these activities. Although the 
Act does not directly prohibit these actions, it mirrors the Code in many ways and there is no 
reason that Parliament would not include the public education mandate if it intended it to be 
included among the commissioner’s responsibilities. Regardless, Commissioner Dion wrote 
about the office’s new YouTube channel in the 2018-2019 annual report that was filed under 
the Act930 and not the report that was filed under the Code. The ‘Ethics Canada’ YouTube 
channel will host videos the office produces that are specifically focused on how the rules 
are applied. This is not a private YouTube channel however, which indicates that its purpose 
is also to help educate the public. This decision to create another open public account with 
which to share information is a clear reflection of the fact that Commissioner Dion wishes 
to assert his independence and is likely very much aware that parliamentary privilege and 
the public’s expectation that he behaves independently afford him some protection if he 
wants to blend or co-mingle his duties under the Act and Code. This is a very clear example 
of a parliamentary institution publicly acknowledging that it does not have a clear mandate 
to do something but then deciding to do it anyway.  
 
The real overall benefit that comes from increasing public disclosure and education 
about the commissioner’s work is that it should give rise to more opportunities for public 
debate about the future of these regimes. As Andrew Stark explained in 2009 “… informal 
norms imposed though media and public debate will always assume a critical role. This 
                                               
930 AR 2018-19 Act, supra note 903 at 10. 
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means that beyond rules, public discourse will have to become a key part of Canada’s 
conflict-of-interest regime.”931 Commissioner Dion echoed this sentiment in his speech at 
York University when he acknowledged the challenge of making sure that his interpretation 
of the Act and Code is modern and reflective of the evolution of thinking on these subjects. 
The office received 3,073 communications from the public and media in 2017-2018, which 
represented a 29% increase compared to the previous year.932 Making better educational 
resources publicly available should also be a way to help reduce the amount of time that 
office staff spend tending to public questions that do not in fact relate to the two regimes. 
 
Finally, it should come as no surprise to anyone when Commissioner Dion follows 
in Commissioner Dawson’s footsteps and issues joint investigation reports or prepares joint 
annual reports and submits the same document to the Speakers of both houses of Parliament. 
Much of the text in the office’s 2018-2019 annual reports is the exact same, including the 
statistics that are reported about the office’s advisory work and public inquiries. The two 
reports are mostly identical, with small changes as are necessary. Preparing them as one 
document is the next logical cost and time saving move for this office, especially given how 
little interest has been taken in the implications of Commissioner Dawson’s 2010 decision 
to combine investigation reports. Such a move could help incentivize parliamentarians 
reading the report, but would also help signal to Parliament that it will slowly lose control 
over the Act if it does not move soon to properly harmonize or fully separate it from the Code 
so that the commissioner’s Act-related work can still be subject to judicial review. 
                                               
931 Stark COI, supra note 462 at 149.  
932 AR 2017-2018 Code, supra note 895 at 8; see AR 2017-18 Act, supra note 722 at 11. 
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(d) Relationship with the Media 
As detailed above, both the office’s commissioners have recognized that the media 
plays an important role in helping them to fulfil their mandates. Commissioner Dion vowed 
early in his mandate to leverage the media so that he could inform the public about his role 
and activities.933 The statistics related to his efforts in this regard seem to bear out that he 
has been doing exactly that. Commissioner Dawson’s office received and responded to 315 
media inquiries in 2016-2017 (more than double the number in the previous year), the Office 
was mentioned 426 times in the media and she participated directly in four media 
interviews.934 After Commissioner Dion’s first full year in the role, the office was referenced 
in 33% of question periods in the House of Commons, mentioned 7,345 times on Twitter 
and 491 times in the media.935 The commissioner also participated directly in 14 interviews 
with journalists throughout 2018-2019.936 
 
 
Both of the office’s commissioners have emphasized public awareness and education 
in their work and established service standards in relation to how they handle inquiries from 
the public and from the media. In 2016-2017, the first year for which Commissioner Dawson 
collected data, the office “exceeded its target and met its service standards in 83% of cases 
for media requests and 81% of cases for public inquiries.”937  This demonstrates how much 
                                               
933 Supra, note 912 at 3; See also AR 2018-19 Act, supra note 903 at 19 (where 
Commissioner Dion writes: “…we will be as forthcoming with Parliament, the media and 
the public as we are permitted to be under the Act.”).  
934 AR 2016-17 Act, supra note 885 at 40. 
935 AR 2018-19 Code, supra note 870 at 14. 
936 Ibid. 
937 AR 2016-17 Act, supra note 885 at 39. 
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of a priority the media and public engagement have become. As she wrote in her 2016-2017 
annual report under the Act:  
My approach is for the Office to be as forthcoming with information for the 
media as is permitted under the Act and the Members’ Code. My Office regularly 
issues news releases, media statements and backgrounders. In the past fiscal 
year, we have taken a more proactive approach when inaccurate information 
about my Office’s administration of the Act and the Members’ Code appears in 
the media.938  
 
Commissioner Dion has taken this one step further and has noted that he even sees Twitter 
as a way to inform and communicate indirectly with the media: 
Cognizant of the important role that the media plays in promoting awareness of 
the mandate and activities of our Office, I have undertaken to ensure we provide 
them with as much information as the regimes that I administer allow. . We issue 
media advisories and news releases about our work, such as the issuance of 
public reports, and publicize other information, such as the imposition of 
administrative monetary penalties and compliance orders via Twitter.939  
 
At this point it is very clear that the office is investing some of its time and money into 
communicating more regularly and robustly with the traditional media, not simply with 
members and public office holders. The office is now being very proactive and intentional, 
rather than reactive, when creating resources for public consumption. If a standing 
committee were in fact to read the annual reports and think critically about what was 
happening, it is possible that they would want to know why the commissioner is worrying 
so much about public awareness and trust rather than simply administering the regimes as 
they have been delegated? Whose responsibility is it to ensure that the Act and Code work 
towards the challenging goal of improving public trust when they are properly administered? 
Parliamentarians may in fact feel that the commissioner has taken some liberties and 
                                               
938 Ibid at 40. 
939 Ibid at 16. 
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operationalized the office’s independence in a way that was not intended when the office 
was created. 
 
The 2018-2019 annual reports also marked the first time in the office’s history that 
the commissioner has explicitly listed academics, ethics practitioners, the media and the 
general public as being stakeholders of the office and its work.940 This was a subtle re-
framing of how Commissioner Dawson had previously recognized the importance of these 
stakeholders, which was as another activity statistic that reflected growing public awareness 
of the office’s work.941 Characterizing these groups as actual stakeholders in the annual 
report is a new idea brought forth by Commissioner Dion.942 This move suggests that he is 
thinking strategically about the fact that these reports may never be properly reviewed by a 
parliamentary committee and that the committees will accordingly never have occasion to 
take issue with his re-characterization of who his stakeholders are. A statement like this one 
could very easily help to steer the future direction of the office and its work.  Nearly 
everything that Commissioner Dion has done since his appointment appears to be aimed at 
emphasizing the office’s independence from government and its role in improving 
transparency and public engagement. This re-framing of who the office’s stakeholders are 
also signals that perhaps the commissioner sees his role as being less accountable to 
                                               
940 AR 2018-19 Code, supra note 870 at 3; AR 2018-19 Act, supra note 903 at 3. 
941 See e.g. AR 2015-16 Code, supra note 877 at 38; Canada, Office of the Conflict of 
Interest and Ethics Commissioner, “The 2015-2016 Annual Report in respect of the 
Conflict of Interest Act” (Ottawa: 9 June 2016) at 26-27. 
942 See AR 2017-18 Act, supra note 722 at 5 (Commissioner Dion did not include the 
heading “Stakeholders” in his 2017-18 annual report under the Code (see AR 2017-18 
Code, supra note 895)). 
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Parliament now and more accountable to the general public. The implications of this move 
are important to unpack. 
 
 
8.4 Strategically Asserting Greater Independence  
 
Commissioner Dion has continued his predecessor’s efforts towards establishing 
greater operational independence in the face of formal accountability structures whose 
productivity has stalled. He has clearly expressed his governance philosophy as one that 
foremost emphasizes the importance of independence: 
Effective institutions are independent, impartial oversight bodies that administer 
the rules. For example, my status as an Officer of the House of Commons means 
I am solely responsible to Parliament and not to the federal government or an 
individual minister.943 
 
It is also clear at this point in the office’s evolution that its responsibility to Parliament is a 
formality that has been mostly unproductive and ineffective. Having both been appointed 
and/or re-appointed in what are now widely criticized as deficient processes where the 
executive council plays a disproportionate role, the office’s two commissioners have come 
to be more reflective about what it means for them to appear to be independent. Instead of 
being tied to their formal reporting relationships in a way that causes them to become 
exasperated while patiently repeating the same recommendations over and over whenever 
they are invited to do so, both commissioners have sought new ways to relay their message 
and to do their work. Their advice and investigations continue to be well supported and to 
meet the overall goals of the regime, which has allowed them to take risks that have not yet 
piqued the curiosity of the committees to which they have reported. 
                                               
943 Dion at McLaughlin, supra note 920 at 7. 
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By investing resources in advancing a public engagement agenda and by continuing 
to speak publicly about what the future of parliamentary ethics regimes might look like (even 
when not being asked for an opinion), Commissioner Dion is now working to establish and 
nurture a new accountability relationship that may prove to be more productive than that 
which was formally in place. The least objectionable way to do this is arguably by 
reinforcing values that underpin the Code and the Act, especially those of transparency and 
public trust or confidence. Dion accordingly does this very thing in his speeches and reports.   
 
As Michael Atkinson and Gerald Bierling wrote in 2005, around the time when the 
current regimes were being implemented, “[l]aws against public sector corruption…will 
remain dormant and ineffective unless ordinary citizens become engaged and alert enough 
to pressure public officials into disciplining each other, something they are unlikely to do of 
their own sweet will, whatever the written law.”944 Commissioner Dion’s outreach is one 
way to help empower ordinary citizens to become more engaged. 
 
8.5 Re-Framing Accountability in the Public’s Interest 
 
Although he has only been in office for a relatively short period of time, 
Commissioner Dion has made a point of been very clear about how important he thinks 
transparency is and why: 
                                               
944 Atkinson & Bierling, supra note 484 at 1025. 
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In my opinion, transparency remains the main tool that our Office has at its 
disposal to increase public confidence and trust in Members and in the House 
of Commons, in support of one of the Code’s purposes...945 
 
He notes that the purpose of the regimes he administers is “…to support and enhance public 
confidence and trust in the integrity of those holding public office in Canada”946 and in his 
2018-2019 annual reports suggest that maintaining and enhancing public trust is one of the 
challenges that he himself must also meet as commissioner. 947  He has accordingly 
committed to making the office’s work as transparent as possible948 and has been vocal about 
the fact that section 51(1)(e) of the Act gives him very broad discretion to add any document 
he deems appropriate to the public registry.949 
 
Increased transparency can support better public trust because it can help to 
facilitate more active engagement and citizen oversight, which Dion has also said he 
believes will play a big role in the future of his work: 
Citizen oversight is another area where we might see some major changes in the 
next 50 years. I envision much better and easier access for the public at large to 
share information and concerns about possible conflicts of interest. Currently, 
anyone who has a concern can contact my Office by email, telephone or post, 
but perhaps one day there will be an app that would make such disclosures easier 
and more accessible.950 
 
                                               
945 AR 2018-19 Code supra note 870 at 19; AR 2018-19 Act, supra note 903 at 22 (this 
notable because the Code is not legislation and these are principle statements. There is no 
indication that they are supposed to guide the Commissioner’s work in any way. It is 
simply a statement of expectations. Dion seems to have taken this to mean that he is 
supposed to rely on these to support his work in order to do what he has to do to help 
members meet those expectations).  
946 Dion at McLaughlin, supra note 920 at 6. 
947 AR 2018-19 Code supra note 870 at 19 (this is included in the Annual Reports). 
948 AR 2018-19 Act, supra note 903 at 18. 
949 Dion at McLaughlin, supra note 920 at 8. 
950 Ibid at 11. 
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Coupled with the work he has already undertaken in administering the regimes, this 
emphasis on increased transparency and public engagement strongly suggests that 
Commissioner Dion is happy to move the goal posts as they relate to which accountability 
relationships will take precedence for him moving forward. As Lewis et al have recently 
argued though, “[c]alls to address the democratic deficit through increasing participation of 
citizens in governing have added to the confused picture of who it is that public sector 
organizations are actually accountable to.”951  Calls for greater citizen participation can 
therefore add to the complications of holding governments to account.952  From Dion’s 
perspective however, progress with public sector ethics regimes is often preceded by 
scandal953 and parliamentarians have made it very clear to both of the office’s commissioners 
that the only way to get their attention as parliamentarians is by reminding them that they 
are accountable to the voting public. 
 
 
8.6 Implications for Responsible Government 
 
The ideal goal of responsible government is to ensure that the government is 
continuously held accountable for its actions. As covered above in chapter two, this 
accountability consists of both individual ministerial responsibility and collective 
responsibility. The principle of collective responsibility dictates that Cabinet is responsible 
to the monarch, to itself, and to elected parliamentarians for its actions. There is accordingly 
an accountability to Parliament that is crucial for good governance. Some aspects of 
                                               
951 Jenny M Lewis, Janine O’Flynn & Helen Sullivan, “Accountability: To Whom, in 
Relation to What, and Why?” 73:4 Aust J of Pub Admin 401 at 404. 
952 Ibid at 401. 
953 Dion at McLaughlin, supra note 920 at 3 (This opinion reflects work done by Greene 
and Shugarman, see Honest Politics, supra note 459). 
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Parliament’s duties to hold government to account have of course been delegated to agents 
and officers.  
 
The Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner is delegated a role that is premised 
on the idea of holding members and other public officials to account for their ethical conduct. 
The commissioner does not evaluate government policy in any broad sense, only the actions 
of individual members. The right to govern the conduct of members is properly a privilege 
that the House of Commons possesses as a collective, which is why it has been delegated to 
the commissioner along with the privileges and immunities that the House of Commons 
would otherwise have if it were to refrain from delegating that responsibility. Things became 
complicated when Parliament also had the unprecedented idea of assigning a non-
parliamentary role to this individual who was already delegated the House of Commons’ 
privileges and immunities. The commissioner they had created would then be required to 
report to two masters (i.e. the House of Commons under the Code and both the House and 
Senate under the Act). This has led to incredible frustration for commissioners who are 
expected to play the role of both an independent officer of the House of Commons and what 
amounts to an agent of Parliament more broadly. The impossible task of balancing these two 
roles that Parliament refuses to harmonize or restructure has led to tensions in the traditional 
accountability relationships and we have very clearly seen two Conflict of Interest and Ethics 
Commissioners who have been continuously trying to make sense of the purpose and value 
of their roles. We also see a Parliament that is responsible for oversight, but that could 
arguably take a much more active approach to the task.  
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(a) Watching and Controlling  
As the commissioner has progressively put less trust in the traditional accountability 
relationships and begun to tie the office’s legitimacy more closely to its public interest role, 
we are seeing some of the implications of Parliament having delegated this oversight duty 
in an ad hoc manner. While trying to enhance its capacity for oversight over the conduct of 
its own members, the House of Commons has delegated to a body that has been given limited 
autonomy and is not being paid attention to by the committees to which it reports. This takes 
away from Parliament’s ability to fulfil its responsibility to watch and control government.  
This may in fact have seriously negative implications for the way that Parliament works. The 
Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner can only be an effective oversight body 
responsible for governing the conduct of members if the House is attentive to its work. If it 
is not attentive, then the COIEC will look more like a fourth branch of government, as Paul 
Thomas has argued.954  
 
The office’s commissioners have asked countless times for improvements to be 
made to both the Act and the Code. Academia, the media and the public have all become 
highly critical of both the regimes and of the commissioner’s work. Furthermore, a sitting 
Prime Minister was found to have contravened the ethics rules for the first, second and 
third times in Canadian history and has suffered no clear consequences outside of having 
to be subjected to unpleasant media scrums where he is asked to apologize. The public calls 
‘government ethics’ an oxymoron and has serious doubts about whether the COIEC’s 
office has the power to do anything. The relative powerlessness of the commissioner in the 
                                               
954 Thomas PSIC, supra note 204 at 6. 
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face of the relative uselessness of the committee system accordingly creates a gap for civil 
society groups like Democracy Watch to be able to control the government ethics narrative 
that emerges through the media. This group aggressively criticizes the COIEC, which in 
turn causes the public to distrust the historically shy-to-speak-out institution and serves to 
shield members of the House of Commons from criticism in relation to how poorly they 
are actually overseeing their own ethical conduct.  
 
In all this, the commissioner becomes more frustrated (after all, they cannot simply 
quit the position without risking their reputation) and starts to look for other ways to be 
heard. Until relatively recently, the commissioner did not feel comfortable fully engaging 
with the real or social media either, which left both of those spaces without sympathetic 
voices to help explain how the regimes work. If the public knew what the commissioner 
was actually responsible for, then it is more likely that government would bear more of the 
criticism for its laissez-faire approach to ethics regulation.  
 
Canada’s parliamentary ethics regime has many challenges to overcome. 
Parliament’s low interest in overseeing and reforming the regime has led the 
commissioners to adopt a more strict and aggressive approach to how they administer their 
mandates. Their goal appears to be to generate greater public engagement in order to inspire 
the public to pressure Parliament for reform. This is a promising approach given that each 
previous overhaul of the public sector ethics regimes have been a direct result of public 
interest and pressure during a general election. Coupled with the Liberal party’s ethics 
challenges throughout their time in office, history suggests that public education and 
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outreach may be the most promising approach for a commissioner to take. That being said, 
all the energy being expended on public engagement to try to convince parliamentarians to 
improve these regimes takes away from the office’s ability to operationalize the idea of 
responsible government the way it is technically supposed to be operationalized – by 
accounting to Parliament.   
 
(b) An Erosion of Power? 
As the commissioner (not so) subtly expands the office’s mandates without the 
express jurisdiction to do so, we are seeing a very clear erosion of Parliament’s power. The 
commissioner’s work is no longer a direct reflection of the mandates assigned under the 
Parliament of Canada Act, but instead looks more like an experiment in institutional design. 
Can you create a new officer who is only accountable to the House of Commons, give that 
person the privileges and rights that properly belong to the House of Commons and then also 
assign a legislative mandate for which no privileges and immunities attach and for which 
they must report back to Parliament as a whole? The answer is clearly yes, but you may also 
want to check in with that individual to understand how that experimental design is working 
out. 
 
The office’s two commissioners have identified their role as being that of an officer of 
the House of Commons and have chosen not to acknowledge the internal inconsistency of 
choosing this one identity given that it does not reflect the reality of also having a legislative 
mandate under the Act for which the commissioner’s work can be subject to judicial review. 
The role that offers the most operational independence is the one that has been chosen as a 
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label, despite the fact that this label lacks the nuance needed to properly capture the 
complexity of the combined role: 
Unlike any of the other agents, my Office is considered an entity of Parliament 
and is part of the Parliamentary Precinct….my Office is covered by 
parliamentary privilege when I carry out duties and functions related to the 
Members’ Code. This is not the case for other agents of Parliament.955 
 
The creation of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner looks more like an absolute 
delegation of power by the House of Commons than the other agents do. This may be why 
Parliament has not given the COIEC more powers as requested, because it realizes that it has 
already given up too much power and that it will be hard to pare back (particularly in a 
minority Parliament if parties cannot come to a clear agreement) because of the 
commissioner’s growing public profile.956 It is also becoming increasingly more difficult for 
parliamentarians to hold the commissioner to account, not only because it is politically risky 
to imply that the regimes are too strict or that they are being too strictly enforced, but because 
it can also come across as silencing the commissioner if changes are made that do not give 
the commissioner more authority.   
 
Having parliamentary privilege makes the Conflict of Interest and Ethics 
Commissioner unique among the parliamentary oversight bodies with which it has been 
grouped. The duties of someone who might otherwise be an agent of Parliament have been 
delegated to an Officer with privilege. The individuals who have held this role with this 
privilege have very publicly attempted to simplify the administration of the two mandates 
                                               
955 Dawson Relationship, supra note 168. 
956 See e.g. Bergman & Macfarlane, supra note 91 (for a discussion of the CIEC’s 
growing public profile). 
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by combining or streamlining them where possible. One example of this unifying approach 
can be found in the investigation reports that cover allegations made under both the Act and 
the Code.  Combining the work being done under the two mandates will make it impossible 
for the Federal Court of Appeal to be able to judicially review an examination conducted 
under the Act because it will necessarily be inseparable from the inquiry and report that was 
conducted under the Code, for which the commissioner can assert parliamentary privilege. 
Although none of the three combined reports have been the subject of an application for 
judicial review to date, that this possibility exists clearly represents an erosion of 
Parliament’s power to hold the commissioner to account. 
 
(c) Both Drifting and Creeping 
Building from our analysis in chapter three, we can see now that the Conflict of 
Interest and Ethics Commissioner’s office has been slowly moving away (i.e. drifting) from 
doing what the office was originally designed to do in the way that it was expected to do it. 
We can also see that it has been slowly and discretely moving into (i.e. creeping) 
jurisdictional territory that was not originally assigned to it by Parliament. Whether and why 
this might matter are important questions worth considering.  
 
It is unquestionable that the office has been fundamentally reliable at administering 
its mandates. While there have been many critics of some of the commissioners’ decisions, 
there has been very little controversy about the office itself, relatively speaking. What we 
have seen however, is that the office has found ways to accomplish its goals by leveraging 
tools it was not and has not been given by Parliament (e.g. it has no jurisdiction to undertake 
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public outreach about the Act and its administration). It also seems to be creatively 
leveraging the tools it has been given, but in ways that Parliament likely did not contemplate 
they would be used. For example, section 51 of the Act allows the commissioner absolute 
discretion about what documents should be made public. This section has accordingly been 
relied upon to justify tweeting out notices about section 30 compliance orders that have been 
issued. The Act does not in fact require the publication of these compliance notices.  
 
This mandate drift appears to have happened mostly in response to the 
commissioners’ frustrations with the parliamentary committee system. Informing the public 
about matters has taken the place of appearing before committee to discuss the office’s work. 
Getting the public’s attention so that it can see what is wrong with the regimes and 
understand the commissioner’s challenges has become the only way to communicate with 
Parliament. If political ethics can become an issue of public anxiety again, then maybe it will 
return to the policy agenda. Commentators like Paul Thomas have certainly raised concerns 
about the idea that some agents tend to push too regularly for the expansion of their 
mandates,957 but this is clearly a case where the mandates have become so stale that they are 
insufficient to meet their own stated goals. 
 
Parliament’s power to keep the commissioner in check has been further eroded by 
the COIEC’s unusual institutional design. Commissioners can assert much more 
independence than seems to have been originally contemplated and this is also allowing them 
to intentionally drift into new territory in order to perform their duties effectively. As Evert 
                                               
957 Thomas PPF, supra note 50 at 1. 
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Lindquist and Irene Huse have explained, “…developing transparency regimes in the digital 
era requires balancing competing values, with the significant tensions among efficiency, 
equity, and democratic accountability.”958 The Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner 
is an excellent example of this re-balancing in action, with democratic accountability being 
where the real challenge lies.  
 
Ian Greene has noted that one of the criticisms that can be leveled at ethics 
commissioners is that they can push too hard and be accused of empire-building.959 The 
COIEC’s jurisdictional creep is a good example of this. In their ongoing efforts to make 
themselves seen and heard by Parliament, the office’s commissioners have been trying to 
become players in the policy process. Gwyneth Bergman and Emmett Macfarlane argued in 
a 2018 article that “[t]he absence of significant media attention and the attendant public 
pressure suggests that the COIEC’s ability to effect policy change is limited to the efficacy 
of her reports and recommendations in convincing parliamentarians or the government to 
act”960, but my analysis suggest that this may be changing quickly under Commissioner 
Dion’s leadership. By posting media releases with reports and recommendations, by 
foregrounding academia, the public and the media as among the office’s primary 
stakeholders and by relentlessly reminding anyone who will listen that the commissioners 
have shared and submitted nearly one hundred recommendations for how to improve the two 
                                               
958 Lindquist & Huse, supra note 778 at 633. 
959 Greene Future, supra note 486 at 169. 
960 Bergman & Macfarlane, supra note 91 at 17. 
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regimes, both commissioners have done more than simply performing the “duties and 
functions they have been assigned.”961  
 
But does any of this matter? If Parliament does not want to do the work of overseeing 
the ethical conduct of its own members, then does it really create a problem if they have 
delegated that privilege to a parliamentary body and chosen to allow it to roam free? Jack 
Stilborn argues that it can be practically difficult for Parliament to hold its agents and officers 
to account and because of this “[t]the accountability of officers of Parliament to Parliament 
will likely continue to be less robust than their independence.”962 This certainly seems to be 
what is happening with the COIEC. If this is simply the new reality however, then the drifting 
and creeping we have noted may not be a real problem. Instead, the problem may be that our 
theories of responsible government need to be re-conceptualized in order to properly account 
for this new reality.963 
 
8.7 The Puzzle of Legitimacy  
 
In my view, the puzzle of the COIEC’s constitutional legitimacy stems from the fact 
that it has been given two distinct mandates that do not seem to work well together as they 
have been designed. If the commissioner was only responsible for the Act and had no duties 
under the Code, then the position would be akin to the other agents of parliament, as I have 
described them above in chapter two. In other words, the commissioner would be categorized 
                                               
961 See PC Act, supra note 15, ss 85-87. 
962 Stilborn Watchdogs, supra note 230 at 252. 
963 John Reid, “Accountability as a Pillar of Democratic Governing” (2008) 1 JPPL 419 
at 420. 
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among the new and emerging institutions that not only support Parliament but that also serve 
Canadians.964 The commissioner’s mandate under the Code however, means that he or she 
is also an officer of Parliament (more precisely, of the House of Commons because the rest 
of Parliament played no role in establishing and assigning this mandate), a term that I have 
reserved for those positions that are purely parliamentary in their focus.965 This means then 
that the COIEC is an institution that is independent of Parliament in its focus (like an officer), 
but that is also expected to serve Canadians in the way that an agent is.  
 
If it were purely an officer, the COIEC would be responsible for assisting the House 
of Commons with operationalizing its parliamentary privileges and rights in relation to 
governing the conduct of members. The COIEC would be assigned some subset of types of 
conduct to watch over and it would report back to the House as instructed. The House would 
make all relevant decisions unless they had delegated them to the commissioner, but even 
then MPs would not be obligated to accept the commissioner’s decisions (e.g. administrative 
monetary penalties) if the House disagreed with them – which could very easily happen in 
the context of a majority government. Privilege would also be easily preserved if groups like 
Democracy Watch brought applications for judicial review, much like it is for other officers 
of parliament and other ethics commissioners throughout the country who do not report to 
bi-cameral legislatures.  
 
                                               
964 Barnes & Hurtubise-Loranger, supra note 171 at 1. 
965 PP&F, supra note 45 at 307. 
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We want to be able to think of the commissioner as being either an officer or an agent 
because those are the only two categories we have available to us, but doing this leads us 
directly into an analytic roadblock. In fact, the commissioner is both. This complicates 
matters unnecessarily and prevents us from being able to rely on any of the other officers or 
agents as a precedent. If we accept that the commissioner is only an office of the House of 
Commons, then we must accept that work undertaken under the Act can and should be 
protected by parliamentary privilege. This was clearly not Parliament’s intent. 
 
In my opinion, the commissioner’s constitutional legitimacy should not be in 
question despite this confusion about categorization. Parliament has the right to use 
legislation to create bodies that help it to oversee the administration of the public service, 
including the conduct of public office holders, and the House of Commons has the right to 
delegate the administration of its own privileges and rights. The only puzzle here is 
understanding why the drafters of the legislation would proceed with such an imprecise, if 
not also poor, institutional design. Given the fact that the Federal Accountability Act was 
what emerged from Stephen Harper’s electoral campaign promises, these regimes may have 
simply been a product of the pressure to make good on a promise. The governing 
Conservatives may have been more concerned with the appearance of decisive action rather 
than with taking the time to do what was necessary to meticulously think through the design 
of their new regime. 
 
Because the formal accountability mechanisms (i.e. the committee system) have 
moved both the office’s commissioners to a point of frustration in administering their 
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mandates, the office’s relationship with Parliament has been strained and the delegated 
jurisdiction has been flouted. The office’s constitutional legitimacy is arguably unchanged, 
but the commissioners appear to be framing the role as having an authority to act outside of 
the confines of its delegated authority by virtue of the authority it receives from its broader 
contributions to governance in the public interest. This could possibly be a natural response 
for an independent body that is confronted with challenges in its accountability 
relationships,966 but it could also give rise to critics challenging the office’s legitimacy to 
act. This challenge could come not because the COIEC has chosen to merge reports or 
engage the public (many officers and agents do that), but because it has chosen to do so 
while also expressly acknowledging that Parliament has not given it the jurisdiction to do so 
in the way that it is. 
 
8.8 Is Reform Necessary? 
 
Government agencies must evolve over time in response to new circumstances, a fact 
that is no more obvious than it is in the world of parliamentary ethics and accountability 
oversight. The Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner must accordingly 
be re-designed so that it is either fully integrated into Parliament’s watching and controlling 
work like an Officer or so that it stands alone as an independent agent that has the power to 
administer its mandate(s) in a way that is similar to the other agents. Parliament places much 
                                               
966 See Carl Baar “Patterns and strategies of court administration in Canada and the 
United States” (1991) 20:2 Can Pub Admin 242 (for an analysis of the maintenance and 
enhancement needs of courts as organizations. The COIEC is similar to courts in terms of 
independence and it has reacted in a manner that is a typical reaction for organizations 
that require independence). 
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more emphasis on its law-making role than on its accountability functions,967 but it must find 
a way to actively oversee the conduct of its own members, especially if it chooses to delegate 
some of that administrative responsibility. Parliamentary ethics oversight is not simply about 
public trust in the institution, but is also about parliamentarians having a way to protect their 
personal reputations in the face of damaging allegations.   
 
If it continues as it has however, Parliament will soon lose control over how its ethics 
laws evolve. The simple fact that Commissioner Dawson issued a report in 2010 that 
combined the investigations conducted under both the Act and the Code should have sent a 
signal to parliamentarians that they needed to pay closer attention to how that institution was 
evolving in its approach to administering its mandates. It chose not to however, and it is clear 
now that this office has been designed in a way that gives the commissioner freedom to 
operate with a level of independence that was not contemplated when the two regimes were 
first united under one roof. Parliament should want to design institutions like this one with 
more intention, which they can certainly still do. 
 
Perhaps the most important thing Parliament should have learned from this 
experimental institutional design is that parliamentary privilege acts as a very effective 
shield from judicial oversight. It is accordingly important that the Code and the Act not be 
administered by the same individual unless there is clarity with respect to the ways in which 
they can be combined and the ways in which them must be kept separate. There must also 
be strong mandatory parliamentary oversight, especially through the committee system. 
                                               
967 PP&F, supra note 45 at 290. 
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There is no real evidence yet to suggest that the office’s digitization or public 
engagement efforts have helped it to administer the Act or Code more effectively. It seems 
instead that the commissioners might simply be searching for greater engagement with the 
office’s work. Given how little interest is shown by Parliament despite how essential this 
office is for enhancing the public’s trust in government and protecting their own reputations, 
it makes sense that the commissioners would search externally for reflective engagement 
and to help highlight the office’s import role. Any restructuring of these regimes must 
account for the importance of this type of public engagement and education. It is not good 
enough for the Code to require the commissioner to undertake educational activities directed 
towards the public while the Act does not.   
 
This critical overhaul must absolutely be undertaken in a non-partisan manner while 
engaging the public and being transparent about the reasons for the overhaul. New ethics 
regulations do not magically make people ethical, but restructuring the regime so that the 
committee system must exercise mandatory and meaningful oversight968 can help to nudge 
parliamentary culture in the right direction. Committees must be obligated to consider every 
significant report tabled by the COIEC and to conclude their reviews by filing some sort of 
opinion(s) about those reports with the appropriate house(s) of Parliament. This requirement 
will ensure that the work of the commissioner becomes Parliament’s responsibility and that 
it cannot simply be ignored as has generally been the case to date. The COIEC would then 
                                               
968 See supra note 36 at 552 (The Lambert Commission Report says that “…the key to 
more effective scrutiny lies in the committee system”). 
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be able to legitimately respond to criticism by saying that it did its work and that Parliament 
is the proper forum for accountability on these matters. Without proper parliamentary 
oversight however, we will continue to see commissioners used by parliamentarians as a 
shield against criticism, even when the commissioner’s mandates are not engaged.  
 
In the interim however, and on the expectation that changes are not forthcoming, I 
believe that the commissioner ought to refrain from publishing joint reports under the Code 
and Act. The Trudeau II report is a good example of why restraint is preferable. In 
paragraph 226 of the report, Commissioner Dion concluded that Prime Minister Trudeau 
and Privy Council Clerk Michael Wernick met with Ms. Wilson-Raybould and emphasized 
that SNC-Lavalin’s corporate headquarters were located in a riding that was close to the 
one that Trudeau himself represented.969 According to Commissioner Dion, the Prime 
Minister drew attention to this fact to make it clear to Ms. Wilson-Raybould that her 
“decision not to intervene could have larger political repercussions in Quebec, both for the 
federal and provincial orders of government.”970 Despite the fact that there may be good 
reason to conduct an inquiry under the Code because Mr. Trudeau seemed to be seeking to 
advance his interests as an MP, Commissioner Dion did not conduct an inquiry under the 
Code. By not conducting a joint investigation, the Trudeau II report is now subject to 
judicial review. In fact, Prime Minister Trudeau has publicly stated that he disagrees with 
some of the commissioner’s findings,971 which suggests that a request for judicial review 
                                               
969 Trudeau II, supra note 10 at para 266. 
970 Ibid at 53. 
971 See e.g. The Canadian Press, “Trudeau Accepts, but disagrees with parts of the Ethics 
Commissioner’s report”, CityNews (14 August 2019), online: 
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could in fact be forthcoming. This is a good thing in my opinion, but not because I think 
there were mistakes in the report.972 
  
I take this position because allowing decisions under the Act to be judicially 
reviewed will bring more attention to them. The Act and the Code have many similarities. 
Allowing the Court of Appeal to interpret the Act could serve to help advance dialogue 
about those rules and improve our understanding of what the rules in both the Act and the 
Code ought to be. As noted above, the Act is unlikely to be amended with any regularity 
because of what seems to be a fear that Senate will take over the process and demand 
reforms that government does not want.  The Code is much more likely to be updated 
however, and public dialogue about a judicial review could increase the likelihood of 
Parliament undertaking such an exercise. I believe a strong argument can be made that you 
lose a potential opportunity to drive greater public engagement if you are unable to 
challenge a decision under the Act because it is in a joint report and is therefore shielded 
by the parliamentary privilege that was intended to only apply to matters under the Code. 
Reports under the Code and Act should always be in separate documents. 
 
It is also important to note again that a report under the Code must be debated by 
the House of Commons for no more than two hours. The Trudeau II report was completed 
under the Act only and is accordingly not subject to mandatory debate. Commissioner Dion 
                                               
<https://toronto.citynews.ca/2019/08/14/trudeau-accepts-but-disagrees-with-parts-of-
ethics-commissioners-report/>. 
972 I do not here wish to express any personal opinion whatsoever about the Trudeau II 
report.  
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could have chosen to publish two separate Trudeau II reports however, which would have 
ensured that one would be debated and the other could be subjected to judicial review. This 
simple act of publishing two separate reports increases the likelihood that there will be 
greater public engagement about the issues covered in the reports. 
 
 Absent a majority government surprisingly deciding to open the Act for amendment 
so that it can be modernized, the best chance for reform will come from either the Act being 
eliminated and replaced by a Code (which was the case before the Federal Accountability 
Act was passed), the Senate tabling a bill or the opposition parties in a minority government 
working together to pass a private members bill. Although I do not believe the first option 
is very likely, the 2019 federal general election did result in a minority government for the 
Liberals and this could inspire the opposition parties and/or the Senate to find a way to 
work together in order to pass amendments to the Act without needing government votes. 
 
8.9 Conclusion 
 
As Canada’s first Senate Ethics Officer Jean Fournier said about the Senate at that 
time: “[a]s the owners of the codes they have to demonstrate leadership by “fighting 
complacency.””973 The same can now be said about all of Parliament. It is accordingly 
through its resistance to Parliament’s complacency that we have been able to learn the most 
about what makes the COIEC different than agents of parliament. In Chapter eight, I 
demonstrated that the COIEC’s obvious frustration has compelled it to leverage its unique 
status as the only ‘agent’ to have been given parliamentary privilege in order to help it assert 
                                               
973 Fournier in Brisbane, supra note 822 at 13. 
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its operational independence in a manner that Parliament could not have intended. This 
reimagined approach to its independence has been complemented by Commissioner Dion 
expressly re-framing both the public and the media as among the office’s key stakeholders, 
while investing more resources into public outreach and education. These efforts appear to 
be an attempt not only to get Parliament’s attention, but also to subtly re-frame the COIEC 
as having authority to act outside of the confines of its delegated mandates by virtue of the 
legitimacy it receives from its broader contributions to governance in the public interest. 
Absent action by Parliament, the commissioner seems intent on leveraging this new 
philosophical approach to his office’s independence in order to enable it to expand and 
modernize its work. Recognizing this stronger assertion of autonomy gives us an opportunity 
to assess its implications and conclude that the office is no less legitimate as a result of its 
assertive choices. These are the tools it has been given by Parliament and it is using them 
with full transparency. It is up to Parliament to decide if reform is necessary or if this new 
status quo is acceptable.  
 #
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9.#Conclusion#
 
We live in an historical moment where the public’s scrutiny of government officials 
is unlike anything we have seen before. There is so much data available and there is so much 
access to information in real time, that Canada’s parliamentary ethics regime is garnering a 
tremendous amount of attention. This is also the first time in history that a sitting Prime 
Minister has been found in violation of the ethics rules, and he has done so on multiple 
occasions.974 It is undoubtedly a rather poignant time to take a deeper look at how this regime 
came to be, what it is, how it works and where it seems to be headed.  
 
Rules about ethics represent the political system’s current efforts to reconcile general 
principles with what its members understand society’s expectations to be in relation to the 
appropriate behavior of public officials.975 Thinking about this topic has evolved over time 
and the Canadian conflict of interest regime has clearly demonstrated a capacity to survive 
transition and to adapt itself to contemporary circumstances.976 Political parties do not wield 
power indefinitely, and what we should learn from Donald Trump’s time as President of the 
United States is that the appropriate time to protect your democracy against the risk of 
politicians using public office for personal gain is always now.  
 
This dissertation has offered a comprehensive study of Canada’s parliamentary ethics 
regime through an historical legal, political and institutional lens. The history of 
parliamentary ethics rules in Canada is one that begins with Prime Ministers implementing 
                                               
974 See supra, notes 8 & 9. 
975 Round Table, supra note 448 at 16. 
976 Bédard Background, supra note 480 at 8. 
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codes of conduct that apply to their cabinet ministers. Cabinet ministers are of course 
appointed to these positions by the Prime Minister, so it has been important for the Prime 
Minister to maintain control over the enforcement of these rules. Over time however, too 
many members of cabinet have found themselves in difficult ethical situations and the public 
has started to take notice. This has given rise to increasing public pressure on Prime Ministers 
to demonstrate that poor ethical decision-making from people who occupy the highest 
offices of government will be met with punishment. Prime Ministers have been reluctant to 
live up to this demand from the public however and so the public has instead come to insist 
that someone independent be put in charge of overseeing the rules of ethical conduct for 
parliamentarians. This eventually led to the appointment of Canada’s first Ethics 
Commissioner in May 2004.  
 
Commissioner Shapiro was responsible for administering two sets of ethics rules, 
one applying to members and one to public office holders. Both sets of rules were simply 
Codes, not laws, which ensured that the rules that applied to public office holders would 
remain under the control of the Prime Minister and the rules that applied to MPs would 
remain under the control of MPs as part of the Standing Orders of the House of Commons. 
Even though the commissioner was responsible for administering these two sets of rules, 
they could be easily amended by the Prime Minister and/or Parliament and a majority 
government would have a great deal of de facto control over the rules that applied to all 
members. 
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Everything changed in 2006 when Parliament passed the Conflict of Interest Act that 
applied to public office holders. This was the first time that the Prime Minister had 
completely given up control over the rules of ethical conduct that applied to members of 
cabinet. This is also when Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s government seems to have 
rushed the creation of a new institution that would be responsible for overseeing 
parliamentary ethics. As I explained in chapter six, this new office had an unprecedented and 
unusual institutional design.   
 
Despite being grouped with agents of parliament in the literature and despite the fact 
that its two commissioners have asserted that the role is properly described as an Officer of 
the House of Commons, the Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner is 
neither.  Notwithstanding this confusion about its proper categorization, the COIEC in its 
current form teaches us something about how to improve the institutional design of agents 
of parliament in order to strengthen their structural and operational independence. For 
example, the COIEC’s annual budget estimates are reviewed and considered through a much 
less problematic process than are the budgets of agents and the CIOEC also has greater 
autonomy over its staffing and office-specific policies.  
 
In chapter three I drew attention to concerns that have been expressed in the literature 
about the constitutional legitimacy of agents of parliament. The purpose of this discussion 
was to make clear that there is real skepticism about the propriety of Parliament delegating 
its oversight and accountability duties to un-elected officials who are given a rather high 
degree of independence. The COIEC has been subject to the same criticism. What I have 
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demonstrated throughout chapters four and six however, is that the COIEC’s independence 
is in fact much more robust than that which characterizes the agents of parliament.  The 
COIEC has been afforded a different status by Parliament than that of an agent, and has also 
been granted the protection of parliamentary privilege over some of its work.  
 
Given that the COIEC has generally been characterized as an agent of Parliament,  it 
is surprising that this interesting quirk in its institutional design has not garnered much 
attention. This may be because the office’s first commissioner was not keen to aggressively 
assert the office’s independence when she took the role. Commissioner Dawson was instead 
happy to stay within the lines and approached her responsibilities in a manner that 
emphasized prevention over enforcement and punishment. Over time however, 
Commissioner Dawson seems to have taken notice of the fact that her work was not given 
enough attention by Parliament for it to be able to have the impact that it should have. For 
example, the recommendations she offered to the standing committees reviewing both the 
Code and Act did not result in significant amendments being made to either of those 
instruments.     
 
While the office’s commissioners were reliably administering their mandates, the 
parliamentary infrastructure to which they reported and accounted seemed to be under-
performing.  Parliamentarians rarely took interest in the office’s work if they did not have 
to. This has unfortunately led to a situation where Canada’s parliamentary ethics regime has 
not kept pace with public expectations. Even though parliamentarians are always quick to 
point out to the media that they will co-operate with COIEC’s investigation(s), they are not 
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quick to point out that the COIEC may not in fact have the power to investigate the types of 
issues that are getting the media’s attention.  
 
I then explained in chapter seven that both individuals who have served as the office’s 
commissioners (i.e. former Commissioner Mary Dawson and current Commissioner Mario 
Dion) have called repeatedly for changes to the Code and Act, including calling for their 
harmonization. This has not happened however. Instead, what we have seen is the 
commissioners becoming more assertive and stricter about how they administer their 
mandates. Commissioner Dawson started by drastically increasing her public engagement in 
an effort to ensure that the public would be better informed about the work that the COIEC 
does and does not do. Commissioner Dion has been even more assertive about public 
engagement during his time in office.   
 
In chapter eight I detailed the ways in which Commissioner Dion has responded to 
the tensions that have arisen in connection to the office’s accountability to Parliament and 
its independence from government. In an effort to ensure that the office remains effective at 
promoting public confidence in the ethical conduct of public officials, the commissioner has 
become proactive about asserting its independence. The office has drastically boosted its 
commitment to direct engagement with the public (which is likely, at least in part, a response 
to Parliament’s indifference to its recommendations) and there is clear evidence that 
Commissioner Dion is operationalizing a philosophical commitment to treating his office as 
being directly accountable to the public as well as to Parliament. I argue that this response 
to the frustration over parliamentary inaction appears to be an attempt not only to get 
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Parliament’s attention, but also to re-frame the COIEC as having authority to act outside of 
the confines of its delegated mandates by virtue of the legitimacy it receives from its broader 
contributions to governance in the public interest. I also brought attention in chapter six to 
the office’s informal stakeholders and influential relationships. These were important to 
address within this study because they can tell us something about who and what influences 
a commissioner’s thinking about their roles and responsibilities.  
 
In chapters six and eight I argued that the parliamentary privilege granted to the 
COIEC allows the office to move beyond its intended mandates by intentionally blending 
the administration of the Act and the Code. Although it has yet to be challenged in court in 
this context, the law of parliamentary privilege clearly tells us that combining inquiries under 
the Code with examinations under the Act into one report will serve to shield work done 
under the Act from judicial review. Commissioner Dion has yet to release a combined report, 
but he has been very clear in his annual reports that he is willing to assert his independence 
by acting in ways that allow him to create greater efficiencies in the administration of his 
mandates. He has done this, for example, by prioritizing public education about the Act 
despite having no clear mandate to do so.   
 
This new philosophical direction does not seem problematic to me, but Parliament 
may wish to reconsider the design of this regime to ensure that it retains the ability to hold 
it to account in the way that was originally intended. Not taking action could mean that 
decisions by the COIEC with respect to matters that fall under both the Code and the Act 
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might be shielded from judicial review. It is difficult to imagine that anyone who is a subject 
of one of these reports would want that to be the case.  
 
Finally, I argued that the commissioner ought to refrain from publishing joint reports 
under the Code and Act.  Given that the rules for public office holders are now legislative 
and therefore more deeply embedded in the political arena, it seems unlikely to me that the 
Act will undergo meaningful reform anytime soon. The commissioner’s interest in public 
engagement might therefore be better served by leaving open the possibility for judicial 
review in relation to the office’s work under the Act.  Overall however, it seems abundantly 
clear that Canada is again at a moment in its history where it ought to reconsider the design 
of its parliamentary ethics regime.   
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